FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 209666. March 4, 2019.]
DAVAO DOCTORS COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs.SAMAHAN NG MGA NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA SA DAVAO DOCTORS COLLEGE-NFL, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 4, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 209666 — (Davao Doctors College, Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Davao Doctors College-NFL)
This is an appeal by certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2013 Decision 1 and October 4, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04614, which affirmed in toto the October 28, 2011 Resolution 3 of the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). The VA ruled in favor of Samahan ng mga Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Davao Doctors College-NFL (respondent) and found that the removal of the emergency allowance and Related Learning Experience (RLE) fee constituted a diminution of benefits, in violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code.
The petition is partly granted.
Monthly Emergency Allowance
Art. 100 of the Labor Code 4 explicitly prohibits employers from unilaterally eliminating or reducing the benefits enjoyed by their employees. This is called the Non-Diminution Rule. There is diminution of benefits when the following requisites concur: 5
(1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period;
(2) the practice is consistent and deliberate;
(3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and
(4) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer. 6 TCAScE
The rule against diminution of benefits applies only if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a practice. To be considered a practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a long period of time. The rule, however, is not ironclad and admits several exceptions. Embedded in separate jurisprudence are the exceptions, namely: (1) "the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law," which error must be corrected immediately after its discovery; 7 (2) the elimination of an existing benefit was in exchange of an equal or better one; 8 and (3) the grant of the benefit is conditional and rests on certain circumstances only. 9
The attendant circumstances fall within the third exception: the grant of the allowance was conditional. A review of the records reveals that the grant of the benefits was impelled by the substantial rise in the number of nursing enrollees due to the surge in the global demand for nurses, resulting in brain-drain. This, in turn, meant high demand in teachers, leaving educational institutions offering nursing programs in an impasse: to offer competitive salaries to retain adept teachers. 10 But petitioner was able to prove that the demand for nurses abroad and the number of nursing students have gradually decreased over time. Petitioner's financial performance and the conditions that existed before have substantially changed. 11 It cannot be gainsaid that the significant reduction in the number of enrollees at present is very much different from the exigencies at the time it was first conferred several years ago. From 5,247 enrollees in the program in 2006, it dwindled down to 1,519 in 2011. Clearly, the circumstances that inspired the munificent grant have ceased.
A bonus is an "amount granted and paid to an employee for his industry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employer's business and made possible the realization of profits." 12 It is a management prerogative; thus, not demandable and enforceable upon the employer, save for cases when it is made part of the wage, salary or compensation of the employee. In the case at bar, the grant of the emergency allowance was neither integrated in the salary nor in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 13 In fact, petitioner issued Office Memorandum No. 026, explaining the caveat that the award of the emergency allowance was subject to withdrawal should the number of enrollees cease to prevail. The Court incorporates the pertinent portion of the Memorandum, to wit:
B. Emergency Allowance
1. All full-time clinical instructors are entitled to a monthly emergency allowance which shall be increased from One Thousand Three Hundred ([P]1,300.00) to THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS ([P]3,200.00) effective April 16, 2004 to be given every 15th and end of the month. The emergency allowance is temporary in nature and is given to encourage clinical instructors to teach at DDC as a result of the extraordinary massive volume of enrolment in the nursing department. Thus, it is understood that should this extraordinary situation cease to prevail, the School has the exclusive prerogative to withdraw this allowance. 14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is indubitable that the award of the emergency allowance was given by petitioner out of pure liberality and in a provisional manner. As the grant of the emergency allowance was conditional and founded on certain circumstances only, the removal thereof did not result in diminution of benefits.
Related Learning Experience (RLE) Fee
Per Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 82, the payment of the RLE fee is compulsory only upon clinical instructors who teach RLE subjects. In the present case, petitioner granted the RLE fee across the board, regardless if the teacher was handling an RLE subject, but on the qualification that such full-time instructor renders 25 hours per week of hospital duty. Paragraph C (1) of the Memorandum reads:
1. Full-time clinical instructors who render hospital duty twenty-five (25) hours per week are entitled to a monthly RLE Fee share of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS ([P]5,000.00) effective April 6, 2004 to be given every 15th and end of the month. 15 cTDaEH
Noteworthy, however, is the marked contrast between the stipulated conditions between the emergency allowance and RLE fee. In the proviso on the RLE fee, the Memorandum did not contain any similar clause limiting its grant. Unlike in the compensation of emergency allowance, there is no provision that the RLE fee shall be momentary and shall be withdrawn upon the decrease in the volume of enrollees. Should petitioner intended for the RLE fee to be awarded under the same controlled condition, it could have reiterated the same but opted not to. Moreover, the Court cannot treat the two benefits alike. The basis for the award of each benefit is different and the computation for each allowance also disparate. Besides, the rate of the granted RLE fee is way above the amount prescribed by the law.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the removal of the RLE fee amounted to a diminution of benefits. First, the payment of the RLE fee had been a policy or had ripened into a practice over a long period of nine (9) years; second, the practice was consistent and deliberate; third, the practice was not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law, as the DECS Order was clear and unambiguous; and fourth, the diminution or discontinuance was done unilaterally by the employer. Most importantly, the withdrawal of the RLE fee was unjustified because it does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions.
The Court finds that the modification of the computation of the RLE fee violated the rule against non-diminution of benefits. As already discussed, the compensation of the RLE fee had been a policy and had ripened into practice over a long period of nine (9) years. Any amendment in the valuation thereof partook the nature of a diminution. Thus, the RLE fee in the amount of P7,500.00 across the board to all clinical instructors should subsist.
Finally, the Court clarifies that while it is mindful that the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it cannot blindly rule in favor of labor in every labor dispute. 16 Equally entitled to the same rights are the employers. In the end, labor disputes should be adjudicated with fairness, justice, and impartiality through the prism of the established facts and the applicable laws and doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The April 18, 2013 Decision and the October 4, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04614 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioner Davao Doctors College, Inc. is ORDERED to pay all its clinical instructors the Related Learning Experience Fee of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P7,500.00) per month. cSaATC
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 25-30; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justices Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and Edward B. Contreras, concurring.
2.Id. at 34-35.
3.Id. at 138-143, docketed as VA Case No. AC-335-RBXI-09-02-08-2011; penned by Arbitrator Alfonso L. Dela Victoria.
4. ART. 100. PROHIBITION AGAINST ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS. — Nothing in this Book shall be construed to eliminate or in any way diminish supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed at the time of promulgation of this Code.
5.TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC Employees Union (FFW), et al., 568 Phil. 774, 790 (2008).
6.Id.
7.Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 246 Phil. 73, 80 (1988).
8. See Lawin Security Services, Inc., et al. v. NLRC, et al., 339 Phil. 330 (1997).
9. See American Wire and Cable Daily Rated Employees Union v. American Wire and Cable Co., Inc., 497 Phil. 213 (2005); Asis v. Minister of Labor and Employment, et al., 253 Phil. 230 (1989).
10. See Rollo, p. 61.
11. See American Wire and Cable Daily Rated Employees Union v. American Wire and Cable Co., Inc., supra note 9, at 222.
12.Id. at 223.
13.Id. at 224-225.
14.Rollo, pp. 61-62.
15.Id. at 62.
16. See Lawin Security Services, Inc., et al. v. NLRC, et al., supra note 8, at 338.