FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 211909. October 13, 2021.]
DASMARIÑAS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND C.F. ARNALDO, INC.,respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 13, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 211909 — DASMARIÑAS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, versus OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and C.F. ARNALDO, INC.,respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the November 27, 2013 Decision 2 and the March 24, 2014 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals Special Sixteenth Division (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127049, and prays for the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2013 (Annex A) and its assailed Resolution dated March 24, 2014 (Annex B), be reversed and set aside, and a Decision be rendered:
(i) Ordering Respondent C.F. Arnaldo, Inc., to comply with Petitioner Dasmariñas Village Association, Inc.'s Deed Restriction on Property Use for residential purposes in respect of its parcel of land with improvements at No. 2224 Paraiso Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, and to direct its lessee to use the property strictly for residential purposes only;
(ii) Ordering Respondent C.F. Arnaldo, Inc., to pay Petitioner Dasmariñas Village Association, Inc., Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and the costs of suit.
Other equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 4
Facts
On September 19, 2007, petitioner Dasmariñas Village Association, Inc. (DVAI) lodged a complaint 5 before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board-National Capital Region Field Office (HLURB-NCR Field Office) against private respondent C.F. Arnaldo, Inc. (CFAI), which was docketed as HLURB Case No. NCRHOA-091907-906. Said complaint sought the enforcement of the provisions of the Deed Restrictions 6 on the use of the subject property, specifically the exclusive use of the properties therein for residential purposes only (use restriction). 7 It alleged that as a member of DVAI, CFAI owns a parcel of land with improvements located at No. 2224 Paraiso Street, Dasmariñas Village (subject property), and that by virtue of said ownership, CFAI freely agreed to the use restriction as annotated in the subject property's Torrens certificate of title. It argued that the use restriction is a valid restraint on ownership rights over the subject property, and serves the higher communal interests of the other members of DVAI. 8 DVAI clarified that it takes no issue in its lots leased out as residences of diplomats and ambassadors, but instead only seeks to enforce the use restriction on the properties of its members. 9
DVAI further narrated that when CFAI leased the subject property to the Embassy of Iran, the residential house became an office where official transactions were undertaken, including the constant presence of visa applicants who would queue daily to process their visa applications, 10 in violation of the use restriction. 11 DVAI submitted that due to said violation, it has the power and principal function to direct CFAI's strict compliance of the use restriction, 12 and that CFAI is bound to comply with the Deed Restrictions of which it was aware when it purchased the subject property. It added that CFAI was previously in compliance with the use restriction until it leased the subject property to the Embassy of Iran. It argued that CFAI's refusal to comply serves as a bad example to the other members of DVAI, and constitutes bad faith. It finally submitted that as a form of deterrence, CFAI should also be made to pay exemplary damages. 13
In its defense, CFAI countered that: (i) the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the complaint, which should have been filed with the regular courts, 14 consistent with the categorical provision in the Deed Restrictions which provides that enforcement of the restrictions must be by court action; 15 and (ii) the pendency of said complaint implicates the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Embassy, in violation of its sovereign immunity and in derogation of its privileges. 16 CFAI first argued that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1344, particularly Section 1 17 thereof, the instant controversy does not fall within the HLURB's jurisdiction. It averred that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases filed by village associations against their own members to compel the latter to abide by a deed restriction, as the same should have been brought before the regular courts. 18 CAIHTE
CFAI also raised as a defense the fact that a decision in DVAI's favor will inevitably affect the Embassy of Iran as the lessee of the subject property, which in turn, is immune from suit and is not subject to the jurisdiction of both the HLURB and the courts. 19 It maintained that the subject property is being leased by the Embassy of Iran and is being used as an embassy, which is an act jure imperii that is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. It denied that the Embassy of Iran is using the subject property for commercial transactions, and that all the activities being undertaken therein form part and parcel of the establishment and operation of a diplomatic mission. 20
HLURB-NCR Field Office Decision
In its Decision 21 dated August 12, 2010, the HLURB-NCR Field Office, through Housing and Land Use Arbiter Joselito F. Melchor, dismissed the complaint of DVAI for the sole reason that it had no jurisdiction over the controversy, viz.:
Perused therefrom, the sole issue to be resolved is whether or not this Office has jurisdiction over the instant case.
This Office rules in the negative. As can be gleaned from the records at bar, the issue raised therein by the respondent on the possession of the subject property by the Embassy of Iran inextricably affects the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Embassy, which enjoys sovereign immunity. As correctly argued by the respondent, the establishment of a diplomatic mission, including the lease of real property for the use of embassy is a jure imperii and is beyond the jurisdiction of all courts and administrative agencies on the ground that the sovereign is immune from suit[.]
xxx xxx xxx
Worthy of note [are] the consolidated cases of Dasmariñas Village Association, Inc. v. Russia Federation, Federal Republic of Nigeria and Republic of India(NCRHOA 091907-901 to 903), which resolved the issue of enforcement of the residential use provision in the deed of restrictions against a number of foreign sovereign states, this Office already had occasion to rule that under international law, the embassy of a foreign state established in a host country is an extension of the sovereign territory of the guest country. It is viewed and honored as a foreign territory, and thus enjoys sovereign diplomatic immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the host country. As such, this Office finds no reason to depart and thus, apply our precedent to this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
HLURB Board of Commissioners Decision
DVAI filed its Notice of Appeal 22 on September 29, 2010, but the HLURB, in its November 26, 2010 Decision, 23 affirmed the HLURB-NCR Field Office's dismissal of its complaint, thus:
We refer to the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 09-I-446, 20 May 2010, which sustained this Board's decision on HLURB Case No. HOA-A-090225-0219, Dasmariñas Village Association, Inc. v. Hilarion Henares, Jr., involving a similar issue:
DVAI's bone of contention is that the respondent-appellee, in leasing out his property is (sic) Dasmariñas Village to the Romanian Embassy, violated its Deed of Restrictions which prohibits the use of the property within the village other than for residential purposes.
As to whether or not herein respondent-appellee violated DVAI's Deed of Restrictions on account of the Contract of Lease he entered with the Romanian Embassy should be answered in the negative.
There is no violation of the Deed of Restriction[s]. The leased property will not be used for any commercial undertaking other than being an embassy of Romania, as well as, the residence of its personnel. No commercial activity will be undertaken on the leased premises.
The issuance of visas by the embassy is not a commercial activity. As aptly explained by Assistant Secretary Jerril G. Santos of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), in a letter dated 26 January, 2007, addressed to the President of the DVAI, Ms. Leslie Anne T. Cruz, the issuance of visas is a sovereign act permitted under pertinent conventions such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and international laws.
The apprehension of DVAI that the presence of the embassy would overcrowd the subdivision, increase the pressure on common facilities, create problems on cleanliness and sanitation, and cause greater security risk to its residents is, at best, speculative.
Guided by the above ruling of the Office of the President, we see no reason to deviate from our previous rulings on the same issue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED and the decision of the ENCRFO is hereby AFFIRMED. 24
After DVAI's Motion for Reconsideration of the HLURB Decision was denied through the latter's March 10, 2011 Resolution, 25 it filed its Notice of Appeal dated May 12, 2011 before the Office of the President (OP), docketed as O.P. Case No. 11-E-163.
OP Order
In its Order dated June 27, 2011, 26 the OP dismissed DVAI's appeal for lack of jurisdiction:
Pursuant to Section 20 (d) of Republic Act No. [R.A.] 9904, the decisions of the Board on homeowners association cases are now appealable to the Court of Appeals, effective March 30, 2010, which was published on the Official Gazette on March 15, 2010.
In light of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. 27
OP Resolution
DVAI thereafter filed before the OP its Manifestation and Motion to Give Due Course to the Complainant-Appellant's Appeal, which the OP treated as DVAI's Motion for Reconsideration. In its August 13, 2012 Resolution, 28 the OP denied said Motion, ruling thus:
[DVAI] avers that the dismissal of its Appeal is erroneous as the legally mandated Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of [R.A.] 9904 is still inapplicable, and that this Office entertained appeals filed before it involving association disputes even after the effectivity of said Act.
The Motion is bereft of merit.
Section 29 of RA 9904 explicitly provides that, "this Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation." Hence, since it was published in the Official Gazette on 15 March 2010, it became legally effective on 30 March 2010. Its provisions may then be applied and given effect sans the IRR which shall be formulated and promulgated within six (6) months from its effectivity. The IRR, after all, will merely carry out the provisions of the law.
As to the Order of this Office dated 12 April 2011, in the case entitled "James Ong v. Dasmariñas Village Association, Inc.," suffice it to say that this is merely an interlocutory order directing the submission of certain documents, "without necessarily giving due course thereto."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 29
Undaunted, DVAI then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, and sought to have the OP's denial of its appeal for lack of jurisdiction nullified. 30 DVAI reiterated its arguments before the OP and maintained that the HLURB's Decision was based on a clear misappreciation of facts, issues and laws. It submitted that the principle of immunity from suit is inapplicable in the instant controversy since the complaint was filed against its erring member, and not against the Embassy of Iran. 31
In its defense, CFAI countered that DVAI's appeal before the OP suffered an important jurisdictional defect, and it was correctly denied. It added that since DVAI failed to file a petition for review before the CA, where the jurisdiction was properly lodged, the Decision of the HLURB had already become final and executory. 32
CA Ruling
The CA dismissed DVAI's petition through its Decision 33 dated November 27, 2013. Therein, the CA found that: (i) the OP correctly found that R.A. 9904 took effect on March 30, 2010, or 15 days after its publication, and was therefore already in effect when DVAI filed its Notice of Appeal before the OP on May 12, 2011; 34 (ii) pursuant to Section 20 (d) of R.A. 9904, jurisdiction over decisions of the HLURB was already vested with the CA when DVAI filed its Notice of Appeal before the OP, thereby filing the same with jurisdictional defect; 35 (iii) DVAI should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA within 15 days from the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration; 36 (iv) DVAI's failure to perfect its appeal with the CA within the reglementary period rendered the HLURB's Decision final and executory; and (v) DVAI's resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA was improper since certiorari may not be availed of as a substitute for the remedy of a lost appeal. 37 DETACa
DVAI sought a reconsideration 38 of the CA's dismissal but the same was denied for lack of merit through the CA's Resolution 39 dated March 24, 2014.
Hence, this petition.
DVAI here maintains that the CA erred in affirming the OP's dismissal of its appeal, and avers that it submits a meritorious substantive position that is anchored on the following grounds: (i) the principle of state immunity is inapplicable to CFAI; (ii) the complaint it filed was against CFAI and not the Embassy of Iran; (iii) CFAI should be held liable for its violation of the use restriction; (iv) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 is inapplicable to CFAI; and (v) the lease contract between CFAI and the Embassy of Iran must be strictly enforced in favor of DVAI and in compliance with the Deed Restrictions consistent with the doctrine of stipulation pour autrui. 40
To bolster its argument that the OP erred in dismissing its case, DVAI cites the HLURB case of Dasmariñas Village Association, Inc. v. Rosemarie J. Arenas (Arenas), and the OP case of Ong v. Dasmariñas Village Association, Inc., et al., (Ong), which it argues was decided by the OP despite the effectivity of R.A. 9904. 41 It adds that since the instant case and the cases of Arenas and Ong are similarly situated, the OP should have taken cognizance of DVAI's subject complaint and decided it similarly, for purposes of stability and consistency. 42 It further cites Bolos v. Bolos 43 and prays that the Court set aside the procedural technicalities and rule on the merits of DVAI's claim. 44 It adds that the Deed Restrictions is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy and should therefore be upheld as a valid restraint. 45 DVAI also claims that through the instant case, the Court can finally put an end to the litigations involving DVAI and its erring members who continually disregard the use restriction of DVAI's members' properties. 46
With regard to its substantive claim, DVAI submits that its complaint is against CFAI and not the Embassy of Iran, 47 and that nevertheless, the principle of state immunity is inapplicable to the instant case since the Embassy of Iran waived its diplomatic immunity when it willingly and voluntarily agreed to be bound by the provisions of the lease contract of the subject property with CFAI. 48 Finally, DVAI, for the first instance, argues that consistent with the second paragraph of Article 1311 of the Civil Code on stipulation pour autrui, the lease contract between CFAI and the Embassy of Iran should be enforced in a manner that favors DVAI since the use restriction annotated on the title of the subject property is considered a stipulation in its favor. 49
In its Comment dated August 4, 2014, CFAI counters that: (i) the rulings of the HLURB are not binding on this Court; 50 (ii) the CA did not err when it dismissed DVAI's petition since the OP correctly dismissed its appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 9904; 51 (iii) DVAI should have filed an appeal with the CA and not with the OP, but the period for said remedy had already lapsed; 52 (iv) DVAI cannot seek a re-evaluation of the facts and evidence in CA-G.R. SP No. 127049 since such is not allowed in a petition for certiorari; 53 (v) DVAI can no longer question the Decision and Resolution of the HLURB since it failed to appeal the same before the CA; 54 (vi) the pendency of the principal action inextricably implicates the Embassy of Iran and the Islamic Republic it represents, and said implication will violate the Embassy of Iran's sovereign immunity and derogate its diplomatic privileges; 55 and (vii) that in any case, CFAI did not violate the use restriction. 56
CFAI asserts that the cases that it relies upon have been rendered either by the HLURB or the OP and not this Court, and therefore negates DVAI's basis for its claim. 57 It also maintains that DVAI's resort to a petition for certiorari may only be availed in cases where the alleged abuse by the court is so grave that it has overstepped its jurisdiction and acted with arbitrariness, which is not obtained in this case since the OP merely applied the provisions of R.A. 9904, specifically Section 20 thereof. 58
Issue
The threshold issues for the Court's resolution are: (i) whether the CA erred in affirming the OP's dismissal of DVAI's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and (ii) whether the HLURB's Decision already attained finality.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petition lacking in merit.
The instant petition is denied primarily due to the fact that the OP was not in error when it found that it had no jurisdiction to rule on DVAI's appeal of the HLURB's Decision and Resolution, and that the said appeal should have been filed instead with the CA, but said appeal was irretrievably lost since the period for the same had lapsed.
First, it is quite plain that when DVAI filed its Notice of Appeal before the OP on May 12, 2011, RA 9904 had already been in effect for over 13 months, and squarely applied to DVAI's appeal. Particularly, Section 20 of R.A. 9904 categorically lodges with the CA the jurisdiction over appeals from the HLURB, thus:
Section 20. Duties and Responsibilities of the HLURB. — In addition to the powers, authorities and responsibilities vested in it by Republic Act No. 8763, Presidential Decree No. 902-A, Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 and Executive Order No. 535, Series of 1981, as amended, the HLURB shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Hear and decide intra-association and/or inter-association controversies and/or conflicts, without prejudice to filing civil and criminal cases by the parties concerned before the regular courts: Provided, That all decisions of the HLURB are appealable directly to the Court of Appeals[.]
Clearly, therefore, the OP no longer enjoyed the jurisdiction to take cognizance of DVAI's appeal, since the same had already been vested with the CA. The OP was therefore correct in dismissing the appeal for being the wrong mode of review, as the same should have been filed with the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Second, the period to appeal before the CA has lapsed, and said HLURB Decision and Resolution have become final and executory. Section 4, Rule 43 provides the pertinent period to file the appeal:
Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. aDSIHc
As applied and based on the records, the March 10, 2011 Resolution of the HLURB which denied DVAI's motion for reconsideration was received by the latter on May 3, 2011, so that it had only until May 18, 2011 to file a petition for review before the CA. Given that DVAI did not file the correct remedy with the CA, that remedy lapsed and ceased to be available. Apropos on this point is the Court's reminder in Yao v. Court of Appeals59 with respect to how the non-compliance with the statutory requirements of an appeal is fatal to it:
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal, for it renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory, with the end result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. 60
Furthermore, DVAI's resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will not suffice since the existence and availability of the right of appeal are incompatible with the availability of the special civil action of certiorari, 61 and the same is not a mode of review that can be made the substitute recourse for a lost appeal. 62 As the Court ruled in Heirs of Miranda v. Court of Appeals: 63
x x x Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to petitioners. Here appeal was available. It was adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court might have committed. But petitioners instead filed a special civil action of certiorari.
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action of certiorari. 64
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice. The Decision dated November 27, 2013 and Resolution dated March 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals Special Sixteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 127049, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 14-42.
2.Id. at 51-61. Penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Melchor Q.C. Sadang.
3.Id. at 63-64.
4.Id. at 41-42.
5.Id. at 100-103.
6.Id. at 97-98. Document labeled as "DASMARIÑAS VILLAGE DEED RESTRICTIONS."
7.Id. at 97.
8.Id. at 117.
9.Id. at 120.
10.Id. at 116.
11.Id. at 101.
12.Id.
13.Id. at 102.
14.Id. at 130.
15.Id. at 98, the Deed Restrictions provides:
IX. ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS.
The foregoing restrictions may be enjoined and/or enforced by court action by the Dasmariñas Village Association, or by the Makati Development Corporation or its assigns, or by any registered owner of land within the boundaries of the Dasmariñas Subdivision or by any member in good standing of the Dasmariñas Village Association.
16.Id. at 130.
17. Section 1 provides:
x x x In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices;
(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
18.Rollo, p. 131, citing Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 278 Phil. 19 (1991); and Russell, et al. v. Vestil, 364 Phil. 392 (1999).
19.Id. at 133.
20.Id. at 134.
21.Id. at 138-139.
22.Id. at 140-141.
23.Id. at 53-54.
24.Id.
25.Id. at 54.
26.Id. at 240.
27.Id.
28.Id. at 524-525.
29.Id.
30.Id. at 51.
31.Id. at 56.
32.Id.
33.Supra note 2.
34.Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 57.
35.Id.
36.Id. at 58.
37.Id. at 59-60.
38.Id. at 65-80; Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2013.
39.Supra note 3.
40.Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 24-25.
41.Id. at 25.
42.Id. at 31.
43. 648 Phil. 630 (2010).
44.Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 25-26.
45.Id. at 28.
46.Id. at 26.
47.Id. at 34.
48.Id. at 31.
49.Id. at 39-40.
50.Id. at 309.
51.Id. at 311.
52.Id. at 315-317.
53.Id. at 318.
54.Id. at 318-A.
55.Id. at 319.
56.Id. at 324.
57.Id. at 310.
58.Id. at 311-312.
59. G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 202.
60.Id. at 214. Emphasis supplied.
61.Heirs of Miranda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 109312 & 120245, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 368, 376.
62.Remo v. Bueno, 784 Phil. 344, 364 (2016).
63.Supra note 61.
64.Id.