FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 201262. April 21, 2014.]
RICARDO H. CUIDNO, petitioner, vs. CARLOS Y. CAMIWET, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 21, 2014which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 201262 (Ricardo H. Cuidno vs. Carlos Y. Camiwet). — Ricardo H. Cuidno (petitioner) assails the Decision 1 dated September 26, 2011 and Resolution 2 dated March 12, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 114138, which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated March 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 7. The CA accordingly reinstated the Decision 4 dated May 14, 2009 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Baguio City, Branch 2, which ruled in favor of respondent Carlos Y. Camiwet (Camiwet).
The subject of litigation is a 4,796-square meter parcel of land located at Pinsao-Longlong Road, Pinsao Proper, Baguio City. In his complaint for forcible entry filed on November 10, 2008, Camiwet alleged that the subject property used to be a gully and was part of a bigger property owned by the heirs of Iloc Bilag. It was ceded to him by the heirs of Iloc Bilag as compensation for the financial and legal assistance 5 he extended to them regarding their properties, 6 and he has been in possession of the same since January 1996. Camiwet also claimed that the petitioner illegally built a shanty on the property on October 30, 2008, despite his prohibition, and that the petitioner then proceeded with the construction of a concrete house on November 7, 2008, without any building permit. HIcTDE
The petitioner denied the allegations and averred that the house does not belong to him, but to his employer, Nestor H. Cuidno (Nestor). According to the petitioner, as early as 2004, Nestor had already constructed a fence on the property, and Nestor's right over the property emanated from the following deeds: (1) the ancestral land claim of Nelie S. Bilag as one of the heirs of Iloc Bilag in her behalf and for the benefit of her co-heirs; (2) an absolute deed of sale of unregistered land dated March 31, 2008 by Reynaldo Suello (Suello) in favor of Nestor; (3) an affidavit of waiver of rights on ancestral land dated March 31, 2008 by Suello in favor of Nestor; and (4) an absolute deed of sale of rights under townsite sale application dated April 14, 2008 by Dominador Bautista in favor of Nestor. The petitioner also argued that he is not a real party in interest in the case as he was merely an employee of Nestor. 7
During preliminary conference, the parties stipulated that Suello was one of the heirs of Iloc Bilag and was the person referred to as the vendor in the sale of the subject land to Nestor, among others. 8
After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision 9 on May 14, 2009, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is granted in part. Defendant Ricardo H. Cuidno, his agent, principal or assignee and all persons claiming under him, i.e., (a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferees pendente lite (d) sub-lessees; (e) co-lessees; or (f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of defendant, are ordered to vacate and deliver to plaintiff Carlos Y. Camiwet that portion of a 4,796 square-meter parcel of land situated at Pinsao-Longlong Road, Pinsao Proper, Baguio City, and identified in Annex "A" of the complaint, occupied by defendant, his agent, principal or assignee and all persons claiming under him, and to remove all improvements built thereon by defendant, his agent, principal or assignee and all persons claiming under him. Defendant, his agent, principal or assignee and all persons claiming under him are also ordered to pay solidarily plaintiff (a) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, (b) P2,720 as legal expenses, and (c) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 10
The MTCC ruled that Camiwet failed to prove that he was in physical possession of property exactly in 1996. What the MTCC found was that Camiwet was in actual physical possession only in 2002, as evidenced by the affidavits of George Abeya and Ambrose Balagtey. 11 The MTCC also found that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 4504-R, which was approved by the RTC in 2004, acknowledged the partition of the estate among the heirs of Iloc Bilag and the assignment of the subject property to Camiwet prior to the execution of the compromise agreement in 2003. 12 Based on the foregoing, the MTCC ruled that Camiwet's physical possession of the property should be reckoned only from prior to 2003 but not from 1996. TcHCDE
Despite said conclusion, the MTCC nevertheless ruled in favor of Camiwet. This is because the petitioner's assertion as regards Nestor's possession of the subject lot starting May 1994 finds no evidentiary basis. The MTCC noted that the petitioner apparently mixed up May 1994 with May 2004 13 as shown by the petitioner's own submissions. What was established by the petitioner's evidence was that Nestor's alleged right over the property was predicated on documents that were dated 2008 and 2009. The MTCC brushed aside the petitioner's contention that he is not a real party in interest since a forcible entry case may be brought against any intruder of the premises, and the decision would still be binding on them. 14
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the RTC, which reversed the MTCC in its Decision 15 dated March 15, 2010. The RTC found that Nestor is the real party in interest and an indispensable party in the action, and the petitioner was merely a necessary party. Even if Camiwet successfully proved his prior physical possession, it could not be weighed against the petitioner as his possession was only by virtue of his employment with Nestor. As soon as his employment ceases, his interest in the occupation of the property likewise ceases. The RTC also ruled that it cannot pass upon the issues of jurisdiction and identity of the property since the petitioner never alleged ownership over the same. Finally, the RTC deleted the award of attorney's fees and legal expenses for lack of legal basis. 16 Consequently, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Undeterred, Camiwet elevated the matter to the CA via petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
In the Decision 17 dated September 26, 2011, the CA granted Camiwet's petition and reinstated the MTCC decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated March 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 7 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Baguio City, Branch 2 dated May 14, 2009 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 18
The CA explained that the petitioner is a real party in interest because in ejectment cases, the real party in interest (as defendant) is the person who entered the property by any of the illegal means set forth in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and deprived the occupant of possession. In the present case, it was the petitioner who was alleged by Camiwet as the one who entered the subject property, constructed a shanty thereon and deprived the latter of possession. 19 The CA also ruled that the records clearly established that Camiwet was in prior possession of the subject property when the petitioner entered the same and constructed a shanty in 2008. Thus, the CA adjudged Camiwet as having a superior right of possession than the petitioner. 20
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the Resolution 21 dated March 12, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner centered his argument in this petition on the sole issue of whether he is the real party in interest in the complaint for forcible entry filed by Camiwet. Thus, the Court will deal only with such issue for the rule is basic that errors not assigned, generally, will not be considered or resolved. 22
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines who are the parties in interest in an action, viz.: TcDHSI
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
A real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal rights of the former. 23 "Interest" within the meaning of the rules, means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. 24
In actions for forcible entry, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be the plaintiff and defendant, viz.:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal "Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Based on the foregoing, the person who deprived another of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth is the real party in interest-defendant. 25 The petitioner is exactly that person.
As shown by the records, it was the petitioner who entered the subject property in 2008 and constructed a shanty thereon without the benefit of any legal title. His illegal entry into the property deprived Camiwet of physical possession. Possession, in ejectment cases, means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law. 26 As correctly concluded by the MTCC:
Since [the petitioner] is unlawfully withholding the subject realty or a portion thereof from [Camiwet] then he qualifies as a party-defendant in this case. With respect to his alleged employer Nestor H. Cuidno he may nonetheless be bound by the judgment herein through circumstances explained in Floyd, et al. v. Gonzales, et al., to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case [the petitioner] admitted that Nestor Cuidno is his privy because allegedly the latter employed him for the construction of the house. It also cannot be denied that given the similarity in their names, i.e., Ricardo H. Cuidno and Nestor H. Cuidno, they may be relatives. At any rate a hearing for purposes of execution would still be conducted to determine the character of Nestor H. Cuidno's possession if or when that time comes. 27 (Citation omitted)
The ruling of the MTCC was seconded by the CA in this wise:
In this case, there was no question that it was [the petitioner] who entered the lot in question and erected a shanty thereon. That [the petitioner] is a mere employee of [Nestor], the purported true owner of the property, is a mere defense put by him. It is clearly alleged in the complaint that it was [the petitioner] who deprived [Camiwet] of possession of the subject property thru force, intimidation, strategy and stealth. 28cCTESa
The CA was, therefore, correct in granting Camiwet's petition. Necessarily, the present petition for review must be denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Agnes Reyes-Carpio, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-31.
2. Id. at 16-17.
3. Issued by Presiding Judge Mona Lisa V. Tiongson-Tabora; id. at 49-53.
4. Issued by Presiding Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III; id. at 54-60.
5. As embodied in a Contract Services for Real Property Development dated December 31, 1994; id. at 54.
6. Compromise Agreement executed by the heirs of Iloc Bilag in Civil Case No. 4504-R in the partition for their properties was dated May 13, 2003, and approved by the RTC of Baguio City on November 10, 2004 regarding the disagreement among the heirs of Iloc Bilag on how to divide the estate.
7. Rollo, p. 56.
8. Id. at 23.
9. Id. at 54-60.
10. Id. at 59-60.
11. Attached as annexes to Camiwet's Comment to Defendant's Manifestation and Motion dated December 15, 2008; id. at 56-57.
12. Id. at 57.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 58.
15. Id. at 49-53.
16. Id. at 52-53.
17. Id. at 22-31.
18. Id. at 31.
19. Id. at 28.
20. Id. at 29-30.
21. Id. at 16-17.
22. Dee Hwa Liong Electronics Corp. (DEECO) and/or Dee v. Papiona, 562 Phil. 451, 456 (2007).
23. Gan Hock v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 495 (1991), citing Lee v. Romillo, Jr., 244 Phil. 606 (1988).
24. Vidal v. Escueta, 463 Phil. 314, 337 (2003).
25. RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 1.
26. Lao v. Lao, 497 Phil. 827, 834 (2005).
27. Rollo, pp. 58-59.
28. Id. at 28.