FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194555. June 13, 2013.]
VELINDA L. CUEVAS, accused, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REP. BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 13, 2013 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 194555 (Velinda L. Cuevas v. People of the Philippines, rep. by the Solicitor General). — We resolve the Petition for Review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by accused-appellant Velinda L. Cuevas from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 22 June 2010 in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 31004.
The RTC Ruling
In its Decision 1 dated 21 May 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas found the accused Velinda L. Cuevas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft 2 and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused Cuevas was also ordered to indemnify complainant Alfonsa M. De Jose in the amount of P130,000 representing the value of the stolen pieces of jewelry. The RTC held that the following circumstantial evidence established the fact of unlawful taking and the identity of accused as the perpetrator, viz.: 1) the accused was complainant's domestic servant, who had complete access to the missing jewelry; 2) complainant's son, Rommel, witnessed the accused going to their room closet and trying on the jewelry; 3) two of the missing pieces were pawned to Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop, as shown by two receipts bearing the name and signature of Velinda L. Cuevas as the "pawner." 3 ASDTEa
The CA Ruling
The CA 4 affirmed the factual findings of the RTC and similarly found no basis for the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused. The appellate court held that all the elements of the crime were sufficiently proven, particularly the trust and confidence reposed in the accused-appellant as house help and babysitter to private complainant's children. It found that the circumstantial evidence — the pawnshop receipts bearing the accused's name and signature, as well as the testimonies of Rommel de Jose and Eduardo Dalusong (stating that the latter was instructed by the accused to pawn off another piece of the missing jewelry to D.M. Garcia Pawnshop) — constituted an unbroken chain that indubitably pointed to accused-appellant as the one who had committed the unlawful taking. However, the CA modified the penalty to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 16 years, 5 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. It ruled that private complainant failed to substantiate her claim that the value of the stolen jewelry amounted to P130,000. Thus, the imposable penalty was modified, and the indemnification reduced to P20,000.
We now rule on the final review of the case.
Our Ruling
We deny the Petition.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the RTC on the circumstantial evidence establishing the guilt of appellant, less so in this case where its findings were affirmed by the CA.
In her assignment of errors, appellant claims that: (1) Eduardo Dalusong was a rehearsed witness; (2) the modifications in his sworn statement cast serious doubts on his credibility, and that (3) both the testimonies of Dalusong and De Jose are irrelevant, because neither witness possessed personal knowledge of the actual unlawful taking. THaAEC
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law. Factual findings of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this Court unless these findings are not supported by the evidence on record. 5 There is a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts; or when there is a need to calibrate the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to one another and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. 6
Appellant's claims pertaining to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the probative weights of the testimonies are factual questions that the trial court has already passed upon. Its analysis was sufficiently supported by the evidence on record, and rightly adopted and upheld by the CA. The testimonies, taken together with the documentary evidence showing that appellant herself pawned the missing jewelry, lead to the fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant committed the unlawful taking. In Rebucan v. People, this Court considered circumstantial evidence, i.e., understated sales lists in the handwriting of the accused, to conclude that as cashier of a book supplies shop, she had unlawfully appropriated several sums of money. 7 The Court held:
While it is true that there was no eyewitness when the petitioner committed the crime of qualified theft, it does not necessarily follow that her guilt for such act was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It should be emphasized that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence had been presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Circumstantial evidence will be considered sufficient if the following are shown:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and HDAaIc
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 8
All these elements are present in the case at bar. Not only did appellant have access to the missing jewelry, she was also seen repeatedly "borrowing" several pieces, 9 and pawning off five others. 10 Eduardo Dalusong testified that he was instructed by the appellant to pawn off a bracelet at D.M. Garcia Pawnshop, the said bracelet turning out to be one of the missing jewelry. 11 More importantly, both the RTC and the CA considered the two pawn tickets or receipts in appellant's name and signature as strong evidence linking her and the unlawful taking. 12
On cross-examination, Dalusong recanted a portion of his sworn statement, stating that he mistakenly claimed therein that a pendant had also been pawned at Buena Mano Pawnshop. 13 Despite this purported "modification," his testimony that appellant had given him the bracelet to pawn without consent from the owner remains uncontroverted; thus, we agree with the RTC and the CA that the chain of circumstantial evidence pointing to appellant remains unbroken.
Lastly, we hold that the CA correctly modified the penalty meted out by the RTC, given that the actual total value of the missing jewelry (pegged by private complainant at P130,000) was never proven during trial. Only the appraised value as reflected in the two pawn tickets (P13,900 and P6,100, or a total of P20,000) may thus be considered in determining the proper penalty and indemnification. Since the total value of the items stolen is more than P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000, the CA correctly applied our rulings in People v. Temporada, 14 and People v. Dela Cruz, 15 pursuant to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. 16 DTAESI
There being no reversible error attributable to the CA, its findings are affirmed and the present Petition is denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 22 June 2010 in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 31004 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Penned by Judge Elizabeth Yu Guray in Criminal Case No. 05-0676; rollo, pp. 66-74.
2.As defined under the Revised Penal Code, Art. 310 in relation to Art. 308.
3.Rollo, p. 72.
4.Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam and concurred in by Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Danton Q. Bueser; id. at pp. 44-54.
5.Republic v. Regional Trial Court, Br. 18, Roxas City, Capiz, G.R. No. 172931, 18 June 2009, 589 SCRA 552, 563-564.
6.Guy v. Court of Appeals (8th Div.), 564 Phil. 540, 563 (2007); Obando v. People, G.R. No. 138696, 7 July 2010, 624 SCRA 299, 310.
7.537 Phil. 490, 502-503 (2006).
8.Id. at 502.
9.Testimony of Rommel De Jose, TSN, 26 June 2006, p. 12.
10.Id. at 14, 20.
11.Testimony of Eduardo Dalusong, TSN, 6 March 2006, p. 6.
12.Rollo, p. 49.
13.Supra note 11 at 18.
14.G.R. No. 173473, 17 December 2008, 574 SCRA 258.
15.383 Phil. 213 (2000).
16.Article 309, par. 1 states: "The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be." Article 310 states that qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those specified in the preceding article.