THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233221. August 28, 2019.]
MARGARET T. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.FLORO T. TADENA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedAugust 28, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 233221 (Margaret T. Cruz vs. Floro T. Tadena). — Considering the allegations, arguments, and issues raised by the parties in the Petition, 1 respondent's Comment, 2 and petitioner's Reply 3 filed thereto, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari after finding that the Court of Appeals (CA) did not commit any reversible error in reversing the Ombudsman's ruling.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is confined only to reviewing errors of law, not of fact, unless there was a misapprehension of facts, or the factual findings were devoid of any evidence on record, 4 or when the findings of facts are conflicting. 5 In the instant case, it is incumbent upon the Court to apply the exception, considering the conflicting factual findings of the CA and the Ombudsman.
The administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9003, otherwise known as the "Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000," was filed by petitioner against the respondent, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, from 2004 to 2010, for his alleged failure to close the dumpsite that was hazardous to the environment, as well as to the safety of the constituents.
The Ombudsman found respondent administratively liable for Simple Misconduct. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals noted that the old dumpsite had already been permanently closed and that such closure was one of the measures undertaken by the respondent in protecting the environment in the municipality.
After a careful review, the Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the CA. A closer look at the records of the case would reveal that the old dumpsite, which is the subject-matter of the complaint, had long been closed by the respondent before the opening of the "controlled dumpsite." Thus, the respondent did not violate R.A. No. 9003.
Even in gratia argumenti that the respondent violated R.A. No. 9003, still, it cannot be denied that he had already been forgiven by the electorate in the Municipality of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, when he won as Vice-Mayor in the 2010 elections and was re-elected to the same post in 2013. The condonation doctrine should, therefore, be applied to the respondent.
In the recent case of CarpioMoralesvs. CAand Jejomar Binay, Jr., 6 the Court has abandoned the condonation doctrine following the concept that a public office is a public trust and that public officers must be accountable to the people at all times. The Court highlighted that an election should never be a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
However, it must be noted that the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales7 is prospective in application; hence, the doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to such ruling. Evidently, the doctrine is still applicable to the respondent's case as the complaint was filed way back in 2004.
Further, in the Office of the Ombudsman vs. Vergara, 8 citing Giron vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Ochoa, et al., 9 the Court emphasized that the application of the condonation doctrine does not require that the official must be re-elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. The condonation doctrine is applicable to a public official elected to another office provided it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is the same; thus:
The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. In Giron v. Ochoa, the Court recognized that the doctrine can be applied to a public officer who was elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is the same. Thus, the Court ruled:
On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court agrees with the interpretation of the administrative tribunals below that the condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this case, it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another office, was the same.
From the above ruling of this Court, it is apparent that the most important consideration in the doctrine of condonation is the fact that the misconduct was done on a prior term and that the subject public official was eventually re-elected by the same body politic. It is inconsequential whether the said re-election be on another public office or on an election year that is not immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the public official be the same. In this case the respondent was re-elected as mayor by the same electorate that voted for him when the violation was committed. As such, the doctrine of condonation is applied and the CA did not err in so ruling.
In line with the above ruling, the application of the condonation doctrine in respondent's case is proper. The complaint for violation of R.A. No. 9003 was filed against him when he was still Mayor of Sto. Domingo from 2004 to 2010. The records disclose that he was elected as Vice-Mayor by the same electorate in 2010. In 2013, he was re-elected as Vice-Mayor. Beyond doubt, the constituents of Sto. Domingo already forgave him for any administrative liability he committed during his incumbency as Mayor. It is inconsequential that the respondent was elected to a different post (Vice Mayor) in 2010 because it was the same electorate who elected and re-elected him to the position. Any misconduct he committed when he was Mayor in 2004 had already been condoned.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., on leave).
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-22.
2.Id. at 326-334.
3.See Manifestation In Lieu of Reply, id. at 340-342.
4. See Mario Diesta Bajaro vs. Metro Stonerich Corp., and/or Ibrahim M. Nuño, G.R. No. 227982, April 23, 2018.
5. See Twin Towers Condominium Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 280, 310 (2003), the following are the exceptions: "(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
6. 772 Phil. 672, 769 (2015).
7.Id.
8. G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017, 848 SCRA 151, 174-175.
9. 806 Phil. 624, 633-634 (2017).