Cruz v. Langiden

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 247946. December 7, 2021.]

REV. DR. EDILBERTO CRUZ, REV. EVANGELINA M. GARCIA, AND REV. ALFREDO G. TORRES, petitioners,vs. REV. ALEJANDRO LANGIDEN, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 7, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 247946 — REV. DR. EDILBERTO CRUZ, REV. EVANGELINA M. GARCIA, and REV. ALFREDO G. TORRES v. REV. ALEJANDRO LANGIDEN

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153487 entitled Rev. Alejandro Langiden v. Rev. Dr. Edilberto Cruz, Rev. Evangelina M. Garcia, Rev. Alfredo G. Torres:

1. Decision2 dated July 11, 2018, dismissing the complaint for forcible entry 3 of petitioners Rev. Dr. Edilberto Cruz, Rev. Evangelina M. Garcia, and Rev. Alfredo G. Torres against respondent Rev. Alejandro Langiden; and

2. Resolution4 dated May 27, 2019, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

On April 19, 2016, petitioners Rev. Dr. Edilberto Cruz, Rev. Evangelina M. Garcia, and Rev. Alfredo G. Torres filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Binalonan-Laoac a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Rev. Alejandro Langiden. 5

In their complaint, petitioners averred:

1) They are the duly elected officers of the Philippine General Council of the Assemblies of God, Inc. (PGCAG), Northern District Council, and of the Luzon Bible Colleges (LUBIC). They were occupying and holding office at the LUBIC Compound in Barangay Sta. Maria Norte, Binalonan, Pangasinan. Respondent, on the other hand, is a member of the PGCAG, Inc. Board of Trustees. They belong to different factions of the PGCAG. 6

2) On March 31, 2015, respondent, together with several companions barged into the LUBIC compound by destroying the padlocks of two (2) gates using a bolt cutter. Respondent and his companions forced the people to leave the premises and replaced the locks with their own. They were refused entry into the compound even with the subsequent intervention of the Binalonan Police Officers. Respondent claimed that their group was the rightful officers and members of the PGCAG, hence, they too are the legitimate officers authorized to run and manage the LUBIC. 7 Thus, they were constrained to file a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. 8

3) Due to the delay in the resolution of the aforesaid case, however, they were constrained to file conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Sta. Maria Norte, Binalonan, Pangasinan on March 4, 2016. But the conciliation proceedings eventually failed, hence, the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a Certificate to File Action 9 on April 1, 2016.

This led to the filing of an action for forcible entry against respondent before the MCTC, Binalonan-Laoac, Pangasinan. 10

In view of respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint, petitioners moved for summary judgment. 11

Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

By Decision 12 dated October 28, 2016, the MCTC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondent to remove the chain, padlocks, and other objects he installed or caused to be installed in the premises, and to peacefully vacate and surrender possession of the LUBIC compound to petitioners. Respondent was further ordered to pay petitioners P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. 13

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

On respondent's appeal, the RTC, Branch 46, Urdaneta City issued a Notice dated December 21, 2016, directing the parties to file their respective memoranda within fifteen (15) days from notice. 14 As respondent himself stated in his subsequent motion for reconsideration, his counsel received the Notice on February 9, 2017, giving him until February 24, 2017 within which to file his memorandum. Yet, instead of filing his memorandum within the original fifteen (15) days, he allowed the same to lapse, albeit on March 13, 2017, or seventeen (17) days from the expiry date (February 24, 2017), he sought an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum, followed by a second motion for extension on March 24, 2017, and a third motion on April 3, 2017, with the attached Appeal Memorandum. 15 Petitioner learned, however, that as early as March 15, 2017, the RTC had already issued an Order 16 dated February 20, 2017, denying his first motion for extension of time to file memorandum. Apparently, as early as February 20, 2017, the RTC had already dismissed his appeal for his failure to file the required memorandum. 17

Thus, respondent moved for reconsideration of the February 20, 2017, order, arguing that since his counsel received the Notice to file memorandum on February 9, 2017, then he had until February 24, 2017, within which to file the required memorandum. Thus, the dismissal of the appeal on February 20, 2017, was prematurely made as he still had four (4) days to file his memorandum. 18 It appears that the RTC reckoned the fifteen (15)-day period from respondent's own receipt of the Notice.

On September 12, 2017, the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. 19

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Under its assailed Decision 20 dated July 11, 2018, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the MCTC should have dismissed outright the complaint for forcible entry for lack of jurisdiction. It noted that respondent forcibly entered the LUBIC Compound on March 31, 2015. The action for forcible entry, however, was filed only on April 19, 2016, beyond the one (1) year reglementary period for filing a summary action for forcible entry. Petitioners' cause of action, therefore, was one for Accion publiciana or Accion reivindicatoria which are cognizable by the proper RTCs. The issue of jurisdiction and prescription cannot be waived. 21

By its assailed Resolution dated May 27, 2019, 22 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The Present Petition

Petitioners now pray that the assailed dispositions of the Court of Appeals be reversed. They argue that the action for forcible entry had not yet prescribed when it was filed before the MCTC on April 19, 2016. Since they initiated conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa on March 4, 2016, or twenty-six (26) days before the expiration of the one (1) year reglementary period, the same tolled the running of the reglementary period. It was only on April 1, 2016, when the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued the Certificate to File Action that the remaining twenty-six (26) days began to run again. Hence, when they filed the complaint for forcible entry before the MCTC on April 19, 2016, they did so within the one (1) year reglementary period. 23

On the other hand, respondent argues 24 that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the one (1) year period had expired. Forcible entry cases must be filed in court within one (1) year from the alleged unlawful entry into the disputed property. Here, petitioners themselves stated that he unlawfully took possession of the LUBIC Compound on March 31, 2015. Thus, the action for forcible entry should have been filed not later than March 30, 2016. The action, however, was filed before the MCTC on April 19, 2016 only. Petitioners could have filed the appropriate action for recovery of possession, yet, they opted to file a summary action for forcible entry, which action had already prescribed under the Rules of Court.

Issue

1. Did the conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa toll the running of the one (1) year reglementary period to file a forcible entry case?

2. Did the RTC err in dismissing respondent's appeal for failure to file the required memorandum?

Ruling

First Issue

True that actions for ejectment such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry must be filed in court within one (1) year from withholding of possession or unlawful deprivation pursuant to Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, as amended. 25

But Section 410 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC), provides that while the dispute is under conciliation, the prescriptive period for a cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay, viz.:

Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. —

(a) x x x

(b) x x x

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. — While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. (Emphases supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, the one (1) year prescriptive period within which to file an ejectment case such as an action for forcible entry is tolled by initiating conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay.

Here, there is no dispute that the alleged forcible taking of the LUBIC Compound took place on March 31, 2015. Thus, petitioners had one (1) year therefrom or until March 30, 2016, within which to file a summary action for forcible entry. Records show that petitioners initiated the conciliation proceeding before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Sta. Maria Norte, Binalonan, Pangasinan on March 4, 2016. 26 As of that date, petitioners still had twenty-six (26) days left to file a summary action for forcible entry in court. In accordance with Section 410 of the LGC, the action before the Lupong Tagapamayapa interrupted the running of the period to file a forcible entry case before the court. It, nonetheless, started to run again on April 1, 2016, after the Lupong Tagapayamapa issued a Certificate to File Action. 27 Thus, petitioners had twenty-six (26) days from April 1, 2016 or until April 27, 2016 within which to file a complaint for forcible entry before the MCTC.

Verily, therefore, when petitioners filed the complaint for forcible entry against respondent on April 19, 2016, the same was not yet barred by prescription and the MCTC correctly took cognizance thereof.

Second Issue

The next question: Did the RTC err when it dismissed respondent's appeal for failure to file his appeal memorandum?

We rule in the negative.

Records show that on December 21, 2016, the RTC issued the Notice to file memoranda within fifteen (15) days from the parties' receipt thereof. 28 As respondent himself stated in his motion for reconsideration, his counsel received the notice on February 9, 2017, giving him until February 24, 2017, within which to file his memorandum. Yet, instead of filing his memorandum within the original fifteen (15) days, he allowed the same to lapse, albeit on March 13, 2017 or seventeen (17) days from the expiry of the fifteen (15)-day period (February 24, 2017), he sought a supposed first extension, followed by a second extension and a third extension of time to file his memorandum, which he eventually filed on April 3, 2017, clearly way beyond February 24, 2017. 29

Admittedly, when the RTC dismissed the appeal on February 20, 2017, respondent still had four (4) days within which to file his appeal memorandum. The RTC, however, reckoned the fifteen (15)-day period to file an appeal memorandum from respondent's receipt of the Notice and not from his counsel's receipt on February 9, 2017.

It is well-settled that when a party to a suit appears by counsel, service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. This is so because notice to counsel is effective notice to the client, while notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in law. Receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the reckoning point of the reglementary period. 30 Consequently, the RTC here erred when it dismissed respondent's appeal on February 20, 2017.

Nevertheless, the RTC did not err when it denied respondent's motion for reconsideration and upheld the dismissal of the appeal in its Order 31 dated September 12, 2017. As earlier stated, respondent's counsel received the Notice on February 9, 2017 giving them until February 24, 2017 within which to file an appeal memorandum. As it was though, he allowed the period to expire, albeit he belatedly asked for an extension to file memorandum on March 13, 2017, or seventeen (17) days from February 24, 2017, followed by yet another extension, and a third extension, and filed his memorandum only on March 13, 2017, or seventeen (17) days from February 24, 2017. 32 By that date, there was no period to extend as the fifteen (15)-day given him had already expired.

Suffice it to state that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. This being so, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants. 33 For respondent's failure to file the required memorandum within the reglementary period, the RTC had a valid ground to dismiss the appeal.

All told, the Court of Appeals erred when it granted due course to respondent's petition for review and dismissed the complaint on ground of prescription.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 11, 2018 and Resolution dated May 27, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153487 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated February 20, 2017 and Order dated September 12, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City in Civil Case No. U-10792, dismissing the appeal of respondent Rev. Alejandro Langiden is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 12-17.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser and concurred in by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and now Supreme Court Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting; rollo, pp. 19-26.

3. Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Court, (as Amended).

4.Rollo, pp. 28-29.

5.Id. at 19.

6.Id. at 13 and 20.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 13.

9.Id. at 13 and 31.

10.Id. at 20.

11.Id. at 20.

12. Copy not attached to the petition.

13.Rollo, pp. 20-21.

14.Id. at 21.

15.Id.

16.Id.

17.Id.

18.Id.

19.Id. at 22.

20.Id. at 19-26.

21.Id. at 23-25.

22.Id. at 28-29.

23.Id. at 14-15.

24.Id. at 43-45.

25. Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs (1a), Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Court, (as Amended).

26. See the Complaint that petitioners filed before the Lupon on March 4, 2016, rollo, p. 30.

27. Annex "D" of the petition; rollo, p. 31.

28.Id. at 21.

29.Id.

30.Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc., et al. v. Ledesma, 757 Phil. 163, 174 (2015).

31.Rollo, p. 21.

32.Id.

33.Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal, 708 Phil. 443, 452 (2013).