Cruz v. AFNI Philippines

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 235108. February 19, 2020.]

ZAHRA M. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.AFNI PHILIPPINES/KEN HAHN/KHALID KHURSHEED, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedFebruary 19, 2020, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 235108 — (Zahra M. Cruz, Petitioner v. AFNI Philippines/Ken Hahn/Khalid Khursheed, Respondents). — This petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Zahra M. Cruz (petitioner) seeks to reverse and set aside the 16 January 2017 Decision 2 affirming the 03 March 2015 Decision 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 02-000484-15, NLRC NCR Case No. 04-04621-14, and 11 October 2017 Resolution 4 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 143747.

Antecedents

Petitioner was employed as a sales verifier by respondent Afni Philippines, Inc. (company). 5 On 10 and 11 December 2013, she informed her immediate supervisor, Valerie Arnedo (Arnedo), through Short Message Service (SMS), that she could not report for work because she needed to take care of her three (3) children. 6 The following day, she missed work anew but failed to notify Arnedo, in violation of the No Call, No Show (NCNS) policy of the company. 7 The next day, she sent an SMS to Arnedo to inform the latter of her continued absence as well as her intention to resign. Allegedly, petitioner could not find a nanny to take care of her children and did not want the company to await for her return. 8 She also inquired from Arnedo if she could avail of her accrued leave credits pending the filing of her resignation documents. 9

In response thereto, Arnedo advised petitioner that if she really wanted to leave the company, and receive her backpay, she should formally tender her resignation. 10 She also told petitioner to file her incurred absences as Unutilized Benefitted Time Off (UBTO), and reminded her that a violation of the company's attendance policy could warrant her dismissal. 11

Petitioner did not file her resignation 12 and continued to miss work without complying with the NCNS policy of the company. Hence, a Return to Work Order Notice 13 (RTWO) was sent to petitioner at her home address, via private courier, warning her that her continued absence amounted to abandonment of work. 14

Weeks went by but the company still heard nothing from petitioner. Apparently, she did not receive the said notice; hence, she was unable to reply thereto. 15 The company, however, construed her silence as lack of interest to report back to work. Consequently, petitioner was issued a 30 December 2013 Termination Memorandum 16 to her address of record. Per receipt records of the private courier, the said letter was received by petitioner's husband the next day. 17

However, it was only on 23 January 2014 when the company finally received a response from petitioner after the latter sent an electronic mail (email) to respondent Ken Hahn (Hahn), the company's Country Manager, 18 respondent Khalid Khursheed 19 (Khursheed), and the company's Senior Operations Director, 20 Don Yager, among others. She claimed that she did not receive the RTWO or any message from the company, and while she already intimated to Arnedo her decision to resign last 13 December 2013, it did not sit well with her that the company terminated her without being accorded due process of law. 21

In response, the company sent a 24 January 2014 letter to petitioner recalling the Termination Memorandum, acknowledging instead her "resignation effective 13 December 2013 as received informally via SMS and confirmed officially in writing by [petitioner] through [her] [23 January 2014] email." 22

Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint 23 for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary, 13th month pay, and separation pay, as well as damages and attorney's fees against the company, Hahn, and Khursheed (collectively, respondents). On the other hand, respondents denied liability arguing that petitioner was not illegally dismissed but voluntarily resigned from the company. 24

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On 22 September 2014, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found petitioner's dismissal as illegal. The LA disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainant AFNI PHILIPPINES Corporation is (sic) ordered to pay complainant the following awards[:]

 

FROM	TO	[M]os. Yr.	[R]ate	13th month pay	Backwages	[S]eparation pay
10/23/2012	9/22/2014	2	25,000			50,000
12/30/2013	9/22/2014	8.77	25,000	18,270.23	219,250.00
1/1/2013	12/30/2014	12.00	25,000	25,000.00
				43,270.83	219,250.00	50,000
Total						P312,520.83
						––––––––––

 

In the meantime, the [complaint] against respondents Ken Hahn and Khalid Kursheed is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 25

The LA held that there was no resignation to speak of since petitioner's purported resignation did not comply with the company's procedure. Further, the LA stressed that the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal was inconsistent with resignation. 26 The LA likewise noted that petitioner was not accorded due process as she was not furnished with the first notice informing her of the specific act or omission for her dismissal. Neither was she given the opportunity to be heard. 27

Aggrieved, respondents filed an appeal 28 with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Ruling of the NLRC

In its Decision, 29 the NLRC granted respondents' appeal. It found that there was valid or just cause to dismiss petitioner by reason of abandonment of work, albeit the company failed to comply with the requirements of procedural due process. 30 It thus required the respondents to pay nominal damages, along with 13th month pay. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered as follows:

1.) The complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit;

2.) Respondent AFNI Philippines is hereby ordered to pay complainant P25,000.00 as nominal damages for [violating] [complainant's] right to due process; and to pay complainant P43,270.85 as 13th month pay.

SO ORDERED.31

Dissatisfied with the findings of the NLRC, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 32 which the NLRC granted through its 29 June 2015 Resolution, 33 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision promulgated on March 3, 2015 is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the monetary awards of P25,000.00 as nominal damages and P43,270.85 as 13th month pay.

SO ORDERED.34

The NLRC corrected itself as it found the award of 13th month pay to be without any basis. Also, it declared that petitioner was not terminated but voluntarily resigned. Consequently, she did not have any cause of action against respondents. 35

After petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 36 was denied by the NLRC in its 23 October 2015 Resolution, 37 she sought recourse to the CA by filing a petition for certiorari. 38

Ruling of the CA

In its Decision, 39 the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the 29 June 2015 and 23 October 2015 Resolutions of the NLRC. The CA sustained the NLRC that it was petitioner who severed her employment with the company by resigning.

Petitioner subsequently moved for reconsideration, 40 but the CA denied her motion in its 11 October 2017 Resolution. 41 Hence, she filed the instant petition before this Court.

Issues

For the Court's resolution is whether petitioner resigned from employment or was illegally dismissed by respondents.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

As a rule, the function of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. However, this rule admits of exceptions, 42 as in the present case. There is a need for this Court to reevaluate and reexamine the evidence on record considering that it appears that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. The CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts, that if properly considered, would warrant a different conclusion. 43 Further, the records bear the divergent factual findings of the Labor Arbiter on one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other.

Contrary to the conclusion of the NLRC and the CA, petitioner did not resign from her employment. It is settled that in order to withstand the test of validity, resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intention of relinquishing the office, coupled with an act of relinquishment.

While petitioner intimated to Arnedo her intention to resign, she failed to execute the necessary steps for resignation. Petitioner was well aware of the company policy on resignation. 44 Arnedo even reminded petitioner to file the necessary paperwork to effect her resignation. Yet, petitioner failed to do so. This ultimately led to the company's issuance of an RTWO, followed by a Termination Memorandum. The company's subsequent actions run counter to its claim that petitioner resigned. There would simply be no need to send an RTWO and Termination Memorandum if it really believed that petitioner had already resigned.

The foregoing notwithstanding, We find that petitioner abandoned her job. For abandonment of work to constitute gross and habitual neglect of duties, a just cause for termination under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, two (2) elements must be present. First, there should be a failure of the employee to report for work without a valid or justifiable reason; and, second, there should be a showing that the employee intended to sever the employer-employee relationship, the second element being the more determinative factor as manifested by overt acts. 45 The mere absence of an employee is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. It must be accompanied by manifest acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. 46 The employer has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his/her employment without any intention of returning. 47

These elements are present in the instant case.

Petitioner admitted that she did not report for work for a long time and failed to observe the company policy to inform her immediate supervisor of her absence two (2) hours prior to her work schedule. Also, petitioner intimated to the company her desire to sever the employer-employee relationship through an SMS to Arnedo and in an email sent to company officers. 48 It is worthy to note that she ticked the "No" box opposite reinstatement in her Complaint. 49 Although it has been held that the filing of an illegal dismissal case is inconsistent with the intention to abandon, this doctrine does not hold true where the complainant, as in the instant case, does not pray for reinstatement but merely asks for separation pay instead. 50

Finding that petitioner abandoned her work, the Court holds that respondent had just cause to terminate petitioner's employment under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. Nonetheless, it was also established that respondents failed to comply with procedural due process in effecting petitioner's termination. Thus, petitioner is entitled to nominal damages, as originally awarded by the NLRC. Indeed, it is settled that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without the observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the validity of the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer shall be ordered to pay nominal damages in the amount of Php30,000.00. 51 Nominal damages are awarded for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing the fundamental right to due process accorded to employees under the Labor Code and its Omnibus Implementing Rules. 52

However, petitioner is not entitled to 13th month pay, backwages, separation pay and attorney's fees. Petitioner's employment was terminated on 30 December 2013. 53 Hence, she is not entitled to the award of 13th month pay in the total amount of Php43,270.83 for the period covering, 30 December 2013 to 30 December 2014.

Meanwhile, petitioner's claim for backwages, separation pay and attorney's fees must fail since her dismissal was for a just cause and respondents acted in good faith when they terminated her services. Backwages may be granted only when the dismissal is illegal 54 and separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault.

In addition, it must be stressed that Hahn and Khursheed cannot be held liable with the company.

It is well-settled that corporate officers and/or agents are not personally liable for money claims of discharged employees absent any showing that they acted with evident malice and bad faith in terminating their employment. 55 Petitioner failed to show any particular act of Hahn and Khursheed constituting malice or bad faith.

Finally, in line with current jurisprudence, 56 the monetary award due to petitioner shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from finality of this ruling until full payment. 57

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the 16 January 2017 Decision and 11 October 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 143747 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Afni Philippines, Inc. is ORDERED to indemnify petitioner Zahra M. Cruz nominal damages in the amount of Php30,000.00.

The monetary judgment due to petitioner shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Resolution until fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 13-35.

2. Id. at 36-48; penned by CA Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco and concured in by Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Danton Q. Bueser of the Fourteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3. Id. at 76-91; penned by Presiding Commissioner Herminio V. Suelo and concured in by Commissioners Angelo Ang Palana and Numeriano D. Villena of the Fourth Division, NLRC.

4. Id. at 50-51.

5. Id. at 147.

6. Id. at 139-140 and 148.

7. Id. at 149.

8. Id. at 148.

9. Id.

10. Id. at 140 and 149.

11. Id. at 149-150.

12. Id. at 150.

13. Id. at 191.

14. Id. at 150 and 191-192.

15. Id. at 140.

16. Id. at 198.

17. Id. at 200.

18. Id. at 146.

19. Referred to as Kursheed in some parts of the record.

20. Rollo, page 146.

21. Id. at 140 and 202.

22. Id. at 203.

23. Id. at 136-138.

24. Id. at 153-154 and 159.

25. Id. at 284-285; penned by Labor Arbiter Enrique L. Flores, Jr.

26. Id. at 283.

27. Id.

28. Id. at 287-313.

29. Id. at 76-91.

30. Id. at 84.

31. Id. at 90-91.

32. Id. at 92-109.

33. Id. at 119-124.

34. Id. at 123.

35. Id. at 121 and 123.

36. Id. at 111-117.

37. Id. at 126-134.

38. Id. at 53-75.

39. Id. at 36-48.

40. Id. at 373-381.

41. Id. at 50-51.

42. x x x to wit: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is gave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. (Moral v. Momentum Properties Management Corp., G.R. No. 226240, 06 March 2019)

43. Id.

44. In the Employment Agreement signed by petitioner, it was expressly provided that "should [petitioner] decide to resign, [she] shall inform the [c]ompany by giving a formal written notice for at least thirty (30) days from the effective date of [her] resignation, and/or otherwise provided that [she has] made proper endorsement and training to the new incumbent. [She is] required to secure clearance from the [c]ompany prior to [her] final discharge.

45. Cabañas v. Luzano Law Office, G.R. No. 225803, 02 July 2018; 869 SCRA 313, 330.

46. Geraldo v. The Bill Sender Corp., G.R. No. 222219, 03 October 2018; 882 SCRA 125, 135.

47. Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. v. Tanguin, G.R. No. 221096, 28 June 2017; 828 SCRA 397, 409 citing Tan Brothers Corp. of Basilan City v. Escudero, 713 Phil. 392-405 (2013); G.R. No. 188711, 03 July 2013; 700 SCRA 583, 592.

48. Rollo, p. 202.

49. Id. at 137.

50. Sugue v. Triumph International (Phils.), Inc., 597 Phil. 320-342 (2019); G.R. Nos. 164804 & 164784, 30 January 2009; 577 SCRA 323, 344.

51. Ortiz v. DHL Philippines Corporation, 807 Phil. 626-639 (2017); G.R. No. 183399, 20 March 2017; 821 SCRA 27, 41.

52. Supra at note 41.

53. Rollo, page 198.

54. Stradcom Corp. v. Orpilla, G.R. No. 206800, 02 July 2018; 869 SCRA 250, 272.

55. Valenzuela v. Alexandra Mining and Oil Ventures, Inc., 796 Phil. 873-885 (2016); G.R. No. 222419, 05 October 2016; 805 SCRA 475, 487.

56. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267-283 (2013); G.R. No. 189871, 13 August 2013; 703 SCRA 439, 453.

57. Barroga v. Quezon Colleges of the North, G.R. No. 235572, 05 December 2018.