Cortes v. Lomotan

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 206993. March 15, 2017.]

MARIA LUISA V. CORTES, petitioner,vs. FELICITAS R. LOMOTAN, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 15, 2017, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 206993 (Maria Luisa V. Cortes vs. Felicitas R. Lomotan). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated January 28, 2013 and Resolution 3 dated April 29, 2013 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121563.

On June 10, 1989, Felicitas R. Lomotan (respondent) gave birth to a daughter whom she named Denise Pauleen L. Cortes (Denise). Denise's Certificate of Live Birth 4 indicated that her father is Jose L. Cortes (Jose) and that the latter and the respondent were married in Antipolo on January 26, 1985. The Certificate of Live Birth further indicated that it was "Felicitas L. Cortes," the respondent, who gave all the information stated therein. Consequently, on August 5, 2007, Jose died. 5

On October 19, 2007, Maria Luisa V. Cortes (petitioner) filed a complaint-affidavit 6 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila (OCP) charging the respondent with four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (2) and (4), of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The petitioner alleged that she and Jose were married on September 14, 1963 in Quezon City. 7 After Jose's death in August 2007, the petitioner discovered Denise's Certificate of Live Birth wherein the respondent unilaterally declared that Denise was the daughter of Jose. 8 The petitioner claimed that the respondent, in Denise's Certificate of Live Birth, maliciously and falsely made it appear, inter alia, that Jose married the latter on January 26, 1985 in Antipolo. 9

In her counter-affidavit, 10 the respondent denied the allegations against her and claimed that the complaint was only intended to force her to agree to a settlement aimed at depriving Denise, Jose's compulsory heir, of her legitime. 11 The respondent asserted that there is no law which makes it, either expressly or impliedly, the duty of an informant in a record of birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child covered by it are married or not. Thus, the respondent averred that the charge of falsification as to the date and place of marriage between her and Jose cannot prosper. 12

Consequently, the OCP resolved to indict the respondent for the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 (4), of the RPC. It averred that the respondent has the legal obligation to disclose the truth of the matters stated by her in Denise's birth certificate; that she failed in the said obligation when she stated that she and Jose were married on January 26, 1985 in Antipolo. 13 On March 10, 2008, an Information 14 was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila charging the respondent with violation of Article 172, in relation to Article 171 (4), of the RPC.

The respondent then moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts stated therein do not constitute an offense. She maintained that there is no law which makes it a duty of an informant in a record of birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child covered by it are married or not. She further alleged that it was Jose who filled out the form and supplied the hospital all the data needed for Denise's birth certificate. 15

On November 21, 2008, the MeTC issued an Order 16 initially denying the respondent's motion to quash. However, upon reconsideration, 17 the MeTC, in its Order 18 dated March 17, 2009, granted the respondent's motion and, thus, directed that the Information filed against her be quashed. Aggrieved, the petitioner then appealed the MeTC's Order dated March 17, 2009 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 19 CAIHTE

On June 8, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision, 20 dismissing the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner sought reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in its Order 21 dated September 6, 2011. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review 22 with the CA, insisting that the MeTC erred in quashing the Information filed against the respondent.

On January 28, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, 23 affirming the RTC's ruling. The CA opined that the petitioner has no personality to appeal the MeTC's Order dated March 17, 2009, which directed the quashal of the Information filed against the respondent; only the Solicitor General can appeal from the dismissal of a criminal case and bring an action in the name of the State. 24 In any case, the CA found that there is indeed no law that imposes upon an informant in a birth certificate the duty to disclose the truth about the marriage of the child covered by it. 25 The petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 26 was denied by the CA in its Resolution 27 dated April 29, 2013.

Hence, the instant petition.

The petitioner claims that the CA erred in ruling that she has no legal personality to appeal the quashal of the Information; that in the interest of substantial justice and where there appears to be a grave error committed by the judge, such as in this case, the private complainant in a criminal case is allowed to appeal the dismissal of a criminal case. 28 She further insists that the CA erred in affirming the quashal of the Information since under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, or the Law on Registry of Civil Status, there is a legal obligation to disclose the truth about the civil status of the parents of a child in a Certificate of Live Birth. 29

On the other hand, the respondent, in her Comment, 30 maintains that the petitioner has no legal personality to appeal the quashal of the said information since it is only the Solicitor General who may bring such action. She claims that although the Court, in exceptional cases, has allowed the private complainant to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case, there exists no justifiable circumstance in this case to allow the petitioner to appeal the quashal of the Information. 31 Further, the respondent claims that a violation of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 is only punishable as making a false statement under Section 16 thereof and not falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 (4), of the RPC. 32

Essentially, the issue set forth for the Court's resolution are: first, whether the petitioner has the legal personality to appeal the MeTC's Order dated March 17, 2009, which directed the quashal of the Information filed against the respondent; and second, whether there is a legal obligation on the part of an informant to a birth certificate to disclose the truth as to the civil status of the parents of the child covered by it.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

First, in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor. In criminal proceedings on appeal in the CA or in this Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. 33

Accordingly, the petitioner has no legal personality to appeal the quashal of the said information to the RTC and to subsequently file the petitions for review with the CA and this Court since her interest in the criminal case is limited only to the civil liability arising therefrom, if any. Tersely put, only the Office of the Solicitor General may file this petition for review on certiorari, which questions the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent since it is the State, and not the petitioner, who is the offended party.

It is true that there were instances when the Court has allowed the private complainant to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case sans authority from the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General. 34 However, the Court only did so in those cases on account of special circumstances and to serve the ends of substantial justice. In this case, no special circumstance exists that would justify the petitioner to appeal the quashal of the Information without authority from the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General.

Further, in the case where the Court allowed the private complainant to assail the dismissal of the criminal case, the petitioners availed of the remedy of petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 45, such as in this case. Thus, in Cariño v. De Castro, 35 the Court held:

We are cognizant of our ruling in the cases of Perez v. Hagonoy, Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, People v. Santiago, and Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, where we held that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or state in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the [CA]. At the same time, we acknowledged in those cases that a private offended party, in the interest of substantial justice, and where there appears to be a grave error committed by the judge, or where there is lack of due process, may allow and give due course to the petition filed. However, the special circumstances prevailing in the abovementioned cases are not present in the instant case. In those cases, the petitioners availed of petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In the instant case, the petition was filed under Rule 45. x x x. 36

Second, assuming arguendo that the petitioner may, by herself, appeal the quashal of the Information, the lower courts correctly ruled that the respondent, cannot be charged with the offense of falsification under the RPC. In Maguad v. De Guzman, 37 the Court, adopting the recommendations of then Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo on an administrative complaint against two court personnel, opined that:

With respect to the charge of falsification, the complainants allege that the respondents committed the offense when they made, through conspiracy, an entry in the birth certificates of their children that they were married on December 8, 1982, or December 8, 1984, in Davao City, when in fact they were not. Apparently, this accusation is predicated on one of the ways of committing falsification, i.e., by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts under Article 171 (4) of the [RPC]. One essential element of this kind of falsification is that there must be a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the fact claimed to be false. In other words, there must be a law requiring, expressly or impliedly, the disclosure of the truth of the fact alleged to have been falsified. No law has been shown by the complainants making it either expressly or impliedly a duty of an informant in a record of birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child covered by it are married or not. Consequently, the charge of falsification against the respondents cannot likewise prosper. 38 (Emphasis ours) DETACa

Indeed, there is no law that expressly or impliedly requires an informant in a record of birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child are married or not. The petitioner's reliance on Section 5 of Act No. 3753 is misplaced. Section 5 provides that:

Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. — The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such other data may be required in the regulation to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 5 of Act No. 3753 merely requires the disclosure of the civil status of the parents of the newborn child and not the truth of whether they were actually married or of the date and place where the supposed marriage ceremony occurred. Further, assuming that Section 5 indeed imposes upon the persons mentioned therein the duty to disclose the truth of the marriage between the parents of the newborn child, including the date and place where the ceremony occurred, it would only be a violation of Section 16 39 of Act No. 3753 and not of falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 (4), of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated January 28, 2013 and Resolution dated April 29, 2013 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121563 are AFFIRMED."

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

By:

MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 36-64.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Francisco P. Acosta concurring; id. at 10-31.

3.Id. at 33-34.

4.Id. at 145.

5.Id. at 144.

6.Id. at 131-138.

7.Id. at 131.

8.Id. at 132.

9.Id. at 132-133.

10.Id. at 147-152.

11.Id. at 147.

12.Id. at 152.

13.Id. at 172-174.

14.Id. at 175.

15.Id. at 177-187.

16. Rendered by Presiding Judge Manuel R. Recto; id. at 209.

17.Id. at 210-212.

18.Id. at 226-227.

19.Id. at 248-249.

20. Rendered by Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta; id. at 120-126.

21.Id. at 127-128.

22.Id. at 92-119.

23.Id. at 10-31.

24.Id. at 27.

25.Id. at 29.

26.Id. at 372-383.

27.Id. at 33-34.

28.Id. at 49-51.

29.Id. at 52-55.

30.Id. at 398-432.

31.Id. at 422-423.

32.Id. at 427-430.

33.See Cariño v. De Castro, 576 Phil. 635, 639-640 (2008); Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, 493 Phil. 85, 108 (2005).

34.See Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208 (2000); People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007 (1990).

35. 576 Phil. 635 (2008).

36.Id. at 641.

37. 365 Phil. 12 (1999).

38.Id. at 16-17.

39. Sec. 16.False statement. — Any person who shall knowingly make false statement in the forms furnished and shall present the same for entry in the civil register, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five hundred or both, in the discretion of the court.