SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226315. October 3, 2016.]
LERMA CORRES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES STEPHEN GO UY AND AMELIA CORRES-UY, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 03 October 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 226315 — Lerma Corres vs. Spouses Stephen Go Uy and Amelia Corres-Uy
After a judicious review of the records, the Court resolved to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari for failure to show that the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 09813 committed any reversible error in dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment to annul the Amended Decree of Adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court, Tacloban City, Branch 7, in SP. PROC. No. 2006-11-78.
As aptly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has no legal personality to file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment to annul the Amended Decree of Adoption as Republic Act No. 8552 1 does not require petitioner to give her consent to the adoption.
Moreover, if there were any substantial irregularities in the adoption proceedings, the State, through the Solicitor General, should have appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The fact that no appeal was filed by the State shows that there was substantial compliance with the law.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 2 the Court emphasized that:
. . . It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed. cDHAES
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court: 'Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, we are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court aquo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.'
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 3
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to AFFIRM the assailed February 11, 2016 and June 20, 2016 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 09813.
Petitioner or her authorized representative is hereby informed to personally claim the refund of the excess payment of the legal fee in the amount of P70.00 under Official Receipt No. 0162887 dated August 1, 2016 from the Cash Disbursement and Collection Division of this Court.
SO ORDERED.(Carpio, J., on official leave; Brion, J., on leave)."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for other Purposes.
2. G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356.
3. Id. at 364-367.