FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 184220. July 24, 2019.]
GLORIA P. CONJE, BERNARDO MENCEDE, EDDIE MENCEDE, ADONIS SAMARES, GERONIMA SAMARES, JOSE SAMARES, JUAN SAMARES, LEONCIO SAMARES, REYNALDO SAMARES, VIRGILIO SAMARES AND ALEJANDRO PANGATUNGAN, petitioners, vs.SPS. JIM AND CORAZON TSAMOUDAKIS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 24, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 184220 (Gloria P. Conje, Bernardo Mencede, Eddie Mencede, Adonis Samares, Geronima Samares, Jose Samares, Juan Samares, Leoncio Samares, Reynaldo Samares, Virgilio Samares and Alejandro Pangatungan v. Sps. Jim and Corazon Tsamoudakis). — We affirm the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated July 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00200 and hold that petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of their ownership of the property. Likewise, We hold that respondents have acquired ownership of the property through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
The facts as narrated by the CA are as follows:
Respondents [petitioners] are the heirs of brothers Roberto and Catalino Samares. They claim that they are the rightful owners of Cadastral Lot No. 7417 located at Brgy. Dawahon, Bato, Leyte, by virtue of intestate succession from their predecessors-in-interest who were the declared owners of the said parcel of land.
They alleged that this parcel of land originally formed part of a larger estate declared in the name of Roberto Samares on August 31, 1906, under Declaration of Real Property No. 849.
Respondents [petitioners] further alleged that the land was surreptitiously declared for taxation purposes in the name of Rodrigo Abapo even without any document evidencing conveyance by the Samares brothers to him. Abapo then sold the subject land to herein petitioner [respondents] Corazon Tsamoudakis as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated November 18, 1998.
Thus, they filed a case for recovery of ownership against Corazon Tsamoudakis with the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court [MCTC] of Bato-Matalom, Leyte, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 117. Tsamoudakis, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Rodrigo Abapo to enforce his warranty as to his title to the subject parcel of land which he sold to Tsamoudakis. CAIHTE
Petitioner [respondent] Tsamoudakis, together with his [sic] husband Jim Tsamoudakis, on the other hand, maintained that they were the ones who offered to buy the disputed property from Rodrigo Abapo in an effort to recover what was once owned by her grandfather Teodoro Larosa. She was only six (6) years old when her grandfather sold the land to Rodrigo Abapo.
She testified that, before such sale was consummated, she required Rodrigo Abapo to produce the necessary documents to show his legal title to said property. Rodrigo Abapo, presented to her the Deed of Sale by which he acquired the land from Teodoro Larosa on March 23, 1976, and Tax Declaration No. 6781.
After sale of the subject parcel of land was consummated, petitioner succeeded in transferring the tax declaration in her name under Tax Declaration No. 06014-00103 and, thereafter she paid the realty taxes thereon.
Petitioner [respondent] traced her title over the land through series of conveyances. Sometime in 1938, Roberto Samares sold the land to Pascual Millar. In 1955, Pascual Millar sold the land to Teodoro Laroza who in turn sold the land to Rodrigo Abapo on March 23, 1976. Finally, Rodrigo Abapo sold the land to Spouses Corazon and Jim Tsamoudakis, the present owners and possessors of the land who built a residential building thereon.
Respondents [petitioners], on the other hand, contend that there could have been no transaction involving the subject piece of land in 1938 since Roberto Samares already died in 1933. Furthermore, the existence of the alleged deed of sale executed in 1955 is dubious as the same could not be presented since the same was allegedly destroyed in a strong typhoon that occurred sometime in 1960.
Moreover, respondents [petitioners] maintain that the character of the possession of Pascual Millar and Teodora Laroza of the land was not in the concept of an owner as they were merely allowed by the Samares brothers to temporarily use the land. 3
The CA also traced the transfers involving the property in favor of respondents:
The title of the petitioners [respondents] over the subject parcel of land can be traced through this series of conveyances, to wit:
i. Petitioners [respondents] acquired the land by purchase from Rodrigo Abapo on November 12, 1998 which is evidenced by a public instrument. After they purchased the same, they transferred the name of the tax declaration in the name of petitioner Corazon Tsamoudakis and built a residential building thereon.
ii. Rodrigo Abapo, on the other hand, bought said parcel of land from Teodoro Laroza in 1976 which is evidence[d] by a Deed of Sale dated March 23, 1976. Abapo also had the tax declaration transferred in his name and thereafter built a warehouse thereon which he used for his business.
iii. Teodoro Laroza acquired the subject land by purchase from Pascual Millar in 1955. Said transaction is evidenced by a private document which petitioners [respondents] claim to have been damaged by a typhoon sometime in 1960. However, in 1962, Pascual Millar as transferor and Teodoro Laroza as transferee executed before Leonardo Daño, the then Ex-officio Municipal Assessor, an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property. The name of the tax declaration was transferred from Pascual Millar to Teodoro Larosa.
iv. Finally, Pascual Millar acquired the land from Roberto Samares, the declared owner, in 1938. This transaction is evidenced by an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property which was executed by Millar and Samares. On the basis thereof, the name of the tax declaration was transferred from Samares to Millar. 4 DETACa
The MCTC, in its Decision 5 dated May 19, 2004, dismissed petitioners' complaint and declared respondents as the rightful owners of the property. The MCTC held that the evidence shows that by virtue of respondents' and their predecessors-in-interests' adverse, public, continuous and peaceful possession of the property for more than 30 years, ownership belongs to respondents. Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they have a rightful claim of ownership over the property, and that they have continuous possession over it. In fact, petitioners' own evidence shows that the property has been in the hands of third persons as early as 1935.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MCTC. In its Decision 6 dated August 6, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Julio Berbesada and Juan Samares that Roberto Samares was already dead at the time the contract of sale with Millar took place. Likewise, following a certification from the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) that there was no tropical cyclone that hit Leyte in 1960, the RTC did not believe respondents' claim that the deed of sale between Teodoro Laroza and Pascual Millar was destroyed by a typhoon in 1960. The RTC then concluded that all the transfers involving the property in favor of respondents were null and void. The RTC denied respondents' motion for reconsideration. 7
The Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the MCTC's Decision. 8 The CA ruled that the best evidence of the death of a person is his death certificate, or any competent proof other than oral testimony, which is absent in this case. Berbesada's testimony is not the required quantum of proof needed to prove the actual date of death of Roberto Samares. Also, the RTC erred in relying on the PAGASA certification since it was neither received in evidence nor did petitioners tender it as excluded evidence. Furthermore, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for more than 50 years. Thus, they have met the requirements of extraordinary acquisitive prescription of dominion. In any case, petitioners are guilty of laches for failing to exert efforts to recover the subject property prior to the belated filing of their complaint. The CA also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 9
In this petition, petitioners assert that the CA erred in overturning the following findings of the RTC: (1) there was no sale between Roberto Samares and Pascual Millar in 1938; (2) the PAGASA certification may be given weight and credit; and (3) petitioners' claim is not barred by laches, estoppel and prescription.
We deny the petition.
Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of their ownership of the property. More, respondents are the owners of the property through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
The action petitioners filed in the MCTC for the recovery of ownership of the property is an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. In this kind of action, the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 10 In order to succeed, Article 434 provides, "In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim." Thus, the basic question in an accion reivindicatoria is whether petitioners have presented sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of the properties in question.
The burden of proof in an accion reivindicatoria, as in all civil cases, is preponderance of evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. 11
In this case, We hold that petitioners failed to meet the required burden of proof. In an attempt to prove their ownership of the property, petitioners alleged that they are the heirs of Roberto Samares through intestate succession and proceeded to attack respondents' and their predecessors-in-interest's title over the property. Petitioners failed to substantiate these allegations. aDSIHc
There is no evidence establishing petitioners' relationship with Roberto Samares and how they succeeded from the latter. As the MCTC correctly pointed out:
x x x Roberto Samares was also shown to be survived by children, or at least one child, thus his property could not have passed on by way of succession to his brother, Catalino, and the latter's successors-in-interest. Plaintiff [petitioner] Juan Samares, grandson of Catalino Samares, as well as the other plaintiffs claiming rights as heirs of Catalino Samares, thus have no legal standing to ask for the recovery of the subject land. 12
Meanwhile, to refute the transfer of the property between Roberto Samares and Pascual Millar in 1938, petitioners claim that the transfer could not have happened since the former died in 1933. Roberto Samares' death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when he died. Petitioners, have, however, inexplicably failed to present it, although there is no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Roberto Samares' death. 13
Similarly, in an attempt to cast doubt on respondents' allegation that a typhoon in 1960 damaged the document evidencing the transfer of the property from Pascual Millar to Teodoro Laroza in 1955, petitioners rely on a PAGASA certification stating that there was no typhoon that hit Leyte in 1960.
We agree with the CA's conclusion that the PAGASA certification cannot be given any probative value. The MCTC did not admit and receive as evidence the PAGASA certification. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. 14
On the other hand, respondents have established ownership of the property through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. 15 Explaining these attributes, We held:
x x x Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
The relevant provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
We explained what acquisitive prescription is and its two kinds:
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable property by possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. The possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be one under claim of title or adverse to or in prescription.
On this note, acquisitive prescription may either be extraordinary, which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years, or ordinary, which requires possession in good faith and with a just title for a period of ten years. 16 ETHIDa
We agree with the MCTC and CA that respondents' possession, together with their predecessors-in-interest, is more than enough to meet the requirements of extraordinary prescription.
Starting with Pascual Millar's acquisition of the property in 1938 until respondents purchased it in 1998, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in physical possession of the property in the concept of owners and to the exclusion of others. This conclusion is supported by the following circumstances: (1) Teodoro Larosa used the land as his and his parents' dwelling; (2) Rodrigo Abapo built a warehouse and a water tank on the property; and (3) respondents built a concrete building on the property and used it as their dwelling. 17
More, tax declarations and tax receipts were issued in the name of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Together with their actual possession of the property, these tax declarations and receipts constitute strong evidence of ownership of the property. We reiterate our ruling:
x x x Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 18
In sum, We hold that as between petitioners and respondents, respondents were able to prove their ownership of the property. Petitioners' attempt to recover it, thus, fails.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00200 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."Del Castillo, J., on official leave; Jardeleza, J., designated as Acting Working Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2680 dated July 12, 2019.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 35-46; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
2. Id. at 48-51; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
3. Id. at 36-38.
4. Id. at 42-43.
5. CA rollo, pp. 36-56.
6. Rollo, pp. 58-63.
7. Id. at 64-66.
8. Supra note 1.
9. Supra note 2.
10. Cañezo v. Bautista, G.R. No. 170189, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 580, 585.
11. Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., G.R. No. 142766, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 641, 652.
12. CArollo, pp. 50-51.
13. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998, 298 SCRA 322.
14. Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013.
15. Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391, 404.
16. Narcise v. Valbueco, Inc., G.R. No. 196888, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 319, 326.
17. CA rollo, pp. 53-54.
18. Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, G.R. No. 151440, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 193, 199-200.