FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 229804. * December 5, 2022.]
GERARDO CONDESTABLE, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING HEIRS, NAMELY: FLORIDA CONDESTABLE, JEFFREY F. CONDESTABLE, FLORADEL CONDESTABLE-NEBRE, JYNDEL F. CONDESTABLE, AND SIERRA MAY F. CONDESTABLE, petitioner, vs.CELSO RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court's First Division issued a Resolution datedDecember 5, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 229804 (Gerardo Condestable, substituted by his surviving heirs, namely: Florida Condestable, Jeffrey F. Condestable, Floradel Condestable-Nebre, Jyndel F. Condestable, and Sierra May F. Condestable vs. Celso Rodriguez). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the July 13, 2016 Decision 2 and the January 11, 2017 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100700, whereby the CA ordered the heirs of Gerardo Condestable to vacate the land in question and to surrender possession thereof to Celso Rodriguez (respondent).
Antecedents
The instant controversy originated from a Protest 4 filed by Gerardo Condestable (Gerardo) with the then Ministry of Natural Resources against the Free Patent Application 5 filed by respondent over a parcel of land located in Barangay Masipag, Parola, Puerto Princesa, particularly described as follows:
Bounded on the North by Light House Road; on the West by 010 P.L. Puerto Princesa Bay; on the East by the Light House and on the South by 005 foreshore. Containing an area of four hundred seventy seven (477) square meters[.] 6
The case eventually reached the Office of the President (OP) which rendered a Decision 7 on January 14, 1993 in the following manner: SCaITA
The principal issue posed in this appeal is the validity of the contract of lease. A perusal of the records shows that this issue had already been passed upon in the resolution of appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the appeal before the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. Nevertheless, we will proceed to resolve the same.
Appellant posits the view that since the subject property is a public land, the contract of lease is null and void. This is untenable. In contract of leases (sic), the lessor need not be the owner of the leased premises. It is enough that the lessor can give to the lessee the enjoyment and use of the leased property. In the case at bar, the contract of lease does not appear to be dependent upon the ownership of appellant. Hence, the fact of (sic) that the subject property is still part of the public land is immaterial. Being a lawful possessor of the land, the appellant can validly enter into a contract of lease over the same.
Finally, this Office finds no cogent basis to reverse the preferential right of the appellee. Except for his lease application in the Bureau of [L]ands, appellant failed to show convincing proof of continuous possession of the land. This being the case, appellee's preferential right over the land, is thus sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the Order of the Acting Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 8
The OP decision paved the way for respondent to file a complaint for recovery of possession against Gerardo before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47 (RTC). 9 Respondent claimed that he applied for free patent covering the land in controversy, and was being occupied by Gerardo by virtue of a lease contract which they entered into sometime in 1982 for a period of one year, subject to renewal. 10
It appears that during trial, the RTC noted the existence of another civil case 11 for revocation of auction sale, cancellation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) order, award, and issuance of patent and damages involving the same parties. Consequently, the RTC allowed the two cases to be tried jointly. 12
Gerardo passed away on September 1, 2010, and was substituted by his heirs, namely: Florida Condestable, Jeffrey F. Condestable, Floradel Condestable-Nebre, Jyndel F. Condestable, and Sierra May F. Condestable (collectively, petitioners). 13
On March 26, 2013, the RTC issued a Decision 14 in favor of petitioners, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the Heirs of Gerardo Condestable, namely: (1) Florida Condestable; (2) Jeffrey F. Condestable; (3) Floradel Condestable-Nebre; (4) Jyndel F. Condestable; and (5) Sierra May F. Condestable, as the persons entitled to the material possession of the land, more particularly described as follows:
Bounded on the North by Light House Road; on the East by 010 P.L. Puerto Princesa Bay; on the West by Light House; and on the South by 005 Foreshore [c]ontaining an area of 477 square meters.
2. DISMISSING this instant case for failure of Celso Rodriguez to prove that indeed he has better right of possession of the subject land independently of title.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 15 AHDacC
Aggrieved, respondent appealed before the CA, 16 contending in the main that the RTC erred in disregarding and setting aside the final and executory orders/decisions of the Director of Lands, the DENR Secretary and the OP. 17
Ruling of the CA
In the now assailed decision, the CA held that res judicata applies because the OP decision barred petitioners from contesting respondent's title over the subject property. It explained that the existence and validity of the lease agreement between respondent and Gerardo had been unequivocally settled in the OP decision. Since said decision had already attained finality, petitioners are bound and could not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. 18 The CA decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 26, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 3392 and Civil Case No. 3794, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The heirs of Gerardo Condestable are hereby ordered to vacate the land in question and surrender possession thereof to Celso Rodriguez.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration 20 arguing that res judicata does not apply. They contended that the causes of action in the two cases differ in that the present case concerns who has a better right of possession over the subject property, while the OP decision dealt with who has the preferential right to apply for title over the same realty. 21
Issue
In a Resolution dated January 11, 2017, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition raising the sole issue, to wit:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RESOLVING THAT THE RULING OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN CASE NO. 4410 (DENR CASE NO. 8001) IS RES JUDICATA TO THE PRESENT ACTION. 22
In his Comment, 23 respondent reiterates that petitioners cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of possession over the subject premises than the lessee. 24
On the other hand, petitioners, in their Reply, 25 maintain that their complaint is not barred by conclusiveness of judgment because the issues in the two cases are different. The issue in O.P. Case No. 4410 (DENR Case No. 8001) is who between the parties has the preferential right to apply for title over the subject property, while the issue in Civil Case No. 3392 (RTC) is who between the parties has the better right to possess the said property. 26 Petitioners contend that the latter issue is best addressed to the trial court and not to administrative or quasi-judicial agencies. 27
Ruling of the Court
The petition fails to impress.
Res judicata, in the form of
Petitioners insist that res judicata does not find application here because the OP case and the instant civil complaint involve different causes of action, especially since the decision in the former was rendered through a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The argument is unpersuasive.
The principle of res judicata is dictated by public interest 28 in that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. 29 It is a rule that imbues every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various precepts of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which dictates that it would be in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. 30 A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to preserve public tranquility and happiness. 31
Thus, res judicata exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquility. 32 It literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." 33 A final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. 34 aCIHcD
Res judicata has two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment, both of which are enshrined in Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphases supplied)
The first aspect refers to bar by prior judgment, where the judgment constitutes as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In traditional terminology, it is known as merger or bar; in modern terminology, it is called claim preclusion. 35 In English common law, it is referred to as cause of action estoppel. 36
On the other hand, the second aspect refers to conclusiveness of judgment which is traditionally known as collateral estoppel. In modern terminology, it is called issue preclusion, 37 or issue estoppel in English common law. 38 It precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. Clearly, all that is required for conclusiveness of judgment to operate is identity of issues. 39
Unlike bar by prior judgment, only the identities of parties and issues are required in conclusiveness of judgment. 40 Since there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment in the first case is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined. The doctrine laid down in the earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and binds the same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated, are the same facts in the latter case. The binding effect and enforceability of the earlier judgment or order can no longer be relitigated in a later case since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case. 41
Thus, if a particular point or question is raised in the second action, and the pronouncement will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, the former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that similar point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. To reiterate, in conclusiveness of judgment, the cause of action need not be identical as it only requires identity of issue. 42
In order to determine whether an action is barred by conclusiveness of judgment, the following must be present: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, but not identity of causes of action. 43
Here, the first element is present. The prior judgment rendered by the OP in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction had already attained finality as it appears that petitioners did not appeal the said decision. It must be remembered that res judicata requires that stability be accorded to final judgments and controversies once decided on the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to litigation which, without the doctrine, would be endless. 44
The second and third elements also exist in the instant case considering that the decision was rendered by the OP, which had appellate jurisdiction over the case decided by the then Ministry of Natural Resources. The OP decision was a judgment on the merits considering that a judgment is "on the merits" when it amounts to a legal declaration of the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the disclosed facts. 45 Since the OP decision finally resolved matters relating to the free patent application and rights of herein parties over the subject realty, including the alleged contract of lease they entered into, it has decided the merits of the case.
Finally, the fourth element is likewise present. Gerardo, as substituted by herein petitioners, and respondent were indisputably the same parties in both the prior and present actions, albeit on different causes of action and claims. Although petitioners had correctly maintained that the former case involved a protest against an application for free patent while the instant case refers to the right of possession, both cases are intricately connected to the factual issue of lease, which the OP decision had already finally resolved. It is on this aspect that res judicata, in the form of conclusiveness of judgment, becomes operative.
Patently, petitioners must have forgotten the two concepts of res judicata, particularly the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, in asserting that the instant case is not barred by the OP decision. To recall, in conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a prior suit cannot be raised again in any subsequent case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required, but merely identity of issues. 46 aICcHA
Significantly, the OP decision emphasized that as a lawful possessor of the subject land, respondent can validly enter into a contract of lease over the same. 47 The decision had, in effect, recognized respondent as the lawful possessor, being the lessor of the subject land. The alleged lease contract, which was an essential factual issue resolved in the prior action, was likewise determinative of the outcome in the present action for recovery of possession filed by respondent.
Moreover, one of the crucial issues in determining material possession in the present case would be the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. It is established that once a contract of lease is shown to exist between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject premises than the lessee. 48 The relation of the lessor and the lessee does not depend on the former's title, but on the agreement between the parties, followed by the possession of the premises by the lessee under such agreement. 49 The Rules of Court protects the lessor from being questioned by the lessee regarding his or her title or better right of possession over the subject premises. 50
Considering that the issue of lease was resolved with finality, such issue can no longer be relitigated to defeat respondent's complaint for recovery of possession. Although the complaint before the RTC was predicated on a different cause of action, which was physical/material possession, and the prior action before the DENR was for application of title to the subject land, both proceedings involved practically the same facts and evidence. The principle of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment or issue preclusion already barred petitioners from putting once again into issue the matter of lease which had already been necessarily determined by an earlier judgment. Unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion only bars individual issues and not the entire claim of a party to an action.
Thus, when the RTC declared petitioners as the persons having the better right of possession, it not only contradicted the final decision of the OP, but also disregarded the principle of res judicata and established jurisprudence. In Ching v. San Pedro College of Business Administration, 51 the Court explained that the concept of conclusiveness of judgment precludes the relitigation only of a particular fact or issue necessary to the outcome of a prior action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. The Court therein ruled:
x x x Traditionally known as collateral estoppel, it is contemporarily termed as issue preclusion. It finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition. The conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action.
In short, for issue preclusion to be applicable, (1) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue or fact actually determined in a former suit, (2) the party to be precluded must be party to or was in privity with a party to the former proceeding; (3) there was final judgment on the merits in the former proceedings, and (4) in compliance with the basic tenet of due process, that the party against whom the principle is asserted must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the prior proceedings. 52
Similarly, in Heirs of Derla v. Heirs of Vda. de Hipolito, 53 the Court emphatically evinced that the difference in causes of action will not preclude the application of res judicata, especially when the actions are supported by the same facts and evidence. Particularly, the Court explained that: IDTSEH
The similarity between the two causes of action cannot be impugned. The facts and evidence which supported Catalina's petition for revival of Hipolito's fishpond sales application in O.P. Case No. 4732 are the same facts and evidence now before us; hence, the difference of actions in the two cases is of no moment. In O.P. Case No. 4732, the action was to revive Hipolito's fishpond sales application, which, when granted, gave the respondents the right to the subject fishpond area, eventually leading to their ownership over the same. The action in Civil Case No. 97-15, the case that was elevated to become this petition, is for the nullification of the respondents' respective titles to the subject fishpond area on the ground that the respondents have no right thereto. If we allow the nullification of these titles on the ground presented by the petitioners, then we would also be nullifying the decision in O.P. Case No. 4732, because it is the decision in that case which gave the respondents the right to the subject fishpond area.
Notwithstanding the difference in the forms of the two actions, the doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating over the same subject fishpond area. More importantly, the same contentions and evidence as advanced by the petitioners in this case were already used to support their arguments in the previous cause of action. 54
Verily, the RTC can no longer disturb the factual findings of the OP in the prior action without running afoul of the principle of immutability of judgments. It is settled rule that once a judgment has attained finality, it can never be altered, amended, or modified, even if the alteration, amendment, or modification is to correct an erroneous judgment. 55
The Court, thus, agrees with the observation made by the CA that the validity of the lease agreement between the parties had already been unequivocally settled by the OP decision. As said decision already attained finality, petitioners are bound thereby and cannot be permitted to once again put the issue in the present civil action. 56
However, petitioners are adamant in accepting the application of res judicata because the earlier decision was rendered in a quasi-judicial proceeding, while the present case is a judicial proceeding.
Evidently, petitioners are once again mistaken because as early as 1956, the Court had categorically declared in Brillantes v. Castro57 that res judicata is applicable to decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. It ruled therein that:
The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. 58
More importantly, in San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 59 the Court held that final and executory decision of the OP can no longer be reviewed by the courts. Decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority have upon their finality the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. 60 Hence, whenever any board, tribunal, or person is by law, vested with authority to judicially determine a question, such as the OP in this case, its final decision is as conclusive between the same parties as though the adjudication was made by a court of general jurisdiction. 61
All told, conclusiveness of judgment proscribes the relitigation of an issue already settled in the OP decision. The CA had therefore correctly ruled that the principle of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment bars petitioners from contesting respondent's title over the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 13, 2016 Decision and the January 11, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100700 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." Hernando, J., on wellness leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Part of the Supreme Court Decongestion Program.
1. Rollo, pp. 4-12.
2. Id. at 14-24: penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of the Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Leoncia R. Dimagiba.
3. Id. at 36-37.
4. Docketed as D.L.O. Case No. (NRD IV-26) 415 Plan F (IV-A-10) 2613-D.
5. F.P.A. No. (IV-A-10) 2613.
6. Rollo, p. 15.
7. Docketed as O.P. Case No. 4410.
8. Rollo, pp. 15-16.
9. Docketed as Civil Case No. 3392.
10. CA rollo, p. 37.
11. Id.; docketed as Civil Case No. 3794, entitled "Gerardo Condestable vs. RED Vicente S. Paragas, DENR Regional Executive Director, Region IV[-A] and Celso Rodriguez."
12. Id.
13. Rollo, p. 16.
14. CA rollo, pp. 33-49.
15. Id. at 49.
16. Id. at 18-32.
17. Id. at 23.
18. Rollo, p. 22.
19. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 26-34.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 46-48.
24. Id. at 47.
25. Id. at 63-65.
26. Id. at 64.
27. Id.
28. Balanay v. Paderanga, 531 Phil. 270, 276 (2006); Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, 507 Phil. 509, 536 (2005).
29. Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, 673 Phil. 12, 22 (2011).
30. Spouses Selga v. Brar, 673 Phil. 581, 591-592 (2011); Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, id.
31. Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, id.; Spouses Ching v. Family Savings Bank, 649 Phil. 84, 99 (2010).
32. Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 382 (2015).
33. Spouses Antonio v. Vda. de Monje, 646 Phil. 90, 98 (2010).
34. Id. at 99.
35. Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, supra at 384.
36. The Canadian legal system similarly refers to "cause of action estoppel." See Sinai, Y., The Downside of Preclusion: Some Behavioural and Economic Effects of Cause of Action Estoppel in Civil Actions, McGill Law Journal, 56 (3), 673, 679-680, https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/wp-content/uploads/pdf/6060424-Sinai.pdf, (visited September 15, 2022).
37. Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, supra at 384-385.
38. Sinai, McGill Law Journal, 679.
39. Taar v. Lawan, 820 Phil. 26, 49 (2017).
40. Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. v. Chavez, 632 Phil. 574, 595 (2010).
41. Id. at 595-596.
42. Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., 665 Phil. 198, 206 (2011).
43. Heirs of Elliot v. Corcuera, G.R. No. 233767, August 27, 2020; Spouses Rosario v. Alvar, 817 Phil. 994, 1004-1005 (2017).
44. Monterona v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., 845 Phil. 556, 566-567 (2019).
45. Riano, Willard B., Civil Procedure (A Restatement for the Bar), Second Bantam Edition 2009, p. 418.
46. Republic v. Yu, 519 Phil. 391, 397 (2006).
47. CA rollo, p. 34.
48. Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., 689 Phil. 411, 420 (2012).
49. Tamio v. Ticson, 485 Phil. 434, 444 (2004).
50. Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., supra at 419.
51. 772 Phil. 214 (2015).
52. Id. at 228-229.
53. 664 Phil. 68 (2011).
54. Id. at 84-85.
55. Republic v. Heirs of Gotengco, 824 Phil. 568, 578 (2018).
56. Rollo, p. 22.
57. 99 Phil. 497 (1956).
58. Id. at 503.
59. 256 Phil. 1 (1989).
60. Id. at 14.
61. Id. at 15.