FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 215220. September 21, 2015.]
PEDRO B. CONCHA, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 215220 — PEDRO B. CONCHA, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Before the Court is the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 1 vis-à-vis the resolution promulgated on February 25, 2015, 2 whereby the Court:
(1) GRANTED petitioner's motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari;
(2) DENIED the petition for review on certiorari for:
(a) failure to pay the amount of P530.00 for docket and other fees and deposit for costs, the total amount due being P3,530.00, in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; and
(b) failure to accompany the petition with clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution certified by the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals, in violation of Secs. 4(d) and 5, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(d), Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; and
(3) REQUIRED counsel for petitioner to COMPLY within five (5) days from notice, regarding the statement of contact details of parties or their counsels in all papers and pleadings filed with the Court pursuant to A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC. 3
On July 28, 2015, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 4 attaching thereto a postal money order in the amount of P530.00 to complete the payment of the docket and other fees, and the duplicate original of the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00695-MIN. He prayed that the attachments be admitted in the highest interest of justice and equity.
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
First of all, the right of appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, but a merely statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 5 As such, the party seeking to appeal must comply with the requirements of the relevant rules; otherwise, he loses the statutory right to appeal. 6 Indeed, the procedures regulating appeals as laid down in the Rules of Court must be followed because strict compliance with them is indispensable to the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. 7 In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules of Court needs to be followed by the petitioner with greater fidelity. 8 TAIaHE
And, secondly, even if it relaxes the rules of procedure just to give due course to the petition for review on certiorari, the Court should still find no cogent reason to vary from the assailed ruling of the CA. In a criminal case, the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal. With the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the CA having been in agreement in finding that the petitioner had not driven his vehicle in a slow speed while passing the parked truck, we have no factual and legal bases by which to disturb such factual findings.
The petitioner contends that Section 39, not Section 44, of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (LTTC) was applicable. These provisions of the LTTC provide:
Section 39. Overtaking a vehicle. — The driver of any motor vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall pass at a safe distance to the left thereof, and shall not again drive to the right side of the highway until safety clear of such overtaken vehicle except that on a highway, within a business or residential district, having two or more lanes for the movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle on the right. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a driver overtaking and passing, upon the right, another vehicle which is making or about to make a left turn.
Section 44. Signals on starting, stopping or turning. — (a) The driver of any vehicle upon a highway, before starting, stopping or turning from a direct line, shall first see that such movement can be made in safety, and if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement, shall give a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle approaching or following may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicles of the intention to make such movement.
(b) The signal herein required shall be given by means of extending the hand and arm beyond the left side of the vehicle, or by an approved mechanical or electrical signal device.
Both the MCTC and the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly ruled that Section 44 was applicable. Hence, the petitioner's reliance on Section 39 is misplaced. Section 39 presupposes that the vehicle to be overtaken is proceeding in the same direction as the overtaking vehicle. Based on the records, however, the vehicle overtaken was a stationary truck then unloading its cargo. Hence, the appropriate provision was Section 44. The records sufficiently established that the petitioner did not abide by the safeguards listed in the provision before proceeding to overtake the parked truck. Had he been more prudent in driving his vehicle, he would have avoided the accident.
Under Section 40 of the LTTC, the vehicle to be overtaken shall give way to the overtaking vehicle upon a suitable and audible signal given by the latter, to wit:
Section 40. Driver to give way to overtaking vehicle. — The driver of a vehicle about to be overtaken and passed by another vehicle approaching from the rear shall give way to the overtaking vehicle on suitable and audible signal being given by the driver of the overtaking vehicle, and shall not increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.
Accordingly, the petitioner was guilty of simple imprudence for causing the death of the two-year old child because he did not use his horn before performing the overtaking maneuver.
WHEREFORE, the COURT resolves to:
(1) ADMIT the postal money order and the duplicate originals of the decision and resolution of the Court Appeals;
(2) NOTE the petitioner's Motion to Admit Compliance; and
(3) DENY with FINALITY the Motion for Reconsideration. cDHAES
SO ORDERED." PERLAS-BERNABE, J., on official leave; JARDELEZA, J., acting member per S.O. No. 2188 dated September 16, 2015.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 56-57.
2. Id. at 53.
3. Id.
4. Supra note 1.
5. Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 165575, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 333, 345.
6. Dimarucot v. People, G.R. No. 183975, September 20, 2010, 630 SCRA 659; Polintan v. People, G.R. No. 161827, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 111.
7. Polintan v. People, supra at 117; Trans International v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128421, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 718.
8. MCA-MBF Countdown Cards Philippines, Inc. v. MBF Card International Limited and MBF Discount Card Limited, G.R. No. 173586, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 214.