FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198604. June 28, 2016.]
COMVAL TRIBAL RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner,vs. JAKE MINING CORPORATION, RAJAH CARLITO C. BUNTAS, SR., DATU ROSALINO ANDRESAN, ARCELA A. CHAVEZ, ALBERTO A. CHAVEZ, DATU CARLITO ALEJO, and DATU VICTORIANO TULIK TUNGGAY, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 28, 2016, which reads as follows: AIDSTE
"G.R. No. 198604 — COMVAL TRIBAL RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. JAKE MINING CORPORATION, RAJAH CARLITO C. BUNTAS, SR., DATU ROSALINO ANDRESAN, ARCELA A. CHAVEZ, ALBERTO A. CHAVEZ, DATU CARLITO ALEJO, and DATU VICTORIANO TULIK TUNGGAY. Respondents.
This resolves the petition for review under Rule 45 filed by COMVAL Tribal Resources Corporation (petitioner) questioning the Resolution1 in Civil Case No. 11-685 dated September 16, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati City (the questioned Resolution), which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction petitioner's complaint for injunction against Jake Mining Corporation, Rajah Carlito C. Buntas, Sr., Datu Rosalino Andresan, Arcela A. Chavez, Alberto Chavez, Datu Carlito Alejo, and Datu Victoriano Tulik Tunggay (respondents).
Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized and existing under Philippine law engaged in the business of mineral and energy resources development and exploration. Respondent Jake Mining Corporation (JMC) is a domestic stock corporation. Individual respondents are: Rajah Carlito C. Buntas, Sr. from the Dibabawon Tribe, Datu Rosalino B. Andresan from the Mandaya Tribe, Arcela A. Chavez and Alberto A. Chavez from the Mangguangan Tribe, Datu Carlito Maligamon A. Alejo also from the Mangguangan Tribe, and Datu Victoriano Tulik Tunggay from the Manobo Tribe (respondent IP Leaders).
Petitioner presents the background of this case in the following manner:
On November 25, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Presidential Proclamation No. 297 which proclaimed a parcel of land with an area of 8,100 + hectares in Monkayo, Compostela Valley as a mineral reservation and an environmentally critical area. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") is to directly undertake mining operations in the area, subject to payment of just compensation that may be due to legitimate and existing claimants, or thru a qualified contractor, subject to existing rights, if any. The DENR then issued Administrative Order No. 2003-38 as "Guidelines for the Implementation of Proclamation No. 297," appointing the National Resources Development Corporation ("NDRC") to undertake mining and mineral processing operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation. SDAaTC
Pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-38 and by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement between and among the DENR, Philippine Mining Development Corporation ("PMDC") (then "NRMDC") and Natural Resources Development Corporation, the PMDC was designated/appointed as the new implementing arm of the DENR in undertaking the mining and mineral processing operations in the 8,100 hectare Diwalwal Mineral Reservation located in the municipality of Monkayo, Compostela Valley province.
The Diwalwal Mineral Reservation falls within the Certificate of Ancestral Domain granted to the Indigenous Cultural Community ("ICC") of Monkayo, Compostela Valley, as owners of the Ancestral Domain covered by the CADT No. R11-CADT-MON-0703-0007. On the basis of Section 57 of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, the indigenous peoples of Monkayo declared their intention to assert their right to develop and harvest the natural resources in their ancestral domain.
On June 17, 2009, the [PMDC] and the [ICC] of Monkayo, Compostela Valley, (representing the four tribes in the area: the Mandaya, Manobo, Manguangan, and Dibabawon) entered into an Operating Agreement. The Operating Agreement designated the contract area where the four tribes of Monkayo shall exclusively undertake mining activities within the Tribal Mining Area [TRIMA], which has a total land area of nine hundred and fifty (950) hectares located in Upper Ulip, Monkayo, within the 8100 hectare Mineral Reservation. The Operating Agreement was registered with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau on July 13, 2009.
With the Operating Agreement with PMDC in place, the [ICC] of Monkayo, represented by the Unified Tribal Council of Elders and Leaders ("UTCEL") executed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Upper Ulip Tribal Emancipating Cooperative ("UUTEC") to operate and undertake exploration and mining activities, by itself or in joint venture with another qualified party, in the said 950 hectares TRIMA.
With full authority from the [UTCEL], the [UUTEC] entered into a Financial, Technical and Management Agreement [FTMA] with CTRC [COMVAL Tribal Resources Corporation] to undertake mining operations in the [TRIMA] on October 24, 2009. 2
Petitioner found out that respondent JMC is trying to secure exploration rights over the Tribal Mining Area (TRIMA); thus, it filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC for the recognition of the alleged rights and obligations of the parties under the Financial, Technical and Management Agreement (FTMA). AaCTcI
Petitioner made the following averments in its complaint:
The FTMA between the UUTEC and CTRC remains to be a valid and enforceable contract. As a valid contract, it has the force of law and the parties should be bound by the provisions thereof. By the ICCs of Monkayo's act of granting the right to explore in the Tribal Mining Areas to UUTEC, the IPs cannot simply renege on its obligation and grant the same right to another investor, to the prejudice of COMVAL [which] has already invested time and resources to the project. Hence, the defendant-IP leaders cannot unilaterally cancel an agreement because COMVAL has a reasonable expectation that the contract between it and the ICCs of Monkayo would be respected by both parties.
In fact, the respondent IP leaders recognize the existence of the FTMA between the Indigenous Peoples of Monkayo with CTRC. The respondent IP leaders filed a Petition dated May 20, 2011 with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples entitled "The Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC) belonging to the Mandaya, Manobo Mangguangan and Dibabawon Tribes, as grantees of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R11-CADT-MON-0703-007, petitioners vs. FF Cruz & Co., and COMVAL TRIBAL RESOURCES CORPORATION (CTRC)" for "Petition for declaration of Nullity of Void Agreements" ("NCIP Petition"). In the NCIP petition, the defendant IP leaders clearly allege that the FTMA between the UUTEC and COMVAL was executed on July 25, 2009, although they question the validity thereof. However, without a court declaration stating otherwise, the contract is valid and enforceable between the parties.
To emphasize, the Respondent IP leaders are also the same petitioners who signed the NCIP Petition, and therefore cannot dispute its existence. . . . .
Meantime, without the NCIP Petition being resolved, the Respondent IP leaders, Jake Mining Corporation, and Eric Tagle (President of Jake Mining Corporation) are making it appear that another deal was struck, authorizing Jake Mining to undergo mining and exploration activities in the TRIMA.
All told, Jake Mining Co., Eric Tagle, and the Respondent IP leaders are railroading due process, that despite the fact that (a) there is [an FTMA] between the Upper Ulip Tribal Community and [petitioner] to operate in the Tribal Mining Areas; and (b) that the [respondents] IP leaders initiated proceedings with the NCIP to declare the FTMA as invalid, the [respondents] are preempting the decision of the NCIP on the matter. Contracts are presumed valid until they are declared to be otherwise; and this can only be done by bringing an action in court. [Respondents] should be reminded that "obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith." 3 acEHCD
The RTC heard petitioner's application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). During the TRO hearing, respondents moved in open court to set the case for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defenses as incorporated in their respective answers, which the RTC granted. After the hearing, respondents submitted their respective memoranda on the grounds for dismissal based on their affirmative and special defenses, while petitioner submitted its memorandum against the respondents' prayer for the dismissal of the case. The RTC denied the application for TRO but scheduled a hearing for plaintiff's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI).
On September 16, 2011, the RTC, acting on respondents' motion, dismissed the case outright for lack of jurisdiction and denied petitioner's application for a WPI in the questioned Resolution. According to the RTC, it did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, which was a ground for dismissal under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC opined that through the complaint for injunction, petitioner was praying for the court to direct the respondents not to discuss with each other about the TRIMA while the TRIMA between it and the Upper Ulip Tribal Emancipating Cooperative (UUTEC) is still considered valid and subsisting. The UUTEC and/or the Unified Tribal Council of Elders and Leaders (UTCEL) are organizations composed of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) and any dispute regarding the FTMA would involve the rights of the ICCs/IPs of Monkayo, Davao Del Norte. Thus, the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) has jurisdiction over the primordial and underlying subject matter of the present complaint for injunction. The NCIP, through its regional officers, by law, has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the ICCs/IPs.
We quote relevant portions of the questioned Resolution below:
The case extant against all the defendants herein should be dismissed at the word go as this Court has absolutely no jurisdiction over the issues raised at bar, jurisdiction having been vested by law with the [NCIP]. More importantly, the dismissal of the present "Complaint for Injunction" would allow NCIP to exercise its primary jurisdiction over the matters raised in the current civil suit congruently with the formulations of Section 66 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as "The Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997," or the IPRA.
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Withal, CTRC itself acknowledges "that the defendant IP leaders initiated proceedings with the NCIP to declare the FTMA as invalid" and has in fact appended to its primary pleading in re, as Annex "E" thereto, a photostatic copy of the "Petition for Declaration of Void Agreements" with "THE INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES (ICC) belonging to the Mandaya, Manobo, Mangguangan and Dibabawon Tribes, as grantees of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R11-CADT-MON-0703-007 as "Petitioners" and "FF CRUZ & CO., INC., and COMVAL TRIBAL RESOURCES CORPORATION [CTRC]" as "Respondents." Even a mere cursory perusal of the said Annex "E" would easily disclose that the issues raised thereat and in the case at bar are intertwined and, ergo, in the interest of the orderly administration of justice, NCIP should be accorded every opportunity to resolve the present row between CTRC and the ICCs/IPs of Monkayo, Davao Del Norte. Parenthetically, it is the illumined opinion of this Court that JMC is a nominal party to the controversy and should not have been needlessly dragged into the conflict as it was just caught in the crossfire, so to speak. EcTCAD
Furthermore, the relief being supplicated by CTRC in the present civil suit, id est, injunction and/or injunctive relief, could very well be beseeched by it in the petition before the NCIP because NCIP itself has quasi-judicial powers . . . .
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Definitely, and there is no doubt in the mind of this Court, that the two (2) actions submitted by CTRC with this Court and by UUTEC with NCIP are one and the same both geared toward precluding the herein defendants from negotiating a new FTMA with JMC and/or any other third party. Considering the formulations of IPRA, it is best that NCIP be just permitted to adjudicate the extant row between and among UUTEC, UTCEL, CTRC, JMC and the individual defendants herein. 4
Hence, the petitioner filed this petition for review, alleging that the RTC palpably erred in dismissing the complaint a quo for lack of jurisdiction, and failed to apply prevailing law and jurisprudence: that since the complaint does not fall within the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by clear mandate of law, the RTC is conferred with exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint.
Petitioner alleges that the dispute referred to in Section 66 of the IP Law 5 is the kind that would necessarily require the application of customary laws and practices. Petitioner avers that Section 66 of Republic Act No. 8371 does not mandate that every action involving ICCs/IPs should be filed with the NCIP. Only when the action involves "claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" will the case be filed with the Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP. In the complaint a quo, the respondent IP leaders are impleaded not as mere members of ICCs/IPs, but rather, as parties to a contract. Hence, the action does not relate to any claim or dispute involving the rights of ICCs/IPs, but only to the obligation of the respondent IP leaders as parties to a contract.
Petitioner argues that since the subject matter involves the enforcement of a valid contract, customary laws and practices cannot take precedence over the terms of a contract. 6 According to petitioner, from the time the FTMA was executed, the parties were bound to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated, thus, petitioner is entitled to a reasonable expectation that the other contracting party would stand true to their obligations. Furthermore, petitioner posits that while the contract is binding, the other contracting party should not simply discard the contract and look for another mining investor, in the person of respondent JMC. SDHTEC
Petitioner claims that respondent JMC is a mere corporate entity who cannot belong to any indigenous community and NCIP cannot be expected to take cognizance of cases against it. Unlike what the RTC held, respondent JMC is a real party in interest and not a nominal party because as a willing investor, it stands to lose and incur damages since the respondent IP leaders cannot be engaged in double-dealing without consequences. Respondent JMC not being a party to any of the NCIP cases involving respondent IP leaders, petitioner has no recourse against JMC with NCIP.
Petitioner concludes that other than the complaint for injunction with the RTC, petitioner has no other adequate remedy available to it even as respondent JMC, in the face of an allegedly valid and outstanding contract, the FTMA, has issued press statements announcing to the public that respondent JMC is dealing with the respondent IP Leaders, some of whom are even signatories to the FTMA with petitioner.
Respondents filed their COMMENT/OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI on April 30, 2012. In their Comment, respondents allege as follows:
• Petitioner executed a contract in 2009 with UUTEC, an indigenous peoples organization (IPO) composed of the indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities (IP/ICC) of the Mandaya, Manobo, Dibabawon and Mangguangan tribes (the four tribes) of Monkayo, Compostela Valley (COMVAL) Province.
• The four tribes were issued CADT No. R11-MON-0703-0007 by the NCIP and the Land Registration Commission over their ancestral domain in the COMVAL Province covering a total land area of 30,486.22 has.
• Petitioner awarded itself under its FTMA the right to explore, develop and exploit the mineral resources within the ancestral domain of the four tribes, particularly the Tribal Mining Area which is situated inside the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation (DMR). The reservation covers an area of 8,100 has. and is where the notorious Diwalwal Gold Rush started in the 1980s. The State-owned Philippine Mining Development Corporation (PMDC) has control over the DMR by virtue of Proclamation No. 297. HSAcaE
• The validity of the FTMA was assailed before the NCIP on the ground that it violated the contract between PMDC and the four tribes which provides that any agreement pertaining to the exploration, exploitation and development of mineral deposits inside the DMR must be unanimously approved and executed by the four key leaders of the four tribes.
• The NCIP En Banc later issued Resolution No. A-007 which sustained the position of the IP/ICC that the FTMA entered into between UUTEC and petitioner is null and void for lack of unanimity among the key leaders in choosing petitioner as their mining investment partner.
Respondents raised the following Counter-Statement of Facts:
• After the NCIP had issued a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) to the four tribes on July 22, 2003, the IP/ICC of Monkayo formed the UTCEL to act as its policy-making body tasked to manage, administer and develop their ancestral domain. The IPs also created the UUTEC to act as its business arm, and the Ancestral Domain Management Office (ADMO) to act as the implementing body.
• Under Section 57 of IPRA the IP/ICC shall have priority right in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting the natural resources found inside their ancestral domain. On October 20, 2005, the four tribes represented by Rajah Carlito Buntas, Datu Camilo Banad, Datu Victoriano "Tulik" Tunggay and Datu Carlito Alejo manifested their intention to assert and exercise their priority right (EPR) over their ancestral domain by virtue of said provision.
• On July 23, 2009, UTCEL signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with UUTEC to undertake exploration and mining operation in TRIMA. Two days later, UUTEC and petitioner executed the FTMA. UUTEC was represented by its Chairman, Datu Fernando Latiban; its Managing Director, Datu Victoriano "Tulik" Tunggay; and the following directors: Datu Carlito Chavez, Datu Rosalino Andresan, Datu Manuel Labrador, Sr. and Datu Hamilo Banad. The Dibabawon tribe represented by Rajah Carlito Buntas did not sign the FTMA.
• The president of petitioner Comval Tribal Resources Corporation (CTRC), John R. Doughty, an Australian national, signed the FTMA. However, when the validity of the FTMA was assailed on account of the citizenship of its president, the parties executed a second FTMA. This time, petitioner was represented by counsel, Atty. Fernando S. Penarroyo. AScHCD
• Petitioner is a corporation registered under Philippine law wherein 40% of its subscribed and outstanding capital stock is owned by foreign nationals. Compostela Mining Ltd., a London-based company registered in the Isle of Man owns 9,998 shares of stock of CTRC. Compostela Mining Ltd. has an option to acquire an additional 50% of petitioner CTRC through an Option Agreement with Mining Quest, Inc., the Philippine company which controls 60% of CTRC's equity. John R. Doughty and David Connal Cather, a British national, owns one share each.
• Respondents present the following as reasons why the NCIP did not issue a certification on the validation of the FTMA:
- Under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules and regulations, a foreign national could not be the president of a mining company.
- UUTEC had no legal personality since its registration with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) had already expired when it entered into an FTMA.
• On March 9, 2010, the Philippine Mining Development Corporation (PMDC) wrote the four tribes a letter saying, among others, that "the three different entities — F.F. Cruz & Co., Comval Tribal Resources Corp. and Mr. Candido Balunos — have been recommended by three different groups among the four tribes, as their chosen investor/operator/partner for the same TRIMA area exclusively." PMDC further said that the "unanimous decision of the four tribes, manifested in any document all signed by the same leaders who executed the Operating Agreement is necessary" before the PMDC can evaluate the technical and financial capability of their chosen investor.
• Under the Operating Agreement between the IP/ICC and PMDC, "the four tribes of Monkayo must come to a unanimous decision in choosing their proposed partner for the development of the TRIMA area. And their unanimous decision shall be arrived at following the traditional customs and traditions of the four tribes. . . . The ICC of Monkayo has also affirmed that for transactions affecting the 950-hectare TRIMA area, they want to secure their free and prior informed consent (FPIC) of the communities to be directly and indirectly affected, following the provisions of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 2006, on the FPIC."
• The IP/ICC of Monkayo filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Void Agreements before the NCIP, docketed as NCIP Case No. 008-2011, entitled "The Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC) belonging to the Mandaya, Manobo, Mangguangan and Dibabawon Tribes, et al. vs. FF Cruz & Co., Inc. and Comval Tribal Resources Corporation (CTRC)." HESIcT
• On July 14, 2011, UUTEC, the business arm of UTCEL filed a Petition for Recognition of UUTEC to enter into contracts for and in behalf of UTCEL and the IP/ICC of Monkayo, with prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, before the NCIP Regional Office in Davao City, UUTEC was represented by the same law firm that represented CTRC in the case a quo and in the present appeal.
Respondents contend that the jugular issue before this Court is the jurisdiction, or lack of it, of the lower court to hear and decide an issue that is clearly within the province of the NCIP. Respondents also claim as an adjunct issue whether or not CTRC and/or its counsel may have violated the rule against forum shopping as there are two cases pending before the NCIP allegedly involving the same issues and set of facts, and basically, the same parties.
Respondents claim that the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over controversies, conflicts and disputes arising from contracts entered into or affecting indigenous peoples. The NCIP is a quasi-judicial body created under Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act or IPRA). The NCIP has the power to grant injunctive relief under Section 69 of IPRA. Thus, it should hear and decide, and issue any injunctive relief, pertaining to the controversial FTMA. The regular courts do not possess the requisite expertise to pass upon issues involving the rights and interest of IPs/ICCs. This petition must be denied because the RTC did not commit reversible error when it dismissed the complaint for injunction of CTRC.
Petitioner filed its REPLY toCOMMENT on September 4, 2012. Petitioner insists that the RTC and not the NCIP has jurisdiction over the complaint for injunction it had filed. Citing Section 66 of Republic Act No. 8371 and Section 5 of Administrative Circular No. 1-03 (2003), petitioner enumerates the issues within the jurisdiction of the NCIP. Petitioner claims that nowhere in the said laws can it be found that NCIP has jurisdiction over controversies, conflicts and disputes arising from contracts entered into by indigenous peoples.
OUR RULING
The petition has merit. The RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for injunction.
This Court recently settled the matter of the jurisdiction of the NCIP in Unduran v. Aberasturi,7 as affirmed in Lim v. Gamosa,8 both decided after the RTC issued the Resolution in question. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA.9 Since the petitioner here is a domestic corporation and one of the respondents is likewise a domestic corporation, then the NCIP has no jurisdiction over whatever dispute or claim is in issue between said parties. The RTC must be the one to adjudicate the complaint. AcICHD
In Unduran, the Court summarized the laws and rules governing the NCIP's jurisdiction and arrived at the general rule based on the following reasoning:
In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents' amended complaint, foremost in the Court's mind is the principle in "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."
Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
On the other hand, the NCIP's jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA as follows:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
On the matter of NCIP's jurisdiction and of procedures for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states: caITAC
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. — All conflicts related to the ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision.
In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIP's quasi-judicial power to promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it, the NCIP issued Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure (NCIP Rules), which reiterates its jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be brought before it. Section 5, Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of the IPRA 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICC/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer: TAIaHE
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371;
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.
Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, Sections 13 and 14, Rule IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently provide:
Section 13. Certification to File Action. — Upon the request of the proper party, members of the indigenous dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in substance the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under customary law or traditional practices.
Section 14. Exceptions. — The certification shall not be required in the following cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official functions;
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification without justifiable reasons.
Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the RTC and the NCIP over the subject matters of their respective cases, the Court now examines the allegations in the original and amended complaints to find out which tribunal may properly exercise jurisdiction over this case. ICHDca
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Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA . . . .
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A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying provision that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP."
The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.
Section 3(f) of the IPRA, defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the abovesaid two conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.
Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. . . . 10
The Court in Unduran noted exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP, as follows: cDHAES
1. Cases under Sections 52 and 62 of the IPRA which contemplate a situation where a dispute over an ancestral domain involving parties who do not belong to the same, but to different ICCs/IPs, to wit:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. — The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:
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h) Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.
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SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. TCAScE
2. Cases under Section 54 of the IPRA over fraudulent claims by parties who are not members of the same ICC/IP, to wit:
SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. — The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties concerned. 11
The case now before us does not fall under the exceptions enumerated above. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the general rule applies, and the NCIP has no jurisdiction here.
The Court in Lim v. Gamosa12 clarified the Unduran ruling, explaining NCIP's jurisdiction vis-à-vis that of regular courts, as follows:
In Unduran and as in this case, we are hard pressed to declare a primary and/or exclusive and original grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs where there is no clear intendment by the legislature.
Significantly, the language of Section 66 is only clear on the nature of the claim and dispute as involving rights of ICCs/IPs, but ambiguous and indefinite in other respects. While using the word "all" to quantify the number of the "claims and disputes" as covering each and every claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs, Section 66 unmistakably contains a proviso, which on its face restrains or limits the initial generality of the grant of jurisdiction.
Unduran lists the elements of the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP: (1) the claim and dispute involve the right of ICCs/IPs; and (2) both parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. Both elements must be present prior to the invocation and exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction.
Thus, despite the language that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, we cannot be confined to that first alone and therefrom deduce primary sole NCIP jurisdiction over all ICCs/IPs claims and disputes to the exclusion of the regular courts. If it were the intention of the legislative that: (1) the NCIP exercise primary jurisdiction over, and/or (2) the regular courts be excluded from taking cognizance of, claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the legislature could have easily done so as in other instances conferring primary, and original and exclusive jurisdiction to a specific administrative body. . . . . ASEcHI
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That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary law to govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs. In fact, even the IPRA itself recognizes that customs and customary law cannot be applied to non-IPs/ICCs since ICCs/IPs are recognized as a distinct sector of Philippine society. This recognition contemplates their difference from the Filipino majority, their way of life, how they have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. The ICCs/IPs share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, which by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories, or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
In all, the limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP, confined only to a special cause involving rights of IPs/ICCs, can only be exercised under the limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.
To effect the IPRA and its thrust to recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of the Constitution goes hand in hand with the IPRA's running theme of the primary distinctiveness of customary laws, and its application to almost all aspects of the lives of members of the IPs/ICCs, including the resolution of disputes among ICCs/IPs. The NCIP was created under the IPRA exactly to act on and resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.
Of particular significance to the case at bar, which involves the rights of non-ICCs/IPs, is the Court's further pronouncement in Lim regarding the nature of the competence of the NCIP:
Once again, the primacy of customs and customary law sets the parameters for the NCIP's limited and special jurisdiction and its consequent application in dispute resolution. Demonstrably, the proviso in Section 66 of the IPRA limits the jurisdiction of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs where both parties are ICCs/IPs because customs and customary law cannot be made to apply to non-ICCs/IPs within the parameters of the NCIP's limited and special jurisdiction. cTDaEH
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to this special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a controversy involving, as well, rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and non-members of ICCs ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot determine the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP. 13
The Court in Lim touched on the effect of the Unduran pronouncement it was affirming to the previous decisions that implied that the NCIP had jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties is not an ICC or IP. The Court held:
As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al. and similar cases where we made an implicit affirmation of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are non-ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding exercises of jurisdiction by the NCIP, cannot tie our hands and declare a grant of primary and/or original and exclusive jurisdiction, where there is no such explicit conferment by the IPRA. At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.
Jurisprudence has held on more than one occasion that in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we consider the nature of the question that is the subject of controversy as well as the status or relationship of the parties.
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We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.
All told, we rule that Section 66 of the IPRA, even as it grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, requires that the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies under their customs and customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP. The validity of respondents' claim is another matter and a question that we need not answer for the moment. . . . . 14
Applying the above to the case now before us, we need only look at the parties to this case and the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy to determine whether the RTC has jurisdiction. ITAaHc
Petitioner claims that its complaint for injunction does not fall under the NCIP jurisdiction for the following reasons:
(a) First, although defendant IP leaders were impleaded in the complaint a quo, it does not involve claims or disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Rather, in recognition of the rights of the indigenous peoples to enter into a contract, the complaint involves the enforcement of [an FTMA] entered into by the Indigenous Peoples Organization of the ICCs of Monkayo, Compostela Valley and the petitioner, which falls under civil laws.
(b) Second, the allegations in the complaint do not require the application of customary laws or practices to resolve the dispute. Instead, the law relied upon are civil laws relating to obligations and contracts. Since the terms of the Agreement are covered by a Contract, it has the force of law between the parties thereto the enforcement of which is governed by civil law.
(c) Third, petitioner CTRC and respondent [JMC] are mere corporate entities, none of the stockholders of which are members of the Indigenous Communities. Therefore, petitioner has no recourse under customary laws, the same being inapplicable to it. Pertinently, the condition precedent of a Certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders cannot be complied with. This follows from the fact that the complaint cannot be resolved by mere application of customary laws or practices. 15
As emphasized in the two cases discussed above, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations of the complaint. Because the agreement of the parties is contained in the document entitled the FTMA, the subject matter of the action is the enforcement of the obligations of the parties under the contract.
Therefore, since the NCIP has no jurisdiction over the complaint, it is the RTC who has, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolution dated September 16, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati City is NULLIFIED. Civil Case No. 11-685 is hereby REINSTATED. cSaATC
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 9-22; penned by Presiding Judge J. Cedrick O. Ruiz.
2. Id. at 28-30.
3. Id. at 31-33.
4. Id. at 61-67.
5. Republic Act No. 8371, "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997."
SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Lows and Practices. — When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
6. Citing ARTICLE 1159, New Civil Code. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
ARTICLE 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
7. G.R. No. 181284, October 20, 2015.
8. G.R. No. 193964, December 2, 2015.
9. Unduran v. Aberasturi, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Supra note 8.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Rollo, pp. 40-41.