THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233932. January 17, 2018.]
COCA-COLA FEMSA PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. DIONISIO JAMITO, RYAN PARADO, VILLAMOR LACORUM, ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 234245. January 17, 2018.]
THE REDSYSTEMS COMPANY, INC., petitioner,vs. DIONISIO JAMITO, RYAN PARADO, VILLAMOR LACORUM, ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated January 17, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 233932 (Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc. vs. Dionisio Jamito, Ryan Parado, Villamor Lacorum, et al.); and G.R. No. 234245 (The Redsystems Company, Inc. vs. Dionisio Jamito, Ryan Parado, Villamor Lacorum, et al.). — For resolution are the following petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45:
1. G.R. No. 233932, which is an appeal filed by Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc. (CFPI) assailing the Decision dated 22 February 2017 and Resolution dated 24 August 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142640; and
2. G.R. No. 234245, which is an appeal filed by The Redsystems Company, Inc. (TRCI) against the same CA decision and resolution.
The said petitions share the same facts:
CFPI is a local manufacturer of carbonated drinks and other beverages. TRCI, on the other hand, is a provider of delivery and warehousing services.
In 2009, TRCI made an offer to provide delivery and warehouse services to CFPI. CFPI accepted TRCI's offer. To evidence their consensus, CFPI 1 and TRCI executed a document entitled "Master Terms and Conditions of the Service Agreement of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and The Redsystems Company, Inc.," wherein the former obliged itself to avail of the services of the latter "from time to time." The document also laid out the various stipulations that would govern any future service agreements between CFPI and TRCI.
To help it fulfill its forthcoming contractual obligations to CFPI, TRCI hired herein respondents Dionisio Jamito, Ryan Parado, Villamor Lacorum Edwin Romero, Jonathan Tacardon, Rolando Moreno, Crisologo Arapoc, Jr., Ruel Libatocia, Mario Bada, Arnel Rabano, Rodolfo Lumunsod, San Alano Bucsit, Joseph Torrero, Jose Melendez, Victor Marasigan, Rolando Geronimo, Anthony Mendiola, Roel Hernando and Freedy Montales (Jamito, et al.).
CFPI and TRCI entered into a one-year service agreement in 2011 and another one-year service agreement in 2012. Under both agreements, Jamito, et al. rendered service as either truck drivers or helpers primarily tasked with the delivery and distribution of CFPI's products.
After the expiration of the second service agreement, TRCI entered into a subcontracting arrangement with the Romac Services & Trading Corporation (Romac) — another company engaged in the business of supplying delivery and warehousing services. By virtue of such agreement, Romac took the place of TRCI as the provider of delivery and warehouse services to CFPI.
In 2013, CFPI and Romac entered into a service agreement. Jamito, et al., except for Freedy Montales, continued to serve under such agreement as truck drivers or helpers for CFPI.
In 2014, however, Jamito, et al. filed complaints for illegal dismissal and regularization2 against CFPI, Romac and TRCI 3 before the Labor Arbiter (LA). In them, Jamito, et al. asked that they be recognized as regular employees of CFPI. They postulated that, as truck drivers and helpers tasked with the delivery and storage of petitioner's products for many years, they have been doing work that is usually necessary or desirable to the business of CFPI and so can be considered as regular employees of the latter under the law. Jamito, et al. claimed that Romac and TRCI are not legitimate contractors and had only been colluding with CFPI in order to frustrate their regularization.
On 31 October 2014, the LA rendered a decision dismissing the complaints of Jamito, et al., among others. Jamito, et al. appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On 29 June 2015, the NLRC rendered a decision modifying the decision of the LA. The NLRC dismissed Jamito, et al.'s charges of illegal dismissal for lack of sufficient evidence but granted their plea for recognition as regular employees of CFPI. The decision was hinged upon the following findings by the NLRC:
1. Jamito, et al.'s allegation that they have been illegally dismissed is not supported by any evidence and is even contradicted by the records. Records indicate that Jamito, et al., to this day, are still employed with TRCI and are actually assigned to the latter's Antipolo Distribution Center office.
2. Nonetheless, Jamito, et al. should be recognized as regular employees of CFPI.
a. TRCI, the contractor that hired Jamito, et al., is engaged in labor-only contracting and is, thus, not a legitimate contractor. Hence, CFPI may be deemed as the employer of Jamito, et al.
Neither CFPI nor TRCI was able to establish that TRCI had sufficient capitalization or investment in reference to the service it was contracted to perform. Although TRCI was able to show that it has a paid-up capital of ten million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), it was not able to prove the sufficiency of such amount insofar as the services it provides to CFPI are concerned. Moreover, it appears the TRCI lacks the equipment to fulfill the contracted service as it never refuted the claim that it had been using CFPI's trucks, warehouses and premises to perform its obligations under the service agreements.
The evidence on record also discloses that TRCI does not have control over the means by which Jamito, et al. perform their work for CFPI. The truck drivers and helpers supplied by TRCI were bound by the Delivery Plan of CFPI in performing their work and were subject to the supervision of CFPI's employees.
b. Jamito, et al.'s employment is regular because, as truck drivers and helpers tasked with the delivery and storage of CFPI's products, they are engaged in work that is necessary or desirable to the business of CFPI.
CFPI filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On 22 February 2017, however, the CA rendered a decision dismissing such petition. Both CFPI and TRCI moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast.
Hence, the instant petitions of CFPI and TRCI.
The petitions of CFPI and TRCI raise the same issues. Both question the ruling that Jamito, et al. may be regarded as regular employees of CFPI. CFPI and TRCI claim that the NLRC and the CA erred in finding that TRCI is engaged in labor-only contracting:
1. The finding of the NLRC and the CA that TRCI is a labor-only contractor contradicts previous final decisions of the NLRC and the CA in a number of cases involving TRCI, the latter's hires and CFPI. In the following decisions, the NLRC or the CA recognized TRCI as a legitimate contractor in relation to several service agreements it had entered with CFPI:
NLRC Decisions:
a. Maas v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., NLRC LAC No. 04-001197-13, 14 January 2013 (resolution). 4 Entry of judgment in this case was made on 18 February 2014.
b. Royol, et al. v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., NLRC LAC No. 01-0000246-12, 5 23 May 2014. Entry of judgment 6 in this case was made on 27 April 2015.
c. Emano, et al. v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., NLRC LAC No. 07-001938-15, 22 October 2015. 7 Entry of judgment 8 in this case was made on 29 February 2016.
d. Estoesta, et al. v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., et al., NLRC LAC No. 01-000188-15, 29 January 2016. 9 Entry of judgment 10 in this case was made on 8 June 2016.
CA Decisions:
a. Manahay v. NLRC, et al., CA-G.R. SP No. 129261, 12 January 2015. 11
b. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., CA-G.R. SP No. 139373, 29 October 2015. 12
c. Buenaventura v. The Redsystem Co., Inc. and Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., CA-G.R. SP No. 137562, 29 April 2015. 13 This decision was affirmed by this Court in its resolution dated 17 August 2016 in G.R. No. 219732. 14
d. Tabago, et al. v. NLRC, et al., CA-G.R. SP No. 126020, 26 December 2012. 15 This decision was affirmed by this Court in its resolution dated 17 July 2013 in G.R. No. 206478. 16 Accordingly, the NLRC and the CA in this case were bound to adhere to the pronouncements in the foregoing decisions anent the status of TRCI pursuant to the principle of stare decisis.
2. At any rate, the NLRC and the CA erred in ruling that TRCI was not able to adduce evidence that it is a legitimate contractor. TRCI was able to adduce proof that it is registered with the DOLE as an independent contractor, that it has a paid-up capital of ten million pesos and that it has its own supervisors that oversee the means by which Jamito, et al. perform their work.
Our Ruling
The CA Decision is correct. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in concluding that Jamito, et al. can be considered as regular employees of CFPI. The NLRC's finding that TRCI is engaged merely in labor-only contracting is based on the evidence on record and its validity is unaffected by past decisions of the NLRC and the CA that held otherwise.
We, therefore, deny the petitions.
First. Even though there had been previous NLRC and CA decisions that found TRCI as a legitimate contractor, the NLRC in the present case is still within its prerogative to reach an opposite finding. Contrary to the submission of CFPI and TRCI, the doctrine of stare decisis does not bind the NLRC in the present case to simply adopt past findings made in previous decisions.
In Confederation of Sugar Producers Association, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 17 we elucidated upon the concept of stare decisis as follows:
Under the doctrine, when the Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment which results therefrom. In this particular sense stare decisis differs from res judicata which is based upon the judgment. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Verily, what are rendered binding by the doctrine of stare decisis are only the legal principles or interpretationsof law that give rise to a conclusion or judgment — not the conclusion or judgment itself. The principle, in other words, enjoins adherence to established doctrinal rules or principles of law, 18 not to particular findings or judgments derived from the application of such rules or principles.
Accordingly, the pronouncement in past NLRC and CA decisions that "TRCI is a legitimate contractor" does not carry over to just any proceedings that happen to involve TRCI. Such pronouncement is not a legal principle or doctrinal rule but only a finding resulting from the application of a legal principle or doctrinal rule. The legal principle that is deducible from the NLRC and CA decisions cited by CFPI and TRCI — and which is also deducible from decisions of this Court in similar labor cases — is that a contractor can only be regarded as a legitimate contractor if it was proven that it is not a labor-only contractor as defined by Article 106 of the Labor Code 19 and Section 5 of Department Order No. 18-02 of the DOLE. 20
Here — and, perhaps, unlike in the previous decisions of the NLRC and the CA — it is clear that the pieces of evidence on record are insufficient to establish TRCI as a legitimate contractor in specific relation to the service agreement and the workers involved in this case. Given such context, we see nothing wrong with the present NLRC in arriving at a conclusion different from those in the invoked decisions.
Second. CFPI and TRCI's challenge against the assessment of evidence by the NLRC and CA in this case must also fail. This Court, in an appeal by certiorari, is not inclined to disturb the factual findings and the evaluation of evidence made by the NLRC in the absence of justifiable reasons and especially when such findings and evaluation had already been affirmed on appeal by the CA.
With that said, this Court is in full agreement with the decisions of the NLRC and the CA anent the insufficiency of the evidence on record in this case establishing that TRCI was a legitimate contractor.
There being no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA on any matter, we resolve to affirm.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated 22 February 2017 and Resolution dated 24 August 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142640 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Then known as Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.
2. The complaints of Jamito, et al. were eventually consolidated with other complaints for illegal dismissal and regularization filed against CFPI and one Mirof Resources, Inc. by the following individuals: Orlando Matias, Arvin Aberilla, Adrian Gutierrez, Jun Shielo Pasadas, Frederic Lopez, Henrico Marinay, Erwin Mabuti, Reynaldo Pangilinan, Joseph Taguiga and Jeoneve Bantolinao. See rollo (G.R. No. 233932), p. 144.
3. TRCI was originally not impleaded as a defendant in any of the complaints. It was only impleaded as a party to the complaints upon motion of CFPI.
4.Rollo (G.R. No. 233932), pp. 2344-2355.
5.Id. at 2357-2386.
6.Id. at 2387-2388.
7.Id. at 2390-2400.
8.Id. at 2401.
9.Id. at 2402-2411.
10.Id. at 2412.
11.Id. at 2316-2333.
12.Id. at 2413-2428.
13. Id. at 2429-2442.
14. Id. at 2456-2457.
15. Id. at 2458-2479.
16. Id. at 2480.
17. G.R. No. 169514, 30 March 2007.
18. Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009.
19. Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended. Article 106 thereof reads:
Article 106.Contractor or subcontractor.Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting-out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code.
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. (Emphasis supplied).
20. Section 5 of DOLE Department Order No. 18-02 reads:
Section 5.Prohibition against labor-only contracting. — Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are present:
(i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or
(ii) the contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee.
The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248 (C) of the Labor Code, as amended.
"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations, tools, equipment, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out.
The "right to control" shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the services of the contractual workers are performed, to determine not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. (Emphasis supplied).