SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233993. August 13, 2018.]
JE FROILAN M. CLERIGO AND MA. CRISTINA T. RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, vs.SPOUSES CHARLIE DINAPO AND ALEJANDRA GARCIA-DINAPO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, NICK E. DINAPO, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated13 August 2018which reads as follows: IDTSEH
"G.R. No. 233993 (Je Froilan M. Clerigo and Ma. Cristina T. Rodriguez v. Spouses Charlie Dinapo and Alejandra Garcia-Dinapo, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Nick E. Dinapo)
After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition 1 and AFFIRM the March 1, 2017 Decision 2 and August 1, 2017 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139849 for failure of petitioners Je Froilan M. Clerigo and Ma. Cristina T. Rodriguez (petitioners) to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in upholding their ejectment from the subject property.
As correctly ruled by the CA, all the elements of unlawful detainer 4 are present in this case, considering that: (a) petitioners legally entered the subject property in accordance with the Agreement; (b) they failed to undertake what was incumbent upon them pursuant to the Agreement, resulting in its termination; (c) despite such termination, they remained in possession of the subject property; and (d) the unlawful detainer complaint 5 against them was filed within one (1) year from formal demand. 6
Further, the CA is likewise correct in holding that rescission under Article 1191 7 of the Civil Code does not apply to contracts to sell. 8 It is settled that "[i]n a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition that gives rise to the prospective seller's obligation to convey title. However, non-payment is not a breach of contract but 'an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.' The contract would be deemed terminated or cancelled, and the parties stand 'as if the conditional obligation had never existed,'" 9 as in this case. SICDAa
SO ORDERED." (CAGUIOA, J., on official leave)
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 12-36.
2.Id. at 39-50. Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring.
3.Id. at 53-55.
4. "A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment." See Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. v. Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, 793 Phil. 611, 618 (2016); citation omitted.
5. Dated January 11, 2012. See rollo, pp. 113-116.
6. See id. at 45-47.
7. Article 1191 of the Civil Code reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
8. See rollo, p. 49.
9. See Racelis v. Spouses Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29, 2018.