Clemente v. Robinson's Supermarket Corp.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 178804. November 13, 2013.]

EMILIA T. CLEMENTE, petitioner, vs. ROBINSON'S SUPERMARKET CORPORATION AND MRS. CONSTANCIA AGUILAR, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated November 13, 2013, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 178804 (Emilia T. Clemente v. Robinson's Supermarket Corporation and Mrs. Constancia Aguilar) — Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision 1 dated May 30, 2006 and Resolution 2 dated June 6, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00007.

The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

[Petitioner] was employed as General Cashier of Robinson's Supermarket Corporation, starting November 25, 1996 and served until December 19, 1998, when she was formally terminated from employment.

As cashier, [petitioner] was entrusted with a revolving fund which runs to about P300,000.00. She was required to keep small bills, coins, and money in small denominations ready in hand to exchange big bills and large denominations, paid by literally thousands of customers, which shop at the store. As cashier, [petitioner] also handled petty cash fund of more or less P20,000.00 as a matter of company policy, the revolving fund is subject to spot audit anytime by the internal auditors. ACHEaI

The incident happened on December 3, 1998, when the internal auditors at about 10:00 A.M. audited the [petitioner] and made a cash count of the company funds in her custody. The auditors found that [petitioner] was short of P6,360.00 from the revolving fund.

The internal auditors, in a memorandum dated December 4, 1998, notified the Treasury Manager who is the immediate supervisor of the [petitioner], regarding their findings. The auditors reported that [petitioner] had a revolving fund of P300,000.00, but the actual cash amount showed she had only P296,637.35. In short, [petitioner] had a shortage of P6,362.65. [Petitioner], according to the auditors, could not explain the shortage, nor explain the possible cause of the shortage although she promised to restore the amount.

[Respondent] Treasury Manager, Constancia Aguilar instructed the [petitioner] to submit her explanation regarding the shortage.

On December 5, 1998, [petitioner] submitted her written explanation.

[Petitioner]'s explanation reads:

This is to explain my shortage of P6,360 as a result of cash count conducted by the Internal Audit last December 3, 1998.

BACKGROUND:

Last Nov. 17, 1998, my youngest son, who is 1 year and 2 mos. old was rushed to the hospital due to excessive cough and difficulty in breathing (post asthma attack). They put oxygen and did some routine check-up, such as X-ray, CBC and others. He was later diagnosed to have Pneumonitis and has "Candida Albicans" and "Escherichia coli" (a form of bacteria in his lungs). He was admitted to LN Agustin Memorial Hospital. There are medicines that I have to buy personally, like Budicinide capsules and Amikasin ampules to be injected in his dextrose every 6 hours. He was released after 7 days of confinement, but we still have to continue his medications and injections.

Unfortunately, funds in my savings account were not enough to cover hospital bills and other expenses. My application for "emergency loan" was not yet approve then. My husband was on his enroute to Negros Oriental, Dumaguete, Cebu and Bohol then, performing his duties. I was having a hard time to reach him. I don't have any relatives here in Bacolod to turn to nor friends to give my needs immediately. Without any available alternative, this prompted me to use my fund for the time being, that I could return the money as soon as my husband arrives. aDCIHE

I have known very well that what I did was against company policy. Such misdoing was my first and will be the last time to ever happen again. The shortage of P6,360.63 (SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY & 63/100) will be returned this December 15, 1998.

Lastly, I would like to appeal to still allow me to serve the company. For the past 2 years, I have learned to love my job at Robinson's just like I have loved my job before at URC and RDPD for 24 years. This is where I rear my child.

Thank you very much.

From the foregoing, [petitioner] admitted having used and misappropriated company funds in the sum of P6,360.63, which she failed to account, and appeared as shortage when the audit was made. [Petitioner] expressed remorse and promised this would not happen again. She said that her son was hospitalized and she had no way to pay for the medical bills and because she had nowhere to go, she used the money of the company intending to replace the amount.

On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] was placed under preventive suspension pending further investigation.

On December 17, 1998, [petitioner] was terminated from employment in a notice of discharge dated December 17, 1998. [Respondent] cited fraud and breach of trust as grounds for the termination.

xxx xxx xxx

There could be no question that [petitioner], whose position as General Cashier, requires a higher degree of trust and confidence, misappropriated company funds which she expressly admitted in her quite emotional explanation. Definitely [respondent] could not be faulted for exercising its management prerogative and discretion to discharge an erring employee, who knowingly violated company rules and regulations, and committed fraud and serious breach of trust.

Both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC are correct in pointing out that management could terminate an employment for just causes, one of which is fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed upon him by his employer as per Art. 282 of the Labor Code.

Misappropriation of company funds, although the shortages were fully restituted, is a valid ground to terminate the services of an employee. [Petitioner] knew as she did admit that what she did was wrong. She used the money of the company entrusted to her, to pay for the medical bills of her sick child. But the pitiable situation she was in, could not possibly justify the commission of a wrongful act which, as correctly pointed out by herein [respondents], constitutes a criminal offense. The offense committed by the complainant is sufficient basis for the [respondents] to lose confidence, taking into consideration her position. Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee and it is sufficient if the employer has reasonable grounds to believe, if not entertain the moral conviction, that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence, demanded by his position. [Petitioner] had openly admitted, without putting up any lame excuses, her misconduct. She was, according to her, under trying circumstances, and was forced to use the fund entrusted to her. She was able to restitute the shortage, although restitution did not necessarily absolve her from what has been consummated as a fraudulent act. cTAaDC

As found, the labor arbiter computed the monetary award of the complainant as follows:

a)	Separation Pay:	11/25/96-12/19/98, 2 yrs.
		P8,437.00 x 2 yrs.	P16,874.00
b)	Unused vacation/sick leave, 18 days
		P8,437.00/30 days x 18 days	P5,062.32
			——————————
	Total		P21,936.32

On January 12, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant Emilia Clemente the sum of Twenty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos and 32/100 ctvs (P21,936.32) representing her separation pay, as a measure of social and compassionate justice, and unused vacation and sick leave benefits, to be deposited with this office within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the NLRC.

On January 09, 2002, the NLRC rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated January 12, 2000, is set aside and another one is entered ordering the respondents-appellants to pay the complainant in addition to her separation pay and leave benefits, backwages from her dismissal on December 19, 1998 until the rendition of this decision on November 29, 2001.

On March 01, 2002, [respondents] filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the NLRC denied. 3

Respondents then appealed to the CA.

In a Decision dated May 30, 2006, the CA modified the NLRC decision and disallowed the award of separation pay and backwages to petitioner. It held as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the present petition, the same is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision dated January 9, 2002 and Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration dated June 14, 2004 issued by public respondent, in NLRC Case No. V-000707-2000 and RAB Case No. VI-01-10046-99 is MODIFIED by way of disallowing the award of backwages and separation pay from the decision and the rest of the decision if AFFIRMED since the dismissal was legal and for just cause. No costs. HESIcT

SO ORDERED. 4

Unfazed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration against said decision. However, the same was denied in a Resolution dated June 6, 2007.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition.

Essentially, petitioner argues that her act of misappropriating a small amount cannot be categorized as serious dishonesty and serious misconduct reflecting on her moral character. She stresses that the amount is insignificant compared to the funds entrusted to her as cashier.

Respondents, on the other hand, point out that misappropriation of company funds, although the shortages had been fully restituted, is a valid ground to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence.

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Article 279 of the Labor Code explicitly provides that in cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just or authorized cause. It is further provided that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

However, where the employee was dismissed for cause and such dismissal is decreed by the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the offender is not entitled to backwages and separation pay as a rule. While it is true that there are certain exceptions based on equity, petitioner's case is not one of them.

Here, there is no dispute that the amount misappropriated by petitioner is just a measly sum compared to the P300,000.00 entrusted to her by respondents. However, it is worth noting that petitioner's position is that of a General Cashier, a position which requires the utmost trust and confidence of the employer. In fact, were it not for the spot audit, petitioner would not have volunteered the information that she misappropriated some of her funds to respondents. As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner cannot just say that the amount is a measly sum, since it is not the amount but the act itself which is reflecting her moral character.

A similar issue was involved in the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC. 5 DETcAH

In said case, the Court undertook a review of past precedents, sanctioning the grant of separation pay to employees dismissed for just cause. It was noted that previous jurisprudence constituted an exception to the rule in the Labor Code that a person dismissed for cause is not entitled to separation pay, the exception being based on considerations of equity. The Court observed, however, that past precedents had not "been consistent as to the justification for the grant of separation pay in the amount and rate of such award," and pointed out the need for a re-examination of the policy therein enunciated, in order to rationalize the exception, "to make it fair to both labor and management, especially to labor." 6 As the Court vigorously ruled in the aforecited PLDT case, social and compassionate justice cannot be used as a shield by wrongdoers from the legal consequences of their acts.

We hereby re-affirm the Court's ruling in that case, to wit:

The Court feels that distinctions are in order. We note that heretofore the separation pay, when it was considered warranted, was required regardless of the nature or degree of the ground proved, be it mere inefficiency or something graver like immorality or dishonesty. The benediction of compassion was made to cover a multitude of sins, as it were, and to justify the helping hand to the validly dismissed employee whatever the reason for his dismissal. This policy should be re-examined. It is time we rationalized the exception, to make it fair to both labor and management, especially to labor.

There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. For example, a subordinate who has irreconcilable policy or personal differences with his employer may be validly dismissed for demonstrated loss of confidence, which is an allowable ground. A working mother who has to be frequently absent because she has also to take care of her child may also be removed because of her poor attendance, this being another authorized ground. It is not the employee's fault is he does not have the necessary aptitude for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be required to maintain him just the same at the expense of the efficiency of its operations. He too may be validly replaced. Under these and similar circumstances, however, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause. EAIaHD

But where the cause of the separation is more serious than mere inefficiency, the generosity of the law must be more discerning. There is no doubt that it is compassionate to give separation pay to a salesman if he is dismissed for his inability to fill his quota but surely he does not deserve such generosity if his offense is misappropriation of the receipts of his sales. This is no longer mere incompetence but clear dishonesty. A security guard found sleeping on the job is doubtless subject to dismissal but may be allowed separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not depraved. But if he was in fact not really sleeping but sleeping with a prostitute during his tour of duty and in the company premises, the situation is changed completely. This is not only inefficiency but immorality and the grant of separation pay would be entirely unjustified.

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.

A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a little leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.

The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.7

Therefore, we hold that the grant of backwages and separation pay to petitioner is unjustified, considering that she was dismissed for causes reflecting on her character.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, this Court, in a number of cases, has granted financial assistance to separated employees as a measure of social and compassionate justice and as an equitable concession. 8 Taking into consideration the fact that she used the money entrusted to her by the company to pay for the medical bills of her sick child and the fact that the shortages were fully restituted immediately thereafter, we rule that petitioner is entitled to this kind of assistance. Accordingly, the Court finds that the award of P20,000.00 to petitioner as financial assistance is deemed equitable under the circumstances. cACEHI

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 30, 2006 and Resolution dated June 6, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00007 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by awarding petitioner with financial assistance in the amount of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap, with Associate Justices Arsenio L. Magpale and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 30-38.

2. Rollo, pp. 39-40.

3. Id. at 31-35.

4. Id. at 37. (Emphasis in the original)

5. 247 Phil. 641 (1988).

6. Osias Academy v. Department of Labor and Employment, 254 Phil. 468, 471 (1989).

7. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC, supra note 5, at 648-650. (Emphasis supplied)

8. Villaruel v. Yeo Han Guan, G.R. No. 169191, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 64, 73.