EN BANC
[G.R. No. 167472. September 14, 2021.]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.ENGR. ALI P. DARANGINA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedSEPTEMBER 14, 2021, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 167472 (Civil Service Commission v. Engr. Ali P. Darangina). — On May 16, 2005, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) filed a Petition 1 for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA) Resolutions dated October 7, 2004 2 and March 18, 2005 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71353 which ruled in favor of Engr. Ali P. Darangina's (Engr. Darangina) reinstatement with backwages. The CA explained that Engr. Darangina, as a temporary appointee to the position of Director III of the Plans and Policy Services (PPS) of the Office of the Muslim Affairs (OMA), can only be replaced by persons who are civil service eligible. In a Decision 4 dated January 31, 2007, in G.R. No. 167472, the Court reversed the CA's findings and ruled that Engr. Darangina, not being a career executive service eligible, was not qualified for the position of Director III of the PPS of the OMA, and his replacement by another ineligible person was not prohibited by law. Moreover, the Court held that Engr. Darangina was not entitled to back wages because he was paid his complete salaries, thus:
Under the Revised Qualifications Standards prescribed by the CSC, career executive service eligibility is a necessary qualification for the position of director III in Plans and Policy Services, OMA. It is not disputed that on September 25, 2000, when respondent was extended an appointment, he was not eligible to the position, not being a holder of such eligibility. Hence, his appointment was properly designated as "temporary." Then on October 31, 2000, newly-appointed OMA Executive Director Tomawis recalled respondent's temporary appointment and replaced him by appointing Alongan Sani. It turned out, however, that Sani is not likewise qualified for the post. A game of musical chairs then followed. Sani was subsequently replaced by Tapa Umal, who in turn, was succeeded by Camad Edres, and later, was replaced by Ismael Amod. All these appointees were also disqualified for lack of the required eligibility.
The Court of Appeals ruled that such replacements are not valid as the persons who replaced respondent are not also eligible. Also, since he was replaced without just cause, he is entitled to serve the remaining term of his 12-month term with salaries.
This Court has ruled that where a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible is not prohibited.
xxx xxx xxx.
As to whether respondent is entitled to back salaries, it is not disputed that he was paid his salary during the entire twelve-month period in spite of the fact that he served only from September 25, 2000 to October 31, 2000, or for only one month and six days. Clearly, he was overpaid.
WHEREFORE, this Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Considering that respondent's employment was validly terminated on October 31, 2000, he is ordered to refund the salaries he received from that date up to September 24, 2001.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 5 (Citation omitted.)
Aggrieved, Engr. Darangina sought reconsideration. 6 On March 27, 2007, the Court denied the motion with finality, to wit:
[T]he Court Resolved to DENY WITH FINALITY the said motion for reconsideration, as the basic issues raised therein have been passed upon by this Court and no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the questioned decision. 7
Dissatisfied, Engr. Darangina wrote a letter 8 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, on March 20, 2007, seeking his intercession for the just resolution of his case. In the letter, Engr. Darangina alleged that the Court's January 31, 2007 Decision was biased, one-sided, and unjust. Also, Engr. Darangina accused the Associate Justices' legal researchers with conduct unbecoming of officers of the court. 9 In its Resolution 10 dated April 17, 2007, the Court treated the letter as a second motion for reconsideration and denied it for being a prohibited pleading. On July 9, 2007, the January 31, 2007 Decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. 11
Nevertheless, Engr. Darangina filed on October 22, 2007, a Motion for Leave to File and Admit a Second Motion for Reconsideration. 12 In its Resolution 13 dated January 15, 2008, the Court expunged the motion from the records considering the finality of the assailed decision. Almost four years later, or on June 28, 2011, Engr. Darangina moved to amend the Court's January 31, 2007 Decision, to recall the Entry of Judgment, and to conduct further proceedings. 14 In its Resolution 15 dated July 12, 2011, the Court noted the motion without action. Undeterred, Engr. Darangina filed on July 4, 2015, a motion to reopen case. On August 18, 2015, the Court expunged from the records the motion. 16 Six years later, or on May 25, 2021, Engr. Darangina, again, filed another motion to reopen case tirelessly echoing that the January 31, 2007 Decision is contrary to law and jurisprudence. 17
The motion must be denied.
The Court's Decision dated January 31, 2007 is already final and executory, and the corresponding entry of judgment had been issued. Thus, Engr. Darangina has no more right to reopen an already closed and terminated case. Public policy dictates that there must be an end to litigation. Otherwise, it would set a bad precedent allowing dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions with no end. This is completely inimical to the orderly and efficient administration of justice. 18 Well-settled is the rule that when a court of competent jurisdiction has tried and decided a right or fact, so long as the decision remains unreversed, it is conclusive on the parties and those in privity with them. More so where the Supreme Court has already decided the issue since it is the final arbiter of all justiciable controversies properly brought before it. 19 Notably, more than 14 years had lapsed since the finality of the assailed decision but the matter has not been laid to rest due to Engr. Darangina's incessant motions to reopen the case.
FOR THESE REASONS, the Verified Motion to Reopen Case is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION and is EXPUNGED from the records. Moreover, no further pleadings will be entertained in this case. The respondent is WARNED that a similar act which tends to disregard the lawful orders of the Court and to abuse, obstruct, impede, and degrade the administration of justice will be treated as a ground for indirect contempt." (3)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MARIFE M. LOMIBAO-CUEVASClerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 13-25.
2.Id. at 27-32. Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso.
3.Id. at 33-34.
4.Id. at 136-142. Penned by Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez.
5.Id. at 140-141.
6.Id. at 145-152.
7.Id. at 153.
8.Id. at 154-A-156.
9.Id. at 154-A.
10.Id. at 163-164.
11.Id. at 199-200.
12.Id. at 189.
13.Id. at 190.
14.Id. at 203-215.
15.Id. at 237.
16.Id. at 239.
17.Id. at 287-307.
18.Lee v. RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, 467 Phil. 997, 1013 (2004).
19.Heirs of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. CA, 466 Phil. 697, 712 (2004).