City Government of Valenzuela v. Spouses Abacan

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211231. April 3, 2019.]

CITY GOVERNMENT OF VALENZUELA, REPRESENTED BY ITS CITY MAYOR, HON. SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SILVINO ABACAN AND REMEDIOS LAZARO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated April 3, 2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 211231 (CITY GOVERNMENT OF VALENZUELA, represented by its City Mayor, HON. SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, v. SPOUSES SILVINO ABACAN and REMEDIOS LAZARO, respondents). — This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by the City Government of Valenzuela (Valenzuela City), represented by its Mayor, Sherwin T. Gatchalian (Mayor Gatchalian), assailing the August 30, 2013 Decision 2 and February 7, 2014 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98581. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court November 17, 2011 Decision in Civil Case No. 102-V-10. 4

Spouses Silvino Abacan and Remedios Lazaro (the Abacan Spouses) are the registered owners of a 1,203-square meter parcel of land located on G. Lazaro Street, Dalandanan, Valenzuela City. 5 The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-54073. 6

In a September 9, 2009 Letter, Valenzuela City formally offered the Abacan Spouses to purchase their property at P400.00 per square meter, or a total of P481,200.00. However, the Abacan Spouses rejected the offer. 7

Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Valenzuela City enacted City Ordinance No. 75, series of 2010, which authorized Mayor Gatchalian to initiate expropriation proceedings over the Abacan Spouses' property for the construction of a public school building and appropriation of the project's funds. 8

On August 12, 2010, Valenzuela City, represented by Mayor Gatchalian, filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for expropriation against the Abacan Spouses. 9 CAIHTE

On August 26, 2010, the Abacan Spouses filed their Answer. They averred that Valenzuela City's offer was way below the current Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation. 10

On September 16, 2010, Valenzuela City manifested that it issued Land Bank of the Philippines Check No. 0000392622 worth P72,180.00, under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160. The check was issued payable to the Abacan Spouses, representing around 15% of the total fair market value of the property based on current tax declarations. 11

In its September 30, 2010 Order, the Regional Trial Court authorized the issuance of a Writ of Possession in Valenzuela City's favor. It directed the Branch Sheriff to place the property in the city government's possession. 12

During pre-trial, the parties agreed that the lone issue for resolution was the amount of just compensation. 13

In its January 14, 2011 Order, the Regional Trial Court ruled that Valenzuela City had the right to take the property to construct the school building. 14 Following Rule 67, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court appointed three (3) Commissioners tasked with determining the amount of just compensation due on Valenzuela City. 15

Subsequently, the Board of Commissioners set the just compensation at P7,500.00 per square meter, or a total of P9,022,500.00. 16 This was assailed by Valenzuela City, insisting that the just compensation must be based on the property's fair market value per the tax declaration, which was P400.00 per square meter. 17

In its November 17, 2011 Decision, the Regional Trial Court directed Valenzuela City to pay the Abacan Spouses P6,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,218,000.00, for the property. 18 The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby ORDERS plaintiff to pay defendant Spouses Silvino Abacan and Remedios Lazaro the just compensation for the expropriated property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-54073, in the amount of P6,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,218,000.00 for the 1,203 square meter property, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from November 5, 2010, until full payment is made.

Defendants, on the other hand, are hereby DIRECTED to present the Owner's Duplicate of said TCT No. B-54073 to the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela City, which is in turn directed, upon payment by defendant of the corresponding capital gains tax, to cancel said title and issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title under the name of plaintiff, City Government of Valenzuela.

SO ORDERED. 19

Valenzuela City filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Regional Trial Court March 5, 2012 Order. 20

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its August 30, 2013 Decision, 21 affirmed the November 17, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court. It held that the trial court had carefully studied the expropriated property when it fixed the amount of just compensation. It also found that the trial court not only relied on the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation, but also evaluated the Commissioners' Report. It also noted how the trial court considered that Valenzuela City, in August 2001, had purchased a 3,000-square meter property for P5,000.00 per square meter, and that the properties in that vicinity were valued at P5,300 per square meter by 2003. 22

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 17, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 269 of Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 102-V-10 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 23 (Emphasis in the original)

Valenzuela City filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 24 which was denied in the Court of Appeals February 7, 2014 Resolution. 25

Undeterred, Valenzuela City filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari26 against the Abacan Spouses on February 28, 2014.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's Decision in fixing the amount of just compensation. The Court of Appeals allegedly based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts, "speculations, surmises[,] and conjectures." 27 DETACa

Similarly, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in considering only the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation and the price of the property it had purchased in 2001 as sufficient bases to determine the amount of just compensation. 28 According to petitioner, the property in question is not a commercial lot, but a vacant or idle residential lot 29 per Tax Declaration No. C-015-04245. That the Court of Appeals disregarded this allegedly violates the power bestowed upon local government units to prescribe zoning classifications, as held in Republic of the Philippines v. Far East Enterprises, Inc.30

Further, petitioner claims that the just compensation of P6,000.00 per square meter valuation was arbitrary 31 and unjustified. 32

In a June 4, 2014 Resolution, 33 this Court required respondents to comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice.

In their Comment/Opposition to Petition for Review on Certiorari34 filed on July 15, 2014, respondents counter that the trial court did not err in determining the just compensation. They note that the trial court based its determination on the Commissioners' Report and documentary evidence presented in court. Such documentary evidence include: (1) the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation, which pegged the just compensation at P5,300.00 per square meter; (2) a 2000 Deed of Sale, showing that petitioner purchased the property where Dalandanan National High School and the Astrodome were erected at P5,000.00 per square meter; and (3) a 2001 Deed of Sale, showing that petitioner purchased another property on G. Lazaro Street as the expropriated property at P12,500.00 per square meter. 35

In its August 18, 2014 Resolution, 36 this Court noted respondents' Comment/Opposition and required petitioner to file a reply within 10 days from notice.

Petitioner filed its Reply 37 on September 29, 2014. It asserts that the three (3) parameters laid down in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco 38 — (1) character of the property; (2) price; and (3) time of actual taking — should have been considered in setting the amount of just compensation. 39 It cites Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974, which lists, among others: (1) the classification and use for which the property is suited; (2) development costs for improving the land; and (3) the value declared by owners, as standards for assessment of land value. Petitioner points out that the property, prior to expropriation, was a vacant or idle residential land without improvements, low-lying, and situated in a flood-prone area. 40

For this Court's resolution is the lone issue of whether or not the classification of a property in the tax declaration must prevail over that in the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation and Commissioners' Report in the determination of the amount of just compensation.

This Petition is denied for lack of merit.

I

This Court is not a trier of facts. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. 41

A question of fact exists when the truth or falsity of the alleged facts is doubted 42 or when the issue entails a review of the evidence presented. 43 Factual issues of an expropriated property's valuation are generally beyond the scope of a petition under Rule 45.

Further, factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, shall not be disturbed by this Court, unless they are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. 44 That is not the case here.

Jurisprudence, however, has provided several exceptions to the rule. For this Court to review the facts, the "exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties[.]" 45 Here, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals Decision was "based on [a] misapprehension of facts and/or are based on speculations, surmises[,] and conjectures." 46 Petitioner, however, fails to substantiate its allegation.

On these procedural grounds alone, the Petition ought to be denied. Nonetheless, even if its propriety is admitted, this Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling.

II

Among the State's inherent powers that need not be expressly granted is eminent domain, which "enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner." 47 The exercise of this power is limited by Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which states that "[p]rivate property [shall] not be taken for public use without just compensation[.]" 48

Section 19 49 of the Local Government Code confers the power of eminent domain to local government units. The requisites for the local government's exercise of eminent domain are:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. aDSIHc

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 50 (Citation omitted)

The procedure on the exercise of the power of eminent domain or expropriation is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. As explained in National Power Corporation v. Posada: 51

It undergoes two phases. The first phase determines the propriety of the action. The second phase determines the compensation to be paid to the landowner. Thus:

There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom. 52 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Here, the parties agreed that only the issue of just compensation remains.

In expropriation cases, just compensation is "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator." 53 It means:

. . . an equivalent for the value of the land (property) taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than compensation. To compensate is to render something which is equal to that taken or received. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. "Just compensation," therefore, . . . means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.

The exercise of the power being necessary for the public good, and all [the] property being held subject to its exercise when, and as the public good requires it, it would be unjust to the public that it should be required to pay the owner more than a fair indemnity for such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity, the interests of the public and of the owner and all the circumstances of the particular appropriation should be taken into consideration. 54 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted) ETHIDa

In Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, 55 this Court held that where the issue is determining the amount of just compensation in an expropriation suit, a trial before the commissioners 56 is indispensable. Trial with the aid of commissioners gives the parties the opportunity to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. As such, it is a substantial right that may not be whimsically waived. 57

However, while the appointment of commissioners is mandatory in resolving the issue of just compensation, courts are not bound by their findings. 58 Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Action upon Commissioners' Report. — Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. (Emphasis supplied)

The determination of just compensation remains a judicial function to be performed by courts. 59 Courts may render judgment that secures just compensation for the defendant and the expropriated property for the plaintiff. Courts may substitute their estimate of the value, as long as it is supported by the evidence on record. 60

In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 61 this Court explained the import of Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay62 on the court's function of determining just compensation:

EPZA v. Dulay resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned. cSEDTC

xxx xxx xxx

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx xxx xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. 63 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Petitioner's assertion on the property's classification indicated in Tax Declaration No. C-015-04245, as it is allegedly in accord with the local government's power to prescribe zoning classifications, is erroneous. Insisting that the trial court solely rely on this encroaches on its judicial power to determine just compensation. Courts are mandated to evaluate and consider competent evidence in determining just compensation. Not one (1) factor shall prevail over the other, especially that which was determined by public officers in the performance of their official functions. 64

Furthermore, petitioner did not substantiate any of its allegations. Proof of its zoning classification, the alleged tax declaration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation, the Commissioners' Report, among other relevant documents, do not appear on record despite having been repeatedly cited by petitioner.

Thus, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals, which stated:

Contrary to the City Government of Valenzuela's claim, the RTC did not solely rely on the BIR zonal valuation when it fixed the just compensation at P6,000.00 per square meter. Evidentiary records disclose that the RTC evaluated the Commissioners' Report dated August 10, 2011. In the said report, it is very evident that the commissioners' recommendation of P7,500.00 per square meter was not merely based on the zonal valuation made by the BIR. The commissioners recommended said amount after taking into consideration the factors set forth under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974. This can be gleaned from the following pertinent portion:

"Considering that the zonal valuation of the subject property as determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which is Pesos: Five Thousand Three Hundred (P5,300.00) per square meter, and the prevalent market value of neighboring developed properties which are today being sold at Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P12,500.00), we decided to propose that the subject property be valued at Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P7,500.00) per square meter. This is a more realistic value of the subject property taking into account the development in the vicinity and its neighboring areas. In our ocular inspection, we observed that the subject property is indeed located in a busy and highly commercialized area. . . ."

The RTC likewise considered that the City Government of Valenzuela purchased a 3,000-square meter property within the same vicinity as the subject property at a value of P5,000.00 per square meter. Said transaction was done sometime in August 2001. It further considered that in 2003, the BIR has valued the properties in the same zone or area at P5,300.00 per square meter. SDAaTC

Verily, the RTC had carefully studied the expropriated property when it fixed the just compensation at P6,000.00 per square meter. Inasmuch as the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, We see no plausible reason to disturb the RTC's findings as to the valuation of the subject property. 65 (Citations omitted)

Notably, petitioner's invocation of Republic of the Philippines is misplaced and does not support its cause.

In Republic of the Philippines, the expropriation was for a national government infrastructure project, governed by Republic Act No. 8974. Among the requirements for authorizing the government's immediate entry in expropriation proceedings is the payment of 100% of the property's value based on the current Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation. There, the petitioner questioned the expropriated properties' classification, which would be used to determine the 100% value of the property based on the current Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation. In disposing the issue, this Court ruled:

Inasmuch as what is involved in this case is the payment of the amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, we must distinguish the same from just compensation. In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, we ruled:

To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property. As the appellate court explained:

The first refers to the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property. It serves a double-purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed. It is not a final determination of just compensation and may not necessarily be equivalent to the prevailing fair market value of the property. Of course, it may be a factor to be considered in the determination of just compensation.

Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination of the fair market value of the property. It has been described as "the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation." Market values, has also been described in a variety of ways as the "price fixed by the buyer and seller in the open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal trade and competition; the price and value of the article established as shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way of business; the fair value of the property between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell; the current price; the general or ordinary price for which property may be sold in that locality.["]

As the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, said amount serves a double purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and of indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed. Said provisional value must be paid to the owner of the land before a writ of possession may be issued. The issuance of a certificate of availability of funds will not suffice for the purpose of issuance of a writ of possession.

After payment of the provisional amount, the court may now proceed to determine the amount of just compensation. Petitioner can now present its evidence relative to the properties' fair market value as provided in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974. 66 (Citations omitted)

In stark contrast, at issue here is the amount of just compensation.

Moreover, this Court deemed that the more important issue in Republic of the Philippines was if "the courts, in the first instance, [were] the proper venue in which to resolve any dispute involving the classification of lands[.]" 67 This Court ruled in the negative. While the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance was recognized, this Court explained that courts must refrain from resolving judicial questions that "demand the special competence of administrative agencies[.]" Such is the case here, where the issue of land classification is raised. acEHCD

Similarly, Land Bank of the Philippines, which involved an expropriated property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, does not apply here. The just distribution of agricultural lands, as mandated by the Constitution, 68 is primarily governed by Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals August 30, 2013 Decision and February 7, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 98581 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-22-A.

2.Id. at 29-35. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now an Associate Justice of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3.Id. at 36. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now an Associate Justice of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting of the Former Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4.Id. at 35.

5.Id. at 38, Comment/Opposition to Petition for Review on Certiorari.

6.Id. at 30.

7.Id. at 5.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 30.

10.Id.

11.Id.

12.Id. at 30-31.

13.Id. at 31.

14.Id.

15.Id.

16.Id.

17.Id.

18.Id.

19.Id. at 29.

20.Id. at 31.

21.Id. at 29-35.

22.Id. at 34-35.

23.Id. at 35.

24.Id. at 23-28.

25.Id. at 36.

26.Id. at 3-22-A.

27.Id. at 10.

28.Id. at 9.

29.Id. at 12.

30.Id. at 14-15. Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Far East Enterprises, Inc. (613 Phil. 436 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]).

31.Id. at 13.

32.Id. at 10.

33.Id. at 37.

34.Id. at 38-41.

35.Id. at 40.

36. Id. at 48-48-A.

37. Id. at 52-56.

38. 645 Phil. 337 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

39. Rollo, p. 53.

40. Id. at 53-54.

41. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:

   SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied)

42. Westmont Investment Corporation v. Francia, Jr., 678 Phil. 180, 191 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

43. Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas, 711 Phil. 576, 586 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

44. Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

45. Id. at 169.

46. Rollo, p. 10.

47. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 809 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

48. National Power Corporation v. Posada, 755 Phil. 613, 637 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

49. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 19 provides:

   SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

50. Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 354 Phil. 684, 692 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division].

51. 755 Phil. 613 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

52. Id. at 624.

53. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 812 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

54. City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208, 233-234 (1913) [Per J. Trent, First Division].

55. 283 Phil. 90 (1992) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].

56. RULES OF COURT, Rule 67, secs. 5 and 6 partly provide:

   SECTION 5. Ascertainment of Compensation. — Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court.

xxx xxx xxx

   SECTION 6. Proceedings by Commissioners. — . . . Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property.

57. Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, 283 Phil. 90, 101 (1992) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].

58. See Republic v. Santos, 225 Phil. 29 (1986) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

59. See Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

60. Republic v. Santos, 225 Phil. 29, 34-35 (1986) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

61. 256 Phil. 777 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

62. 233 Phil. 313 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].

63. Id. at 814-815.

64. Republic Act No. 8424 (1997), Title I, sec. 6 (E) provides:

   SECTION 6. Power of the Commissioner to Make Assessments and Prescribe Additional Requirements for Tax Administration and Enforcement. —

xxx xxx xxx

   (E) Authority of the Commissioner to Prescribe Real Property Values. — The Commissioner is hereby authorized to divide the Philippines into different zones or areas and shall, upon consultation with competent appraisers both from the private and public sectors, determine the fair market value of real properties located in each zone or area. For purposes of computing any internal revenue tax, the value of the property shall be, whichever is the higher of:

   (1) the fair market value as determined by the Commissioner; or

   (2) the fair market value as shown in the schedule of values of the Provincial and City Assessors. (Emphasis supplied)

65. Rollo, pp. 34-35.

66. 613 Phil. 436, 472-473 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

67. Republic of the Philippines v. Far East Enterprises, Inc., 613 Phil. 436, 465 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

68. CONST., art. XIII, sec. 4 provides:

   SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.