THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 218737. December 10, 2018.]
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, REPRESENTED BY THE CITY TREASURER, AND RODRIGO S. RIOLA, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL TWENTY-FIRST DIVISION, DR. JOSE P. NARAJOS, JR., SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: EARL R. NARAJOS, JOSE R. NARAJOS III, ISMAEL R. NARAJOS, CHERYL NARAJOS ESTILO AND LORELEI B. NARAJOS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated December 10, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 218737 (The City Government of Davao, represented by The City Treasurer, and Rodrigo S. Riola, in his personal capacity v. Court of Appeals, Special Twenty-First Division, Dr. Jose P. Narajos, Jr., substituted by his heirs, namely: Earl R. Narajos, Jose R. Narajos III, Ismael R. Narajos, Cheryl Narajos Estilo and Lorelei B. Narajos) — This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the July 30, 2014 Decision 1 and the March 9, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02313-MIN. The CA dismissed the appeal from the July 27, 2009 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 31,785-07.
Antecedents
On June 15, 2005, petitioner City Treasurer Rodrigo S. Riola (Riola) sent a "Notice of Sold Real Property" (notice of sale) to the original owner Leonida V. Garcia (Leonida) informing her that the property covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-7013 (Lot 33) was sold at a public auction conducted on July 19, 2004 to satisfy a real estate tax delinquency; and that pursuant to Section 261 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), she had one year from the date of registration of sale to redeem the property. The subject property was sold to Ariel O. Garcia (Ariel) and a Certificate of Sale was issued in his name. 4
On February 19, 2007, Dr. Jose P. Narajos, Jr. (Dr. Narajos) informed Riola by mail that he was already the owner of the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in his favor by Leonida; that the deed of sale was presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration on September 25, 1995; that since there was a "defect in the civil status of Dr. Narajos," the document was recorded only in the books of the Register of Deeds; and that the transfer of title to Dr. Narajos' name was held in abeyance. Dr. Narajos claimed that Leonida assigned and transferred to him the right to redeem the subject property; that it was stated in the notice of sale that the period of redemption was one year from the "date of the registration of sale." Dr. Narajos then inquired from the City Treasurer about the amount of the redemption.
In its letter-reply of March 1, 2007, the Office of the City Treasurer informed Dr. Narajos that the period within which to redeem the subject property had already lapsed. On March 12, 2007, Dr. Narajos tendered the amount of P21,247.89 to Riola and requested that a certificate of redemption be issued. Dr. Narajos' payment was refused, however, prompting him to consign the said amount to the RTC on March 14, 2007. A Notice of Deposit was sent to Riola informing him of the consignation of the redemption money to the court. 5
Because of Riola's refusal to accept the redemption payment, Dr. Narajos filed a complaint for "redemption and consignation with damages" before the RTC. He prayed that the period to redeem should commence from the date the certificate of sale was registered; that the certificate of sale issued to Ariel be declared invalid and the City Treasurer be ordered to issue a certificate of redemption; and that the payment of damages amounting to P800,000.00 be awarded. CAIHTE
In its answer, petitioner City Government of Davao asserted that Riola had acted within his duties and responsibilities when he refused Dr. Narajos' tender of payment as the redemption period had expired. It argued that Sec. 261 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Section 78 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464. Sec. 261 set the reckoning period within which to redeem property in a tax delinquency sale as the "date of the sale" and not the "date of the registration of the sale." 6
Riola also filed an answer in his personal capacity claiming good faith in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities. As special and affirmative defenses, he averred that the complaint stated no cause of action. He added that if Dr. Narajos had any such cause, it would have already prescribed. Thus, Dr. Narajos was not entitled to the relief demanded considering that the one-year period to redeem had already lapsed. In his compulsory counterclaim, Riola asked for payment of damages amounting to P820,000.00.
Dr. Narajos died on May 17, 2007. He was duly substituted by his heirs, Earl R. Narajos, Jose R. Narajos III, Ismael R. Narajos, Cheryl N. Estilo, and Lorelei B. Narajos (private respondents).
Meanwhile, Ariel filed his Answer-in-Intervention reiterating the argument that the redemption period had already expired. He claimed to have absolute right over the subject property he had purchased at a tax delinquency sale and that it should now be turned over to him by private respondents.
Ruling of the RTC
On July 27, 2009, the RTC rendered judgment, as follows:
The Court finds merit in plaintiff's Complaint.
Indeed the cited jurisprudence had clarified that the one (1) year period of redemption of property (which includes properties sold at public auction for tax delinquency) should be reckoned not on the date of sale, but from the date of the actual inscription of the sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds. The tender of payment made by plaintiff in the amount of P21,247.89, in the Office of the City Treasurer and the consignation of the said payment in the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, last March 14, 2007, was therefore made within the period of redemption.
Defendant Rodrigo Riola is, therefore, directed to receive the said amount from the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for release to Ariel O. Garcia.
The Register of Deeds is likewise directed to annotate on the Original Certificate of Title No. P-7013, that the said property has been validly redeemed.
SO ORDERED. 7
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, petitioners City Government of Davao and Riola appealed to the CA, arguing that the one-year period of redemption should be counted from July 19, 2004, the date of sale. They reasoned that it was sold by virtue of the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992. They pointed out that the RTC erred in not declaring that the said law had expressly repealed the Land Registration Act (Act 496), Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529), and P.D. No. 464.
In its decision, the appellate court dismissed the appeal as it raised a pure question of law, i.e., what law is applicable in counting the one-year redemption period of properties in tax delinquency sales. It held that an appeal raising pure questions of law should be filed directly with the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 50 further provides that an appeal erroneously brought before the CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE
WHAT LAW IS APPLICABLE IN COUNTING THE ONE-YEAR REDEMPTION PERIOD FOR REAL PROPERTY SOLD IN A TAX DELINQUENCY SALE.
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners plead that procedural rules be relaxed on appeal. They claim that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to consider jurisprudence allowing a liberal construction of the rules to serve the ends of justice. It cited Municipality of Pateros v. Court of Appeals, et al., 8 where the Court opted to relax the rules notwithstanding that the petitioner therein pursued the wrong mode of appeal. They had filed with the CA an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, raising the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the case.
On the merits, petitioners argue that Sec. 261 of R.A. No. 7160 clearly provides that the one-year period of redemption of forfeited or sold tax-delinquent properties is reckoned from the date of the auction sale rather than on the actual date of inscription by the Register of Deeds as held by the RTC. Thus, when Dr. Narajos tendered his payment to the City Treasurer and consigned the same to the RTC on March 14, 2007, the one-year redemption period allowed under the Local Government Code of 1991 had already expired. DETACa
Respondents' Arguments
Private respondents assert that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal that raised pure questions of law.
Additionally, private respondents contend that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy and needs to be struck down.
OUR RULING
On the propriety of the
There are three modes of appeal from the decisions of the RTC: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) by petition for review under Rule 42, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. 9
Section 4 10 of Circular 2-90 in effect provides that an appeal taken either to the Court or to the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, 11 Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. 12
The appeal before the CA presented two questions: first, whether the one-year redemption period for real property sold at tax delinquency sales be counted from the date of registration and not from the date of sale; and second, assuming the correct answer is the date of registration, whether such date refers to the actual inscription of the sale (annotation) in the Office of the Register of Deeds as held by the CA, or to the filing of the deed and its entry in the date (entry) book of the Registrar of Deeds based on jurisprudence. 13 Plainly, these are questions of law. Hence, the CA did not err in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners should have instead elevated the case directly to the Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
On April 22, 2015, petitioners received a copy of the March 9, 2015 CA resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. From the denial of their motion, they had until May 7, 2015, within which to file their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, they have come before the Court via a petition for certiorari in an effort to salvage their lost appeal. Evidently, appeal was available to petitioners, it being also the speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances. Consequently, petitioners failed to comply with the requirements for the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue. They were unable to show that there was no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 14
We have explained the important distinction between a Rule 45 petition for review and a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, thus:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the proper remedy of petitioner from the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. To draw a distinction, an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. We have underscored that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. Such a remedy will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 15 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Clearly, the availability to petitioners of the remedy of a petition for review on certiorari from the assailed decision and resolution of the CA effectively barred their right to resort to a petition for certiorari. 16 Such is already a sufficient justification for dismissing the present petition.
It is true that, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, the Court has in many cases treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly, if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file such petition. However, this exception is not applicable to the present factual milieu. 17 aDSIHc
Notwithstanding the procedural flaw, in the interest of justice and in view of the erroneous conclusion of the RTC as shown in the RTC decision, we shall address the legal issue at hand which has been previously settled by this Court.
One-year redemption period
In City Mayor of Quezon City, et al. v. RCBC, 18 the controversy similarly involved the reckoning period of the redemption period for auctioned tax-delinquent properties. In said case, respondent RCBC had foreclosed the real estate mortgage over certain properties of its debtor-mortgagor, the original registered owner. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of RCBC as the highest bidder. About five years later, the same properties were sold by petitioner City Treasurer, along with other tax-delinquent real properties. A Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property was issued to the purchaser at the public auction. Subsequently, RCBC tendered payment for all of the assessed tax delinquencies, interests, and other costs of the subject properties. However, the City Treasurer refused to accept them. When the latter again refused the second tender of payment, RCBC filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for injunction. Initially, the RTC denied the petition but, on motion for reconsideration, it granted the petition. It held that the counting of the one-year redemption period for tax-delinquent properties sold at public auction should start from the registration of the certificate of sale or the final deed of sale, based on Section 78 of P.D. No. 464. Accordingly, it held that the tender of payment made by RCBC was within the one-year redemption period. The City Treasurer and City Mayor filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court, assailing the lower court's interpretation of Sec. 261 of R.A. No. 7160. We held thus:
Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 provides for a one-year redemption period for properties foreclosed due to tax delinquency, thus:
Sec. 78. Redemption of real property after sale. — Within the term of one year from the date of the registration of the sale of the property, the delinquent taxpayer or his representative, or in his absence, any person holding a lien or claim over the property, shall have the right to redeem the same by paying the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy the total amount of taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption, the costs of sale and the interest at the rate of twenty per centum on the purchase price, and such payment shall invalidate the sale certificate issued to the purchaser and shall entitle the person making the same to a certificate from the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy, stating that he had redeemed the property.
From the foregoing, the owner or any person holding a lien or claim over a tax delinquent property sold at public auction has one (1) year from the date of registration of sale to redeem the property. However, since the passing of R.A. No. 7160, such is no longer controlling. The issue of whether or not R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, repealed P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code has long been laid to rest by this Court. Jurisdiction thrives to the effect that R.A. No. 7160 repealed P.D. No. 464. From January 1, 1992 onwards, the proper basis for the computation of the real property tax payable, including penalties or interests, if applicable, must be R.A. No. 7160. Its repealing clause, Section 534, reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as the crafter of the Local Government Code clearly worded the above-cited Section to repeal P.D. No. 464, it is a clear showing of their legislative intent that R.A. No. 7160 was to supersede P.D. No. 464. As such, it is apparent that in case of sale of tax delinquent properties, R.A. No. 7160 is the general law applicable. Consequently, as regards redemption of tax delinquent properties sold at public auction, the pertinent provision is Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
Section 261. Redemption of Property Sold. — Within one (1) year from the date of sale, the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein, or his representative, shall have the right to redeem the property upon payment to the local treasurer of the amount of delinquent tax, including the interest due thereon, and the expenses of sale from the date of delinquency to the date of sale, plus interest of not more than two percent (2%) per month on the purchase price from the date of sale to the date of redemption. Such payment shall invalidate the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser and the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein shall be entitled to a certificate of redemption which shall be issued by the local treasurer or his deputy.
From the date of sale until the expiration of the period of redemption, the delinquent real property shall remain in the possession of the owner or person having legal interest therein who shall remain in the possession of the owner or person having legal interest therein who shall be entitled to the income and other fruits thereof.
The local treasurer or his deputy, upon receipt from the purchaser of the certificate of sale, shall forthwith return to the latter the entire amount paid by him plus interest of not more than two percent (2%) per month. Thereafter, the property shall be free from all lien of such delinquent tax, interest due thereon and expenses of sale. ETHIDa
From the foregoing, the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein, or his representative, has the right to redeem the property within one (1) year from the date of sale upon payment of the delinquent tax and other fees. Verily, the period of redemption of tax delinquent properties should be counted not from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, as previously provided by Section 78 of P.D. No. 464, but rather on the date of sale of the tax delinquent property, as explicitly provided by Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160. 19 (Emphasis supplied)
It must be noted, though, that City Mayor was ultimately resolved in favor of RCBC. It turned out that petitioner city government had enacted an ordinance providing for the procedure in the collection of delinquent taxes on real properties within its territorial jurisdiction. Sec. 14 (a), paragraph 7 of the ordinance expressly set the redemption period within one year from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry. Being a special law with limited territorial application, the City Ordinance prevailed over the Local Government Code which is the general law on the matter. Thus, RCBC had until February 10, 2005, to redeem the properties counted from the date of registration of the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property on February 10, 2004. Its tender of payment for the properties' tax delinquencies and other fees on June 10, 2004, was well within the redemption period. 20
City Mayor was reiterated in the 2015 case of The City of Davao v. The Intestate Estate of Amado S. Dalisay. 21 This involved the forfeiture or purchase by the local government of tax delinquent properties when there is no bidder at the public auction under Section 263 of the Local Government Code. The Court declared that the reckoning period for redemption of such forfeited real properties should be from the date of their forfeiture or purchase, and not from the date of issuance of declarations of forfeiture. In that case, said declaration was belatedly issued by the City Treasurer. City Mayor invoked Sec. 261 because it involved a private individual adjudged as the highest bidder during the public auction. The case passed upon the same issue: the reckoning period of the redemption period for auctioned tax delinquent properties. Thus:
It is now apparent that the previous rule enunciating the reckoning period of redemption for tax delinquent properties from the date of the registration of sale of the property is no longer controlling. Section 261 now mandates that the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein, or his representative, has the right to redeem the property within one (1) year from the date of sale upon payment of the delinquent tax and other fees.
In the case at bench, considering the fact that neither of the parties has invoked the existence of an ordinance of similar import, the general law on the matter finds bearing. In applying the pronouncements in City Mayor to this case, the Court finds no harm in considering the interpretation of Section 261 which is emphatic in saying that the redemption period is set "within one (1) year from the date of sale," as applicable to Section 263. The usage of the terms "sale" and "forfeiture" in Sections 261 and 263, respectively, only highlights a distinction in the situations covered and produces no significant variance. The former refers to the voluntary purchase made by a bidder in public auction while the latter points to the divesting of the ownership of a particular property on account of the breach of a legal duty, without compensation, for example, the non-payment of tax. Therefore, in cases covered by these pertinent provisions in the LGC, the date of the "sale" or "forfeiture" is rightfully the point in time when the owner is divested of certain attributes of ownership over the property albeit only until the redemption of the property. This translates to no other event but to the date of the public auction. More than the purpose of uniformity and harmony among provisions of law, the Court finds this conclusion as consistent with the intention of the law. 22 (Emphasis in the original)
In this case, the one-year redemption period under Sec. 261 had long expired on July 19, 2005. The tender of payment made by Dr. Narajos on March 12, 2007, therefore, was correctly refused by petitioner City Treasurer. The Local Government Code of 1991 had long been in force when the RTC rendered its decision that erroneously cited jurisprudence prior to the enactment of said law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 30, 2014 Decision and March 9, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02313-MIN and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 31,785-07 are SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by Dr. Jose Narajos, Jr. against petitioners City Government of Davao, represented by the City Treasurer of Davao City, and Rodrigo S. Riola, in his personal capacity, is DISMISSED. cSEDTC
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 6-15; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, and concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar V. Badelles and Pablito A. Perez.
2.Id. at 16-19.
3.Id. at 50-54; penned by Judge Isaac G. Robillo, Jr.
4.Id. at 7.
5.Id. at 7-8.
6.Id. at 8.
7.Id. at 54.
8. 607 Phil. 104 (2009).
9.Republic v. Malabanan, et al., 646 Phil. 631, 637 (2010), citing Murillo v. Consul, Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 1, 1990 as cited in Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, et al., 596 Phil. 76, 92 (2009); Abedes v. Court of Appeals, et al., 562 Phil. 262, 277-278 (2007) and Suarez v. Judge Villarama, Jr., 526 Phil. 68, 74 (2006).
10. Sec. 4. Erroneous Appeals. — An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
11. Sec. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — The appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal; x x x
12.Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc, 561 Phil. 167, 181 (2007), citing Suarez v. Judge Villarama, Jr., supra note 9, at 75.
13.Rollo, p. 60.
14.Abedes v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 9, at 275.
15.Id. at 273-274.
16.Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank (Formerly Philippine Commercial International Bank), et al., 575 Phil. 384, 398 (2008).
17.Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, et al., 584 Phil. 183, 196 (2008), citing Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542, 556 (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 379 Phil. 92, 98 (2000); Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 347 Phil. 232, 256 (1997).
18. 640 Phil. 517 (2010).
19.Id. at 525-527.
20.Id. at 529-530; The City of Davao v. The Intestate Estate of Amado S. Dalisay, 764 Phil. 171, 190 (2015).
21.Id.
22.Id. at 191.