CICL XXX v. Third Division of the Sandiganbayan

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 243916. September 7, 2022.]

CICL XXX, *petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE THIRD [3RD] DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL., respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 7, 2022, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 243916 (CICL XXX v. The Honorable Third [3rd] Division of the Sandiganbayan, et al.). — This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing, on grounds of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Resolutions dated July 31, 2018 2 and October 18, 2018 3 issued by the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386. The assailed Resolutions denied the Motion to Quash Amended Information 4 filed against CICL XXX (petitioner), for violation of Section 3 (e) 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Antecedents

Petitioner was the Municipal Federation President of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of the Municipality of Patnongon, Province of Antique from December 6, 2007 to November 30, 2010. 6 Pursuant to Section 41 (b) 7 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, she was given a seat as an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Patnongon (SB-Patnongon).

On January 22, 2008, SB-Patnongon passed and approved Resolution No. 007-2008 8 authorizing Municipal Mayor Henry A. Mondejar (Mayor Mondejar) to enter into a memorandum of agreement with the Greater Antique Development Cooperative (GRAND Coop) for the purpose of transferring in favor of GRAND Coop the ownership of the Municipality of Patnongon's 40-ton rice mill.

Years later, a complaint, docketed as OMB-V-C-13-0272, was filed before the Ombudsman against Antique Lone District Representative Exequiel B. Javier, Mayor Mondejar, and the members of SB-Patnongon, on account of the supposed irregularity of Resolution No. 007-2008. 9 It was alleged that the transfer of the rice mill in favor of GRAND Coop was made without any financial consideration or justification, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the government. 10

In her Counter-Affidavit 11 dated January 13, 2014, petitioner asserted that she was merely a minor who voted for said Resolution No. 007-2008 in good faith after the same was discussed and debated upon during the plenary session of SB-Patnongon; that she was not part of any conspiracy to defraud the government; that the transfer of ownership of the rice mill in question actually took effect on December 13, 2007 or merely a week after her election as Municipal Federation President; and that, being a minor at the time of the passage of Resolution No. 007-2008, she was exempt from criminal liability. 12 TIADCc

On January 8, 2015, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution 13 recommending the filing of criminal charges against the foregoing officials of Antique, including petitioner. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman in its Order 14 dated June 27, 2016.

Thereafter, on May 5, 2017, an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386, indicting petitioner, among others, of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. The accusatory portion of said Information reads as follows:

That in or about the period from January 2007 to February 2008, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Patnongon, Province of Antique, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court; accused EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, a high-ranking public officer being the then Congressman of the Lone District of Antique; HENRY A. MONDEJAR, the then Municipal Mayor, JOHNNY FLORES S. BACONGALLO, the then Municipal Vice-Mayor, Municipal Councilors GEMMA B. CEPEDA, THOMAS V. BACAOCO, AL BRIAN T. CRESPO, FELIX GREGORIO G. BARRIENTOS, RENE PHILIP G. CAYETANO, TEOPISTO C. ESTARIS, JR., CICL XXX, all of the Municipality of Patnongon, Province of Antique; all public officers and while in the performance of their administrative and/or official functions; conspiring with one another and with private individual EFREN G. ESCLAVILLA, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Greater Antique Development Cooperative (GRAND Coop); acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the transfer of ownership, operation and maintenance of the 40-ton rice mill worth PhP9,900,000.00, intended for the Municipality of Patnongon, Antique, and funded from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of accused EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER in favor solely of GRAND Coop, without any financial consideration, and despite the absence of any research, study or justification in the selection of GRAND coop as grantee, much less any justification of the necessity of entering into such partnership with the said private entity, thereby giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to GRAND Coop, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 15

Petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Quash Information for the Accused Minor, 16 alleging inter alia that because she was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime charged, she was exempt from criminal liability; 17 that, at any rate, the Information failed to allege and prove that she acted with discernment; 18 and that in accordance with Section 5 (a) 19 of R.A. No. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to hear and try the criminal case against her. 20

The foregoing motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution 21 dated November 3, 2017. The Sandiganbayan ruled that because petitioner was already 21 years old at the time that she received the summons from the Ombudsman requiring her to file her counter-affidavit, the provisions of R.A. No. 8369, as well as R.A. No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, no longer applied to her; 22 and that the issue of whether petitioner acted with discernment or not can only be determined during the trial. 23 The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to amend the Information in the case at bar.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 24 but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 25 dated January 20, 2018.

Meanwhile, on January 11, 2018, an Amended Information was filed in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386, viz.:

That in or about the period from January 2007 to February 2008, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Patnongon, Province of Antique, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court; accused EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, a high-ranking public officer being the then Congressman of the Lone District of Antique; HENRY A. MONDEJAR, the then Municipal Mayor, JOHNNY FLORES S. BACONGALLO, the then Municipal Vice-Mayor, Municipal Councilors GEMMA B. CEPEDA, THOMAS V. BACAOCO, AL BRIAN T. CRESPO, FELIX GREGORIO G. BARRIENTOS, RENE PHILIP G. CAYETANO, TEOPISTO C. ESTARIS, JR., AND CICL XXX, a minor, above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age, and having acted with discernment, all of the Municipality of Patnongon, Province of Antique; all public officers and while in the performance of their respective administrative and/or official functions; conspiring with one another and with private individual EFREN G. ESCLAVILLA, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Greater Antique Development Cooperative (GRAND Coop); acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the transfer of ownership, operation and maintenance of the 40-ton rice mill worth PhP9,900,000.00, intended for the Municipality of Patnongon, Antique, and funded from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of accused EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER in favor solely of GRAND Coop, without any financial consideration, and despite the absence of any research, study or justification in the selection of GRAND coop as grantee, much less any justification of the necessity of entering into such partnership with the said private entity, thereby giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to GRAND Coop, to the damage and prejudice of the government. AIDSTE

CONTRARY TO LAW. 26

Petitioner then filed a Manifestation with Motion to Keep Confidential the Accused Minor's Identity, 27 followed by a Motion to Quash Amended Information. 28

Petitioner insisted that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, she was only 16 years and 15 days old, having been born on January 7, 1992, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth 29 and Baptismal Certificate; 30 that, as such, the Family Courts, not the Sandiganbayan, have jurisdiction over the case at bar; 31 that the amendment of the Information violated her right to due process because the same was made without conducting a second preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining if she indeed acted with discernment; 32 and that the Ombudsman had neither the authority nor the competence to handle cases involving children in conflict with the law. 33

The Sandiganbayan Ruling

On July 31, 2018, the Sandiganbayan issued the herein first assailed Resolution 34 denying petitioner's motions.

The Sandiganbayan maintained that petitioner could no longer be considered as a minor in conflict with the law because when she received on December 23, 2013 a copy of the Ombudsman's order directing her to file her counter-affidavit, she was already 21 years old; 35 that resultantly, the regular rules of criminal procedure should be applied and her case must be tried before the Sandiganbayan; 36 and that the amendment of the Information did not violate her right to due process because the same pertains only to the form and not to the substance of the charge against her. 37

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 38 which was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan in the second assailed Resolution 39 dated October 18, 2018.

Hence, the present recourse.

Issue

The Court is tasked to determine whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motions to quash the Information against her, as well as keep confidential her identity as a minor accused of committing a crime.

Arguments

Petitioner's contentions

Petitioner reiterates the postures that she had already presented before the Sandiganbayan.

She asseverates that because her minority at the time of the commission of the crime charged is undisputed, the prosecution had the burden of proving during the preliminary investigation that she acted with discernment. However, it failed to do so. 40 Moreover, the amendment of the Information breached her right to due process since no preliminary investigation was ever conducted to answer the question of the presence of discernment which, in any event, is best determined by a social worker and a duly trained family court judge. 41 At any rate, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to try the case against her. 42

The prosecution's contentions

In its Comment, 43 the prosecution countermands that pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 1 44 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, 45 petitioner's trial must be subjected to the regular rules of procedure; 46 that because petitioner was no longer a minor when she was subjected to preliminary investigation, there was no longer any need for the prosecution to allege in the Information that she was a minor or that she acted with discernment; 47 and, in any event, such defect had already been cured by the Amended Information. 48

Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

I.

The application of the special rules provided in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC is dependent on the age of a juvenile at the time of initial contact. Section 4 (p) 49 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC provides, inter alia, that a juvenile is deemed to have received "initial contact" upon his or her receipt of the summons or subpoena, as the case may be.

In the case at bar, the initial contact was made upon petitioner on December 23, 2013, when she received the Ombudsman's order directing her to answer the allegations against her. It is not disputed that at the time of said initial contact, petitioner was already a 21-year-old adult. She was no longer a child. Having received initial contact as an adult, the proceedings laid down in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC are inapplicable to her case. Following Section 1 50 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Sandiganbayan correctly concluded that the case against petitioner should already be tried under the regular rules of procedure. AaCTcI

Nevertheless, Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC contains a proviso which states that "the regular rules on criminal procedure shall apply without prejudice to the rights granted under Secs. 53, 54, 55 and 56." In particular, Section 54 51 of the same Rule mandates that all proceedings and records involving a child in conflict with the law should be considered privileged and kept confidential.

Accordingly, the Court holds that despite the applicability of the regular rules of procedure, petitioner's identity should be concealed in the course of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

II.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. 52 Being a matter of substantive law, 53 it pertains to the right of the court to act in a case. 54 In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. 55

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. 56 Conferred by the Constitution 57 or given by law and in the manner prescribed by law, 58 jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for. 59

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person or the parties, or jurisdiction in personam, refers to the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action. 60 It is the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on persons. 61 It is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. 62

One of the issues raised by petitioner is the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case against her, or the lack thereof.

Under Section 4 63 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1486, 64 as amended by PD No. 1606, 65 R.A. No. 8249, 66 and R.A. No. 10660, 67 the Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 where one or more of the accused are, at the time of commission of the offense, occupying the official positions enumerated in the said provision, holding a salary grade of 27 or higher under R.A. No. 6758, 68 whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity.

Here, petitioner's co-accused include a Municipal Mayor and a Member of the House of Representatives whose positions are classified as salary grade 27 69 and 31, 70 respectively. They were indicted for violation of Section 3 (e) 71 of R.A. No. 3019. Considering the circumstances, it is the Sandiganbayan which has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the case against them.

III.

Discernment, as defined in Section 4 (j) of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, is "the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the offense to understand the differences between right and wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act." It is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his or her unlawful act. 72 Under Section 6 73 of R.A. No. 9344, a child above 15 years but below 18 years of age is exempt from criminal liability, unless he or she is found to have acted with discernment.

The manner of determining whether a minor accused of a crime acted with discernment is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.

In the olden case of U.S. v. Maralit, 74 a minor who was less than 15 years old was convicted by the trial court of the crime of homicide. In measuring the presence of discernment on the part of said minor, this Court held that:

[I]t must appear from the evidence that the accused acted with knowledge of the nature of his acts and of the results which would naturally follow therefrom; but to establish that fact it is not necessary that some witness declare directly and in words that he acted with such knowledge. It is sufficient that, from the evidence as a whole, it is a necessary inference that he so acted. The trial court taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances presented by the record, together with the appearance of the accused as he stood and testified in court, drew the conclusion that he was of sufficient intelligence and was sufficiently endowed with judgment to know that the act which he committed was wrong and that it was likely to produce death. x x x 75

In the 1928 case of People v. Sera Josep, 76 a case involving a minor who was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, the Court issued a caveat that "the degree of discernment necessary to render a person accountable for his criminal acts, is not the same as that required for the full exercise of his civil rights." 77

In 1939, the Court, in People v. Doqueña, 78 where a minor was also convicted of homicide, stressed that discernment is a person's "mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial." 79

Subsequently, in People v. Capistrano, 80 the Court held that a minor accused who acted with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, especially when the trial court had the opportunity to see and hear said minor accused during the trial.

Then, in People v. Surbida, 81 We ruled that if a minor accused pleads guilty to an Information alleging that he or she acted with discernment in the commission of a crime, he or she may be convicted without the need of positive proof of his or her having acted with discernment. EcTCAD

However, in People v. Esteves, 82 the Court set aside a plea of guilty because there was "no showing as to the age, education, occupation and other personal circumstances of the accused which could guide the reviewing court, in determining whether the plea of guilty was made with sufficient discernment." 83 We arrived at the same conclusion in People v. Baylosis84 and People v. Simeon. 85

In Jose v. People, 86 We stated that "[f]or a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong." 87

In the 2009 case of Remiendo v. People, 88 the Court definitively declared that "[t]he prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness." 89

More recently, in Dorado v. People, 90 We held that "when a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the [minor] committed the alleged crime with discernment." 91

And in People v. ZZZ, 92 We added that discernment "is determined by considering all the facts of each case." 93

Prescinding from the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, it can be concluded that the presence or absence of discernment on the part of a minor accused of committing a crime is best determined during the trial. The prosecution bears the burden of proffering evidence as would demonstrate that, indeed, a minor accused committed a crime fully understanding the wrongfulness of his or her act, as well as the consequences thereof. For its part, the trial court is tasked to calibrate the evidence adduced by the prosecution and rule in favor of, or against, the minor accused.

IV.

An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. 94 When an Information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and has the authority to determine, among others, whether or not the case should be dismissed. 95

An Information, once filed in court, may still be amended. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court so states:

SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

Under this rule, any amendment — be it formal or substantial — may be made without leave of court before the arraignment. 96

A formal amendment, which can be made at any time, does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. 97 A formal amendment merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original Information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction of the crime charged. 98 HSAcaE

On the other hand, there is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. 99 In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 100 We held that a substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court, and all other matters are merely of form.

In the case at bar, the insertion of the phrase "a minor, above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age, and having acted with discernment" 101 in the Amended Information is merely a formal amendment. It neither deprives petitioner a fair opportunity to present a defense, nor does it change the theory of the prosecution or even introduce any new and material fact. 102 Verily, there is no need for the Ombudsman to conduct another preliminary investigation for the purpose of introducing the subject amendment. 103

V.

In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that before she can be indicted for violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Ombudsman must first make, during the preliminary investigation, a finding that she acted with discernment.

We reject petitioner's contention.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the Ombudsman had already made a determination on the presence of petitioner's discernment when it decided to file the Amended Information. It bears stressing that in this amendment, the Ombudsman precisely indicated that petitioner was a minor who acted with discernment. There is no need for the Ombudsman to conduct another preliminary investigation because petitioner's intended purpose had already been accomplished.

VI.

Well-settled is the rule that certiorari will lie only when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his/her jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 104 By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. 105 For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. 106 Nothing of that sort is obtaining in this case, in light of applicable laws and prevailing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 31, 2018 and October 18, 2018 issued by the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the identity of petitioner CICL XXX is ordered concealed from the records pursuant to Section 54 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

* The identity of petitioner should be kept confidential pursuant to Section 54 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC which took effect on December 1, 2009.

1. Rollo, pp. 3-28.

2. Id. at 31-42. Penned by Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang with Associate Justices Bernelito R. Fernandez and Sarah Jane T. Fernandez concurring.

3. Id. at 43-49.

4. Id. at 163-174.

5. SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

6. Rollo, p. 53.

7. SECTION 41. Manner of Election. — x x x

(b) The regular members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan shall be elected by district, x x x.

x x x Sangguniang barangay members shall be elected at large. The presidents of the leagues of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The presidents of the liga ng mga barangay and the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan elected by their respective chapters, as provided in this Code, shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan.

8. Rollo, pp. 54-56.

9. Id. at 63.

10. Id. at 66.

11. Id. at 57-62.

12. Id. at 58-61.

13. Id. at 81-104. The Resolution was signed by Amy Rose E. Soler-Rellin, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, reviewed by Euphemia B. Bacalso, Acting Director of the Evaluation and Investigation Office (EIO) and, ultimately, approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

14. Id. at 63-80. The Order was signed by Amy Rose E. Soler-Rellin, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, reviewed by Euphemia B. Bacalso, Acting Director of the EIO, recommended for approval by Paul Elmer M. Clemente, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, and, ultimately, approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

15. Id. at 106-107. The Information was signed by Jorge B. Espinal, Assistant Special Prosecutor III, before Sergio Duke B. Villar, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, and approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

16. Id. at 113-121.

17. Id. at 114.

18. Id. at 116.

19. SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. — The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred.

The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code"[.]

20. Rollo, p. 118.

21. Id. at 122-126.

22. Id. at 124-125.

23. Id. at 126.

24. Id. at 127-141.

25. Id. at 142-153.

26. Id. at 155. The Amended Information was signed by Arieta P. Say, Assistant Special Prosecutor III, before Madonna Joy L. Ednaco-Tanyag, Assistant Special Prosecutor II, and approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

27. Id. at 158-162.

28. Id. at 163-174.

29. Id. at 50.

30. Id. at 51.

31. Id. at 166.

32. Id. at 168-171.

33. Id. at 171-173.

34. Id. at 31-42.

35. Id. at 39.

36. Id. at 39-40.

37. Id. at 41.

38. Id. at 175-183.

39. Id. at 43-49.

40. Id. at 10-14.

41. Id. at 19-26.

42. Id. at 16-19.

43. Id. at 544-555.

44. SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rule. — This Rule shall apply to all criminal cases involving children in conflict with law.

A child in conflict with the law is a person who at the time of the commission of the offense is below eighteen (18) years old but not less than fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old.

This Rule shall not apply to a person who at the time of the initial contact as defined in Sec. 4 (q) of this Rule shall have reached the age of eighteen (18) in which case, the regular rules on criminal procedure shall apply without prejudice to the rights granted under Secs. 53, 54, 55 and 56 of this Rule.

45. REVISED RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.

46. Rollo, pp. 549-552.

47. Id. at 552.

48. Id. at 553.

49. SECTION 4. Definitions. — As used in this Rule,

xxx xxx xxx

(p) Initial contact is the apprehension or taking into custody of a juvenile in conflict with the law by law enforcement officers or private citizens. It includes the time when the juvenile receives a subpoena under Section 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6 (a) or Sec. 9 (b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require preliminary investigation or where there is no necessity to place the juvenile under immediate custody.

50. Supra note 44.

51. SECTION 54. Confidentiality of Proceedings and Record. — All proceedings and records involving children in conflict with the law from initial contact until final disposition of the case by the court shall be considered privileged and confidential. The public may be excluded from the proceedings and pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, the records shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the proceeding for any purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child may have the sentence suspended under Section 38 of this Rule or if the child may be granted probation under the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action.

The court shall employ other measures to protect confidentiality of proceedings including non-disclosure of records to the media, the maintenance of a separate police blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the law and the adoption of a system of coding to conceal material information, which lead to the child's identity. The records of children in conflict with the law shall not be used in subsequent proceedings or cases involving the same offender as an adult.

52. Platinum Tours and Travel, Inc. v. Panlilio, 427 Phil. 961, 967 (2003).

53. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 748 Phil. 473, 522 (2014).

54. Herrera v. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245, 251 (1913).

55. Spouses Genato v. Viola, 625 Phil. 514, 527-528 (2010).

56. Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941).

57. Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 262 Phil. 298, 304 (1990).

58. U.S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil. 90, 92 (1913).

59. Gabrillo v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 234255, October 2, 2019.

60. Macasaet v. Co., Jr., 710 Phil. 167, 177 (2013).

61. De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 748 Phil. 706, 724 (2014).

62. Guy v. Gacott, 778 Phil. 308, 318 (2016).

63. SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense[.]

64. CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS "SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (June 11, 1978).

65. REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS "SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (December 10, 1978).

66. AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (February 5, 1997).

67. AN ACT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR (April 16, 2015).

68. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPENSATION AND POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACT OF 1989.

69. Department of Budget and Management, Monthly Salary Schedule for Local Government Personnel Effective July 1, 2008, retrieved from https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/Issuances/2008/Local%20Budget%20Circular/LBC88/annex/annexes.pdf (last accessed May 13, 2022).

70. See REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6758, Section 8.

71. Supra note 5.

72. Madali v. People, 612 Phil. 582, 606 (2009).

73. SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

74. 36 Phil. 155 (1917).

75. Id. at 158.

76. 52 Phil. 206 (1928).

77. Id. at 211.

78. 68 Phil. 580 (1939).

79. Id. at 583.

80. 92 Phil. 125, 127 (1952).

81. 113 Phil. 318, 320 (1961).

82. 150-B Phil. 607 (1972).

83. Id. at 609.

84. 150-B Phil. 718 (1972).

85. 150-B Phil. 827 (1972).

86. 489 Phil. 106 (2005).

87. Id. at 113.

88. 618 Phil. 273 (2009).

89. Id. at 289.

90. 796 Phil. 233 (2016).

91. Id. at 249.

92. G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019.

93. Id.

94. RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Section 2.

95. Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, 820 Phil. 706, 720 (2017).

96. Villarba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 227777, June 5, 2020.

97. People v. Sandiganbayan (Seventh Division), G.R. No. 240621, July 24, 2019.

98. Id.

99. Mendez v. People, 736 Phil. 181, 191 (2014).

100. 283 Phil. 956, 966 (1992), citing Almeda v. Villaluz, 160 Phil. 750, 757 (1975).

101. Rollo, p. 155.

102. Buhat v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 562, 580-581 (1996).

103. Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, supra note 99 at 964.

104. Balindong v. Dacalos, 484 Phil. 574, 580 (2004).

105. Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater, 628 Phil. 81, 92-93 (2010).

106. Lagua v. Court of Appeals, 689 Phil. 452, 457 (2012).