FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156333. June 13, 2013.]
HENRY CHUA, petitioner, vs. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 13, 2013 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 156333 — HENRY CHUA, Petitioner v. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, Respondent.
By virtue of a contract of lease, petitioner Henry Chua (Chua) leased from respondent Emmanuel Andamo (Andamo) three-fourths of a semi-concrete commercial building located at 7233 J. Victor Street, Pio del Pilar, Makati City for a monthly rental of P20,000.00 from March 1994 to June 30, 1994, then P25,000.00/monthly from July 1, 1994 onwards. The monthly rental was increased by 20% to P30,000.00/month effective July 2, 1995. On April 3, 1998, Andamo sent a letter to Chua, demanding payment of the unpaid rentals starting from August 1997. After Chua refused to comply, Andamo brought the matter to the proper barangay for conciliation, but the parties failed to amicably settle their dispute at the barangay. Hence, Andamo commenced this special civil action for unlawful detainer on September 23, 1998 in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Makati City (MeTC). IcAaEH
In his answer to Andamo's complaint, Chua denied being still the real party-in-interest to be sued as defendant after having subleased the premises to one Nelson Sin as early as January 27, 1997 under a deed of transfer; that on August 27, 1997, an agreement had been entered into by himself, Andamo and Nelson Sin whereby he agreed that Nelson Sin would be the one to directly pay the monthly rentals to Andamo; and that Andamo had actually received the payment for the arrearages until August 1997 from Nelson Sin.
On July 20, 1999, the MeTC decided the unlawful detainer action in favor of Andamo, 1 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Henry Chua and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the leased premises known as 7233 J. Victor St., Pio Del Pilar, Makati City and return the possession of which (sic) to the plaintiff; to pay P30,000.00 per month from August 1, 1997 and the same amount every month thereafter with legal rate of interest from even date, until the property is finally restituted to the plaintiff, as reasonable compensation for the continued and illegal use and occupancy of the property in question; the additional sum of P10,000.00 as for (sic) attorney's fees plus cost of suit (sic).
SO ORDERED.
Considering that Chua appealed only his monetary liability, the possession of the leased property was meanwhile restored to Andamo pursuant to the MeTC's decision.
On February 7, 2001, the Regional Trial Court in Makati City (RTC) reversed the MeTC, and dismissed the unlawful detainer action, 2 holding:
After a review of the records of the case and a perusal of the memoranda of the parties, this Court finds reason to reverse the decision appealed from. The issue of whether or not the lessee can be held liable to pay for the unpaid rentals on the leased premises now in the actual possession of an alleged sub-lessee is resolved in favor of the lessee. AECIaD
Appellants' contention that plaintiff-appellee agreed that rentals beginning August 1997 be paid to him directly by Nelson Sin, defendant-appellant's sub-lessee, deserves consideration against plaintiff-appellee's denial of the said agreement. The letter dated May 29, 1998 (Annex 2-position paper for defendant) belies plaintiff-appellee's claim that defendant is still responsible for the payment of the rentals due under the lease contract. It would be incongrous for defendant to invent such letter which speaks of an agreement albeit verbal in character between plaintiff-appellee, defendant-appellant and the sub-lessee Nelson Sin that the latter will pay, and in fact, paid directly to plaintiff-appellee the monthly arrearages and that Nelson Sin will be substituted as lessee of the subject premises. Hence, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from demanding the unpaid rentals from August 1997 from defendant-appellant when Nelson Sin begun to default thereon.
In view of the foregoing, this Court resolves that since it was established by preponderance of evidence that defendant-appellant has ceased to become the lessee of plaintiff-appellee, the latter has no more recourse against the former but against Nelson Sin the new tenant-possessor.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision dated July 20, 1999 is hereby REVERSED instant appeal DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
On March 15, 2001, Andamo, through the Law Office of Dominguez, Delani, Dominguez, Orsos and Fortuno, moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's decision. 3
On March 16, 2001, another law office (Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan) filed a motion for time to file a petition for review in behalf of Andamo. 4 The CA granted the motion for time on April 2, 2001, giving him a non-extendible period of 15 days from March 21, 2001 (or until April 5, 2001), within which to file the petition for review. Instead of filing the petition for review, however, the Law Office of Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan later on withdrew the appeal upon motion filed in the CA on April 4, 2001. 5 The CA granted the motion for withdrawal of the appeal. 6 The withdrawal ultimately became final, per the entry of judgment dated June 7, 2001 issued by the CA. aIcDCT
After the RTC denied Andamo's motion for reconsideration on May 18, 2001, 7 Andamo appealed to the CA. This appeal was what the CA ultimately resolved in Andamo's favor through its assailed decision promulgated on May 16, 2002, reversing the RTC, and reinstating the MeTC's decision, 8 viz.:
The petition is meritorious.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the merits of the case, it is to be emphasized that the bone of contention is whether or not the private respondent is the one truly liable to pay the petitioner for the unpaid rentals of the subject premises. It is clear that the unpaid rentals are to be reckoned from August 1997. The petitioner believes the unpaid rentals must be paid by no other than by the private respondent, the latter being his lessee, as evidenced by their contract of lease. The herein private respondents never denied such contract, however, he insists that the subject premises was subleased to Nelson Sin and that on August 27, 1997 there was an agreement among the three of them that Nelson Sin would directly pay the monthly rental to the petitioner. Accordingly, the private respondent in raising an issue that from the time the rentals were not paid, he was no longer a lessee of the subject premises but Nelson Sin.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, the private respondent who is raising the issue whether he is still a lessee of the subject building at the time unpaid rentals accrued, has the burden of proving the same by preponderance of evidence — an evidence which is of greater weight than that which is offered in opposition. ASDCaI
In its assailed decision the RTC ruled that the private respondent's claim that Nelson Sin should be the one liable to the petitioner is shown by the letter sent by his lawyer to Nelson Sin, reminding Nelson Sin of the agreement between the three of them that it is he (Nelson Sin) who will pay the rentals of the leased premises. However this court cannot simply agree that with the existence of such letter, the private respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence his affirmative defense. The date of the letter and the registry receipt would not assume significance for being self-serving. They are mere afterthoughts which were executed and sent to Nelson Sin only after the petitioner started to demand payment for the unpaid rentals and after the petitioner has secured a certificate to file action from the barangay concerned. If there is truth to the claim of the private respondent that Nelson Sin has already substituted him as lessee, then nothing will prevent him from including Nelson Sin as party-defendant. In Fact, the Rules allow him to file a third-party complaint against Nelson Sin. Hence, it is the belief of this court that without any other competent evidence, the defense of the private respondent as against the existence of the contract of lease falls.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision and order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision rendered by Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62259 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 9
Chua moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion.
Hence, Chua has come to the Court via petition for review on certiorari. The Court initially denied due course to the petition, but reinstated it on March 19, 2003 upon motion of Chua.
Issues
The petitioner argues that the CA should not have entertained Andamo's appeal because his petition for review had been filed late; and that the CA disregarded Chua's evidence showing that he had meanwhile ceased to be the lessee of the premises. He further posits that Andamo's failure to file a timely petition for review, and the withdrawal of the appeal filed on March 16, 2001 barred him from seeking relief from the CA. HSCcTD
In his comment, 10 Andamo asserts that Chua's arguments raise questions of fact, not questions of law as required by a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The issue is whether the CA committed a reversible error in giving due course to Andamo's appeal, and in ruling on the merits of the case in Andamo's favor.
Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Section 2 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal of a decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that the "petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration."
Based on the foregoing rule, Andamo's appeal was timely. He had received the order of the RTC denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the Law Office of Dominguez, Delani, Dominguez, Orsos and Fortuno on June 1, 2001. Within the 15-day period to appeal reckoned from June 1, 2001, he filed in the CA a motion for extension of the time to file a petition for review. That motion for extension was allowed by Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the CA "to grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review." On June 26, 2001, the CA granted his motion for extension, and expressly allowed him until July 1, 2001 within which to file his petition for review. He filed his petition for review in the CA on June 29, 2001, or two days prior to the end of his additional period. ETDAaC
It is erroneous for Chua to argue that the withdrawal of the March 16, 2001 appeal initiated in Andamo's behalf by the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law Office rendered the RTC's decision final. The previous filing of Andamo's motion for reconsideration by the Law Office of Dominguez, Delani, Dominguez, Orsos and Fortuno effectively precluded that outcome. In fact, the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law Office withdrew the erroneously-filed appeal on April 4, 2001 in consideration of the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in the RTC, which denied the motion for reconsideration only on May 18, 2001. It is relevant to note that the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law Office conceded that more than anything else inadvertence and the failure to confer with its collaborating counsel were the causes of said law office's taking of the appeal on March 16, 2001. 11
As to whether or not Chua still remained legally liable to pay the rentals starting from August 1, 1997, both the CA and the MeTC declared that he was because he did not present competent evidence establishing that he had meanwhile ceased to be the lessee of the leased premises. The RTC differed from the CA and the MeTC because it gave weight to Chua's evidence showing that he had ceased to be the lessee by virtue of the deed of transfer covering the leased premises executed between him and Nelson Sin, and by the letter dated May 29, 1998 of Chua's counsel to Nelson Sin.
Although the question of Chua's liability for the unpaid rentals is essentially a factual one whose determination would depend on whether or not Nelson Sin had taken over from Chua as tenant with the consent of Andamo, and as such could not be the proper subject of a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, 12 the rule is not without exceptions, including the following, namely: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the CA went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (f) when the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (g) when said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (h) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (i) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence of record. 13 ISCDEA
One of the aforementioned exceptions is applicable herein, because the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the RTC. Hence, the Court undertakes the review, and itself ascertain the facts on the basis of the record.
We conclude from our review that the evidence on record sustains the findings of the CA and MeTC. For one, the contract of lease expressly made Chua the lessee who bore the obligation to pay the rentals to Andamo as the lessor. In that context, the obligation of Chua was express. Also, Chua was shown to have himself paid the rentals to Andamo from March 1998 until July 1998, many months beyond the date of the execution of the supposed deed of transfer on January 27, 1997. 14 And, lastly, a facial examination of the letter dated May 29, 1998 that Chua's counsel sent to Nelson Sin fails to show Andamo's knowledge of and consent to the supposedly verbal agreement to have Nelson Sin assume the liability to pay the rentals. The CA found the letter dated May 29, 1998 not only as self-serving but also as executed purposely to support Chua's defense mainly because of its being written only after Andamo had started to demand payment of the unpaid rentals and after Andamo had been issued the certificate to file action by the barangay. In short, the totality of the evidence satisfactorily established Chua's liability for the unpaid rentals.
Chua's liability for the rentals rested on both law and contract. From the point of view of the law, Article 1657 of the Civil Code obliged him as the lessee "to pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated" by the parties. From the point of view of contracts, the clear terms of the contract of lease designated Chua as the lessee with the obligation to pay the rentals. Under the circumstances, the judgment against Chua for the "restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs" was unquestionably called for. 15 He remained liable as the lessee for the stipulated rentals to Andamo as the lessor because he did not competently establish that the lessor had meanwhile agreed to a transfer of the obligation to lease to another party.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on May 16, 2002; and DIRECT petitioner Henry Chua to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 95-96; penned by Judge Cesar D. Santamaria.
2.Id. at 112-114; penned by Pairing Judge Zeus Abrogar.
3.Id. at 116-122.
4.Id. at 109-110.
5.Id. at 142-144 and 161.
6.Id. at 161.
7.Id. at 148-149.
8.Id. at pp. 38-42; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired).
9.Id. at 41-42.
10.Id. at 171-174.
11.Id. at 143.
12.Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320, 332.
13.Ibarra v. Ibarra Sr., No. L-52393, December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA 616, 622.
14.Rollo, pp. 95-96.
15.Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.