SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233987. January 22, 2018.]
SUSAN M. CHAMORRO, petitioner,vs. DR. SYLVIA B. SANTIAGO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 22 January 2018 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 233987 (Susan M. Chamorro v. Dr. Sylvia B. Santiago)
After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM the April 11, 2017 Decision 1 and August 16, 2017 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139646 for failure of petitioner Susan M. Chamorro (petitioner) to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in remanding the instant case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 70 (MeTC) for the reception of defense evidence insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the presentation of various checks purportedly drawn from the account of and signed by petitioner are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of money claim in favor of respondent Dr. Sylvia B. Santiago. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to petitioner to present controverting evidence to support her position. Case law provides that a check constitutes an evidence of indebtedness and is a veritable proof of obligation. It functions more than a promissory note since it not only contains an undertaking to pay an amount of money, but is an order addressed to the bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank, 3 as in this case.
Furthermore, the order of remand to the MeTC for the presentation of defense evidence in respect to the civil aspect of the case is proper as the acquittal of an accused in a criminal case does not preclude judgment against him on the civil aspect thereof. While the rule admits of various exceptions, none exists in this instance. 4
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 35-43. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Justice and Chairperson Normandie B. Pizarro and Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez concurring.
2.Id. at 44-45.
3. See Ting Ting Pua v. Spouses Lo Bun Tiong and Siok Ching Teng, 720 Phil. 511, 525 (2013); citation omitted.
4. "The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him." (Daluraya v. Oliva, 749 Phil. 531, 537 [2014]; citation omitted).