Centeno v. Paguio

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 11667. December 10, 2018.]

PABLO F. CENTENO, complainant, vs.ATTY. RENATO T. PAGUIO, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated December 10, 2018, which reads as follows:

"A.C. No. 11667 (Pablo F. Centeno v. Atty. Renato T. Paguio) — This case arose from an Administrative Complaint 1 filed by Pablo F. Centeno (complainant) against Atty. Renato T. Paguio (respondent) for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Complainant was the petitioner in the probate of the will of Delfin Ramirez Jarin pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, while respondent represented Leila Cortes Alampay (Alampay) who was an oppositor in the said special proceeding. Complainant claimed that respondent fabricated facts and made untruthful statements under oath to establish a ground for a motion for inhibition against the handling judge, then Judge Bernelito R. Fernandez (Judge Fernandez). 2 In the aforesaid motion for inhibition, Alampay and respondent alleged that complainant and his counsel entered the judge's chambers which caused the loss of hope for an objective and impartial determination of their case. 3 Complainant vehemently denied the said allegation and, in fact, filed a criminal case for perjury against respondent apart from this administrative complaint. Complainant asserted that respondent's act is unlawful and a clear violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

Preliminarily, respondent argued that he was duty bound to expose indiscretions which extend to corrupt and unethical members of the bar. He also pointed out a defect in the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping of the complaint wherein complainant failed to mention the case he filed against respondent before the Office of the City Prosecutor for perjury. In his defense on substantial grounds, he contended that complainant was merely sourgraping as his ejectment case filed against the client of respondent was dismissed and the motions filed by complainant were put on hold until the handling judge inhibited from the case. He stands by his statements in the motion for inhibition and the corresponding joint affidavit that complainant and his counsel committed "chamber practice." Respondent maintained that a positive statement by five (5) witnesses, himself included, prevails over a general negative denial. Finally, he raised the issue of violation of privileged communication which may not be subject of a prosecution. He argued that the use of a judicial pleading, the joint affidavit in this case, for the prosecution of respondent violated the tenet of absolute privileged communication. CAIHTE

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline conducted a mandatory conference wherein both parties appeared before Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr., LhM. (Commissioner De la Rama, Jr.). Thereafter, the parties were directed to file their position papers, together with documentary exhibit. After evaluation of the case, Commissioner De la Rama, Jr. found violations of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. Commissioner De la Rama, Jr. believed that respondent merely fabricated and made untruthful statements to ensure that the motion for inhibition would be granted. During the mandatory conference, respondent failed to confirm whether complainant and his counsel actually entered the chambers of Judge Fernandez. 4

The IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution on April 18, 2015, adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding that the same was fully supported by evidence on record and applicable laws. 5

Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied. 6 Thus, he filed a Petition for Equitable Reliefs 7 before us.

OUR RULING

We find partial merit in the petition.

In the motion for inhibition, it was alleged that respondent, together with his companions, saw complainant and his counsel enter the judge's chamber 8 and also stated that, together with his client, they perceive a clear sense of bias for complainant. 9 He claimed that the antagonism of the judge could be discerned, and narrated that he felt the apathy of the judge in one of the hearings in riling him that the proceeding was for a probate of a will.

On the allegation of chamber practice, respondent himself admitted during the mandatory conference that he did not actually see complainant and his counsel enter the judge's chambers nor did he ask any of the court personnel whether the said parties were there. It was also found that contradictory statements were made by respondent. In the Joint Affidavit, respondent came to know that complainant and his counsel were inside the judge's chambers based on the narration of his clients, who were not party litigants to the probate case and whose familiarity with complainant and his counsel were not established as observed by the Investigating Commissioner. 10 While in the motion for inhibition, respondent claims that he and his client-movant Alampay saw complainant and his counsel enter the chambers. 11 These inconsistencies, to the mind of the Court, establish doubt as to the truthfulness of the facts.

Being a lawyer, an officer of the court, respondent should have, at the very least, a sense of certainty in his allegations especially when he himself signed the affidavit and actually involved himself in the motion filed before the court. The requirement of certainty of facts may be different had respondent only prepared the pleadings/affidavit on behalf of his client. But in this case, since he is an affiant and considering his involvement based on the narration of his pleading, respondent should have exercised caution and established certainty of facts before signing the said documents.

He likewise claims in the motion for inhibition that there were other pieces of information showing partiality and unfairness, 12 but did not elaborate on them. Considering the materiality of the said information to the motion, Atty. Paguio still failed to enumerate his allegations, which lead this Court to suspect that he has no other evidence. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light then Judge Fernandez; yet, he did not even include any particulars that would validate his claim. Bare allegations of hostility and partiality will not suffice. DETACa

In this regard, we find that respondent violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 of the CPR, thus:

Canon 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

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Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

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Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

We have to emphasize that lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. 13 It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 14

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self-interest. 15

In this case, without clear and convincing evidence to establish bias, respondent should not have encouraged his client, much more, participated in the baseless allegation in the motion for inhibition and joint affidavit. We agree with the IBP that if respondent is "not sure if the complainant and Atty. Mendoza entered the chamber of the judge, he should refrain from making statements that tend to destroy the image and reputation of the presiding judge." 16 Respondent is clearly remiss in his duty to the courts and the legal profession in the process of protecting the interest of his client.

As to the issue of privileged communication, this Court finds no application of the doctrine in this case. In Belen v. People, 17 this Court had the occasion to clarify the doctrine of absolute privileged communication in judicial proceedings/pleadings, to wit:

A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith. This class includes allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as answers given by the witness[es] in reply to questions propounded to them in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive to the questions propounded to said witnesses.

The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged is not only because said pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also to the undeniable fact [that] said pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for proper administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they can be supported by evidence in good faith, the contents of which would be under scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein. In fine, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice. aDSIHc

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The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice, if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in and or subject of the inquiry. Sarcastic, pungent and harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make the alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that a matter alleged in the pleading may be privileged, it need not, in any case, be material to the issue presented by the pleadings; however, it must be legitimately related thereto or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial. What is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not [to] be scrutinized with microscopic intensity, as it would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communication. 18 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)

In his attempt to justify his actions, respondent is confusing the Court in claiming that the judge is biased, thus, the need to file a motion for inhibition, and at the same time shedding partiality against the judge and/or the other parties by asserting the privileged communication doctrine.

The statements made in the affidavit and the motion for inhibition are not covered by privileged communication as the privilege does not extend to communications proven improper and irrelevant to the controversy, much more, when not supported by evidence. Thus, such statements cannot escape scrutiny and respondent cannot be allowed to take refuge in the doctrine of privileged communication after alleging an unlawful act without basis in order to advance the cause of his client.

Finally, the allegation of a defect in the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping must likewise fail. This Court had ruled in Pena v. Atty. Aparicio, 19 that:

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or "action" is one that necessarily involves "the same issues" as the one posed in the disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.

Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person." Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure — which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible." 20 (Citations omitted) ETHIDa

At any rate, we rule that there is substantial compliance when complainant himself mentioned in the body of his complaint that he filed a criminal case for perjury against respondent.

As to the penalty, the Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment as we are convinced that through it the end desired of reforming the errant lawyer is possible. 21 In other words, we heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. 22 It is our view that admonition will suffice under the circumstances. That there is no material damage to the complainant may be considered as a mitigating circumstance 23 and this being respondent's first offense, he should be entitled to some measure of forbearance. 24 A penalty other than disbarment may satisfactorily forewarn the respondent and other members of the bar to be more cautious and diligent in the practice and exercise of their profession. 25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Renato T. Paguio is hereby ADMONISHED, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 2-5.

2. Now Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

3.Rollo, p. 230.

4.Id. at 305-315.

5.Id. at 304.

6.Id. at 373.

7.Id. at 389-424.

8.Id. at 227-228.

9.Id. at 229-230.

10.Id. at 254.

11.Id. at 227-228.

12.Id. at 229.

13.Roxas, et al. v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al., 554 Phil. 323, 341 (2007).

14.Id. at 341-342.

15.Judge Madrid v. Atty. Dealca, 742 Phil. 514, 523 (2014).

16.Rollo, p. 314.

17. 805 Phil. 628 (2017).

18.Id. at 647-649.

19. 552 Phil. 512 (2007).

20.Id. at 521-522.

21.Arma v. Atty. Montevilla, 581 Phil. 1, 8 (2008).

22.Vitug v. Atty. Rongcal, 532 Phil. 615, 632 (2006).

23.Maligaya v. Atty. Doronilla, Jr., 533 Phil. 303, 311 (2006).

24.Id.

25.Arma v. Atty. Montevilla, supra note 21, at 9.