Celdran y Pamintuan v. People

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 220127. November 21, 2018.]

CARLOS CELDRAN y PAMINTUAN, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Special First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 21, 2018which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 220127 — Carlos Celdran y Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines

This resolve the motion for reconsideration 1 filed by petitioner Carlos Celdran y Pamintuan and the Omnibus Motion 2 filed by People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) questioning our Resolution 3 dated March 21, 2018, the dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 12, 2014 and Resolution dated August 14, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36170 are hereby AFFIRMED. 4

Factual Antecedents

In our Resolution dated March 21, 2018, the antecedent facts of this case are as follows:

Petitioner was charged in an Information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 4, for the offense of Offending the Religious Feelings defined and penalized under Article 133 of the RPC.

The facts of the case established that in celebration of the second anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign (MTBC) and the launching of the Hand Written Bible which coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome, a throng of people composed mainly of catholic church dignitaries intermixed with those of different religions such as members of the military, police, media, non-catholics, students, representatives of various religious organizations gathered around the Manila Cathedral in the afternoon of September 30, 2010. cSEDTC

The event was comprised of three (3) inseperable parts. The first part was the ecumenical liturgical religious worship wherein the heads of the different protestant mainland churches and the catholic church were present celebrating the words of God. It was followed by the Eucharistic celebration — the holy mass. The last part was the hand written unity bible.

While Brother Edgar J. Tria Tirona was reading a passage from the Bible around 3:00 p.m., petitioner entered the Manila Cathedral clad in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the center of the aisle, in front of the altar and suddenly brought out a placard emblazoned with the word "DAMASO." Commotion ensued when petitioner started shouting while inside the church saying "Bishops, stop involving yourself (sic) in politics," disrupting and showing disrespect to an otherwise solemn celebration.

The defense, on the other hand, alleged that the incident did not happen during the celebration of the holy mass and nothing happened that disturbed the proceedings.

The MeTC in its Decision dated December 14, 2012, found petitioner guilty of the crime Offending Religious Feelings, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [petitioner] is found "Guilty" beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Offending Religious Feelings under Article 133 of the [RPC], and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no mitigating and aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) months and twenty-one (21) days as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days as maximum of prision correccional in its medium period, with costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Upon appeal to the RTC, the latter in its Decision affirmed petitioner's conviction, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the Decision dated December 14, 2012 rendered by the [MeTC], Branch 4, Manila finding [petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Offending Religious Feelings under Article 133 of the [RPC], and sentencing him to an indeterminate prision term of two (2) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor, as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum with costs de officio. SDAaTC

SO ORDERED.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA. In its Decision dated December 12, 2014, the CA affirmed the findings of the MeTC and the RTC which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the 12 August 2013 Decision and the Order dated 11 November 2013 of the [RTC] of Manila, Branch 32 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 5

Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion

Both petitioner and the OSG argue as to the unconstitutionality of Article 133 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). They claim that Article 133 of the RPC violates the constitutional right of freedom of expression and of free speech. Article 133 of the RPC regulates the contents of a speech and its overbreadth and vagueness application result in a chilling effect on what would otherwise be considered as free speech.

Ruling of the Court

The motion for reconsideration and omnibus motion are both denied.

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states that "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."

All laws are presumed to be valid and constitutional. As held in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan: 7

This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. x x x. 8

Further in case of Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan: 9

Every statute is presumed valid. On the party challenging its validity weighs heavily the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put by Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary, the rationale for the presumption of constitutionality was explained by this Court thus:

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. 10 (Citations omitted)

In the present case, petitioner seeks to declare the unconstitutionality of Article 133 of the RPC indirectly through the appeal of the criminal case. In their motions, petitioner and the OSG claim that Article 133 of the RPC is, on its face, and as applied to petitioner, void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. acEHCD

Even if this Court considers petitioner's arguments on the purported unconstitutionality of Article 133 of the RPC, the same would not result to the reversal of his conviction.

At the outset, facial invalidation of statutes is generally disfavored. This is because it results in the striking down of an entire statute on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Certainly, facial challenges to statutes constitute as an exception to the case and controversy requirements of deciding constitutional issues.

In his Concurring Opinion in Estrada, 11 Justice Mendoza succinctly discussed the nature of a facial and as applied challenges and its applicability to penal statutes:

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative Act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." EcTCAD

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. 12 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

As an exception, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine may be allowed when the subject penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech. Thus, in Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., 13 this Court allowed facial invalidation of the criminalization of aiding and abetting cyberlibel because of its chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use the cyberspace, and boost a social media post by liking, commenting or sharing the same.

Evidently, such is not the case here. Article 133 of the RPC does not encroach on the freedom of expression as it does not regulate free speech. The gravamen of the penal statute is the disruption of a religious ceremony and/or worship by committing acts that are notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful inside a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of a religious ceremony. There is nothing in the provision that imposes criminal liability on anyone who wishes to express dissent on another religious group. It does not seek to prevent or restrict any person from expressing his political opinions or criticisms against the Catholic church, or any religion.

A facial challenge on the ground of the overbreadth doctrine is also impermissible in this case. In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 14 this Court refused to facially invalidate Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on such ground that it does not regulate free speech but covers a spectrum of conduct which is manifestly within the State's authority to regulate. The Court held that "claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words." 15 Again, Article 133 of the RPC does not regulate only spoken words. It encompasses all acts that are notoriously offensive to the religious feelings. Such acts are within the State's authority to regulate.

Notably, the OSG argued that Article 133 of the RPC is vague also "as applied to petitioner." In Romualdez, 16 the Court allowed an "as applied challenge" through examining the vagueness of the assailed statute as applied to the party raising its vagueness. In determining whether the term "intervene" is vague, the Court held:

As to petitioners claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood through simple statutory construction. HSAcaE

The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law "void for vagueness," if the meaning can be determined through the judicial function of construction. Elementary is the principle that words should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.17 (Citation and italics omitted and emphasis ours)

Jurisprudence further provides that the void-for-vagueness doctrine can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. As such, a statute is not vague if it defines the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. 18

Petitioner and OSG claim that the terms "notoriously offensive" and "religious feelings" are vague. We disagree.

The said terms are not utterly vague as they are composed of words commonly used. As such, any person of ordinary intelligence may understand the same in their ordinary and usual meaning. Further, although the Court has not specifically defined the said terms, there is no dearth of jurisprudence providing examples of acts which are considered notoriously offensive to the religious feelings such as stoning of a minister while he was preaching or spreading his belief on a public road before a crowd of around 500 persons. 19 In contrast, the accused charged with an offense under Article 133 of the RPC was acquitted in the following cases:

In People v. Reyes, et al. (CA-G.R. No. 13633-R, July 27, 1955), the accused Reyes, who was the chief of police of the town of San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, ordered his policemen to stop Minister Sanidad of the Iglesia ni Kristo, which was then holding a meeting at the public plaza, from continuing with his sermon when the latter attacked in the course of his sermon the Catholic and Aglipayan churches, as well as the women of San Esteban, Ilocos Sur. Accused were convicted of violation of Art. 131 of the Revised Penal Code.

xxx xxx xxx

People v. Mandoriao (CA-G.R. No. 12114, February 25, 1955, 51 O.G. 4619) started with a rally organized by the Iglesia ni Kristo, attended by about 300 people, 50 of whom belonged to the said sect at a public park in Baguio City. One of the ministers of the sect expounded on a topic asserting that Christ was not God but an ordinary man, causing the crowd to become unruly, whereupon, appellant went up the stage and grabbed the microphone challenging the minister to a debate. (The lower court convicted appellant of violation of Art. 133 of the Revised Penal Code but the Court of Appeals acquitted him). 20

Given the foregoing cases where the Court either applied or refused to apply Article 133 of the RPC, petitioner cannot claim a total lack of understanding of what constitutes a notoriously offensive act. In fact, petitioner himself cited the case of People v. Baes21 and argued that the standard provided therein (i.e., judging whether the acts are notoriously offensive according to the feelings of the person professing such faith) should be revisited. Further, petitioner's acts of purposely dressing in a Jose Rizal costume while raising a placard and shouting "Bishops, stop meddling in politics" during a big gathering/celebration attended by important dignitaries of the Catholic Church and other religious sects clearly evinces his intent to cause dishonor, offend and disrepute the church. To argue that the term "notoriously offensive" is vague is belied by petitioner's calculated acts to cause offense and disruption in the said gathering.

At any rate, the absence of definition of terms constituting an offense is not uncommon. For instance, the Court had opined that the term "obscenity" has no perfect definition. Thus, it is an "issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges sound discretion." 22 Likewise, whether an act is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings is an issue that should be treated on a case to case basis. HESIcT

Moreover, this Court cannot give credit to petitioner and the OSG's contention that Article 133 of the RPC violates non-establishment clause of Section 5, Article III of the Constitution.

At the outset, the non-establishment clause is a reinforcement of the principle of separation of church and state. It is not equivalent to separation of religion and state. It is not indifference nor denial of the religious nature of the Filipino society. In the case of In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, 23 this Court succinctly explained the non-establishment clause:

On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion," otherwise known as the non-establishment clause. Indeed, there is a thin line between accommodation and establishment, which makes it even more imperative to understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society's perspective.

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.

Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:

"In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Such government neutrality may be summarized in four general propositions: (1) Government must not prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because such preference would violate voluntarism and breed dissension; (2) Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes because this too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; (3) Government action must not aid religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; [and] (4) Government action must not result in excessive entanglement with religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension." (Italics in the original and emphasis ours) caITAC

In this case, petitioner himself admitted that Article 133 of the RPC "protects all religion." It does not endorse nor give aid to one religion over the other. No excessive entanglement will result from the effectivity of Article 133 of the RPC as it does not punish every act which may be construed to attack one religion. It only covers those acts which are "notoriously offensive" to the feelings of the faithful. In determining whether there was excessive entanglement of the State in church matters, the following factors are considered: 1) the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited; 2) the nature of the aid that the State provides; and 3) the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. 24 In this case, petitioner and the OSG has not endeavored to establish how the State can be unduly involved with church matters. It also bears to note that there is nothing in Article 133 of the RPC which requires the State, or the courts for that matter, to be partisan in favor of any church in making its factual findings.

On the contrary, we agree with the CA that Article 133 of the RPC merely implements the right of the religious to conduct their rites within their place of worship.

As to the violation of equal protection of laws, we fail to see merit in petitioner's contention that Article 133 of the RPC is a discriminatory penal statute against non-believers. As stated above, non-believers are not prohibited from expressing dissent outside premises devoted to public worship, and after the celebration of religious ceremony. TAIaHE

In all, we do not find any cogent reasons to modify, much less reverse our Resolution dated March 21, 2018. As stated, the acts of petitioner were meant to mock, insult, and ridicule those clergy whose beliefs and principles were diametrically opposed to his own, 25 as such, petitioner is guilty of Article 133 of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Omnibus Motion are hereby DENIED. Our Resolution dated March 21, 2018 STANDS.

NO FURTHER pleadings or motions shall be entertained herein.

Let an ENTRY of judgment in this case be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED." Peralta, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated October 22, 2018 in lieu of Leonardo-de Castro, C.J.; Bersamin, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated October 22, 2018 in lieu of Sereno, C.J.; Del Castillo, J.; Caguioa, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated March 12, 2018 in lieu of Jardeleza, J.; and Tijam, J.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 799-832.

2.Id. at 777-796.

3.Id. at 772-776.

4.Id. at 775.

5.Id. at 772-774.

6.Article 133.Offending the religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

7. 421 Phil. 290 (2001).

8.Id. at 342-343.

9. 479 Phil. 265 (2004).

10.Id. at 284-285.

11.Supra note 7.

12.Id. at 354-355.

13. 727 Phil. 28 (2014).

14. 522 Phil. 705 (2006).

15.Id. at 776.

16.Supra note 9.

17.Id. at 287.

18.Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 7, at 352.

19.See Concurring Opinion of Justice Felix Makasiar in Pamil v. Judge Teleron, 176 Phil. 51, 108 (1978).

20.Id.

21. 68 Phil. 203 (1939).

22.Fernando v. CA, 539 Phil. 407, 417 (2006).

23. A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017.

24.See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

25.Rollo, p. 126.