FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 191230. August 30, 2016.]
CEBU MITSUMI, INC., petitioner, vs. LORNA D. TAN, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 30, 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 191230 — CEBU MITSUMI, INC., Petitioner, v. LORNA D. TAN, Respondent. — The letter dated July 25, 2016 of Ophelia R. Lapiz, Administrative Officer V, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City, transmitting the records of RAB-VII-05-0899-2004; and the letter dated July 15, 2016 of Mario C. Agura, Records Officer II, Archives and Receiving Unit, Court of Appeals, Cebu City, transmitting the Court of Appeals rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 01520 consisting of one (1) folder with 505 pages, are both NOTED.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner questions the Decision 1 dated September 18, 2007 (the questioned decision) and the Resolution 2 dated January 27, 2010 (the questioned resolution) of the Court of Appeals in Cebu City in Special Civil Action CA-G.R. SP No. 01520.
Petitioner Cebu Mitsumi, Inc. (petitioner) is a corporation duly organized under Philippine laws and is engaged in the manufacture of semi-conductors and computer and electronic parts, with more than fifteen thousand (15,000) employees. In 1989, petitioner hired production operators who were between the ages of 18 and 23. Respondent Lorna Dagandan Tan (respondent) applied for the position, stating that she was born on May 1, 1968, and attaching to her application a certification of birth issued by the assistant local civil registrar of her hometown and her SSS E-1 form stating that she was born on said date. Respondent was consequently hired for the position on July 17, 1989.
In her application form as production operator, respondent swore to the following statements:
I hereby certify that the foregoing information are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and permission is hereby given for any investigation that may be necessary. It is understood and agreed that any false statement, omission or misrepresentation made by me in this application will be a sufficient ground for my dismissal from the company's services if I am employed regardless of when such fact may be discovered. 3 CAIHTE
In November 2003, the Social Security System (SSS) informed petitioner of certain discrepancies between its records and the written reports petitioner submitted, specifically the conflicting birth dates of some of petitioner's employees, including that of respondent. The SSS had on record 1965 as respondent's birth year instead of 1968.
Petitioner investigated all the employees with conflicting birth records, including respondent. Petitioner was able to secure through Municipal Civil Registrar Judine U. Laurel a document entitled "birth certificate" from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tabuelan, Cebu, and a copy of the page in the Registry of Birth, which contained the entry of one Lorna D. Dagandan of Bongon, Tabuelan. Both documents showed that respondent was born on May 1, 1965.
Petitioner issued a Disciplinary Action Notice against respondent on January 19, 2004, charging her with violating Section 10.27 of the company rules and regulations for falsifying company records. Respondent was required to submit a written explanation within two days from receipt of the notice, but petitioner found her explanation insufficient. Petitioner subsequently dismissed respondent from employment on the ground of dishonesty, which it considered as serious misconduct, and a commission of a criminal offense.
Respondent, together with another employee who was dismissed on the same ground, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Respondent claimed in her position paper that what she submitted in her application for employment was a birth certificate duly issued by Mr. Homberto A. Olivo, Assistant Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Tabuelan, Cebu. She attached to her position paper Olivo's affidavit dated June 28, 2004 stating that the birth certificate he issued indicating May 1, 1968 as respondent's date of birth is authentic. When confronted by her employer about the discrepancy, she explained that she was willing to cooperate and to correct the facts of her birth records with the company. She said that sometime in 1994, she filed a petition for the clerical correction of her date of birth in her birth certificate after learning from her brother that she was actually born on May 1, 1965 and not May 1, 1968; that said entry was corrected and a new birth certificate was issued on March 22, 2000; and that on April 24, 2000, she sought the correction of her date of birth in her SSS records. She presented to the Labor Arbiter both the corrected birth certificate and the Member's Data Amendment Form for the correction of her birth date, stamped as received by the SSS.
The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal to be legal, declaring that respondent, when applying for employment, falsified her application for employment for the position of production operator by providing a false date of birth so as to inveigle the petitioner into believing that she possessed the required age of employment. The Labor Arbiter held that respondent stated in her application for employment that she was only 21 years old, and she even submitted a birth certificate and SSS E-1 Form where she affirmed her birth date to be May 1, 1968. Respondent was duly notified and acquainted with all the existing rules and regulations particularly the company's code of conduct and discipline, which provides that falsification of company records carries the severest penalty of dismissal. Even if, after many of years of getting employed, respondent decided to file for an application for correction of entries in the Local Civil Registrar, the Labor Arbiter still considered this against respondent because, according to the Labor Arbiter, this fact all the more proves that there was misrepresentation on the age requirement at the time of employment. The Labor Arbiter said that respondent's actuation was highly suspect, because even a child at the school age of seven knows exactly how old he or she is. Respondent is neither unlettered nor unschooled and must have known whether she was lying or not. The Labor Arbiter lastly held that petitioner complied with the procedural requirements of due process in dismissing respondent. DETACa
The dispositive portion of the April 21, 2005 Decision 4 of Labor Arbiter Julie C. Rendoque reads:
WHEREFORE, VIEWED FROM THE FOREGOING, Judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the case for illegal dismissal. However, as regards the 13th month pay, respondent Cebu Mitsumi Phils., Inc. is hereby ordered to pay the following complainants, to wit:
1. LORNA TAN
P241.00 X 26 days =
In a Decision 5 rendered on September 14, 2005, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter, holding that respondent willfully used the 1989 certification of birth knowing that the date of birth appearing thereon is incorrect, so as to qualify for the age requirement of the company. The NLRC questioned why respondent did not immediately contest the discrepancy in her birth certificate and held that respondent concealed her true age by misrepresenting vital information required to be employed by petitioner. The NLRC denied herein respondent's appeal for lack of merit. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC likewise denied the same on October 28, 2005.
Respondent thus filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, which then reversed the NLRC Decision and ruled that the dismissal was illegal. The questioned decision disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Both the assailed 14 September 2005 Decision and 28 October 2005 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are hereby SET ASIDE. A new decision is entered declaring ILLEGAL the dismissal of petitioner Lorna Tan, and ordering private respondent Cebu Mitsumi Incorporated to immediately reinstate petitioner to her former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with full back wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time these compensation (sic) were withheld until her actual reinstatement, pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code. 6
According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to adduce clear and convincing evidence showing that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause. The Court of Appeals reasoned that respondent did not knowingly use a falsified or spurious birth certificate to secure her employment. The appellate court considered respondent's claim that she only knew of her real birth date sometime in 1994, and that she was the one who initiated the amendment of her records with the SSS, which then prompted said office to verify the discrepancy with petitioner. The Court of Appeals held that if respondent had been aware of the erroneous entry in her birth certificate at the time of her employment, she would have kept mum about it while employed with petitioner. Instead, she voluntarily disclosed and sought the correction of the error.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied both in the questioned resolution.
Thus, petitioner is now before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error:
1. WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER FINDING THE DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENT TAN ON THE GROUND OF DISHONESTY AND FRAUD AS LAWFUL AND VALID, AS THIS IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT;
2. IN HOLDING THAT THE FALSITY OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE SUBMITTED BY LORNA TAN, IN ORDER TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF JUST CAUSE IN HER DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT, SHOULD BE PROVED BY CLEAR, CONVINCING AND OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE, AS THIS IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT;
3. IN UNDULY EXERCISING A FUNCTION OF MAKING ITS OWN FACTUAL FINDINGS, WHICH IS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF LABOR TRIBUNALS TO EXERCISE; AND
4. IN ORDERING PETITIONER [CEBU] MITSUMI TO IMMEDIATELY REINSTATE RESPONDENT TAN TO HER FORMER OR EQUIVALENT POSITION WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS AND OTHER PRIVILEGES WITH FULL BACK WAGES. 7 aDSIHc
According to petitioner, jurisprudence dictates that for dismissal based on serious misconduct to be lawful, the misconduct must be serious, relate to the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, and imply wrongful intent; that respondent committed serious misconduct by falsifying her application form and birth certificate as she violated the Company Rules and Regulations; that she failed to provide sufficient explanation; and that her obvious misrepresentation was tantamount to an act of dishonesty and serious misconduct that warrants termination from employment. Petitioner alleges that it has the option of punishing its erring employees and that as an employer, it should be given latitude to determinate to what extent and what penalty to impose its erring employees.
In respondent's Comment received on July 16, 2010, she presented the following arguments and discussion:
1. Petitioner does not actually have a legitimate question of law that if ruled in its favor would justify the immediate reversal of the Honorable Court of Appeals' Decision.
2. Respondent did not falsify her Birth Certificate, the Civil Registrar even attested to this fact; hence, her dismissal grounded on submitting a falsified Birth Certificate is illegal.
The issue for our resolution is clear and simple: whether or not respondent's dismissal by petitioner for dishonesty in falsifying company records, which it considered as serious misconduct, was a valid one.
We find that the dismissal was illegal, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals in the questioned decision and resolution. Thus, the petition has no merit.
We have defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." 8 Furthermore, in Basilla v. Ricafort, 9 dishonesty means "the concealment of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the performance of his duties. It is an absence of integrity, a disposition to betray, cheat, deceive or defraud, bad faith."
Respondent's actions, to our mind, do not fall under the above definitions of dishonesty, and all the more do not constitute the serious misconduct which is defined under the Labor Code, the relevant provision of which reads as follows:
ARTICLE 297. [282] Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work[.] 10
This Court discussed serious misconduct in PNOC-Energy Development Corp. v. Estrella: 11
Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be dismissed from employment only for a valid cause. Serious misconduct is one of the just causes for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, not every form of misconduct can be considered as a just cause for termination. The law explicitly qualifies that the misconduct must be both serious and made in connection with the employee's work. As clarified in Cosmos Bottling Corp. v. Fermin:
Misconduct involves "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be (1) of grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant and (2) connected with the work of the employee. . . . . ETHIDa
In this relation, it is well to stress that the employer bears the burden of proving, through substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just cause — or any other valid cause for that matter — forms the basis of the employee's dismissal from work. Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. . . . .
There is thus basis for the Court of Appeals' ruling that petitioner has the burden of proof to adduce clear and convincing evidence showing that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the birth certificate respondent presented upon application was falsified, for official documents from the Local Civil Registrar are presumed valid, due to the principle of presumption of regularity of official acts or orders of government officials and its agents.
Respondent's right to security of tenure may not be jeopardized except by substantial, clear and convincing evidence of dishonesty, which the petitioner failed to produce. A doubtful accusation should not be allowed to overshadow respondent's unblemished record of service from 1989 to 2004. 12 Respondent was able to explain the discrepancy in her birth records and even presented proof that the birth certificate she attached to her application for employment was valid, through the affidavit of the Assistant Local Civil Registrar who issued the same. Petitioner may doubt respondent and claim that the evidence submitted by respondent is fabricated, but petitioner has failed to convince us of such falsification and fabrication. We cannot turn a blind eye to respondent's pieces of evidence which prove that at the time she applied for employment, she presented an authentic birth certificate, the contents of which she believed to be true. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals held, if she meant to withhold her true age upon belated discovery of it, she would not have corrected the date in her birth certificate and she would not have updated her SSS Member's Data Record. Her mistake, and this is evident from the records, was in not immediately updating her employer and her Personnel Information Sheet. She offered to rectify this mistake, but petitioner would have none of it, and refused her explanations.
This mistake is not so serious as to cost respondent her source of living, and not enough to render her unfit to work with the company, absent any showing of other causes of serious misconduct or dishonesty on her part. Petitioner has also not convinced this Court of the materiality of the age of the employee to the nature of her work. Besides, the actual age of respondent at the time of hiring was 24 years old, only one year above the age requirement of 18-23 years old.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in making its own findings, notwithstanding the absence of evidence to support its conclusion. However, factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside if they fail the test of arbitrariness, like in the present case, where the findings of the Court of Appeals differ from those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. 13
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring the dismissal to be illegal and reversing the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. As we have held in Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corp.: 14
Further, when the circumstances so warrant, the Court of Appeals can disregard the factual findings of the NLRC. While as a rule, factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions such as the NLRC are accorded not only respect but even finality, and that judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor officials' findings rest; more so when both the labor arbiter and the NLRC share the same findings, such as in the present case, the Court cannot affirm the decision of the NLRC when its findings of fact on which the conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence, we mean the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.
Doubts reasonably arising from conflicting evidence of the parties should be resolved in favor of labor, in consonance with the avowed policy of the State, under Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 18, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in Cebu City in Special Civil Action CA-G.R. SP No. 01520 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 101-110; penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with Associate Justices Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla and Stephen C. Cruz concurring.
2. Id. at 111-112.
3. Id. at 114.
4. Id. at 144-155.
5. Id. at 171-177.
6. Id. at 110.
7. Id. at 64-66.
8. Re.: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting and Angelita C. Esmerio, 502 Phil. 264, 277 (2005).
9. 588 Phil. 110, 119 (2008), citing Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (3rd edition).
10. Labor Code of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Amended & Renumbered), [July 21, 2015].
11. 713 Phil. 560, 567-568 (2013).
12. Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission, 259 Phil. 1105, 1108-1109 (1989).
13. See Nissan Motors Phils., Inc. v. Angelo, 673 Phil. 150, 158 (2011).
14. 542 Phil. 618, 626-627 (2007).
15. C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Legal Heirs of Godofredo Repiso, G.R. No. 190534, February 10, 2016.