Cawan v. People

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 206334. November 17, 2021.]

CHARISSE D. CAWAN AND ROY G. MENDOZA, petitioners,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VILLARAZA CRUZ MARCELO AND ANGANGCO LAW OFFICES, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 17, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 206334 (Charisse D. Cawan and Roy G. Mendoza, Petitioners, v. People of the Philippines and Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco Law Offices, Respondents.) — Before the Court is an appeal seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated 31 August 2012 and Resolution 2 dated 14 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116864, which convicted petitioners Charisse D. Cawan (Cawan) and Roy G. Mendoza (Mendoza) (collectively referred to as petitioners) for the crime of qualified theft.

Antecedents

In an Information 3 dated 08 July 2008, herein petitioners were charged with the crime of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of July 2008, in the City of Makati, Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Charisse Cawan being then a Collection Assistant and Roy Mendoza a Bank Representative of complainant Villaraza, Cruz-Angangco Law Firm, conspiring[,] confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence, with intent to gain and without knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of $777.33 or its Philippine equivalent [P]34,965.00 belonging [to] Villaraza Cruz-Angangco Law Firm[,] herein represented by Atty. Miguel Silos, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total amount of $777.33 or its equivalent [P]34,965.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Upon arraignment, both petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. CAIHTE

The facts are lifted from the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:

[Private respondent Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco Law Offices] [law office] is a general professional partnership duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

According to the [p]etition, [petitioners] Cawan and Mendoza were former employees of the [l]aw [o]ffice, occupying the positions of Collection Assistant and Bank Representative, respectively. Moreover, [petitioners] belonged to the Cashiering and Collection Department of [the] [l]aw [o]ffice.

In June 2008, [the] [l]aw [o]ffice's litigation Department had a seminar in the United States, wherein Atty. Miguel U. Silos [Atty. Silos], a partner of [the] [l]aw [o]ffice, was required to advance the total amount of US$777.33, using his credit card, as transportation expenses. Atty. Silos thereafter caused the reimbursement of said amount. However, since the amount charged to his credit card was in Philippine Pesos, he did not accept the US$777.33 amount. Instead, on July 1, 2008, Atty. Silos directed his Executive Assistant, Ms. Merba M. Baleña (Baleña), to return the US$777.33 to the [l]aw [o]ffice's Cashiering and Collection Department in order to have the same exchanged to Philippine Pesos. A day after that or on July 2, 2008, Baleña placed the US$777.33 inside a white envelope and attached thereto a note stating that it was intended for Ms. Neliza C. Sotto (Sotto), the Head of the Cashiering and Collection Department. Baleña thereupon gave the envelope to Mr. Armando B. Riñon (Riñon), a docket clerk of [the] [l]aw [o]ffice.

At the time when Riñon delivered the white envelope to the Cashiering and Collection Department, only [herein] petitioners were present inside it. Riñon thereafter placed the white envelope containing the US$777.33 inside the Cashiering and Collection Department, on the table in front of the window. Baleña later asked Sotto whether she received the US$777.33, to which the latter replied in the negative. Sotto similarly asked Cawan whether she received the money but Cawan likewise denied having received the same.

An investigation was thereafter conducted consequently by [the] [l]aw [o]ffice. During the course of the investigation, petitioners admitted to taking the US$777.33, which they converted to its Peso equivalent of P35,000.00 and thereafter split the amount between themselves. [Petitioners] executed affidavits and handwritten admissions to that effect, as well as admitted to Sotto, their immediate supervisor, that they committed the crime.

xxx xxx xxx

Law [o]ffice's evidence also revealed that, in the course of the proceedings and prior to arraignment, the mother of Cawan, Mrs. Fe De Guzman, wrote a series of letters to Atty. Silos asking him for forgiveness on account of the criminal act committed by her daughter. Moreover, Mendoza also approached Atty. Silos to ask for forgiveness. 5

xxx xxx xxx

After the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed their Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Attached Demurrer to Evidence 6 which was opposed by the prosecution. Initially, the trial court granted the demurrer to evidence in a Resolution 7 dated 15 September 2009. However, upon motion for reconsideration, 8 the trial court reversed itself in a Resolution 9 dated 02 December 2009 and held that the prosecution had already established a prima facie case against herein petitioners. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration 10 but it was denied in a Resolution 11 dated 22 February 2012.

On the scheduled dates for the presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioners did not adduce evidence on their behalf, thus, the trial court declared them to have waived their right to do so. 12

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 (RTC) acquitted petitioners of the crime charged. The fallo of the RTC's Decision 13 dated 12 July 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, on reasonable doubt, both accused CHARISSE CAWAN y DE GUZMAN (Ms. Cawan) and ROY MENDOZA y GAERLAN (Mr. Mendoza) are hereby ACQUITTED.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED. 14

The trial court found the prosecution's evidence insufficient to prove petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with moral certainty. 15 Thus, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners should prevail and they should be exculpated of the present charge against them. 16

Furthermore, the trial court did not give credence to Sotto's testimony, since according to the court, from her demeanor on the witness stand, she appeared to be a reluctant witness, or a deponent compelled to testify against her will. 17 It also pointed that the prosecution did not adduce any evidence to directly link both petitioners as the author of the crime. 18 The trial court also ruled that the "Affidavit" and "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Cawan and Mendoza cannot be given weight as they contradict each other on material points. 19 From the foregoing, the trial court held that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of herein petitioners.

Aggrieved, the law office filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) thereafter filed its Entry of Appearance and Motion to Join and Adopt the Petition of the law office, stating that it joins the law office in questioning the Decision of the respondent Judge. 20

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision 21 dated 31 August 2012, the CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC's decision and convicted herein petitioners. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition filed by the petitioner Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco and adopted by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 12, 2010 issued by the public respondent Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, in Makati City, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents Charisse Cawan and Roy Mendoza are hereby declared GUILTY of the crime of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code of money worth P35,000.00 and, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum thereof, to eighteen (18) years, two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of it, which is two degrees higher than the penalty specified in paragraph 1 of Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court is directed to promulgate this judgment of conviction of said respondents.

SO ORDERED. 22

The CA ruled in this wise:

It should be emphasized that, as a general rule, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him or her to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case. DETACa

xxx xxx xxx

To repeat, once a prima facie case is established, the burden of evidence rests upon the accused such that if he or she fails to present his or her evidence, his or her conviction must necessarily follow. 23 (citations omitted)

xxx xxx xxx

The CA further held that considering the pieces of evidence presented by the law office were not refuted by herein petitioners, as they failed to present any evidence despite several opportunities given by the trial court, their conviction becomes inevitable. Respondent Judge Ruiz cannot have acquitted petitioners because he had expressly stated his Resolution dated 02 December 2009 that a prima facie case is "sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction." 24 Thus, the act of the trial court judge in acquitting herein petitioners was made in indifferent disregard of the law and without any rational deliberation. 25

Finally, the CA held that the principle of double jeopardy does not apply in the instant case, as the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that the acquittal of herein petitioners were not only without basis, worse, it contradicts its earlier denial of the demurrer of evidence, which ruled that the prosecution has established a prima facie case for qualified theft against petitioners. Thus, the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed decision and, the principle of double jeopardy will not apply. 26

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied in a Resolution 27 dated 14 March 2013. Hence, this Appeal.

Issues

In this Petition, petitioners assert:

I

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR SINCE THERE IS A DENIAL OF THE PROSECUTION'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT.

II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN GRANTING THE PETITION, THUS, ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 12, 2010 WHICH ACQUITTED THE PETITIONERS OF QUALIFIED THEFT ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT. 28

The main issue in this case is whether the CA violated petitioners' right against double jeopardy when it reversed the RTC's decision of acquittal.

Petitioners maintain that the CA erred in ruling that the principle of double jeopardy does not apply in the instant case on the ground of denial of the prosecution's right to due process and there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 29 They argue that after the prosecution has rested its case, herein petitioners filed with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence which was initially granted by the trial court in a Resolution dated 15 September 2009, thus, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. At this point in time, the defense of double jeopardy has already set in. 30 It was only reversed by the trial court upon reconsideration at the instance of private respondents. aDSIHc

According to petitioners, the prosecution was never denied the opportunity to present its case before the trial court, nor was there a sham trial so as to render the assailed judgment of acquittal void. 31 The RTC arrived at the decision of acquitting them of qualified theft after assiduously considering and weighing the evidence adduced by the prosecutor. 32 Therefore, the imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC undeniably boils down to the latter's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility, which is a mere error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. 33

On the other hand, the law office counters that the principle of double jeopardy has not set in when the trial court granted petitioners' motion for demurrer to evidence.

First, the law office argues that the trial court's issuance of the Resolution dated 15 September 2009 did not terminate the criminal case as this was done prematurely, since the issuance was made without first resolving the pending issues with respect to the admissibility of the prosecution's documentary evidence. Thus, such issuance was definitely done in grave violation of the prosecution's right to due process, rendering it null and void and does not terminate the criminal case. 34

Second, the assailed decision of the CA correctly ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion as it had already found a prima facie case against petitioners based on the testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution. Thus, Judge Ruiz's "about face" anomalous acquittal of the petitioners is not a mere error of judgment, especially because the latter failed to adduce evidence in order to overturn the prima facie case against them. 35 A finding of prima facie case, if uncontroverted by evidence of the defense, can be the basis of a conviction in a criminal case. 36

Third, contrary to the erroneous contention of petitioners, the prosecution has established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 37 The prosecution has presented direct evidence in various written admissions and confessions by petitioners wherein they categorically admitted to having taken the $777.33. 38 In addition, the unbroken circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution overwhelmingly demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of petitioners for the crime of qualified theft. 39

In its Comment, 40 the OSG agrees with the law office. It argues that when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging its burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him or her to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow that prima facie case. 41 Furthermore, according to the OSG, the RTC had unquestionably gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it rendered a decision of acquittal notwithstanding its final pronouncement that the prosecution had already established a prima facie case against herein petitioners sufficient to warrant their conviction unless countered and nullified by the evidence of the latter, and the defense' failure and/or refusal to present evidence on their behalf despite several opportunities given to it. 42

Ruling of the Court

The petition is impressed with merit.

The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy. 43 Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 44

In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. 45 This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. 46 The rationale for this rule is explained in the often-cited case of People v. Velasco: 47

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. . ." Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply engrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right to repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to ensure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empaneled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceedings. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In People v. Serrano, Sr., 48 We have reiterated that a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offence. Also, in People v. Dela Torre, 49 We held that the finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. ETHIDa

In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are present. First, there was a valid information for the crime of qualified theft filed against petitioners. Second, this resulted in the institution of a criminal complaint against them before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, a court of competent jurisdiction. Third, petitioners were arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. Fourth, petitioners were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. What is peculiar in this case is that the trial court previously granted petitioners' motion for demurrer to evidence with leave of court, only to be reversed upon the law office's motion for reconsideration. Petitioners chose not to present evidence and the trial court issued the judgment of acquittal based on the prosecution's failure to prove with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial court or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. 50

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. 51 However, We find that these exceptions do not exist in the case at bar.

First, was there a deprivation of due process or was there a finding of mistrial or sham trial? A perusal of the records of the case show that there was no deprivation of due process on the part of the prosecution. The prosecution was able to present their witnesses and documentary evidence. There was also no sham trial or mistrial.

Second, was there grave abuse of discretion? Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 52 Its aim is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 53

In the assailed decision, the CA held that the principle of double jeopardy does not apply in the instant case because the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. In setting aside, the acquittal of petitioners, the CA explained that:

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that the pieces of evidence presented by [private respondent] [l]aw [o]ffice were not refuted by [petitioners] as they failed to present any evidence despite several opportunities being given by the RTC Makati, their conviction becomes inevitable. Respondent Judge Ruiz cannot have acquitted [petitioners] Cawan and Mendoza because he had expressly stated in his Resolution dated December 2, 2009 that a prima facie case is "sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction.'' Hence, the "about-face" ruling has absolutely no basis and cannot be considered as a mere error of judgment.

The act of respondent Judge Ruiz in acquitting [petitioners], despite their utter failure to present evidence and notwithstanding his earlier pronouncement that the prosecution had already established a prima facie sufficient to convict, was clearly made in indifferent disregard of the law and without any rational deliberation whatsoever. The same is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, we agree with [respondent] [l]aw [o]ffice that the principle of double jeopardy does not apply in the instant case. Double jeopardy does not apply when there is a denial of the prosecution's right to due process and when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion.

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it bears repeating that the [d]ecision acquitting [petitioners] Cawan and Mendoza is not only without basis, worse, it contradicts the RTC Makati's earlier denial of a demurrer of evidence. As admitted by respondent Judge Ruiz himself in his Decision dated December 2, 2009, a prima facie case had already been established against the latter, from which a decision of conviction should have inevitably followed. Thus, it is clear that the RTC Makati was ousted of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed [d]ecision and, therefore, the principle of double jeopardy won't apply so as to preclude a review thereof. 54

xxx xxx xxx

In our view, the petition of the law office before the CA is bereft of any allegation or evidence that the prosecution was deprived of their right to due process or that the proceedings before the trial court was a sham, that would result to the acquittal of petitioners as void. The fact remains that petitioners' right against double jeopardy already attached when the RTC acquitted them. While it may be argued that there have been instances where the appreciation of facts might have resulted from possible lapses in evaluation of the evidence, nothing therein detracts from the fact that relevant and material evidence was scrutinized, considered and evaluated. 55 Hence, no amount of error of judgment will ripen into an error of jurisdiction that would have allowed the CA to review the same through a petition for certiorari. 56

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 31 August 2012 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116864, finding CHARISSE CAWAN and ROY MENDOZA guilty of the crime of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code are hereby declared NULL and VOID for violation of their constitutional right against double jeopardy. cSEDTC

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez (now a member of this Court) and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring; rollo, pp. 115-1126.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez (now a member of this Court) and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring; id. at 1179-1180.

3. Id. at 208-209.

4. Id.

5. Id. at 1116-1117.

6. Id. at 147-176.

7. Id. at 177-190.

8. Id. at 210-282.

9. Id. at 191-200.

10. Id. at 660-667.

11. Id. at 201-204.

12. Id. at 14-15.

13. Penned by Presiding Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz; id. at 122-146.

14. Id. at 146.

15. Id. at 135.

16. Id.

17. Id. at 137.

18. Id. at 138.

19. Id. at 139.

20. Id. at 1119-1120.

21. Id. at 1115-1126.

22. Id. at 1125.

23. Id. at 1121-1122.

24. Id. at 1123.

25. Id.

26. Id. at 1125.

27. Id. at 1179-1180.

28. Id. at 18.

29. Id. at 20.

30. Id. at 20-23.

31. Id. at 23.

32. Id. at 25.

33. Id. at 27.

34. See id. at 1213-1217.

35. Id. at 1221.

36. Id. at 1226.

37. Id. at 1228.

38. Id. at 1229.

39. Id. at 1235.

40. Id. at 1249-1262.

41. Id. at 1256.

42. Id. at 1261.

43. Article III, Section 21, 1987 CONSTITUTION provides:

 Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

44. Bangayan v. Bangayan, 675 Phil. 656 (2011).

45. Chiok v. People, 774 Phil. 230 (2015).

46. Id.

47. People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517 (2000).

48. 374 Phil. 302 (1999).

49. 430 Phil. 420 (2002).

50. Villareal v. Aliga, 724 Phil. 47, 62 (2014).

51. People of the Philippines v. Alejandro, G.R No. 223099, 11 January 2018.

52. People v. CA, 368 Phil. 169 (1999).

53. People v. CA, 545 Phil. 278 (2007); Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.

54. Rollo, pp. 1123-1124.

55. Supra note 51.

56. Castillo v. AAA, G.R. No. 248567, 10 November 2020.