SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 220786. November 25, 2015.][Formerly UDK No. 14943]
LORRIE G. CATOR, MHARA LORRAINE CATOR, MARGENETTE CATOR AND MARLITO CATOR, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JOSE P. JAYAG AND MARILYN P. JAYAG, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, EX OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated25 November 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 220786 [Formerly UDK No. 14943] — Lorrie G. Cator, Mhara Lorraine Cator, Margenette Cator and Marlito Cator v. Spouses Jose P. Jayag and Marilyn P. Jayag, Philippine Savings Bank, Ex Officio Sheriff of the City of Manila and the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the July 16, 2013 Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98714, which dismissed the appeal of Lorrie G. Cator, Mhara Lorraine Cator, Margenette Cator, and Marlito Cator (petitioners) from the November 14, 2011 Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Manila City (RTC-Branch 42), in Civil Case No. 08-118805, dismissing the complaint for failure of petitioners' counsel to appear at the scheduled hearing without just cause.
The Antecedents
Sometime in February 2008, petitioners filed a complaint for Nullification of Deed of Absolute Sale, Annulment/Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance of Property with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Spouses Jose P. Jayag and Marilyn P. Jayag (Spouses Jayag), and Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank).
The complaint was in connection with a loan secured by Spouses Jayag from PS Bank as an accommodation for petitioners. A mortgage was instituted over a parcel of land, with a total land area of 142.50 square meters, registered in the name of petitioner Lorrie G. Cator (Lorrie) as a security for the loan. It was averred in the complaint that there was an agreement that Spouses Jayag would transmit the proceeds of the loan in the amount of P5,891,000.00 to petitioners, who were obliged to settle the amortization thereof. Initially, the complaint was raffled to RTC-Branch 49.
On July 30, 2008, RTC-Branch 49 issued an Order 3 dismissing the complaint for failure of petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference and to file their pre-trial brief three (3) days before the scheduled conference. 4 RTC-Branch 49, nevertheless, granted petitioners' motion for reconsideration and set aside the dismissal of the complaint.
Thereafter, petitioners sought the inhibition of the presiding judge of RTC-Branch 49, which motion was granted. 5 The case was transferred to RTC-Branch 24.
The RTC-Branch 24 also ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference on time, but the said order was likewise recalled. 6 Again, petitioners moved for the inhibition of the presiding judge of RTC-Branch 24. Consequently, the case was raffled to RTC-Branch 42. 7
On May 31, 2010, RTC-Branch 42 issued an order 8 dismissing the case for failure of petitioners and their counsel to appear at the May 24, 2010 hearing. The dismissal of the case was once again set aside and the trial of the case continued, but the said court warned that it would no longer entertain further postponement without justifiable reasons. 9
On October 18, 2010, Lorrie completed her direct examination but the respondents' counsels moved to defer their cross-examination. 10 The RTC-Branch 42 acceded and the case was set for hearing to a subsequent date. After a series of postponements due to various reasons, the case was finally set for continuation of hearing on September 23, 2011. ITAaHc
During the September 23, 2011 hearing, however, petitioners' counsel again was not present. The respondents' counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the case, on which motion the court set the hearing on October 3, 2011.
During the October 3, 2011 hearing, the respondents' counsel submitted a certification from the Central Post Office of Manila stating that petitioners' counsel received the notice of hearing as early as September 9, 2011. The latter, on the other hand, manifested that he was unable to attend the September 23, 2011 hearing because his secretary had failed to note down the trial date on his desk calendar. 11
The RTC Order
On November 14, 2011, the RTC-Branch 42 issued an order dismissing the complaint for failure of petitioners' counsel to appear at the scheduled hearing without just cause. The trial court noted that it was not the first time that the case was dismissed on a similar ground.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the RTC-Branch 42 in its March 7, 2012 Order. 12
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA, and the latter ordered the filing of the appellant's brief.
On November 9, 2012, the CA issued a resolution granting petitioners' first motion filed on November 5, 2012, for an extension of 30 days to file their brief. Petitioners, however, filed a second motion for another extension, which the CA granted but ordered them to file their brief not later than January 3, 2013. Petitioners still failed to file their brief and instead pleaded for another extension.
On January 22, 2013, the CA issued another resolution allowing the 30-day extension prayed for by petitioners with a warning that no further extension would be allowed. Petitioners, however, failed to file their brief on time as they were only able to file it three (3) days after the deadline. Nonetheless, in its February 15, 2013 Resolution, the CA admitted the appellants' brief despite the belated filing. 13
On March 11, 2013, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 15, 2013 Resolution of the CA. They contended that petitioners' failure to file their brief within the 90-day extension showed that they had a penchant to trifle with the orderly rules of procedure. 14
Petitioners, on the other hand, commented that their counsel arrived late at the CA on the last day of filing, which fell on a Friday, due to heavy traffic, but had immediately filed their appellants' brief on the next working day.
The CA Ruling
On July 16, 2013, the CA issued the assailed resolution granting the respondents' motion for reconsideration expunging petitioners' appellant's brief from the records; and dismissing the appeal pursuant to Rule 50 (e) of the Rules of Court. The appellate court opined that the circumstances surrounding the case did not warrant the liberality of the courts.
Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' appeal due to the belated filing of the appellant's brief. CHTAIc
Petitioners contend that the CA should not have recalled its earlier resolution because their appeal must not be dismissed on mere technicalities. They argue that since their brief was already on hand, it would serve the ends of substantive justice to let the case be decided on the merits.
In their Comment, 15 Spouses Jayag countered that the CA rightfully dismissed petitioners' appeal for the latter's failure to timely file their brief. Further, they cited the several instances when the case had been dismissed by the trial courts to stress petitioners' abuse of the rules of procedure to delay the case.
In its Comment, 16 PS Bank averred that the dismissal of the case was due to the inexcusable neglect of petitioners' counsel. It asserted that the negligence of their counsel bound them; and that the Rules of Court should not be whimsically ignored by petitioners.
The Court, in its Resolution, dated February 24, 2014, required petitioners to file a consolidated reply to the Comments filed by Spouses Jayag and PS Bank within ten (10) days from notice. 17 Petitioners, however, did not file any reply. Thus, the Court resolved to consider petitioners as having waived their right to file a reply and the case as being ripe for judicial disposition.
The Court's Ruling
Failure to file Appellant's Brief
Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for dismissal of an appeal before the CA. Particularly, Section 1 (e) thereof reads:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: . . .
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules; cHDAIS
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis Supplied)
From the foregoing, failure to file the appellant's brief on time suffices as a ground for the dismissal of an appeal. It may be done motu proprio or upon motion of the appellee, as what the respondents did.
The dismissal of an appeal pursuant to Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court is not a mandatory duty of the CA, rather, it is exercised in accord with the principles of justice and fairness. In Spouses Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court ruled:
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CA's authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief is a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case.
Having in mind the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, we find that the petitioners' excuse for their failure to file their brief was flimsy and discreditable and, thus, the propriety of the dismissal of their appeal.
In dismissing an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief, the surrounding circumstances must be taken into account.
In the case at bench, it is noteworthy that petitioners requested for an extension to file their brief three times, for an aggregate period of 90 days. Despite the liberality of the CA, petitioners neglected to seasonably file their brief.
It is true that the Court has relaxed the strict application of the rules of procedure in the interest of substantive justice. In CMTC International Marketing Corporation v. Bhagis International Trading Corporation, 19 the Court reversed the dismissal of an appeal for failure to timely file the appellant's brief. It reasoned out that it was apparent that there was a strong desire to file an appellant's brief on the petitioner's part.
The same could not be said of petitioners in the case at bench. If petitioners were truly serious and sincere in filing their brief on time, the 90-day extension provided for by the CA would have sufficed. They, nevertheless, took for granted the tolerance extended by the CA and still belatedly filed their brief. In Polintan v. People, 20 the Court sustained the CA's holding that the failure of the accused-appellant therein to timely file his brief, after being granted an extension of a total of 75 days, indicated a lack of interest to pursue his appeal.
Application of procedural rulesrule, and not the exception
In Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, 21 the Court reiterated that the general rule was that the application of the rules must be upheld and its suspension or mere relaxation was merely the exception. It was further stated therein:
For the exception to come into play, first and foremost should be the party litigant's plausible explanation for non-compliance with the rules he proposes to be exempted from. Absent any acceptable explanation, the party's plain violation of the rules will not be countenanced.
In the present case, petitioners claim that their counsel failed to file the appellants' brief on time due to heavy traffic. Their explanation is unacceptable. It is not a valid excuse, especially if the prior procedural lapses of petitioners before the RTC are taken into account. It is worth emphasizing that, on at least three occasions, the case was ordered dismissed because of petitioners' disrespect for procedural rules. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 22
Fortunately for them, the RTC accommodated their reconsideration and allowed the case to proceed to trial. To grant petitioners another liberality, despite their repeated procedural blunders, would be extremely prejudicial against the respondents.
Counsel's neglect binding
In Sofio v. Valenzuela, 23 the Court held that the negligence of counsel was binding on his client, considering that any act performed by counsel is within the scope of his general or implied authority was still regarded as an act of the client. Exception is allowed when the counsel's negligence is so gross that it resulted in the client's deprivation of his property without due process of law. 24 ISHCcT
In this case, petitioners are bound by their counsel's shortcomings as the latter was voluntarily employed by them to represent them in their appeal before the CA. Further, they cannot invoke the exceptional rule to repudiate their counsel's misgivings as they have not been deprived due process. They were given multiple opportunities to file their briefs, but still failed to capitalize on the same. Consequently, they are bound by their counsel's ineptitude.
Finally, petitioners are not without fault as they could have insisted on their counsel to file the appellants' brief on time as the latter was already given more than enough time by the CA to do so. Petitioners should have closely monitored the status of the brief when the deadline was nearing to avoid any possible last-minute mishap.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. (Carpio, J., on official leave; Brion, J., designated Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2281, and Velasco, Jr., J., designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 2282, both dated November 13, 2015)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Associate Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang, concurring; rollo pp. 40-45.
2. Penned by Presiding Judge Dinnah C. Aguila-Topacio; id. at 92-94.
3. Id. at 157.
4. Id. at 148.
5. Id. at 51.
6. Id. at 148.
7. Id. at 51.
8. Id. at 162.
9. Id. at 93.
10. Id. at 64.
11. Id. at 188.
12. Id. at 163-164.
13. Id. at 40-41.
14. Id. at 41.
15. Id. at 147-156.
16. Id. at 182-196.
17. Id. at 198-199.
18. 680 Phil. 334, 341-342 (2012).
19. G.R. No. 170488, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 469, 476.
20. 604 Phil. 42, 46 (2009).
21. 574 Phil. 20, 38-39 (2008).
22. 528 Phil. 1033, 1044 (2006).
23. 682 Phil. 51, 62-63 (2012).
24. Id.