FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 230948. November 20, 2017.]
MARLYN JANE F. CASTRO, petitioner,vs. UNION MOTORS CORPORATION, LIVI MARQUEZ, AND GILBERT DEE, JR., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 20, 2017, which reads as follows: aScITE
"G.R. No. 230948 (Marlyn Jane F. Castro v. Union Motors Corporation, Livi Marquez, and Gilbert Dee, Jr.). — The motion for an extension 1 of 30 days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Marlyn Jane F. Castro, is GRANTED.
Nevertheless, after a judicious perusal of the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced, the Court resolves to DENY the Petition for failure to show sufficiently any reversible error in the assailed judgment that would warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
It must be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application, of procedural rules must remain the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice. 2 The desired leniency cannot be accorded, absent any valid and compelling reason for the procedural lapse, 3 especially in view of the fact that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ which is never demandable as a matter of right and is never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Thus, one who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. 4 In this case, the CA saw no compelling need that would merit the relaxation of the rules. Neither does this Court see any.
Petitioner failed to substantiate her belated claim that she had indeed received the assailed National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution 5 on 6 August 2016, a fact that would have made the filing of her Petition on 5 October 2016 timely. 6 The attached Air 21 system-generated report (report) 7 is a mere photocopy, which thus deserves scant consideration. Further, the recipient indicated in the report was a certain Melinda Flores, supposedly petitioner's mother who received it on her behalf. However, aside from her bare allegation, petitioner failed to offer any evidence that Melinda Flores was indeed her mother who received the delivery on petitioner's behalf. Also, petitioner failed to convince this Court that the document delivered was, as referred to in the report, the assailed NLRC Resolution. Thus, to all intents and purposes, she failed to file her Petition before the CA within the reglementary period.
On account of the foregoing procedural lapse, the claim of good faith in petitioner's delayed payment of docket fees is likewise rendered doubtful.
Further, we find no merit in petitioner's bare contention that respondents' Position Paper, Reply, Opposition to Appeal, and Motion for Partial Reconsideration were not material portions of the record. Notable is the fact that there was no effort to remedy this lapse or to provide the CA with a justification or an explanation for the lapse. Indeed, the aforementioned documents are integral parts of the ruling of the labor arbiter and the NLRC; those documents were necessary for the CA to make a full evaluation of the facts involved and to arrive at a well-informed ruling on the case.
In any event, the substantive issues raised fail to present any compelling reason that would warrant a relaxation of the rules. We note the fact that both the labor arbiter and the NLRC came up with a uniform factual finding — that petitioner had been validly dismissed by respondent company on grounds of gross negligence and breach of trust and confidence. Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally respected, and even accorded finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters falling under their specialized jurisdictions. 8 Likewise, it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts, and that it accords great weight to the factual findings of lower courts or agencies whose function is to resolve factual matters. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. 9 We find no reason to depart from the foregoing findings, as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case.
Only strong considerations of equity, which are wanting in this case, would lead us to allow an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice. 10
WHEREFORE, the CA Resolutions dated 13 October 2016 11 and 4 April 2017, 12 respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 147761 are AFFIRMED. HEITAD
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-6.
2.Building Care Corp. v. Macaraeg, 700 Phil. 749 (2012).
3.Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. v. Raza, 606 Phil. 796 (2009).
4.Nayve v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 473 (2003).
5.Rollo, pp. 96-97; dated 29 July 2016.
6.Id. at 20.
7.Id. at 167.
8.Lim v. Commission on Audit, 447 Phil. 122 (2003).
9.Heirs of Spouses Olarte v. Office of the President, 667 Phil. 253 (2011).
10.Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 570 Phil. 188 (2008).
11.Rollo, pp. 41-46.
12.Id. at 49-50.