EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268. November 25, 2014.][Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3425-RTJ]
MYLA C. CASTRO, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, TAGUMPAY CASTRO, AND LUCIANA MALABANAN VDA. DE ROJALES, complainants, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO DE JOYA MAYOR, respondent.
[A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269. November 25, 2014.][Formerly A.M. No. 10-8-238-RTC]
CLERK III MYLA C. CASTRO AND STENOGRAPHER III LUCIANA M. ROJALES, complainants, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO DE JOYA MAYOR, respondent.
[OCA IPI No. 11-3593-P. November 25, 2014.]
JUDGE WILFREDO DE JOYA MAYOR, complainant, vs. MYLA C. CASTRO, CLERK III, AND LUCIANA M. ROJALES, STENOGRAPHER III, BOTH OF BRANCH 14, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NASUGBU, BATANGAS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated NOVEMBER 25, 2014, which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3425-RTJ] (Myla C. Castro, joined by her husband, Tagumpay Castro, and Luciana Malabanan Vda. de Rojales, Complainants v. Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor, Respondent.)
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269 [Formerly A.M. No. 10-8-238-RTC] (Clerk III Myla C. Castro and Stenographer III Luciana M. Rojales, Complainants v. Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor, Respondent.)
OCA IPI No. 11-3593-P (Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor, Complainant v. Myla C. Castro, Clerk III, and Luciana M. Rojales, Stenographer III, both of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Nasugbu, Batangas, Respondents.)
Before the Court are three related administrative complaints, particularly:
(a) A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268 is comprised of two complaints. First, the Joint Complaint dated May 12, 2010 filed by Myla Comia-Castro (Myla), Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, joined by her husband Tagumpay Castro; and Luciana M. Rojales (Luz), Court Stenographer III of the same court, charging Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor (Mayor) with gross misconduct and violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law, and Rules 1.01, 2.00 and 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Ethics. And second, the Complaint dated May 28, 2010 filed solely by Myla charging Judge Mayor with grave misconduct and immorality;
(b) A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269 involves the letter dated July 1, 2010 of Myla and Luz to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) requesting appropriate action on their Daily Time Records (DTRs), which remain unsigned by Judge Mayor; and
(c) OCA IPI No. 11-3593-P consists of Judge Mayor's countercharges of perjury, estafa, and misappropriation against Myla; immorality against Luz; and bribery against both Myla and Luz.
I
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268(formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3425-RTJ)
In their Joint Complaint 1 in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268, Myla and Luz alleged the following:
Upon Judge Mayor's assumption of his position as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Myla, Luz, and the other court staff observed said Judge's propensity for touching the hands, neck, and other body parts of the female staff. Judge Mayor more frequently touched Myla and Luz than the other staff, but Myla and Luz merely thought then that Judge Mayor was being fatherly. With the passage of time, however, Judge Mayor began acting more blatantly and inappropriately, even implying that three of his female staff, namely, Myla, Luz, and Atty. Marcian Noby J. Cueto-Matabang (Noby), the Branch Clerk of Court, were in love with him.
One day, Judge Mayor summoned Myla to his chamber. Hesitantly, Myla complied. Inside the chamber, Judge Mayor immediately held Myla's hands, caressed her arms, and told her that he wanted to bear children with her and Luz and that he would financially support them. Not wanting to hear more, Myla walked out of the chamber, but before she could do so, Judge Mayor warned her of the consequences of refusing him, and even threatened her that he would not approve her and Luz's DTRs and Performance Ratings.
Following the above-described incident, Judge Mayor assigned to Myla the additional duties of putting on and taking off the Judge's robe, and preparing his coffee and table calendar. To perform these additional duties, Myla needed to be inside Judge Mayor's chamber. One time, while Myla was inside the chamber, Judge Mayor told her that he loved her very much. Judge Mayor also showed Myla wads of money and promised her that if she would accept his proposals of love, he would buy her a house where she could establish a business and where they could soon live together. Myla then reminded Judge Mayor that they were both already married to someone else, and that when she got married, she vowed to love only her husband. AScHCD
However, Judge Mayor still persistently pursued Myla and sent her text messages expressing his love. 2
While they were attending a convention for court employees in Cebu, Myla and Luz received instructions from Judge Mayor, relayed through the other court staff, for them to report to the Judge's rented house as soon as they returned from the convention. Myla and Luz were prevailed upon by their co-employees to just follow Judge Mayor's instructions so the Judge would not get angry. When Myla and Luz entered the front door of Judge Mayor's rented house, the Judge suddenly embraced them both and tried to kiss Myla. Both Myla and Luz tried to avoid Judge Mayor's embrace and kiss, but the Judge persisted, and in the confusion, Judge Mayor's kiss, intended for Myla, landed on Luz's cheek. Myla and Luz left the house right away after they freed themselves from Judge Mayor's embrace. As Myla and Luz were on their way out, Judge Mayor warned them that he would not approve their Performance Ratings.
In January 2010, Myla and another court staff Rosalinda Salanguit (Rosalinda) accompanied Judge Mayor to the testimonial dinner for a newly appointed Supreme Court Associate Justice in Tagaytay City. On their way to the testimonial dinner, Judge Mayor seated himself between Myla and Rosalinda at the back of the Judge's car. All the while, Judge Mayor heavily leaned his body against Myla, and held Myla's hands and caressed her arms. Judge Mayor also attempted to kiss Myla but the latter was able to avoid the same. Since Myla went with Judge Mayor to the testimonial dinner, Judge Mayor approved two days later her and Luz's Performance Ratings for the years 2008 and 2009.
Judge Mayor continued to court Myla despite her vehement objections. In furtherance of his efforts to pursue Myla, Judge Mayor promoted her to the position of Data Entry Machine Operator II (Data Encoder). Judge Mayor also resorted to coercion to sway Myla by threatening that he would not approve the DTRs of Myla and Luz until Myla accepts his proposal. When the court staff submitted their DTRs, Judge Mayor approved and signed them all except those of Myla and Luz. Judge Mayor even instructed his staff to just forward the DTRs of Myla and Luz without his approval and signature.
Myla and Luz asserted in their Joint Complaint that Judge Mayor's misconduct and immorality resulted in the loss of their peace of mind, as well as the alienation and disintegration of their families. With their patience exhausted and their backs against the wall, Myla and Luz decided to bring their situation to the attention of the Court, risking Judge Mayor's reprisal.
Myla subsequently filed another Complaint 3 for grave misconduct and immorality against Judge Mayor. Myla narrated in said Complaint that on May 19, 2010, at around 2:00 p.m., she was called by Judge Mayor to his chamber, supposedly to talk about Myla's absence on May 18, 2010. After Myla explained to Judge Mayor the reason for her absence on said date, she was asked by the Judge to help him put on his robe. As Myla was doing so, Judge Mayor kissed her on her right cheek and touched her right breast. Stunned, Myla tried to leave the chamber but Judge Mayor blocked the door. Myla warned that she would make a scene and scream for help if Judge Mayor would not let her out. Judge Mayor though still asked Myla to help him put on his robe as proof that Myla was not offended by what the Judge did. Myla refused and insisted to be let out of the chamber. Myla was only able to leave the chamber when Peter Ramos (Peter), a court utility worker, peeped into the room to inform Judge Mayor that the litigants were ready for trial. Myla returned to and cried at her table. Noticing how upset Myla was, Rosalinda approached her and asked her what happened. Upon hearing Myla's story, Rosalinda accompanied Myla to confront Judge Mayor, who readily admitted his misdeeds before both women. Thereafter, Myla proceeded to the nearest police station to have the incident with Judge Mayor entered into the blotter. Myla also filed a criminal complaint against Judge Mayor before the Public Prosecutor's Office, docketed as IV-02-INV-10E-00456.
To answer the complaints against him, Judge Mayor submitted an undated Affidavit 4 and comment 5 dated August 18, 2010, in which he categorically denied the allegations of Myla and Luz. Judge Mayor contended that the complaints were simply meant to harass him and malign his reputation.
As regards the May 19, 2010 incident, Judge Mayor narrated that he had a post-paid cellular phone service subscription with Globe Telecom. Counsel for Globe Telecom had sent Judge Mayor a demand letter dated October 22, 2009 for the settlement of the Judge's unpaid bill amounting to P7,500.00, exclusive of penalties and charges. Sometime in March 2010, Rosalinda informed Myla that Judge Mayor had not yet paid his P7,500.00 bill from Globe Telecom, and Myla, in turn, reminded Judge Mayor about the unpaid bill. Judge Mayor immediately took P7,500.00 from his wallet and gave it to Myla, instructing her to pay his Globe Telecom bill and to get a receipt as proof of payment. Myla, however, failed to turn over any receipt to Judge Mayor. When Judge Mayor confronted Myla, Myla purportedly admitted that she used the money to buy her daughter a cellular phone. Judge Mayor alleged that this was not the first time Myla had misappropriated his money. Myla had also previously misappropriated P10,000.00 intended for the payment of Judge Mayor's jewelry bracelet, an amount which Myla paid back only after several months. SIaHDA
According to Judge Mayor, he only called Myla to his chamber on May 19, 2010 to demand payment of the P7,500.00 because the Judge was aware that Myla had already received the proceeds of her loan from the Supreme Court Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (SCSLA). Myla supposedly told Judge Mayor that she had already given him back the P7,500.00 and then attempted to walk out of the chamber, thus, prompting the Judge to close the doors to prevent Myla from leaving the room. Judge Mayor denied that he kissed Myla and touched her breast while they were inside his chamber. To support his version of events, Judge Mayor presented a copy of Peter's Affidavit attesting to the fact that no such incident happened in the Judge's chamber on said date. Judge Mayor further dismissed Rosalinda as a witness because she was not present in the chambers and whatever she said happened inside was based only on what Myla told her and was mere hearsay.
Judge Mayor additionally maintained that he never sent text messages to Myla and that the same were mere products of Myla's "hallucination and illusion of grandeur." In his Affidavit, Judge Mayor claimed that Myla was suffering from a personality disorder brought about by her family problems, which had negatively affected her work performance. Judge Mayor temporarily reassigned Myla as a Data Encoder, hoping that she would do well at this post, and then he could promote her. Unfortunately, Myla's work performance as a Data Encoder only worsened. In his subsequent comment, Judge Mayor stated that he had already issued a special order promoting Myla to Data Encoder, but Myla declined the appointment and did not prepare the necessary documents to effect the promotion.
Judge Mayor refuted Myla's allegation that he made any monetary promises to her. Judge Mayor recounted that it was Myla and Luz who asked for the Judge's recommendations for the employment of Myla's husband at Hamilo Beach and Luz's brother as a jail guard. Based on Judge Mayor's recommendation, Luz's brother was already appointed as jail guard. Judge Mayor though did not issue any recommendation for Myla's husband because the latter had not submitted the results of a drug test, which the Judge requested.
Although Judge Mayor admitted that he withheld the Performance Ratings of Myla and Luz, he only did so because these ratings were so low, given the numerous complaints against the two received by the Judge's office from lawyers and party litigants.
Judge Mayor, in turn, charged Myla and Luz with the following: (1) Myla engaged in "money trading business" or "five-six lending operations," which Judge Mayor warned her, verbally and in writing (through a Memorandum dated July 24, 2009), to stop; (2) Luz made "contumacious utterances" to lawyers and party litigants, and was directed to refrain from doing so by Judge Mayor through a Memorandum dated July 24, 2009; (3) Luz asked for payments from the party litigants for the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs); (4) Luz was having an affair with one Atty. Pedro Belmi (Pedro), a private practitioner in Nasugbu, Batangas, per the letter dated May 18, 2010 of Floraida C. Terania (Floraida); and (5) Myla and Luz demanded P10,000.00 from Mrs. Marlyn C. Ellis (Marlyn) to finance their trip to Cebu, as stated in Marlyn's Salaysay.
The parties subsequently exchanged more pleadings. 6
In their later pleadings, Myla and Luz avowed that Judge Mayor, himself and through intermediaries, had tried to persuade them to withdraw their complaints. Judge Mayor even demanded that Atty. Noby, if she really was a good lawyer, should find a way to convince Myla and Luz to drop their complaints against the Judge. Myla and Luz pointed out that the charges of Judge Mayor against them came out only after they had filed their complaints. The Memoranda issued to them by Judge Mayor were only part of the Judge's harassment.
Myla specifically denied receiving P7,500.00 from Judge Mayor to pay for the Judge's Globe Telecom bill, and other than his self-serving statement, the Judge failed to present any evidence of the same. Myla argued that she would not have made up the story of Judge Mayor kissing her and touching her breast for no woman would willingly expose herself to such embarrassment. Myla even expressed her willingness to surrender her cellular phone to prove that the text messages really existed and they were from Judge Mayor. Judge Mayor's calling card bore the same number from whom the text messages came from. Myla further explained that the reason she was performing poorly at work was because Judge Mayor kept her inside the chamber for most of the day, leaving her little time to do anything else. Myla confirmed that she refused her promotion to Data Encoder for she was afraid that Judge Mayor would ask for something in exchange. Luz, for her part, denied having an affair with Atty. Pedro and alleged that Floraida was Atty. Pedro's ex-girlfriend who was possibly still bitter about their break-up. Both Myla and Luz rejected Judge Mayor's charge that they demanded P10,000.00 from Marlyn and contended that Marlyn's Salaysay was spurious as it was not included in the Notarial Report of the Notary Public before whom it was purportedly sworn and attested to. ETAICc
Judge Mayor denied talking to Myla and Luz about the withdrawal of the complaints against him. Neither did Judge Mayor ask Atty. Noby to convince Myla and Luz to drop the cases against him as Atty. Noby was always absent. Judge Mayor maintained that his integrity and uprightness had never been tainted since he started in government service. Judge Mayor even submitted affidavits from several people attesting to his good character.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269(formerly OCA IPI No. 10-8-238-RTC)
In their letter 7 dated July 1, 2010 addressed to the OCA, Myla and Luz asked for appropriate action on Judge Mayor's continued refusal to sign their DTRs for April 2010.
Judge Mayor explained in his Comment 8 dated October 26, 2010 that he had not signed the DTRs of Myla and Luz because the entries therein were false and erroneous. Myla usually went home during lunch time. According to Judge Mayor, even though Myla's time card and DTR showed that she would punch out of the office at 12:00 noon, punch in at 1:00 p.m., and punch out again at 5:00 p.m., in reality, Myla would actually return to the office much later than 1:00 p.m. and would leave again even before 5:00 p.m. Judge Mayor seemed to suggest that someone else was punching in and out Myla's time card for her. While Judge Mayor conceded that Luz herself would punch in and out her time card, he claimed that Luz would immediately leave after punching in her time card to attend to her duties as President of the Parent-Teachers Association of the Batangas State University. Judge Mayor mentioned that the RTC entirely relied on the Bundy Clock Machine and there was no logbook to supplement the record of attendance of the court staff. Myla and Luz's transgressions were tolerated by Atty. Noby because the latter was herself often absent. Judge Mayor averred that it was time to stop these irregularities.
OCA IPI No. 11-3593-P
The comments filed by Judge Mayor in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268 and A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269 were considered as a complaint against Myla and Luz for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In a Resolution dated January 24, 2011, the Court resolved:
(1) To RE-DOCKET separately A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3425-RTJ and A.M. No. 10-8-238-RTC as regular administrative matters;
(2) To REFER these consolidated cases to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, for RAFFLE among the Justices thereat for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of records thereof;
(3) To CONSIDER and DOCKET the comments of respondent Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor in A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3425-RTJ and A.M. No. 10-8-238-RTC as a complaint against complainants Clerk III Myla Comia-Castro and Stenographer III Luciana M. Rojales for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
(4) To REFER the case to the Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals to whom the above administrative matters would be raffled, for just investigation, report and recommendation also within the same period of ninety (90) days from receipt of records. 9
II
The cases were raffled to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz (CA Justice Cruz) for investigation and report.
During the Preliminary Conference held on August 31, 2011, the parties agreed to prove and establish the following matters:
1. A.D. No. RTJ-11-2268, (1) the text message allegedly sent by [Judge Mayor] to complainant [Myla]; (2) the incident while complainant [Myla] was accompanying [Judge Mayor] in going to a testimonial dinner in Tagaytay City; (3) the incident in [Judge Mayor's] rented residence after the Cebu conference; and (4) the incident that occurred on May 19, 2010 in [Judge Mayor's] chamber.
[Judge Mayor's] main defense is that [the allegations] are all hearsay, fabrication and concoction.
2. A.D. No. RTJ-11-2269, parties agreed that the main issue to be resolved is the propriety of [Judge Mayor's] not signing the Daily Time Record of both [Myla and Luz].
3. A.D. OCA-IPI No. 11-3593-P, parties agreed that it is a counter charge filed by Judge [Mayor] against the complainants [Myla and Luz] for perjury, bribery, and as against [Myla] for estafa and misappropriation of the amount P7,500.00. 10
Complainants Myla and Luz and their co-employees at the RTC, namely, Rosalinda, Atty. Noby, and Milagros Salac, testified to substantiate the charges against Judge Mayor. Peter, Floraida, Lea Mortel (Judge Mayor's yaya), Nelson Rala (Judge Mayor's driver), and Judge Mayor himself appeared as witnesses in defense of the Judge. AaCcST
On October 19, 2011, CA Justice Cruz transmitted to the OCA his Report, in which he made the following findings and recommendations:
The charges levelled by [Myla and Luz] against the respondent, Judge Mayor, in A.D. No. RTJ-11-2268 are for violation of Sections 2 and 3 of the provisions of R. A. 7877 otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law and the pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Ethics particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 2.00 and Rule 2.01. As a basic precept in administrative cases, the burden is upon [Myla and Luz] to prove their claim by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that one is administratively liable. The standard of substantial evidence, thus, is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. In this case, [Myla and Luz] satisfied this requirement. Based on the above stated evaluation, there is indeed substantial evidence in the records to support the claim that respondent Judge committed the offensive acts.
The nature of "sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire — it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. Under Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed when "the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee."
Ineluctably, [Judge Mayor] has moral ascendancy over [Myla and Luz]. He did not only commit the overt acts complained of with sexual connotations but also used his position to intimidate [Myla and Luz] by not signing their DTR's (as charged under A.D. No. RTJ-11-2269) after they have filed several administrative cases addressing his misbehavior. The New Code of Judicial Conduct is explicit. It requires a Judge to ensure that not only his conduct be above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Judges are thus required to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. Such exacting standard applies not only in the exercise of their official duties but also to their other activities, including their personal life. . . .
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Sexual harassment, such as by making sexual advances against a subordinate, may be considered as a grossly immoral act which is a ground for a disciplinary action against a judge. In the same vein, the act of [Judge Mayor] in not signing the DTR's of [Myla and Luz] maybe a form of gross misconduct. Gross misconduct is present when the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Here, the unjustified refusal of [Judge Mayor] to sign [Myla and Luz's] DTR's in retaliation for the administrative cases filed by the latter illustrates a dishonest mind. Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, classifies gross misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense. Under Section 11 thereof, a serious offense is punishable either by dismissal, suspension, or a fine.
As laid down by jurisprudence, sexual harassment is a serious offense, the commission thereof warrants the dismissal of the erring judge from service. . . .
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In a plethora of cases, the court has nonetheless refrained from imposing the penalty of dismissal in the presence of some mitigating factors. . . .
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Thus, taking into consideration [Judge Mayor's] service in the different courts to which he had been assigned, his record prior to his appointment as a judge and this being his first offense, the undersigned recommends the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay.
As for the claims by [Judge Mayor] under A.D. OCA-IPI No. 11-3593-P against [Myla and Luz], the same remained unsubstantiated and uncorroborated. Other than his bare allegations, [Judge Mayor] had no other evidence to establish the alleged violations of [Myla and Luz]. To reiterate, the rule in administrative cases is that the burden of proof is upon the complainant to prove his claim by substantial evidence. In this case, [Judge Mayor] failed to satisfy the quantum of evidence required that would hold [Myla and Luz] administratively liable.
The undersigned therefore recommends the following:
1. In A.D. No. RTJ-11-2268 and A.D. No. RTJ-11-2269, for blatant violation of the pertinent provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, it is recommended that the penalty of SUSPENSION for one (1) year without pay be imposed upon [Judge Mayor]. AcTDaH
2. In A.D. OCA-IPI No. 11-3593-P, for failure to establish the charges against [Myla and Luz] by substantial evidence, it is recommended that the cases against the latter be DISMISSED for lack of merit. 11
In its Memorandum dated September 26, 2012, the OCA similarly found Judge Mayor guilty of the charges against him, but modified the recommended penalties to be imposed upon him, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that:
(1) In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268 and A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269
(a) Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor, Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Nasugbu, Batangas, be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency, or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations;
(b) Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor be DIRECTED to promptly act on the daily time records (DTRs) of complainants Myla C. Castro and Luciana M. Rojales; and
(2) In OCA IPI No. 11-3593-P
The complaint filed by Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor against Myla C. Castro, Clerk III, and Luciana M. Rojales, Stenographer III, both of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Nasugbu, Batangas, for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service be DISMISSED for lack of merit. 12
In Compliance with the Resolution 13 dated November 14, 2012 of the Court, Judge Mayor submitted his Urgent Manifestation dated February 15, 2013 and Myla and Luz filed their Ex-ParteManifestation dated February 19, 2013, stating that they were submitting the cases for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
In the meantime, Judge Mayor retired on December 1, 2012.
III
Upon its evaluation of the pleadings and evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the OCA and CA Justice Cruz, but modifies the penalties to be imposed.
As declared by both the OCA and CA Justice Cruz, there is substantial evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268 that Judge Mayor subjected Myla and Luz to sexual harassment. Judge Mayor was not exactly discreet and made his attraction to Myla known to the rest of the court staff, through both his words and actions.
The incidents reported by Myla and/or Luz were corroborated by at least one other witness. Myla and Luz were both present at Judge Mayor's rented house where they went as soon as they arrived from the Cebu convention. It was there that Judge Mayor embraced them both and attempted to kiss Myla but accidentally ended up kissing Luz. Rosalinda saw how Judge Mayor was being overly familiar and physical with Myla on their way to a testimonial dinner in Tagaytay City. Rosalinda also noticed how upset Myla was after coming out of Judge Mayor's chamber on May 19, 2010 (when according to Myla Judge Mayor kissed her and touched her right breast while she was inside the chamber), and even accompanied Myla in confronting Judge Mayor soon after. Although Rosalinda was not inside the chamber with Myla and did not personally witness the incident of May 19, 2010, she was able to confirm Myla's distressed mental and emotional state at that time. Twelve (12) of the fourteen (14) court staff attested that Judge Mayor specifically imposed upon Myla the additional duties of making him coffee and assisting him in wearing and removing his robe, all performed inside his chamber.
In wooing Myla, Judge Mayor did not only promise her a house and business, but also exerted pressure on her and Luz by refusing to sign their Performance Ratings. Judge Mayor's claim that he did not sign the Performance Ratings because of the poor performances of Myla and Luz is unconvincing, especially when he actually promoted Myla.
Even more difficult to repudiate are the amorous text messages sent by Judge Mayor to Myla. It was established during the investigation that the cellular phone number that sent the text messages belonged to Judge Mayor. Judge Mayor himself, during his cross-examination of Myla, admitted that the cellular phone number was his. 14
In contrast, Judge Mayor generally denied all these incidents.
Already beyond cavil is the evidentiary rule that denial does not overturn the relative weight and probative value of an affirmative assertion. Denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is without evidentiary value. Like the defense of alibi, denial crumbles in light of positive declarations. 15 Judge Mayor was unable to present evidence of ill motive on the part of Myla and Luz, as well as the other court employees to falsely testify against him. As for Myla, no married woman would cry assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetrate a falsehood. 16CTcSAE
Judge Mayor relies heavily on Peter's Affidavit to belie the incident of May 19, 2010. According to Peter, he knocked on the chamber's door to inform Judge Mayor that the party litigants were ready for trial. As he opened the door, he saw Myla standing inside the chamber. Judge Mayor, who was at the side of the door, suddenly closed the door, and the door hit Peter on the head. Peter's statements do not necessarily disprove that Judge Mayor kissed Myla and touched her breast while she was inside the chamber. Judge Mayor could have easily done so before or after Peter knocked on and opened the door to the chamber.
The Court cannot tolerate Judge Mayor's behavior. In Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 17 the Court emphasized the exacting standards by which members of the Judiciary are measured:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
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The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the judiciary must observe (Sicat vs. Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized (Junio vs. Rivera, 225 SCRA 688 [1993]). He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 SCRA 493 [1981]), the Court laid down the rationale why every judge must posses[s] moral integrity, thusly:
The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be beyond reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people in the administration of justice can not be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.
(at p. 504.)
In Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991]), it was emphasized that:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
(at p. 93.)
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
Likewise relevant herein are the pronouncements of the Court in Veloso v. Caminade: 18HcSETI
Those who serve in the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not only know the law but must also possess the highest degree of integrity and probity, and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and private lives.
In this particular case, we are principally concerned with the moral fiber of Judge Caminade. His penchant for teasing and showing unwelcome affection to women indicates a certain moral depravity and lack of respect towards his female employees. They were his subordinates and he should have treated them like his own children. Instead, he took advantage of his superior position.
We have repeatedly held that, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts greater moral righteousness than a seat in the judiciary. Performing as he does an exalted role in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can weather the most exacting scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.
Canons 3 and 4 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct mandate, respectively, that "judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of the reasonable observer" and that "judges shall avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities." These very stringent standards of decorum are demanded of all magistrates and employees of the courts.
Judge Caminade's behavior must be sanctioned. We are neither amused by his claims of innocent playfulness nor impressed by his excessive display of congeniality. He acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety. He failed to meet the standard of conduct embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. His abusive and distasteful acts unmistakably constituted sexual harassment because they resulted in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for his female subordinates.
Clearly, Judge Mayor, by his inappropriate conduct toward Myla and Luz on several occasions, failed to live up to the aforementioned standards of his position and violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct, for which he must be held administratively liable.
However, considering that Judge Mayor already retired on December 1, 2012, he can no longer be dismissed or suspended. The Court further takes into account that Judge Mayor has rendered fifty (50) years of continuous service to the government, that this is his first infraction, and that as a retiree, he mostly relies financially on his retirement benefits, the Court finds that a fine of P180,000.00 will suffice as penalty.
Moreover, in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269, the Court finds no basis for Judge Mayor's stubborn refusal to sign the DTRs of Myla and Luz. Other than Judge Mayor's bare allegations, there was no independent evidence to show that Myla and Luz had falsified or tampered with their DTRs, time cards, and/or the Bundy Clock. And even assuming that Judge Mayor's allegations are true, the proper recourse would not have been to simply refuse to sign the DTRs of Myla and Luz, but to initiate administrative proceedings against the two. Given the concomitant circumstances, the only plausible reason for Judge Mayor's unjustified refusal to sign the DTRs of Myla and Luz was to get back at them for filing the administrative cases against him, and eventually compel them to withdraw their complaints in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with one's performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. 19 The unjustified refusal of Judge Mayor to sign the DTRs of Myla and Luz in retaliation for the cases filed against him was undeniably an abuse of his position as the superior of Myla and Luz, and constitutes gross misconduct.
Gross misconduct consisting of violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge punishable under Section 11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. — A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Given the foregoing, Judge Mayor is fined P20,000.00 for his gross misconduct.
As for OCA IPI No. 11-3593-P, the Court agrees with the OCA and CA Justice Cruz that it should be dismissed. ScAaHE
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. 20
Judge Mayor failed to present substantial proof in support of his countercharges against Myla and Luz. The Court concurs in CA Justice Cruz's evaluation of the allegations and evidence presented by Judge Mayor, to wit:
OCA-IPI No. 11-3593-P laid down the counter-charges filed by [Judge Mayor] against [Myla and Luz]. According to [Judge Mayor], complainant Myla is guilty of Estafa for misappropriating the amount of Php7,500.00 which he entrusted to her for the payment of his GLOBE account. In her testimony, Myla denied having received such amount. Moreover, [Judge Mayor] claimed that Peter Ramos saw him giving the amount to Myla, however Peter Ramos never testified that he saw [Judge Mayor] gave the said amount to Myla. Based on the evidence extant in the records, while counsel for GLOBE indeed sent a demand letter to [Judge Mayor] asking for payment of Php7,500.00 on October 2009 but why [Judge Mayor] would have to wait for seven (7) months or until May 2010 to confront Myla for a demand letter that has been sent months back beggar belief.
As for complainant Luz, [Judge Mayor] charge her with immorality for her alleged amorous relationship with Atty. Pedro Belmi. To support his claim, he presented as evidence the Letter of Floraida Terania. During the trial, it was revealed that the witness was a former girlfriend of Atty. Belmi, whom the latter promised to marry. When ask if she had other proof that Atty. Belmi and Luz [are] indeed having an affair, Floraida can only speculate . . .
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In fact, on cross examination, witness Floraida cannot positively say that Atty. Belmi had already broken up with her, saying that she and Luz had a misunderstanding even before she wrote the letter.
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Clearly, the credibility of the witness Floraida Terania is tainted by her ill motives as it is evident that she wrote the letter narrating the alleged amorous relationship of Atty. Belmi and Luz out of spite after seeing them together.
[Judge Mayor] accused both [Myla and Luz] of bribery for allegedly asking the amount of Php10,000.00 from Marlyn Ellis. Other than the affidavit executed by Marlyn Ellis, who was not presented before this office, and the bare allegations of [Judge Mayor], no other proof was attached to prove that [Myla and Luz] indeed asked Marlyn Ellis for the same amount or that [Myla and Luz] received the same amount from Marlyn Ellis.
[Judge Mayor] also claimed that [Myla and Luz] were guilty of Perjury for the alleged false statements found in their complaints, and that the cases were mere harassment suits because [Myla and Luz] wanted to get back at him for the Memoranda which he issued to them but [Judge Mayor] did not adduce enough evidence to support his claim and rebut the arguments of [Myla and Luz].
Perhaps, the best argument for the dismissal of the perjury charge of Judge Mayor against Myla and Luz is the finding of guilt rendered by the Court herein against Judge Mayor based on the incidents stated in their complaints.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves:
1. In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268, to declare Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor GUILTY of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct, for which he is FINED One Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P180,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits;
2. In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269, to declare Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor GUILTY of gross misconduct, for which he is FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits;
3. In OCA IPI No. 11-3593-P, to DISMISS for lack of merit the counter-charges of Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor against Myla C. Castro and Luciana M. Rojales for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
4. To DIRECT the Fiscal Management Office to immediately release the balance of Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor's retirement benefits after the aforementioned fines have been deducted therefrom." Velasco, Jr., J., no part. Brion, J., on leave. Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave. (5)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDALClerk of Court
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the findings that Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor subjected Myla and Luz to sexual harassment in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268 and A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269.
I regret that I must register my dissent regarding the penalties imposed. In my view, he should have been dismissed and, therefore, all his retirement benefits should also have been forfeited.
As eloquently elaborated in the resolution, the acts of harassment made by Judge Mayor were not isolated. They were made persistently and consistently. As soon as they arrived in the rented house, Judge Mayor embraced both Myla and Luz. He attempted to kiss Myla but kissed Luz instead. Judge Mayor was overly and inappropriately familiar with Myla on the way to a testimonial dinner in Tagaytay. Judge Mayor kissed Myla inside his chamber and fondled her right breast. Myla was given the additional duty of making him coffee and assisting him with his robe, giving him more opportunities to inappropriately touch Myla and make further indignities on her.
Judge Mayor clearly abused his power over his subordinates. At one point, he refused to sign the performance ratings of Luz and Myla so that the two would be more accommodating of his illicit and depraved advances.
The text messages sent by Judge Mayor were clearly inappropriate. It caused an emotionally hostile environment in his workplace not only for Myla and Luz but likewise for his entire staff. Instead of being the paragon of character, he impliedly compelled his staff to look the other way while he overtly and contumaciously violated our Canons of Judicial Conduct and our circulars against sexual harassment.
I disagree that all these should be considered his first infraction.
Judge Mayor's acts caused Myla and Luz untold suffering for years. In my view, it would add further to their indignity if we characterize Judge Mayor's actuations as a first and, therefore, isolated. It speaks of his character. It articulates the quintessential abuse of power by a superior to achieve sexual advances on his subordinates. It is more deplorable because it is committed by a judge supposed to lend succor to those who are oppressed by established laws that protect the dignity of human beings — most especially women.
In Tan v. Judge Pacuribot, 1 this court held:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice, but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have administered justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, has been served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and in their private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system. ACHEaI
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We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday lives.
For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. We have adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency, which every member of the judiciary must observe. A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
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Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. His actuations are aggravated by the fact that complainants are his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of acting in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, he was even the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
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We find totally unacceptable the temerity of Judge Pacuribot in subjecting the complainants, both his subordinates, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Over long periods of time, he persistently solicited sexual favors from Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca. When they refused, he made their working conditions so unbearable that Ms. Tan was eventually forced to transfer to another office and Ms. Villafranca to seek employment abroad. Certainly, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from any court employee, even from a woman of loose morals. Judge Pacuribot's conduct indubitably bears the marks of impropriety and immorality. Not only do his actions fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee[s]." 2 (Emphasis supplied) (Citation omitted) SIDEaA
I also disagree that his long service in the judiciary should be considered as a mitigating factor. In my view, it aggravates his actions. Senior judges should be expected to have honed the discipline of the judicial temperament. They serve as mentors to the new entrants to the judiciary. In their senior years and after having been long exposed to the cruelties committed by human beings on other human beings in all the cases that they have judged, they are supposed to be shining examples of wisdom and compassion. For us to excuse Judge Mayor or mitigate his penalty due to his advanced age or due to his experience and longevity would be to scorn the service of others who have not succumbed to similar temptation and lived a life of discipline and sacrifice.
To tarnish the image of the judiciary through continued acts of immorality and gross misconduct merits the severest form of sanction, that is, the dismissal from service: 3
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that "[T]he administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all that is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come to pass." 4
Canon II, Rule 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to avoid impropriety, or even just the appearance of it. Under the Rules of Court, Rule 140, section 8 (3), 5 as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, 6 gross misconduct amounting to a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a "serious charge." Section 11 of the same rule imposes dismissal from service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, as this court may determine, as penalty for this type of charge.
I am of the view that dismissal with forfeiture of all his benefits must be imposed on Judge Mayor. His "first infraction" continued for as long as it did because his actions went unchecked. The "length of service" even provided him the opportunity to hide his morally corrupt acts behind a shroud of authority — an authority that ironically was entrusted upon him by virtue of his commitment to public service.
This court should not countenance sexual oppression. It is a violation of a fundamental human right to dignity. Committed by one who occupies a superior position in the workplace, it is a depravity which, when tolerated, will relieve us of our humanity. The wrong committed was not only to Myla or Luz. It is a wrong committed to what it is that we hold ideal as human beings. It is that dignity that I propose we hold to high esteem. Because of this, we should impose on Judge Mayor the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of all his retirement benefits.
I am aware that forfeiture of retirement benefits will mean that Judge Mayor will not enjoy the added income in the twilight of his years. I am also painfully aware that this will deprive his spouse — the one who stood by his side while he abused his power to satiate his depravity — of the benefits of a survivor in the event that Judge Mayor passes away.
My colleagues have suggested that we grant him mercy and exercise compassion by reducing his penalty.
Sadly, I cannot agree. This will send the wrong message and will simply reinforce the patriarchy that sponsors these abuses. Men will abuse to the detriment of others and, when caught and held to account, will then ask for the mercy and compassion that they had so little while they had power. I cannot agree to give mercy to Judge Mayor knowing that there may be many more Myla's who have suffered and may yet still suffer. Mercy in these cases is not solely ours to give.
Neither should we give clemency when Judge Mayor does not appear to have shown remorse. He has not asked for and, therefore, not been given the forgiveness of those whose lives he has traumatized. This includes Myla, Luz, and the rest of his staff. This also includes his wife and children, for they, too, may have suffered in silence. It is from them that he should first seek mercy.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to find Judge Wilfredo de Joya Mayor guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and gross misconduct, and impose upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.
Footnotes
1. Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268), pp. 1-14.
2. Id. at 5-7.
3. Id. at 16-20.
4. Id. at 47-51.
5. Id. at 103-110.
6. Myla and Luz's Reply, Judge Mayor's Rejoinder, Myla and Luz's Sur-Rejoinder, Judge Mayor's Reply to Complainants Sur-Rejoinder dated October 13, 2010, Myla and Luz's Comment (to the Reply to Complainants Sur-Rejoinder dated October 13, 2010), and Judge Mayor's Counter-Comment to Complainants Comment to the Reply to Complainants Sur-Rejoinder dated October 13, 2010.
7. Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2269), p. 5.
8. Id. at 13-15.
9. Id. at 20.
10. Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268), p. 540.
11. Id. at 581-588.
12. Id. at 606-607.
13. Id. at 608-609.
14. TSN, September 13, 2011, pp. 9-20.
15. Jugueta v. Estacio, 486 Phil. 206, 213 (2004).
16. Simbajon v. Esteban, 371 Phil. 119, 127 (1999).
17. 328 Phil. 692, 705-707 (1996).
18. 478 Phil. 1, 7-8 (2004).
19. Gacad v. Clapis, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 534, 544.
20. Navarro v. Cerezo, 492 Phil. 19, 22 (2005).
LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Sherlita O. Tan v. Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot, 565 Phil. 1 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
2. Id. at 52-57.
3. Id. at 57-58.
4. Id. at 58, citing Employees of the RTC of Dagupan City v. Judge Falloran-Aliposa, 384 Phil. 168, 191 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
5. Rule 140 pertains to the Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.
6. Re: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges (2001).