THIRD DIVISION
[OCA I.P.I. No. 16-4594-RTJ. August 5, 2019.]
LOURDES H. CASTILLO, complainant, vs.HON. JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 66, MAKATI CITY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedAugust 5, 2019, which reads as follows:
"OCA I.P.I. No. 16-4594-RTJ (Lourdes H. Castillo v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City.). — Before this Court is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 dated July 5, 2016 filed by complainant Lourdes H. Castillo (Castillo) against respondent Judge Joselito C. Villarosa (Judge Villarosa) of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, charging the latter with violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for his alleged impropriety and partiality.
Castillo alleged that she was a respondent in a civil case for the settlement of the intestate estate of Cornelia Meer Hernandez (docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-7627), and a petitioner in a related civil case for the probate of the will of the said decedent Cornelia Meer Hernandez. Both cases were pending before respondent Judge Villarosa in Branch 66, RTC of Makati City.
According to Castillo, one of the heirs of the decedent Cornelia, Percival Miguel M. Hernandez (Hernandez), had two other pending receivership cases before Judge Villarosa: the petition for the rehabilitation of PSS Realty and Development Corporation, docketed as Case No. M-7110, and the petition for the rehabilitation of Lao David Agro Development Corporation, docketed as Case No. M-6731. Castillo said that in these two cases, Judge Villarosa appointed Hernandez as receiver of the distressed corporations, giving the latter broad powers with which to manage the properties of the said entities.
Castillo contended that Hernandez is "a grossly incompetent person especially in handling cases involving money." 2 In support of her contention, Castillo said that there had been news that Hernandez managed to obtain under suspicious circumstances a questionable loan in the United States of America in the amount of one million dollars (USD1,000,000.00). Because of this, Hernandez allegedly had to flee to the Philippines to avoid criminal indictment in the United States.
Castillo further averred that her opinion of Hernandez was supported by a newspaper column written by Ramon Tulfo (Tulfo) in the March 3, 2016 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. 3 In the said column, Tulfo hinted at a supposed connection between Hernandez and Judge Villarosa in connection with the conduct of a raid of a call center office in Makati City, and alluded to an alleged syndicate of Makati City judges involved in receivership cases.
Castillo maintained that the two receivership cases and the article written by Tulfo were clear indications of the connection between Hernandez and Judge Villarosa.
Likewise, Castillo alleged that Judge Villarosa did not reveal his transactions with Hernandez and Hernandez's lawyer, a certain Atty. R.A. Ukol, in the receivership cases. Castillo argued that it was incumbent upon Judge Villarosa to disclose these circumstances to the parties in the cases involving the settlement of the estate of Cornelia Meer Hernandez, since these transactions brought about a potential bias on the part of the respondent judge.
Castillo mentioned a specific instance when Judge Villarosa allegedly exhibited bias in favor of Hernandez, saying that when Atty. Ukol, on behalf of Hernandez, filed four (4) requests for extension of time to comment on the Motion to Inhibit filed by the oppositors in the intestate proceedings, Judge Villarosa did not impose any sanction on Atty. Ukol for unduly delaying the case. 4 Castillo also claimed that Judge Villarosa's partiality was manifested when he issued an Order dated March 18, 2016 in Sp. Proc. No. M-7627 granting all the matters prayed for by the petitioners in the said case.
According to Castillo, these circumstances manifested bias and partiality on the part of Judge Villarosa, in violation of Canons 1 and 2 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. 5
In a Request for Extension of Time 6 dated August 24, 2016, Judge Villarosa asked the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for a thirty-day period of extension within which to comply with the OCA directive, given the volume of cases he was handling in addition to the daily conduct of trials, hearings, and case dispositions. The said request was granted by the OCA on August 31, 2016, giving Judge Villarosa until October 2, 2016 to file his Comment.
In his Comment 7 dated September 30, 2016, Judge Villarosa countered that the accusations in the Complaint-Affidavit were empty and bereft of meaning, stating that the complaint was evidently a retaliation on Castillo's part in order to get back at him for issuing an Order adverse to Castillo's interest in the intestate proceedings. 8
Judge Villarosa maintained that the choice of receiver was discretionary to the court, taking into consideration the personal qualifications, competence, and capability of the receiver to act as such. 9 According to him, Hernandez was appointed by the court as rehabilitation receiver after finding that he had all the requirements and none of the disqualifications of one. There were also no objections as regards the appointment of Hernandez on the part of the parties and creditors. Judge Villarosa added that other than having Hernandez as a participant in all the intestate and receivership cases, there was no other reasonable connection between the cases that could affect one another. 10
As regards the issue of inhibition, Judge Villarosa argued that the appointment of Hernandez as rehabilitation receiver in his court was not one of the mandatory grounds for inhibition under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. He added that he did not consider such fact as a just and valid reason for his voluntary inhibition from the intestate proceedings as the issue of voluntary inhibition is mainly a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. 11
Regarding the claim of Castillo that the newspaper article of Tulfo was indicative of a connection between him and Hernandez, Judge Villarosa countered that apart from the fact that the same was written without consulting him, such article was mere hearsay evidence. Thus, not only was it inadmissible in evidence, but it was also without any probative value. 12
Citing Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, Judge Villarosa contended that contrary to Castillo's claims, he was not duty-bound, as presiding judge, to inform the former of Hernandez's participation in the receivership cases. 13
Further, Judge Villarosa stressed that Castillo had no basis to file the instant complaint against him, given that the same was filed when he initially granted the petition prayed for in the instestate settlement of the estate of Cornelia Meer Hernandez. He lamented that rather than exhaust all remedies available to her in the same court as a result of the adverse ruling, Castillo chose to file an administrative complaint against him. 14
On May 28, 2018, the OCA submitted to the Supreme Court its recommendation 15 that the instant administrative case against Judge Villarosa be dismissed on the ground of prematurity and lack of merit.
The OCA found that there was no substantial evidence to support Castillo's charges of impropriety and partiality on the part of Judge Villarosa. Apart from the bare allegations in the complaint that respondent judge appointed as rehabilitation receiver a "grossly incompetent person" and the news article referred to which did not even feature Judge Villarosa's side of the story, the OCA stressed that Castillo did not present any other evidence to prove her claims.
With regard to Castillo's argument that the non-disclosure by Judge Villarosa of his transactions with Hernandez carried badges of bias, partiality, or impropriety which should have imposed upon him the duty to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the intestate and probate cases, the OCA stated that no such ground is supported by law and jurisprudence. 16
The OCA stressed that Castillo had not showed any clear and convincing evidence that would overcome the presumption that Judge Villarosa would decide the intestate cases in accordance with law and jurisprudence. The OCA added that on the contrary, the Orders of Judge Villarosa dated March 18, 2016, granting petitioner's prayers in Sp. Proc. No. M-7627, and September 26, 2016, resolving both the Motion to Inhibit and Motion for Reconsideration filed by Castillo, gave solid and legal jurisprudential bases as to how his rulings were arrived at. 17
This Court sustains the findings of the OCA that the instant administrative complaint against respondent should be dismissed for lack of merit.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for when a judge is mandatorily disqualified and when a judge may involuntarily inhibit from a case. The said rule states:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of Judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
This being the case, it is clear that none of the circumstances for mandatory disqualification applies to Judge Villarosa.
As for voluntary inhibition, this Court's pronouncement in Castro v. Judge Mangrobang18 is apropos:
However, the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 does not give judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, we have noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice. 19
Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There must be sufficient evidence to prove the same, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis. 20 Moreover, the evidence must be clear and convincing to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor. 21
There is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case shall be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances. 22 Time and again, this Court has emphasized that the decision whether to voluntarily inhibit or not from hearing a case is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge. The judge, after all, is in the best position to evaluate the necessity and suitability of a recusal. 23
As such, this Court is of the same opinion as the OCA that there was no clear and convincing evidence presented by the complainant that would substantiate the charges of bias and partiality against respondent Judge Villarosa. All that Castillo presented were her presumptions and misgivings as regards the character of Hernandez, as well as the news article written by a columnist. By themselves, these do not provide enough grounds to prove bias and prejudice.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge Joselito C. Villarosa, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 1-9.
2.Id. at 4.
3. "Annex E" of the Complaint-Affidavit; id. at 45-46.
4.Rollo, p. 6.
5.Id. at 7.
6.Id. at 65.
7.Id. at 67-80.
8.Id. at 70.
9.Id. at 72.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 73.
12.Id. at 74.
13.Id. at 75-76.
14.Id. at 77.
15.Id. at 88-92.
16.Id. at 91.
17.Id.
18. 784 Phil. 267 (2016).
19.Id. at 285.
20.Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara, 633 Phil. 67, 75 (2010).
21.Castro v. Judge Mangrobang, supra note 17, at 286.
22.Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., 640 Phil. 33, 48 (2010).
23.Castro v. Judge Mangrobang, supra note 17, at 286.