Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Garcia

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 234843. November 11, 2021.]

CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC., and/or COLUMBIA SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD. LIMASSOL, CYPRUS, petitioners,vs. NESTOR M. GARCIA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 11, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 234843 (Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., and/or Columbia Shipmanagement Ltd. Limassol, Cyprus v. Nestor M. Garcia). — In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners assail the Decision 1 dated February 6, 2017, and Resolution 2 dated October 10, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142894, which affirmed the Decision dated February 22, 2015, and Resolution dated September 22, 2015, issued by the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA). Petitioners argue that the PVA has no jurisdiction over their dispute and that the illness of respondent Garcia is not work-related.

The Voluntary Arbitrator or

Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states that for disputes involving money claims of Overseas Filipino Workers, the primary jurisdiction to hear and decide these cases is lodged with the Labor Arbiters, thus:

SECTION 10. Monetary Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

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While RA 8042 is the specific law governing money claims of OFWs, it did not provide for instances wherein the parties are covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), like those relating to contracts of Filipino seafarers. In such cases, the Court held in Estate ofDulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc.3 that the general provisions on jurisdiction under the Labor Code should apply, particularly Articles 217 (c) and 261, which state: CAIHTE

ARTICLE 224. [217] Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

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(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.

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ARTICLE 274. [261] Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators and Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. (Emphases supplied.)

Clearly, disputes on the claims of Filipino seafarers whose employment contracts are covered by a CBA fall under the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. 4

Despite this, petitioners insist that their case should have been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, not by the PVA because Garcia failed to present the fulltext of the alleged CBA. 5 We are not convinced.

In the assailed Decision, the CA aptly noted that petitioners themselves declared before the PVA that "the vessel which respondent boarded is covered by a CBA." 6 This is an admission that Garcia's contract of employment contains a CBA. As regards the supposed failure of Garcia to submit the full text of the CBA, suffice it to state that petitioners, as employers, have custody of Garcia's records. In fact, they were able to attach a portion of the CBA in their Position Paper as Annex 2. 7 This means that petitioners could have easily presented its entirety to prove their defense that Garcia's employment contract is not covered by a CBA, and yet they did not. To be sure, persons in good faith would not hesitate to present evidence in support of their case. The non-production of such relevant document inevitably gives rise to the presumption that the evidence would be averse to petitioners' cause if produced. 8

Moreover, even assuming that there was no CBA in Garcia's contract, still the PVA has jurisdiction over this case because the parties are deemed to have submitted their dispute to voluntary arbitration, as stated in Article 262 9 of the Labor Code. 10 Here, the parties' Submission Agreement 11 show that they agreed to settle their dispute through voluntary arbitration, as sanctioned under Section 29 of the POEA-SEC, 12 which reads:

In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. If the parties are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may at their option submit the claim or dispute to either the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended, or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If there is no provision as to the voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties, the same shall be appointed from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Hoard of the Department of Labor and Employment. (Emphasis supplied.)

Having signed the Submission Agreement, petitioners who are Garcia's employer cannot question the voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling the dispute. 13 They freely submitted themselves to the authority of the PVA. They appointed an arbitrator, actively participated in the arbitration proceedings and prayed for affirmative relief. They did not timely object to the jurisdiction of the PVA since the only issue raised in the Submission Agreement is Garcia's entitlement to disability benefits and other claims. Petitioners should not be allowed to repudiate the authority of the PVA only now that unfavorable decision was issued against them.

In upholding the jurisdiction of the PVA over the present case, the Court not only considered the parties' Submission Agreement. More importantly, we recognized the State's expressed a preference for voluntary modes of dispute settlement. 14 No less than the Constitution provides — "[t]he State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace." 15 Consistent with this, Article 218 of the Labor Code declared the State's policy "[t]o promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes." 16

Garcia's illness is work-related:

Foremost, the question on whether an illness is work-related is one of fact 17 and is, therefore, beyond the ambit of this Court's jurisdiction in a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law. Absent any exceptional circumstances to merit the Court's review of factual questions, we will not go over the evidence presented below to ascertain if they were appreciated and weighed correctly, most especially when the CA and the PVA speak as one in their findings and conclusions. 18 Here, the PVA received the evidence of the parties first-hand. No compelling reason has been shown for us to diverge from its findings, especially since it was affirmed by the appellate court. 19 As correctly ruled by the CA:

In the present case, while it was the company-designated physician, Dr. Reyes, who first assessed and worked up respondent for hypertension after his repatriation, the records show that respondent's appointed doctors, Dr. Bitong and Dr. Vicaldo, had also the same opportunity to observe and study his medical condition did not improve despite Dr. Reyes' surgical removal of his adrenal mass. Dr. Bitong and Dr. Vicaldo issued their reports where they traced in detail the history of respondent's medical condition, diagnosed his illness and assessed his disability. They both declared respondent's illness to be work related and that he is permanently unfit for sea duty in any capacity. This Court takes notice that respondent's appointed physicians, are respected Endocrinologist and Cardiologist. Given their expertise in their respective medical fields, We are convinced that their medical assessment that respondent's illness is work [-] related is more accurate and therefore deserve greater weight than that of the company-designated physician. 20

Noteworthy, as per Medical Certificate issued by the company-designated physician, Dr. Reyes, respondent's disability is "Partial Permanent" thereby impliedly admitting that he is indeed inflicted with an illness incapacitating him to perform his usual sea duties. x x x 21

It must be pointed out that respondent had been with petitioners' company since 1989 or for twenty-three (23) years of successive renewed contracts. He was in good health and fit to work when he was engaged anew by petitioners to work on board the vessel M/T WILLY in 2012. His PEME showed essentially normal findings with no hypertension and without any indication of adrenal mass. In short, he served the best years of his life for the company. His years of service certainly took a toll on his body, and he could not have contracted his illness elsewhere except while working for petitioners. To stress, it was only in September 2012, while rendering duty on board the vessel that he complained of anxiety, insomnia and high blood pressure. And, after seeking medical assistance in Grangemouth, United Kingdom for several times, he was found and subsequently treated for hypertension. Unfortunately, when he wrote a letter to the petitioners for his continued treatment, no action was taken thereon.

Simply, it cannot be denied that the stress caused by his job as bosun actively contributed to the progression and aggravation of his illness, both the formation of the adrenal mass and essential hypertension. (Emphases supplied.)

Garcia is entitled to total and

A seafarer's entitlement to disability benefits for work rendered overseas is a matter governed not only by medical findings but also by Philippine law, particularly Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, which is deemed incorporated in every seafarer's contract of employment. If the seafarer suffers from an illness or injury during the term of the contract, like Garcia who was medically repatriated, the process in Section 20 (A) on how the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered applies: 22

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

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2. x x x However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.

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For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., 23 the Court explained the rules on the 120-day and 240-day periods for medical treatment on permanent and total disability in this manner:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

The period of 120 days from repatriation is the period within which the employer is required to determine the fitness of the seafarer to work or to ascertain the degree of his disability. When the seafarer remains in need of medical attention, the 120-day period may be extended to a maximum period of 240 days within which the company-designated doctor must make a definite declaration on the fitness to work or the degree of the disability of the seafarer. A seafarer is thus considered "permanently and totally" disabled when so declared by the company-designated doctor within the period of 120 or 240 days, as the case may be; or when the 240 days lapsed without any declaration being issued by the company-designated physician. 24

Here, it was established that after the lapse of 120 days from the date of repatriation, Garcia's treatment continued. Thus, the 240-day extension period was justified. The company-designated physician declared Garcia's disability as "partial permanent" after the period of his confinement from December 17, 2012, to December 22, 2012. However, it is undisputed that Garcia remained incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties and was given further medical treatment. When the company stopped providing for his medical needs, Garcia filed his Notice to Arbitrate on July 15, 2013. By this time, 261 days have passed since his repatriation, without a final and definite assessment from the company-designated physician. DETACa

As jurisprudence dictates, without a valid final and definitive assessment from the company-designated physician to declare whether a seafarer is fit to work or permanently disabled within the 120/240-day periods, the law steps in to consider the disability as total and permanent. This remains regardless of whether the seafarer loses the use of any part of his body, or if the injury or disability is classified as Grade 1 under the POEA-SEC 25 because it is not the injury per se that is compensated but the incapacity to work. 26

Accordingly, upon the failure to timely provide a categorical medical assessment on the illness of the seafarer, the company-designated physician abdicated his obligation under the POEA-SEC to give a complete and definite medical assessment of the seafarer's condition. Hence, the disputable presumption under Section 20 (A) (4) of the POEA-SEC that the seafarer's illness is work-related stands. 27 In such instances, the law considers the physician's lapse as equivalent to a declaration of permanent and total disability in favor of the seafarer. The CA and PVA correctly ruled that Garcia is rightfully entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 6, 2017, and Resolution dated October 10, 2017, in CA-G.R. SP No. 142894 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 87-100. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda (now a member of this Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales.

2.Id. at 144-145. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda (now a member of this Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales.

3. 687 Phil. 153, 158.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 37-41.

6.Rollo, p. 95.

7.Id.

8.Heirs of Tabia v. Court of Appeals, 545 Phil. 326, 334 (2007); citing Rule 131, Sec. 3 (e) of the Rules of Court; See also inre: Guerrero, 521 Phil. 482, 492 (2006).

9. ARTICLE 275. [262] Jurisdiction over Other Labor Disputes. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. (Emphasis supplied.)

10. See also San Jose v. National Labor Relations Commission, 355 Phil. 759, 772 (1998) and 7K Corp. v. Albarico, 712 Phil. 372, 381 (2013).

11.Rollo, p. 200.

12. Amended Standard Terms and Conditions, Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 010-10, October 26, 2010.

13.Apalisok v. RPN Radio Station DYKC, 451 Phil. 302, 307 (2003).

14.Ace Navigation Co., Inc. v. Fernandez, 697 Phil. 250, 264 (2012).

15. Section 3, par. 3, Article XIII.

16.Estate of Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc., 687 Phil. 153, 162 (2012).

17.OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc. v. Monje, 820 Phil. 142, 150 (2017).

18.Arrivas v. Bacotoc, G.R. No. 228704, December 2, 2020 and Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Zanoria, G.R. No. 233071, September 2, 2020; See also Rogelia R. Gatan, et al. v. Jesusa Vinarao, et al., G.R. n 820 Phil. 257, 273 (2017); Heirs of Teresita Villanueva, et al. v. Heirs of Petronila Suquia Mendoza, et al., 810 Phil. 172, 178 (2017); and Bacsasar v. Civil Service Commission, 596 Phil. 858, 867 (2009).

19.Ludo & Luym Corp. v. Saornido, 443 Phil. 554, 563-564 (2003).

20.Rollo, pp. 96-97.

21.Id. at 97.

22.Ventis Maritime Corp. v. Salenga, G.R. No. 238578, June 8, 2020.

23. 765 Phil. 341, 362-363 (2015); and Pastrana v. Bahia Shipping Services, G.R. No. 227419, June 10, 2020.

24.Guadalquiver v. Sea Power Shipping Enterprise, Inc., G.R. No. 226200, August 5, 2019.

25.Philsynergy Maritime, Inc. v. Gallano, 832 Phil. 922, 942 (2018); See also Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 702 Phil. 717, 738 (2013).

26.Magsaysay Mol Marine, Inc. v. Atraje, 836 Phil. 1061, 1081 (2018).

27.Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Heirs of Buenaflor, G.R. No. 227447, June 23, 2020.

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.