THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 193574. August 28, 2013.]
GAMAL CAMID Y MAMA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated August 28, 2013, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 193574 — (Gamal Camid y Mama v. People of the Philippines). — Subject of this resolution is the motion for reconsideration of the Court's Resolution, dated December 10, 2012, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Petition for Review on Certiorari, and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals in its Resolutions, dated May 19, 2010 and August 27, 2010 in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 31980, dismissing the appeal and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Court again painstakingly reviewed the records and pleadings filed before it, specifically the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by Gamal Camid (Camid), but it appears that it is merely a rehash of the arguments already raised in his petition. Consequently, no compelling reason or justification exists to warrant this Court's modification or reversal of its earlier Resolution.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 1 ATcaEH
When the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Camid's appeal on the ground of abandonment, such did not amount to a violation of his right to due process of law neither was he deprived of his right to appeal. Camid himself acknowledged that the trial court gave due course to his notice of appeal filed on June 12, 2008 for being sufficient in form and for seasonably filing it, as shown in the Order, 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dated July 11, 2008, contrary to his claim that the order was dated June 11, 2008. It was by his very own omission that the said appeal was dismissed.
Bail pending appeal is not a necessary requirement for the perfection of appeal. Bail is only the key of the accused to provisional liberty while his appeal is pending before the CA.
Again, in no way should Camid assume continuance of his provisional liberty after conviction by the trial court without making any application to that effect. If indeed Camid was so willing and ready to post the necessary bail, the least he could have done was to make an urgent motion or application for the admission of bail and not to keep on blaming the court, in as much as he was duly assisted by his counsel. No application to that effect was ever made or attached with his motion for reconsideration before the CA, despite knowing that the dismissal of his appeal was caused by his failure to make the necessary application. Not even his prayer before the CA showed any persistence in applying for bail pending appeal. To be sure, his prayer states: EIDaAH
WHEREFORE, IN THE GREATER INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, it is most respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Court that the Resolution dated May 19, 2010 be recalled and set aside and the appeal be resolved on its merit and the Decision of the trial court be reversed and set aside and ACCUSED-APPELLANT be acquitted.
Other relief and equitable remedies are likewise prayed for. 3
Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that:
Section 5.Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. . . .
It is, therefore, clear from the abovementioned rule that the filing of a notice of appeal, and ultimately its perfection, is independent of the application for bail pending appeal. It is likewise clear from the rule that once convicted by the trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes discretionary and application thereof is necessary for the continued provisional liberty of the accused during pendency of his appeal. SAaTHc
Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. 4 The term "surrender" under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict against him. As no such surrender was ever made in this case, Camid is, in the eyes of the law, a fugitive from justice and therefore, not entitled to seek relief from the courts.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal, G.R. No. 181182, April 10, 2013.
2.Rollo, p. 51.
3.Rollo, p. 83.
4.Villena v. People, G.R. No. 184091, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 127, 136.