FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 197061. January 31, 2018.]
HERMANA CAMED AND OLIVIA CAMED MERJUDIO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT CEASAR GUMPENG,petitioners,vs. THE HEIRS OF ALVAREZ ALIMONDO REPRESENTED BY MARY C. ALIMONDO AND CELESTINO C. ALIMONDO,respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated January 31, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 197061 (Hermana Camed and Olivia Camed Merjudio, represented by their attorney-in-fact Ceasar Gumpeng v. The Heirs of Alvarez Alimondo represented by Mary C. Alimondo and Celestino C. Alimondo). — This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated December 8, 2010 and the Resolution 3 dated May 11, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98089 which affirmed the denial of petitioners' notice of appeal by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First Judicial Region, Baguio City. 4
Respondents Heirs of Alvarez Alimondo, represented by Mary C. Alimondo and Celestino C. Alimondo, filed Civil Case No. 6027-R for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages 5 against petitioners Hermana Camed and Olivia Camed Merjudio, 6 claiming that without the knowledge or permission of the late Alvarez Alimondo 7 or his heirs, petitioners entered his land located at Holy Ghost Proper, Baguio City and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1971. Petitioners allegedly built their house on portions of it. 8
On December 9, 2005, petitioners, represented by their attorney-in-fact Ceasar Gumpeng, filed their Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim. 9 Petitioners alleged that: (1) they and their predecessors-in-interest had been occupying the lot since 1964; (2) the land was transferred to Olivia Camed Merjudio through an affidavit of waiver executed on December 14, 1992 by Pablo Gawigawen, the allocatee of the land and who, by his entry permit granted on December 6, 1967, built a house and introduced permanent improvements on it; (3) their building was constructed years before 1994 when OCT No. P-1971 was granted; (4) OCT No. P-1971 was granted to Alvarez Alimondo in violation of Republic Act No. 6099 (RA 6099) 10 which prescribes that the parcels of land be sold to the occupants-claimants; (5) on April 1, 1993, Olivia Camed Merjudio filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Service in Baguio City; (6) the Office of the City Buildings and Architecture certified that no approved building permit was issued to Alvarez Alimondo for a structure located at the land from 1960 to present; and (7) Olivia Camed Merjudio has a tax declaration of real property and official receipts to show that she paid the real property taxes over the land. Thus, petitioners prayed that OCT No. P-1971 be declared null and void and cancelled by the Register of Deeds. They also prayed for the award of damages and attorney's fees. 11 CAIHTE
At the pre-trial on April 6, 2006, the RTC ordered a Relocation Survey of the premises, thus:
When this case was called for hearing, it is only the question of whether or not the defendants (sic)are located within the titled property of the plaintiffs. However, both parties are willing to have a Relocation Survey of the premises based on the title. The names of their respective engineers shall be submitted to the Court not later than April 12, 2006, and these engineers shall appear on April 20, 2006, Thursday, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Only the lawyers will bring their documentary evidence in order to guide their engineers.
Meantime, Engineer Bernard Bagano is appointed chairman of the Relocation Survey. Issue subpoena to him.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Done in open Court, Baguio City, Philippines, this 6th day of April, 2006. 12
At the hearing on April 20, 2006 the RTC made the following Order in open court:
In today's hearing, Engr. Bernard Bagano as Chairman, Engr. Parmenio Rillorta representing the plaintiffs through Atty. Marciano Inso and Engr. Oliver Mangonon representing the defendants through Atty. Matthew Bawayan, they (sic) will conduct an ocular inspection of the property using the title and other relevant documents and they shall submit their findings not later than May 31, 2006. No extension shall be granted to them because they are given [o]ne and a half (1 1/2) months to do their survey.
The result of the Relocation Survey is subject to clarificatory hearing on June 13, 2006, Tuesday at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. The result of the Relocation Survey is binding to the parties as they are represented by their respective engineers. No appeal will be entertained by this Court considering this is considered a Compromise Agreement.
Furnish the three (3) engineers and the lawyers respective copy of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE IN OPEN COURT, this 20th day of April 2006, at Baguio City, Philippines. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, the committee of surveyors, composed of: (1) Oliver E. Mangonon, surveyor for petitioners; (2) Parmenio T. Rillorta, surveyor for respondents; and (3) Bernardo L. Bagano, representative of the City Assessors Office, submitted a report on May 30, 2006 to the RTC on the results of the joint relocation/verification survey (Report on the Relocation Survey). 14 It revealed that petitioners' building is within the titled lot of Alvarez Alimondo, thus: DETACa
FINDINGS:
1. Portion of the residential building of Hermana Camed and Olivia Camed Merjudio consisting of a roofprint area of 52 square meters, more or less, is within the titled lot of Alvarez Alimondo. Said structure is made of light materials such as wooden materials, GI sheets and concrete on its basement.
2. Portion of the roof eaves and porch of the residential structure of the Hrs. of Andres Degsi Sr. consisting of 5 square meters, more or less, is also within the titled lot of Alvarez Alimondo. Said structure is also made of light materials.
3. About one-half of the residential structure of the Hrs. of Alvarez Alimondo, represented by Celestino C. Alimondo, and the mid-portion of the residential house of Hermana Camed and Olivia Camed Merjudio encroached on the Road as described in the lot title. The road however is no longer feasible at present because of its steep contour and its entrance from Sumulong Street was reduced to an existing pathway.
4. Blueprint copy of the survey result showing the relative portion of the Titled lot, and all the structures constructed therein is hereby attached for easy reference. 15
Appended to the Order was a certified true copy of the survey plan showing the encroachment. 16
On July 3, 2006, the RTC rendered an Order which provides:
In today's hearing, there is the result of the relocation survey. Therefore, in accordance with the result of the relocation survey[,] considering the issue in this case is whether or not who is encroaching on each other lot and per finding of the relocation survey team: the portion of the residential building of Hermana Camed and Olivia Camed Merjudio consisting of a roofprint area of 52 square meters is within the titled lot of Alvarez Alimondo, the same should be removed immediately; also, portion of the roof eaves and porch of the residential structure of the Heirs of Andres Degsi, Sr. consisting of 5 square meters is within the lot of Alvarez Alimondo, the same shall also be removed. If the parties do not leave within twenty (20) days from today, a Writ of Execution will be issued there being no clarificatory questions asked from the Engineers.
This case is considered Decided based on a Compromise Agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE IN OPEN COURT, Baguio City, Philippines, this 3rd day of July, in the year of our Lord, 2006. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)
On August 8, 2006, petitioners filed a notice of appeal 18 but the same was denied due course by the RTC in an Order dated August 31, 2006 which reads:
The Notice of Appeal filed by the defendants is DENIED due course having been filed in bad faith and in violation of the Compromise Agreement of the parties before the Court (See Orders dated April 6 and 20, 2006), and having been filed by the defendants who are now changing their position only now, contrary to their previous commitment. aDSIHc
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Done in CHAMBERS, Baguio City, Philippines, this 31st day of August, 2006. 19
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 20 was also denied by the RTC in its Order 21 dated December 6, 2006.
Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari 22 before the CA. They argued that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied their notice of appeal because it already lost jurisdiction over the case upon their timely filing of said notice under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and when it limited the issue to whether one is encroaching on the property of the other and failed to determine the respective rights of the parties, despite the action being one for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages. 23
The CA denied the appeal for lack of merit. 24 It ruled that: (1) the RTC correctly defined the issue in open court, without any objection from petitioners, as whether petitioners' building was located within the titled property of the respondents; (2) the parties entered into a compromise agreement as embodied in the RTC Orders dated April 6, 2006 providing for the Relocation Survey and April 20, 2006 declaring that the result of the Relocation Survey will be binding on the parties and is unappealable; (3) there is no law requiring that the parties' compromise agreement on a pending case be reduced in writing; (4) the agreement is a judicial compromise which has the force and effect of res judicata, is immediately executory and not appealable unless a motion to set aside the same is filed on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, in which event an appeal may be filed from an order denying the same; (5) it was only in the reply before the CA that petitioners claimed that they did not agree that the case would be decided pursuant to the outcome of the Relocation Survey; (6) petitioners are in estoppel for failing to contest the April 6, 2006 and April 20, 2006 Orders; (7) even in the absence of a compromise agreement, the two Orders already attained finality due to petitioners' failure to challenge them within the reglementary period; and (8) the RTC had jurisdiction to deny the notice of appeal since under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the lower court retains its residual jurisdiction prior to the transmittal of the record of the case. 25 ETHIDa
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 26 but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution 27 dated May 11, 2011.
Hence, this petition 28 which raises the following issues:
1. Whether petitioner's notice of appeal was correctly dismissed by the RTC; and
2. Whether the RTC correctly decided the case on the basis of an alleged compromise agreement reflected in the Orders dated April 6 and 20, 2006.
We grant the petition.
Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred and abused its discretion in upholding the RTC's denial of the notice of appeal which was filed on time. When filed on time, the approval of the notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the court. 29 We agree.
Under Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for a dismissal of the appeal prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court are limited to late filing or non-payment of docket and other lawful fees. 30 Thus, in Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., 31 we ruled that the timeliness of the filing of a notice of appeal determines whether the trial court's giving due course to it is ministerial. If the notice of appeal is filed within the reglementary period, it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to give it due course. If not, the trial court cannot be compelled by mandamus to do so. 32
Here, it is clear that petitioners timely filed their notice of appeal. We note that they received the RTC Order dated July 3, 2006 on July 24, 2006. 33 They filed their notice of appeal before the RTC on August 8, 2006 34 which was clearly within the 15-day reglementary period under Section 3, Rule 41. 35 Respondents did not controvert petitioners' contention as to the timeliness of the appeal; neither did the CA address it.
Thus, we find that the RTC erred when it dismissed petitioners' notice of appeal on the ground that it was filed in bad faith and in violation of the compromise agreement. 36 As we explained further in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 37 which petitioners correctly relied on:
E. Trial Court's Lack of Authority to Dismiss Appeals of Ortigas and Solicitor General
Yet another serious error was the disallowance by His Honor of Ortigas' appeal from the judgment in the reconstitution case, declaring its notice of appeal to be nothing but "a mere scrap of paper." His Honor opined that "Ortigas is ** not vested with any justiciable interest to be a party in (the) case" because it had admittedly "already sold all the subdivision lots which it claims to overlap the disputed two lots (of Molina)," and Ortigas' pleadings "failed to disclose ** any allegation about its ownership of road lots that may overlap the land covered by the certificate of title of petitioner sought to be reconstituted;" and that therefore Ortigas was not a real party in interest since it would neither derive benefit nor suffer injury from the decision; hence, its opposition could not be entertained and, "by force of law," it could not also appeal the decision. cSEDTC
His Honor was apparently incognizant of the principle that dismissals of appeals from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court by the latter are authorized only in the instances specifically set forth in Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding provision, Section 14 of said Rule 41, provides that "(a) motion to dismiss an appeal may be filed in the (Regional Trial) Court ** prior to the transmittal of the record to the appellate court;" and the grounds are limited to those "mentioned in the preceding section," i.e., Section 13, to wit: where "the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided **."
These two (2) sections clearly establish "that unless the appeal is abandoned, the only ground for dismissing an appeal in the trial court is the failure of the appellant to file on time the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal. ** (A) trial court may not dismiss an appeal as frivolous, or on the ground that the case has become moot and academic, such step devolving upon the appellate courts. Otherwise, the way would be opened for (regional trial) courts ** to forestall review or reversal of their decisions by higher courts, no matter how erroneous or improper such decisions should be."
xxx xxx xxx
Dismissals of appeal may also be had upon the grounds specified by Rule 50 of the Rules of Court; but it is the Court of Appeals, not the trial court, which is explicitly authorized to dismiss appeals on said grounds. Generally, these grounds do not include matters which go into the merits of the cause or to the right of the plaintiff or defendant to recover. Case law has come to recognize other grounds for dismissal, by way of exception, e.g., that the cause has become moot, or the appeal is frivolous or manifestly dilatory. But, to repeat, authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that it is frivolous or taken manifestly for delay "is not certainly with the court aquo whose decision is in issue, but with the appellate court." 38 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Similarly here, it was not for the RTC to determine that the notice of appeal was filed in bad faith or that it was violative of a purported compromise agreement embodied in its Orders dated April 6, 2006 and April 20, 2006. To rule otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their right to appeal other than through the limited circumstances mentioned in Section 13, Rule 41 and in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco. 39
Moreover, petitioners maintain that the CA erred and abused its discretion in ruling that the RTC was correct in framing the issue as to who between the parties encroached on the other's lot and in concluding that the portion of petitioners' building which encroached upon respondents' lot should be removed. The determination as to whose property encroached upon whose land demands a finding of fact as to when and how each lot has been occupied. Petitioners alleged that they have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of their house and lot, in the concept of owners, for more than 30 years and way before Alvarez Alimondo worked for the titling of his lot. They claimed that it is respondents' title which is defective since it covered the house and lot of petitioners. While certificates of title are indefeasible and binding against the whole world, they merely confirm or record title already existing and vested; they cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud. 40 Again, we sustain, petitioners' argument. SDAaTC
In affirming the RTC Order dated April 6, 2006, the CA ruled that the RTC correctly defined the issue as whether petitioners' building was located within the property titled in the name of the respondents. 41 This led to the RTC Order dated July 3, 2006 42 which relied on the report of the commissioners that petitioners' building encroached upon respondents' lot. Based on these Orders it rendered, the RTC believed that the Relocation Survey will settle the issue of who owned the lot, more so when the parties allegedly agreed that the results of the Relocation Survey will be binding upon them and cannot be appealed before the RTC.
We disagree. The allegations and defenses of respondents before the RTC show that the issue in the action for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages is not limited to encroachment.
At the outset, since petitioners did not contest the results, we find it unnecessary to determine whether there was a valid compromise agreement on the binding effect of the results of the Relocation Survey. In their petition for certiorari before the CA, petitioners even invoked the results of the Relocation Survey, albeit, to support their own claim, thus:
When the title, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1971 was granted to Alvarez Alimondo in 1994 the area that the title covered was different from that which Alvarez Alimondo applied for under his MSA. As shown in the result of the relocation survey that was undertaken upon orders by the Respondent Court, the title now covers only about one half of the area over which the house of Alvarez Alimondo stands when his MSA covers the whole perimeter over which the house was built. Furthermore, the said relocation survey shows that the title has covered a portion of the residential building of the herein petitioners consisting of a roofprint area of 52 square meters when in the MSA application it is shown that the area applied for by Alvarez Alimondo lies north and adjacent to the lot of the herein petitioners. The relocation survey conducted as ordered by the Respondent Court makes it very clear that the title covers portions of houses and lots like those owned by the herein petitioners and another occupant-claimant Andres Degsi Sr., that Alvarez Alimondo never possessed or owned. It is the title that has encroached on the house and lot possessed and owned by the herein petitioners so it is but just and proper that the title should be amended for it to cover the lot possessed and owned by the herein private respondents. 43 (Emphasis supplied.) acEHCD
Even assuming that there was an existing compromise agreement, it could not qualify as a judicial compromise between the parties. A judicial compromise operates as an adjudication on the merits and has the force of law and effect of res judicata. 44 In erroneously framing the issue in this case, however, the RTC failed to rule on the merits of the entire case.
Petitioners' Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim 45 shows that they attacked the validity of OCT No. P-1971 and prayed that it be nullified.46 Petitioners alleged that OCT No. P-1971 was granted in violation of RA 6099. 47 Section 1 of RA 6099 provides that the specified parcels of public land in the Baguio Townsite, City of Baguio should be sold to occupants-claimants. 48 Petitioners alleged that they constructed the building allegedly encroaching upon respondents' lot years before the OCT was granted to the late Alvarez Alimondo.
Moreover, since the action filed before the RTC was for quieting of title, there should have been a determination of the respective rights of the parties. 49 More particularly, there should have been "an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim." 50 There was none in the RTC Order dated July 3, 2006. While it stated that the action for quieting of title is decided based on a compromise agreement, the RTC Orders dated April 6, 2006 and April 20, 2006 and the May 30, 2006 Report on the Relocation Surveys 51 did not examine the validity of claims over the lot where the building of the petitioners stands or made an adjudicated rights over it. At most, the Report on the Relocation Survey merely identified which properties were within the lot covered by OCT No. P-1971 and determined whether said properties encroached upon the road described in the title. 52 Thus, whether by agreement as to the binding effect of the Relocation Survey which only dealt with physical encroachment, or by petitioners' failure to contest the same, no resolution or determination of the rights of the parties can be had.
Considering the foregoing, the RTC should not have limited the resolution of the case to an issue of physical encroachment addressed by the Relocation Survey. Having failed to fully address the issues raised in the pleadings, this case should be remanded to the RTC for a trial on the issues and for a proper determination of the rights of the parties over the lot where petitioners' building stands.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition dated July 7, 2011. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 8, 2010 and its Resolution dated May 11, 2011 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. We remand the action for quieting of title to the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 3, Baguio City which is directed to try and decide the case with deliberate speed. SDHTEC
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-21.
2.Id. at 71-86. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring.
3.Id. at 97-98.
4.Id. at 52.
5.Id. at 22-26.
6. Also referred to as "Cam-ed" in some parts of the record.
7. Also referred to as "Alimundo" in some parts of the record.
8.Rollo, pp. 22-23.
9.Id. at 37-43.
10. An Act Authorizing the Sale of Fourteen Parcels of Public Land in the Baguio Townsite, City of Baguio (1969).
11.Rollo, pp. 38-41.
12.Id. at 47.
13.Id. at 48.
14.Id. at 101.
15. Id.
16. Rollo, pp. 102-103.
17. Id. at 49.
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at 52.
20. Id. at 53-55.
21. Id. at 56.
22. Id. at 57-69.
23. Id. at 64-66.
24. Supra note 2.
25. Rollo, pp. 80-85.
26. Id. at 87-91.
27. Supra note 3.
28. Supra note 1.
29. Rollo, pp. 15-16.
30. Sec. 13. Dismissal of Appeal. — Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
31. G.R. No. 145911, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 631.
32. Id. at 635-636. Citations omitted.
33. Rollo, p. 50.
34. Id. at 51.
35. Sec. 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
36. Rollo, p. 52.
37. G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
38. Id. at 493-495.
39. Supra note 37.
40. Rollo, pp. 17-18.
41. Id. at 76-80.
42. Supra note 17.
43. Rollo, p. 66.
44. Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B.V., G.R. No. 173783, June 17, 2015, 758 SCRA 691, 701.
45. Supra note 9.
46. We note that while petitioners did not expressly include the nullification of OCT No. P-1971 in their counterclaims which only included attorney's fees, appearance fee per hearing and moral damages, the allegations of fact in petitioners' answer and which petitioners expressly stated in their counterclaims as repleaded, are consistent with petitioners' prayer that OCT No. P-1971 be nullified.
47. Rollo, p. 38.
48. Sec. 1. The following parcels of public land in Residence Section "B", Baguio Townsite, City of Baguio, shall be sold to the occupants-claimants in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Seven Hundred and Thirty: x x x.
49. De Guzman v. Tabangao Realty Incorporated, G.R. No. 154262, February 11, 2015, 750 SCRA 271, 285, citing Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105902, February 9, 2000, 325 SCRA 137, 146-147.
50. Id.
51. Supra note 14.
52. Id.