THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 228644. November 28, 2018.]
JONATHAN T. CAMBA, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated November 28, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 228644 (Jonathan T. Camba v. People of the Philippines) — This is an appeal by certiorari filed under Section 2, Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the August 26, 2016 Decision 1 and the December 6, 2016 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which convicted Jonathan T. Camba (petitioner) of the crime of homicide as defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Petitioner was ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Elenita Camba (Elenita), the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages.
The CA affirmed with modification the January 9, 2015 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 1 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 12450.
After a perusal of the records, the Court resolves to deny the appeal. Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in the assailed decision as to warrant the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The Court does not find any cogent reason to disrupt the findings of the CA.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Noticeably, while the CA and the RTC unanimously resolved that the justifying circumstance of self-defense was absent, petitioner did not assign it as an error. However, because an appeal of a criminal case throws the entire proceedings wide open for review, the Court can review the appealed judgment in its entirety, including errors that were unassigned in the petition.
From the foregoing, although petitioner did not assign as an error the lower court's decision not to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of self-defense, the Court reiterates the findings of the lower courts. As correctly determined by the CA, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Elenita, and there was no real danger to the life or limb of petitioner. While petitioner may have sustained injuries, which have healed without any medical attention, they did not pose any imminent harm to him.
Mitigating circumstance of
Petitioner has admitted to the killing of Elenita, but invokes that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. As such, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of said circumstance. Petitioner failed to discharge such burden.
For passion and obfuscation to exist, the following must concur:
1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and
2. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. 4
Both requisites are lacking. First, the invectives and actions of Elenita were insufficient to provoke an uncontrollable reaction from petitioner. Elenita's statement, "hayop ka, nagkita rin tayo!," while arguably deplorable and sufficient to evoke anger, is not enough reason to cause passion and obfuscation. As the Court has clarified in People v. Oloverio, 5 "[t]he excitement which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation." For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful feelings, which are simply absent in this case.
Second, petitioner's actuations before stabbing Elenita prove that he had recovered his normal equanimity. Based on petitioner's admission, despite Elenita's tirades, he had even come to decide to resolve the situation peacefully. In retrospect, after Elenita's supposed goading statements, "[petitioner] tried to approach [Elenita] in an attempt to talk things over." 6 If petitioner was indeed inflamed by Elenita's words, he would have easily retaliated and uncontrollably exacted revenge. Instead, petitioner recovered his normal equanimity and was able to contemplate the right action. This belies any passion and obfuscation that may have been provoked by Elenita's words.
Alternative circumstance of intoxication
For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the willpower of the accused that he did not know what he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. 7 While it is arguable that petitioner had consumed a considerable amount of alcohol, petitioner failed to prove that his mental faculties were affected enough to deprive him of the ability to control his anger. Moreover, the records reveal that petitioner, in fact, was not intoxicated at the time of the killing.
Petitioner's actuations prior to the stabbing thus contradict any alleged intoxication. First, petitioner was strong and conscious enough to drop by his cousin Eddie Toledo's house, to ask the latter to join their drinking spree. Second, as previously mentioned, petitioner even had the rational mind to contemplate peaceably settling the quarrel. Petitioner's testimony disproves any obscured mental faculties brought about by high alcohol intake, thus:
Court:
Q: But it was you who approached her?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Why did you [do] that[?]
A: Because she bad-mouthed me, Your Honor.
Q: You were bad-mouthed, you were angry to the statement. You neared her, what was the purpose?
A: I wanted to talk to her but I didn't know that she had a knife, Your Honor.
Q: What was it about that you were going to talk to her?
A: I would asked (sic) why she was bad-mouthing me, Your Honor.
Q: Couldn't you have done that at a distance of some four meters?
A: I wanted to talk to her in a nice way, that is why I approached her.
Q: Couldn't you have done that in a nice way at a distance of a few meters?
A: No, Your Honor. She might not hear what I will say to her.
Q: And you doubted that you might not be heard even as you heard clearly (sic) made her utterances?
A: I heard her (sic) what she was saying but I wanted to approach her in order to talk to her. 8
Hence, the mitigating circumstance of intoxication cannot be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The evidence and testimony of the witnesses do not warrant a conclusion that the degree of petitioner's intoxication had affected his faculties. 9
Finally, even assuming that Elenita's expletives were sufficient to cause petitioner's outrage and to produce his uncontrollable outburst that led to the killing of Elenita, petitioner's actuations reveal that such passion and obfuscation had already ceased. Thus, petitioner cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. Indeed, as the passion and obfuscation had ceased and petitioner had already recovered his normal equanimity, the nature, location, and number of the wounds he inflicted on Elenita prove that he was, in fact, the aggressor.
The imposable penalty for homicide prescribed under Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the range of penalty that must be imposed as maximum term should be reclusion temporal medium, which is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or prision mayor as minimum, which is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Based on the foregoing, therefore, the maximum penalty imposed by the appellate court should be increased accordingly.
As to the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to modify the amount of temperate damages from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). 10 In addition to the award of temperate damages by the RTC and the CA, the Court also finds petitioner liable to pay the heirs of Elenita civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each. 11
WHEREFORE, the August 26, 2016 Decision and the December 6, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Jonathan T. Camba is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE. Accordingly, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Petitioner is also ordered to pay the heirs of Elenita Camba the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages.
A legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction. (Peralta, J., on official business; Leonen, J., Acting Chairperson.)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 7-21; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Maria Elisa S. Diy, concurring.
2.Id. at 23-24.
3. Copy not attached to the petition.
4.People v. Oloverio, 756 Phil. 435, 450-451 (2015).
5.Id. at 453.
6.Rollo, p. 31.
7.People v. Lamberte, et al., 665 Phil. 728, 736 (2011).
8.Rollo, pp. 33-34.
9.See note 6 at 737.
10.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
11.Id.