THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212724. November 7, 2018.]
SHIRLEY CAMALES, petitioner, vs. JULIAN F. OLIVA, JR., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 7, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 212724 — (Shirley Camales, petitioner,v. Julian F. Oliva, Jr., respondent). — This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals February 13, 2014 Decision 2 and May 27, 2014 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 126047, and to reinstate the March 30, 2012 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265, in SCA No. 3433-PSG. In this Order, the Regional Trial Court reversed its January 3, 2011 Decision 5 and dismissed the Complaint of Julian F. Oliva, Jr. (Oliva) filed against Shirley Camales (Camales).
On January 28, 2005, Oliva filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68 a Complaint for forcible entry against Camales, 6 to which she filed an Answer with Counterclaim with a Prayer for Dismissal of the case.
Oliva alleged that he was the owner of a residential house in Pasig City. The house was built in 1986 on a lot owned by the government under administration by the NAPICO Homeowners Association XI. He claimed that his ownership and right to possession had been judicially settled through an action for ejectment 7 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 60451, and an action for injunction and prohibition 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 153, docketed as SCA No. 2399. 9 He pointed out that the decisions in these cases were decided in his favor, and were final and executory.
Oliva added that on February 24, 2004, the Deputy Sheriff, upon an issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution: (1) ejected the previous occupants of the contested property; (2) padlocked the house's doors and the concrete fence's gate; (3) posted a sign, "DO NOT ENTER UNDER COURT CUSTODY"; and (4) turned over possession to Oliva. He said that sometime in October 2004, Camales entered and took possession of the property by destroying a portion of the concrete fence and destroying the locks. She also demolished a part of the house and started to build a two (2)-storey house on a portion of the property. When Oliva discovered this on November 8, 2004, he demanded that Camales vacate and return possession of the property, as well as pay for the structures destroyed. He said that Camales ignored these demands. 10 ScHADI
In her Answer, Camales alleged that she was the legitimate awardee of the contested lot, for which she had been paying a monthly amortization. She argued that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not the Metropolitan Trial Court, had jurisdiction over the subject matter. She added that Oliva had not made any formal demand before he filed a Complaint. 11
Resolving Camales' prayer for the Complaint's dismissal, the Metropolitan Trial Court found in its January 9, 2007 Order 12 that the Complaint sufficiently alleged a case for forcible entry, which it held to be within its jurisdiction. 13 It explained that the Complaint stated that Oliva had been adjudged the lawful possessor of the property in question, and that Camales had subsequently entered and taken possession of it without Oliva's knowledge. It further noted that the defenses raised by Camales could be properly determined during its proceedings. 14
Camales moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied in the Metropolitan Trial Court March 30, 2007 Order. 15 Thus, after a scheduled preliminary conference, the parties submitted their respective position papers, and the case was submitted for resolution. 16
In its January 11, 2010 Decision, 17 the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed Oliva's Complaint, finding insufficient evidence to establish his right of possession or the authority from which he derived such right. 18 It held that the rulings Oliva cited in his Complaint do not suffice to establish his right to possess the contested lot, or to eject Camales from it. It further declared that Camales did not employ threat, strategy, or intimidation to acquire possession of it, as she was given authority by the NAPICO Homeowners Association XI to enter, possess, and occupy it. 19
The dispositive portion of the Metropolitan Trial Court January 11, 2010 Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby DISMISSES the instant case for failure to state a cause of action on the part of the plaintiff and the latter is ORDERED to pay defendant hereof attorney's fees in the amount [of] Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 20 (Emphasis in the original)
On Oliva's appeal, the Regional Trial Court in its January 3, 2011 Decision 21 reversed and set aside the Metropolitan Trial Court January 11, 2010 Decision. It found that Oliva's prior possession of the contested lot was recognized by the Metropolitan Trial Court itself in its March 28, 2002 Decision. It held that Oliva had been exercising physical possession over the lot since 1986 when he built his residential house over it, evidenced by the writ of execution's implementation on February 24, 2004. The Regional Trial Court held that Camales's act of building her own house on the property without Oliva's consent is "a crystal clear act of taking physical possession from the prior possessor." 22 aICcHA
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court January 3, 2011 Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment rendered by the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the amount of P20,000.00 as actual damages and to vacate and turn-over possession of the subject property to the herein plaintiff after payment of reasonable rent of P5,000.00 per month, computed from the time of her illegal entry up to the time of this Decision.
Accordingly, let this case be remanded to the court of origin for proper execution.
SO ORDERED. 23
On Camales's Motion for Reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court in its March 30, 2012 Order 24 found that the case should have been dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction. 25 It found that the contested lot was owned, registered, and titled in the name of the NAPICO Homeowners Association XI, which awarded the property to Camales under the Community Mortgage Program of socialized housing scheme under Republic Act No. 7279, or the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. Thus, it concluded that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 26
The Regional Trial Court set aside its January 3, 2011 Decision and nullified the Metropolitan Trial Court's dated March 30, 2012 Decision. The dispositive portion of its Order read:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing premises[,] this Court finds merit to the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the Decision dated January 3, 2011 is lifted and set aside. Likewise, the decision of the court a quo is nullified. Accordingly, the case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. 27
Oliva filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review questioning the March 30, 2012 Regional Trial Court Order. In its February 13, 2014 Decision, 28 the Court of Appeals found that since the Complaint established a case for forcible entry, it is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. 29 Its dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 30 March 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 265, Pasig City is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and its Decision dated 3 January 2011 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 30 (Emphasis in the original)
Camales filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its May 27, 2014 Resolution. 31
Thus, Camales filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari32 before this Court. Respondent Oliva filed his Comment, 33 to which petitioner filed her Reply. 34 EHaASD
Petitioner insists that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's Complaint, given that it alleged that the contested property was built on a lot "owned by NAPICO Homeowner's Association XI for award to its members and present occupants." 35 Assuming that it was within the Metropolitan Trial Court's jurisdiction, she says the Complaint should have been dismissed because respondent was in pari delicto, or in equal fault, for having occupied and leased the property without the NAPICO Homeowners Association XI's authority. 36
Petitioner also argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering her ejectment from the contested lot, as it was awarded to her under Republic Act No. 7279. 37 Moreover, she said there could be no forcible entry because the lot was abandoned and uninhabited when she occupied it. 38
Finally, petitioner argues that she established her right of possession over the contested lot, and presents documents to support her claim: (1) Homeowners Association's Resolution No. 03-2004, which declared respondent as "recalcitrant and a non-member of the Association"; 39 (2) a Certificate of Cash Payment; (3) a Barangay Clearance Certificate for building the house on the contested property; and (4) the Technical Description of the lot awarded to her. She maintains that respondent had no proof supporting his cause of action. 40
Respondent, citing Spouses Suntay v. Gocolay, 41 contends that regular courts, not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, have jurisdiction over issues of ownership, possession, or interest in disputed real property, 42 consistent with Presidential Decree No. 1344 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 43 On the right of possession, he insists that the decisions and other submissions in Civil Case No. 60451 and SCA No. 2399 are conclusive evidence of his prior physical possession of the contested property. 44 He also refutes the evidentiary value of the Certificate of Cash Payment and the Barangay Clearance Certificate. 45 Lastly, he argues that petitioner raised questions of fact not proper for resolution in a petition for review. 46
The primary issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondent's Complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the regular courts have jurisdiction over it:
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant."
The nature of the action — on which depends the question of whether a suit is within the jurisdiction of the court — is determined solely by the allegations in the complaint. Only facts alleged in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of the action and the court's competence to take cognizance of it. One cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action thereby initiated.
To resolve the issue, we examine the specific allegations of petitioner in his complaint. The allegations of the complaint reveal that petitioner's cause of action is for forcible entry. In forcible entry, the deprivation of physical possession of land or building is effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy[,] or stealth. Clearly, petitioner alleged that respondent entered the house, demolished a portion of it, destroyed its locks[,] and took possession of the property without knowledge and consent of the petitioner as owner of the house. The surreptitious entry of respondent into the property and consequent dispossession of petitioner thereof is a glaring violation of the latter's rights and interest. Petitioner claims he was in possession of the subject property but such possession was disrupted following respondent's entry therein. In his complaint, petitioner was seeking to be restored into possession of the subject property with damages on account of respondent Camales'[s] use of the property and respondent Camales'[s] entry to the property through force. In which case, petitioner's cause of action as presented in his complaint is for forcible entry over which the Housing, Land Use and Regulatory Board (sic) (HLURB) has no jurisdiction. DaIAcC
xxx xxx xxx
Under the [Rules of Court, Rule 70, Section 1], for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and (sic): (1) prior physical possession of the property, and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat[,] or stealth. All of these were alleged by petitioner in his complaint. 47 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner has failed to show any error of law on the part of the Court of Appeals on this issue of jurisdiction, and does not disagree with the legal framework for its conclusion. Rather, she insists that the Complaint contained allegations that removed its jurisdiction from the regular courts, and placed it within the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. This is based on the allegations in the Complaint:
3. Plaintiff is the legal and absolute owner of a 2-door 1 storey residential house located at No. 1296 Mulawin St., NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City.
4. The above-stated residential house was constructed as early as October 1986 on a[n] 82[-]square meter lot owned by NAPICO Homeowner's Association XI for award to its members and present occupants, of which association plaintiff is a member. 48
Based on this, petitioner claims that the controversy involves the implementation of the Community Mortgage Program of socialized housing under Republic Act No. 7279, which is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. She cites the 2004 Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Rules of Procedure: 49
Rule VIII, Section 1. Cases covered. — The provisions of this rule shall apply to disputes involving solely of the rights of members of homeowners associations. . . . 50 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner provided a misleading citation.
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the 2004 Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Rules of Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Cases covered. — The provisions of this rule shall apply to disputes involving solely the rights of members of the homeowners association to inspect the association books and records and/or to be furnished with the financial statements or reports required by this Board, and, where applicable, those required under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines.
This rule pertains only to the right of a homeowner's association member to inspect books and records, and to be furnished with financial statements or reports of the homeowner's association. No conceivable reading of this provision supports petitioner's position, or how it applies to respondent's Complaint. Certainly, it does not remove respondent's Complaint from the regular courts' jurisdiction.
Petitioner also cites Eugenio v. Sta. Monica Riverside Homeowners Association, 51 where this Court sustained the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board over an ejectment case. In the ruling, this Court held that the right of possession was intertwined with the determination of matters within the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board's expertise. 52
Petitioner, however, does not explain how Eugenio applies to this case. It is unclear from the Complaint how respondent's right of possession, as alleged, involves issues that must be determined by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not the regular courts.
Thus, there is no basis to reverse the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the issue of jurisdiction.
The other issues raised by petitioner are either inscrutable or pertain to questions of fact not proper for review in this case. TAacHE
Petitioner's claim that the contested lot was abandoned and uninhabited is based on the following: (1) she was issued a Barangay Clearance Certificate rather than a demolition permit; (2) she only claimed P20,000.00 worth of missing galvanized iron sheets instead of claiming the value of his entire structure; and (3) the October 2003 Alias Writ of Execution and the February 24, 2004 Request for Police Assistance appear unserved to the relevant parties as they voluntarily vacated and abandoned the lot. Thus, the contested lot had been abandoned and uninhabited for almost a year, and respondent's structure no longer existed when petitioner occupied it. 53
While this Court rejects the arguments since they pertain to a factual question, their inadequacies bear noting. The inferences from the allegedly unserved Alias Writ of Execution and Request for Police Assistance are speculative and insufficient to convince this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. Further, the Barangay Clearance Certificate does not state that the contested lot was abandoned. It only states that the barangay has no derogatory records on petitioner, and that it does not object to the proposed construction project. 54
All told, petitioner has failed to show any error of law committed by the Court of Appeals or any cogent reason to reverse its Decision and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals February 13, 2014 Decision and May 27, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 126047 are AFFIRMED. DHIcET
SO ORDERED." (Gesmundo and Reyes, J., Jr., JJ., on wellness leave.)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-42.
2.Id. at 246-255. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez of the Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 370-371. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez of the Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 196-201. The Order was penned by Judge Danilo A. Buemio of Branch 265, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
5.Id. at 141-149. The Decision in SCA No. 3433-PSG was penned by Judge Danilo A. Buemio of Branch 265, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
6.Id. at 116.
7. The civil case is entitled, "Julian F. Oliva, Jr. v. Elsa Sison and Lydia Jose."
8. The action for injunction and prohibition was entitled, "Elsa Sison and Lydia Jose v. Julian F. Oliva, Hon. Jose P. Morallos, and Sheriff Benjamin Cabusao, Jr."
9.Rollo, pp. 117-118, Metropolitan Trial Court Decision.
10.Id. at 118.
11.Id. at 119.
12.Id. at 85-86. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Divina Gracia Lopez Peliño of Branch 68, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City.
13.Id. at 85.
14.Id. at 85-86.
15.Id. at 87-88. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Divina Gracia Lopez Peliño of Branch 68, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City.
16.Id. at 117.
17.Id. at 116-122. The Decision in the case docketed as Civil Case No. 11242 was penned by Acting Presiding Judge Glenn D. Santos of Branch 68, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City.
18.Id. at 121.
19.Id.
20.Id. at 121-122.
21.Id. at 141-149.
22.Id. at 147-148.
23.Id. at 149.
24.Id. at 196-201.
25.Id. at 201.
26.Id. at 200-201.
27.Id. at 201.
28.Id. at 246-255.
29.Id. at 254.
30.Id.
31.Id. at 370-371.
32. Id. at 9-41.
33. Id. at 381-390.
34. Id. at 395-408.
35. Id. at 27.
36. Id. at 28.
37. Id. at 34-35.
38. Id. at 35.
39. Id. at 37.
40. Id.
41. 507 Phil. 606 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
42. Rollo, p. 382.
43. Id. at 383.
44. Id. at 386-387.
45. Id. at 387-388.
46. Id. at 389.
47. Id. at 252-254.
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 650 Phil. 166 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
52. Rollo, p. 27.
53. Id. at 35-36.
54. Id. at 308.