FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 197009. April 18, 2018.]
MARCIAL C. CALISQUISIN AND RUBEN T. SARITA, petitioners,vs. HON. FELIPE M. ABALOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, MTCC, BRANCH 1, DIPOLOG CITY, AND HEIRS OF JOSE SORRONDA, ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 18, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 197009(Marcial C. Calisquisin and Ruben T. Sarita v. Hon. Felipe M. Abalos, Presiding Judge, MTCC, Branch 1, Dipolog City, and Heirs of Jose Sorronda, et al.). — Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated July 30, 2010 and Resolution 3 dated May 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01619-MIN. The CA nullified and set aside the Decision 4 dated December 7, 2007 and Resolution 5 dated May 5, 2008 of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 9th Judicial Region, Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 5985, which nullified the Judgment 6 dated September 24, 2001 and Order 7 dated January 16, 2003 of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Dipolog City in Civil Case No. A-3406.
Jose Sorronda (Sorronda), predecessor-in-interest of respondents Lucila Agura Sorronda, Marlon Agura Sorronda, and Marlen Sorronda-Amora (collectively, respondents), is the owner and lawful possessor of a 1,166-square meter parcel of land situated at Turno, Dipolog City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-819 (property). 8 Petitioner Marcial C. Calisquisin (Calisquisin) is the occupant of the adjacent lot. It was discovered that Calisquisin's house encroached on a portion of the property. Sorronda eventually agreed to sell to Calisquisin approximately 100 square meters, the portion of the property encroached upon, for P40,000.00. Together with petitioner Ruben T. Sarita (Sarita), his son-in-law, Calisquisin tendered the amount of P20,000.00 as partial payment for the portion of the property to Sorronda. Petitioners prepared a memorandum of receipt (memorandum) which Sorronda signed. 9
Later, and to his dismay, Sorronda discovered that the Memorandum stated that the sale was purportedly for 320 square meters instead of the 100 square meters that they agreed upon. Sorronda tried to return to petitioners the partial payment they made and pleaded for the annulment of the memorandum. However, petitioners were unmoved by Sorronda's pleas. 10 Thus, Sorronda filed a complaint for annulment of document with damages against petitioners before the MTCC. 11
Petitioners failed to file their answer. 12 This prompted Sorronda to move that petitioners be declared in default. 13 The MTCC granted Sorronda's motion and rendered judgment by default in favor of Sorronda. 14 The dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby renders Judgment for the Plaintiff as follows: CAIHTE
1. Ordering the cancellation and annulment of the Receipt x x x;
2. Ordering the Defendants, to pay jointly and severally, Plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as Moral Damages.
3. Ordering the Defendants, to pay jointly and severally, Plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages.
4. Ordering the Defendants, to pay jointly and severally, Plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as Attorney's Fees by way of Damages; and
5. Ordering the Defendants, to pay the Costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the MTCC denied in an Order 16 dated January 16, 2003. Upon the motion of Sorronda, a writ of execution was issued by the MTCC on January 24, 2003. 17 A month after, or on February 18, 2003, the property was sold to Ricardo Y. Reluya, Jr. (Reluya) and a transfer certificate of title was issued in his name. 18
Nonetheless, on August 13, 2004, more than a year after the issuance of the writ of execution, petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and writ of execution with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the RTC. They averred that the Decision of the MTCC is a nullity since the complaint filed by Sorronda, one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation, was within the jurisdiction of the RTC. 19
In its Decision dated December 7, 2007, the RTC ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, the assailed decision of the respondent court is hereby declared null and void and consequently, the writ of execution issued pursuant thereof has no force and effect.
SO ORDERED. 20
The RTC held that the complaint filed by Sorronda was one for annulment of document. In fact, there is no allegation in the complaint as to the assessed value of the property. As such, the nature of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. 21 Hence, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over Sorronda's complaint, not the MTCC. The RTC explained that Sorronda cannot invoke Laresma v. Abellana, 22 which held that the RTC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the action since the complaint did not state the assessed value of the lot involved, because it is not on all fours with the case at bar. Since the MTCC had no jurisdiction over Sorronda's complaint, its decision as well as the writ of execution it issued, are not valid and effective. 23
With respect to the allegation of Reluya that he is an indispensable party who should have been impleaded in the action, the RTC noted that his right, if any, may be ventilated in another action pursuant to our ruling in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals. 24
Sorronda filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied. 25 Thereafter, Sorronda died and was substituted by respondents 26 who instituted the appeal before the CA. 27
Respondents appealed to the CA and argued, among others, that the RTC had no jurisdiction to annul orders of the MTCC based on the following: 1) Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy filed before the CA in order to annul orders of the RTC; and 2) Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is available only when other ordinary and appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. 28 The CA granted respondents' petition and set aside the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated July 30, 2010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED, and the December 7, 2007 decision rendered by Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Dipolog City is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 29
The CA agreed with respondents and emphasized that Rule 47 can be availed as a remedy exclusively before the CA to annul judgments, final orders, and resolutions rendered by the RTC; it is not available to annul a judgment of the MTCC. The CA opined that the remedy availed of by petitioners before the RTC is not provided for under Rule 47, and does not exist. 30 Section 19 31 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended, cannot supplant such absence. Likewise, petitioners failed to prove that the ordinary remedies of new trial, relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer be available through no fault of petitioners. 32
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. 33 They are now assailing the CA's rulings.
We deny the petition.
We first determine whether the RTC can annul the judgment of the MTCC.
The CA is grossly mistaken in proclaiming that there is no remedy under the rules empowering the RTC to annul the decision of the MTCC. Apparently, the CA relied on Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court alone. It overlooked Section 10 of the same rule which provides:
Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts. — An action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and Sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable thereto.
The foregoing provision leaves no doubt as to the availability of the remedy resorted to by petitioners. Notwithstanding the same, we must now determine if the annulment of the judgment of the MTCC was warranted.
In Toledo v. Court of Appeals, 34 we explained the nature of an action for annulment of judgment:
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. 35 (Citation omitted.)
As stated, the grounds for annulment of judgment are limited to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 36 Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. Lack of jurisdiction must pertain to total absence of jurisdiction over the person of a party or over the subject matter. 37
Since an action for annulment of judgment requires that other remedies are wanting, the party availing it must have failed to resort to ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law without fault on her part. 38 As such, the party must provide a plausible explanation for not resorting to the other remedies under the Rules of Court. 39 However, if the ground raised is lack of jurisdiction, the party need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom is no longer available through no fault of his own, precisely because the judgment rendered or the final order issued is null and void. Thus, it may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked. 40 Nevertheless, the action must be filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel. 41 DETACa
According to the principle of laches or "stale demands," the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier — negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 42 It must be emphasized that the doctrine of estoppel is the exception, not the general rule, and therefore must be applied with great care, and the equity must be strong in its favor. 43
Petitioners alleged that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Sorronda's complaint. Without question, this is one of the grounds for a petition for annulment of judgment. The question is, did petitioners file the petition before it was barred by laches or estoppel?
To recall, petitioners filed their petition on August 13, 2004. 44 This was more than a year after their motion for reconsideration was denied by the MTCC on January 16, 2003, and the issuance of the writ of execution on January 24, 2003. In their reply, petitioners argue that they "immediately took action and asserted their right upon learning of the decision rendered by MTCC Branch 1 in Civil Case No. A-[3406] and, thus, their claim of lack of jurisdiction was not in [any way] barred by laches or estoppel." 45 Petitioners heap the blame on their former counsel, as shown by the following paragraphs in their petition before the RTC:
9. That it may be emphasized that the case [MTCC Civil Case No. A-3406] was decided without the knowledge and active participation of the Plaintiffs (Defendants therein). In fact, it was only very recently that herein Plaintiffs knew that the Judgment of the Respondent Court had become executory after they were prevented from undertaking a construction in the property involved in Civil Case [No.] A-3406 as accordingly a Writ of Execution has already been issued in the aforesaid case;
10. That being unfamiliar with the legal intricacies of a case being mere laymen, Plaintiffs had to fully rely on the courses of action that our counsel may take under the circumstances, unaware all along that we failed to present our case and argue against the reliefs sought in Civil Case No. A-3406 because the said counsel did not attend to the same nor bothered to apprise us as to its status;
11. That we come to Court to most respectfully seek redress for the serious prejudice that has been dealt to us resulting from the negligence and sheer disregard of our former counsel; 46
Petitioners, however, cannot blame their counsel for all their troubles. We recently explained in Sibayan v. Costales: 47
The attribution of negligence to the counsel does not automatically shield the client from adverse consequence of her own negligence and relieve her from the unfavorable result of such lapse. Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough. 48 (Citations omitted.)
Here, there is no showing that petitioners took steps to protect their interest in the case. It seems that they merely waited for their counsel to update them. Petitioners may be laymen, and therefore not expected to know the intricacies of the law, but they should at least monitor and inquire about the status of their case. It appears here that they failed to do even that. Hence, they are bound by the negligence of their counsel and its consequences.
It is true that delay alone is insufficient to support the defense of estoppel by laches. 49 However, there is estoppel by laches if it also appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to change of title, among other causes. 50 Such is the case before us. Petitioners claim that they filed the petition before the RTC immediately after learning of the ruling of the MTCC. 51 But as to why petitioners discovered it so belatedly, if that is the case, they have not provided any explanation. They have not even provided the exact date when they received the order of the MTCC. And again, even if petitioners' former counsel was remiss in his duties, it is not sufficient basis to excuse petitioners for being remiss in theirs. Simply put, petitioners were not vigilant in exercising or protecting their rights, only acting after they could no longer do as they please. Further, title over the property has already been transferred to Reluya.
Significantly, not only did petitioners fail to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the MTCC in their motion for reconsideration before said court, they prayed that they be allowed to submit their answer and the case be tried on the merits. 52 We have long frowned upon the "undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse." 53
All told, the circumstances of this case lead us to conclude that the petition for annulment was barred by laches or estoppel. Therefore, the ruling of the MTCC can no longer be assailed by petitioners.
Having ruled that the petition for annulment of judgment is already barred by estoppel by laches, we need not determine anymore whether the MTCC had jurisdiction over Sorronda's complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The July 30, 2010 Decision and May 5, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01619-MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." (Sereno, C.J., on leave; De Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018.) aDSIHc
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rollo, pp. 27-41.
2.Id. at 43-52. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justices Angelita A. Gacutan and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.
3.Id. at 61-62.
4.Id. at 104-111. Penned by Judge Yolinda C. Bautista.
5.Id. at 112-120.
6.Id. at 69-80. Penned by Judge Felipe M. Abalos.
7. CA rollo, pp. 83-85.
8.Rollo, pp. 28, 70.
9.Id. at 71-72.
10.Id. at 92-96.
11.Id. at 44.
12.Id.
13.Rollo, p. 70.
14.Id. at 44.
15.Id. at 80.
16.Supra note 7.
17.Rollo, pp. 91.
18.Id. at 100, 114.
19.Id. at 45.
20.Id. at 111.
21.Id. at 108-109.
22. G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156.
23.Rollo, pp. 108-109.
24. G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 20; rollo, pp. 110-111.
25.Rollo, p. 120.
26. CA rollo, pp. 4-7.
27.Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 29-32.
29. Rollo, p. 51.
30. Id. at 49.
31. Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
32. CA rollo, pp. 140-141.
33. Supra note 3.
34. G.R. No. 167838, August 5, 2015, 765 SCRA 104.
35. Id. at 113.
36. RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 2.
37. Lasala v. National Food Authority, G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015, 767 SCRA 430, 447.
38. See Manila v. Gallardo-Manzo, G.R. No. 163602, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 20, 28.
39. Lasala v. National Food Authority, supra at 443.
40.Paulino v. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 205065, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 273, 286.
41. RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 3.
42. Mangubat v. Morga-Seva, G.R. No. 202611, November 23, 2015, 775 SCRA 312, 324.
43. Adlawan v. Joaquino, G.R. No. 203152, June 20, 2016, 794 SCRA 81.
44. Records, p. 1.
45. Rollo, p. 164.
46. Id. at 99-100.
47. Sibayan v. Costales, G.R. No. 191492, July 4, 2016, 795 SCRA 387.
48. Id. at 396.
49. Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63, 82.
50. Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, G.R. Nos. 174040-41, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 136, 161 citing Figueroa v. People, supra.
51. Rollo, p. 37.
52. Id. at 88.
53. Figueroa v. People, supra note 49 at 74. Citations omitted.