Calilung v. Caltex Philippines, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 193011. July 30, 2019.]

TARCISO S. CALILUNG, petitioner, vs.CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., respondent.

[G.R. No. 193039. July 30, 2019.]

CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.JOSE MEDINA, ET AL., respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 30, 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 193011 (Tarciso S. Calilung v. Caltex Philippines, Inc., et al.); G.R. No. 193039 (Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Jose Medina, et al.). — These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 assail the Decision 2 dated November 17, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated July 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85830 affirming with modification the Decision 4 dated March 9, 2005 of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Ilagan, Isabela in Civil Case No. 948.

In G.R. No. 193011, petitioner Atty. Tarciso S. Calilung (Atty. Calilung) assails the CA Decision solely on the ground that it deleted the RTC's grant of lucro cesante, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit in his favor.

In G.R. No. 193039, Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) assails the CA Decision insofar as it declared that Caltex usurped the interests of Jose Antonio Medina, Maria Luisa Medina, and Maria Milagros Medina (hereafter collectively known as the Medinas) in the properties subject of this case, thus, ordering it to pay the Medinas the amount of P257,259,000.00 representing the fair market value of their interest therein. It further assails the CA's ruling ordering it to return to Atty. Calilung the money which the latter paid, the same being a legitimate business transaction. Lastly, Caltex assails the CA's finding of bad faith on its part and, on account thereof, holding it liable for moral and exemplary damages to the Medinas.

The controversy revolves around a 228.9-hectare land in Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela consisting of 14 parcels (subject properties) originally registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-35316 of the Register of Deeds of Isabela in the name of Antonio Medina (Antonio). Upon Antonio's death, the subject properties passed on, through intestate succession, to his wife Antonia Vda. De Medina (Antonia) and their three children, Jose Antonio Medina (Jose), Maria Luisa Medina (Luisa), and Milagros Medina (Milagros). Subsequently, the subject properties were transferred in the name of the "Heirs of Antonio Medina represented by Antonia Carragayan Medina," and covered by 14 separate titles, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-133021 to T-133034. 5

Antonia was a dealer of Caltex. For unpaid deliveries of petroleum products, Caltex filed an action for collection of sum of money against her with Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 84-22434, entitled Caltex (Philippines, Inc.) v. Antonia Vda. De Medina. 6

On September 17, 1984, the RTC, in Civil Case No. 84-22434, rendered a judgment by default 7 in favor of Caltex and against Antonia which became final and executory upon the latter's failure to appeal. Consequently, on June 9, 1989, a Writ of Execution was issued. 8 On July 24, 1989, Deputy Sheriff Adolfo Garcia issued: (1) a Notification 9 informing Antonia of the sale of her properties through public auction; (2) a Notice of Levy on Execution 10 addressed to the Register of Deeds, Ilagan, Isabela identifying Antonia's properties which were levied upon and requesting that proper annotations be made in the former's records; and (3) a Notice of Sheriff's Sale 11 setting the public auction on August 24, 1989 and directing compliance with the publication and posting requirements. The subject properties were listed and identified in these notices.

On August 24, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff sold Antonia's properties to Caltex for P2,785,620.00. He issued a Certificate of Sale 12 indicating that whatever rights or interests Antonia may have on the real properties mentioned in the notice of levy/sale were sold to Caltex.

Thus, on October 24, 1990, a Sheriff's Certificate of Final Sale 13 was issued stating that all the properties stated therein, including the subject properties, were sold at public auction to Caltex, the lone bidder.

Meanwhile, prior to the issuance of the Writ of Execution dated June 9, 1989 in favor of Caltex in Civil Case No. 84-22434, Antonia executed the following:

1.) Special Power of Attorney 14 (SPA) in favor of Carlito Balauag (Balauag) dated April 5, 1988, authorizing him to represent her and her children in transactions with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) or the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and any private or public institution with regard to the subject properties. On March 10, 1989, Balauag offered the subject properties to the DAR for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme. 15

2.) Deed of Assignment 16 (With Special Power of Attorney Coupled with Interest) dated February 22, 1989 where Antonia assigned to Caltex "all [her] rights, interests, claims and participation from the proceeds of land compensation for all the property [she has] voluntarily offered for [operational] land transfer" 17 in consideration of her unpaid obligations to Caltex, as well as designating the latter as her exclusive attorney-in-fact to follow up with the DAR the papers pertaining to the voluntary offer of the subject properties.

On August 13, 1993, Caltex sold to the DAR, under the VOS scheme of the CARP, the subject properties. 18 Thereafter, the DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) to agrarian reform beneficiaries. 19

In October 1994, Atty. Calilung manifested his interest to acquire Caltex's rights over the subject properties. He came to know of the subject properties when he met Luisa, Antonia's daughter and his future wife. In consideration of the sale, Caltex was to absolve Antonia from any further civil and/or criminal responsibility. The sale pushed through for a consideration of P3,500,000.00. 20 Accordingly, Caltex issued a Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim 21 dated December 30, 1994 releasing and discharging Antonia from any and all pending civil and criminal cases which Caltex had filed against her.

On June 22, 1995, Atty. Calilung and Caltex executed a Deed of Assignment with Consolidation of Title, 22 where Caltex, claiming ownership over the subject properties, transferred its rights to Atty. Calilung. 23 In the same deed, Atty. Calilung acknowledged that he was fully aware of the circumstances under which the properties were acquired by Caltex and that he has examined the title and inspected its boundaries and locations. 24

Atty. Calilung then attempted to register the deed with the Register of Deeds of Isabela but the latter refused on the ground that Caltex already sold the properties to the DAR. 25

On October 25, 1996, the Medinas filed with the RTC a complaint 26 for annulment of sheriff's sale, cancellation of sheriff's certificate of final sale, annulment of voluntary offer to sell of Caltex to the DAR, annulment of Deed of Assignment with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against Caltex, Deputy Sheriff Adolfo B. Garcia, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) David Pascua, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Jun Israel, the DAR and its Secretary, the Land Bank, and Atty. Calilung. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 948 and raffled to Branch 16 of the RTC in Isabela.

The Medinas alleged that Caltex misappropriated their respective co-ownership shares: first, by attachment, levy and execution sale of the subject parcels of land; second, by selling the same by way of VOS to the DAR; and third, by selling the subject properties to Atty. Calilung. 27

In its answer with compulsory counterclaims, 28 Caltex stressed that it did not encroach upon the property rights of the Medinas because the Sheriff's execution sale covered only Antonia's rights and interests in the subject properties. Caltex was merely constrained to file the VOS in favor of the DAR to protect its rights and interests.

In his answer with cross-claim and its amendment, 29 Atty. Calilung alleged that he became aware of the VOS to DAR only after he became an assignee of Caltex. Further, he claims he could not be held liable for he is also a victim of Caltex's fraudulent misrepresentation and machinations. In his cross-claim, Atty. Calilung claims that Caltex fraudulently and falsely represented itself as owner of the subject properties when it assigned the same to him. Because of Caltex's failure to deliver the 228.9 hectares it sold to him, it should be held liable to pay compensatory damages in the form of lucro cesante based on the price difference at the time of acquisition of the subject properties and the present action, plus interest. He asserts that he is also entitled to damages due to Caltex's bad faith.

Through its Decision 30 dated March 9, 2005, the RTC, in Civil Case No. 948, ruled that, as heirs of Antonio, Antonia, Milagros, Jose, and Luisa became owners of the estate in four equal pro-indiviso shares; therefore, Antonia is only entitled to 1/4 of the estate. It upheld the validity of the auction sale insofar as Antonia's 1/4 share is concerned, but declared that the 3/4 share should be restored to the Medinas. The RTC also invalidated the SPA in favor of Balauag, as well as the latter's VOS to DAR. However, it upheld Caltex's VOS only to the extent of Antonia's 1/4 share in the subject properties. On Atty. Calilung's claim, the RTC ordered Caltex to pay Atty. Calilung P300,000,000.00 as lucro cesante or unrealized profits. The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, after a careful consideration of the respective claims of all the parties, the evidence and applicable laws, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Sheriff's Sale of August 24, 1989 pursuant to a final judgment in Civil Case No. 84-22434 of RTC Manila Br. 31, valid as to the one fourth (1/4) share in the subject property of the judgment debtor Antonia Vda. De Medina only; which share passed on to defendant Caltex Philippines, Inc. as successful bidder;

2. Upholding the Voluntary Offer to Sell of defendant Caltex in favor of the Department of Agrarian Reform to the extent of the one fourth (1/4) share in subject property;

3. Declaring the Voluntary Offer to Sell of Antonia Vda. De Medina thru her Attorney-in-fact Carlito Balauag invalid as the same is not authorized by law;

4. To restore plaintiffs to their three fourth (3/4) share in subject property. To this end, the parties concerned, plaintiffs and representatives of the Department of Agrarian Reform and their respective Counsels are directed to submit a draft partition of the property, taking care to promote the best use thereof for the benefit of all parties within 30 days from receipt of the decision for the approval of the Court;

5. To order defendant Caltex to pay plaintiffs the total sum of P3,000,000.00 (3 million) by way of compensation for damages for all the years plaintiffs failed to fully utilized (sic) their shares in subject property occasioned by the erroneous disposition thereof by defendant Caltex;

6. To order defendant Caltex to pay plaintiffs P500,000.00 as moral damages and P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

7. To order defendant Caltex to pay plaintiffs P500,000.00 by way of Attorneys (sic) fee and P300,000.00 as reimbursement for litigation expenses;

ON THE CROSS-CLAIM:

8. To annul and declare invalid the Deed of Assignment with consolidation of titles executed by Caltex in favor of defendant Cross-Claimant;

9. To order defendant Caltex to restore to Cross-Claimant the amount of P3,500,000.00 which he paid for the subject property with legal interest thereon from October 1994 until fully paid;

10. To order Caltex to pay Cross-Claimant the amount of P300,000,000.00 by way of Lucro cesante with legal interest until fully paid;

11. To order Caltex to pay Cross-Claimant P1,000,000.00 by way of moral damages and P1,000,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;

12. To order Caltex to pay Cross-Claimant P500,000.00 by way of Attorneys (sic) fee and P300,000.00 as reimbursement for litigation expenses;

13. To order Caltex to pay Cost of Suit.

SO ORDERED. 31

Both Atty. Calilung and Caltex filed separate appeals to the CA.

In denying Atty. Calilung's appeal, the CA ruled that the amount of P300,000,000.00 awarded and the P745,000,000.00 Atty. Calilung is praying for cannot be justified as lucro cesante since it arose from his investment of only P3,500,000.00. It, however, ordered Caltex to return the purchase price with legal interest. 32

With regard to Caltex's appeal, the CA ruled that Caltex usurped Medinas' interest over the subject properties. Consequently, it found that the Medinas are entitled to the reconveyance of their pro-indiviso share of 3/4 of the subject properties. Since the subject properties have already been subjected to CARP and have been taken over by the DAR, with CLOAs already issued to beneficiaries of portions of the subject properties, 33 the CA instead ordered Caltex to pay the Medinas' the present market value thereof, plus interest and damages. 34 The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision dated March 9, 2005 in Civil Case No. 948 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

Accordingly, the decretal portion of said Decision is modified as follows: (Original Decision in italics; Modified decision underscored)

"WHEREFORE, after a careful consideration of the respective claims of all the parties, the evidence and applicable laws, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Sheriff's Sale of August 24, 1989 pursuant to a final judgment in Civil Case No. 84-22434 of RTC Manila Br. 31, valid as to the one fourth (1/4) share in the subject property of the judgment debtor Antonia Vda. De Medina only; which share passed on to defendant Caltex Philippines, Inc. as successful bidder.

2. Upholding the Voluntary Offer to Sell of defendant Caltex in favor of the Department of Agrarian Reform to the extent of the one fourth (1/4) share in subject[] property;

3. Declaring the Voluntary Offer to Sell of Antonia Vda. De Medina thru her Attorney-in-fact Carlito Balauag invalid as the same is not authorized by law.

4. Ordering CALTEX to pay the plaintiffs the monetary equivalent of their 3/4 share in the Medina Estate in the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P257,250,000.00), at 6% interest per annum from the time of judicial demand up to the finality of the judgment and at 12% interest per annum from the finality of judgment until the actual payment thereof.

5. Ordering CALTEX to pay the plaintiffs FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as moral damages;

6. Ordering CALTEX to pay the plaintiffs FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

7. Ordering CALTEX to return to ATTY. TARCISO CALILUNG the amount of THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P3,500,000.00) with legal interest at 6% per annum reckoned from March 9, 2005 when the RTC rendered its judgment. From the time this Decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction.

Costs against defendants-appellants CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.

SO ORDERED. 35 (Emphasis in the original.)

In a Resolution 36 dated July 9, 2010, Atty. Calilung's and Caltex's motions for reconsideration were denied. Hence, these petitions, which were consolidated on October 3, 2011. 37

In G.R. No. 193039, Caltex claims that it cannot be faulted for the inclusion of the Medinas' share in the CARP. The VOS is not the operative act which placed the subject properties under CARP as it was the government, through the DAR, which made the determination. Regardless of whether anyone, including Caltex, voluntarily offered the subject properties for sale to the government, the latter will eventually acquire them for redistribution under CARP. Caltex also argues that it has never misrepresented itself to be the owner of the subject properties and that it has consistently maintained that it acquired ownership only over the rights, interests, participation and title of Antonia. Any damage caused to the Medinas is due to their own fault because they refused to participate in the proceedings before the DAR despite their knowledge of the proceedings. Caltex also questions the monetary awards in favor of the Medinas and Atty. Calilung for lack of basis.

In G.R. No. 193011, Atty. Calilung insists that he should be paid lucro cesante and damages as he was unable to register his title over the subject properties.

I

At the outset, We affirm the CA's disposition with regard to the DAR's appeal from the RTC Decision. The CA was correct in holding that the RTC was without jurisdiction to declare the subject properties as exempt from CARP coverage as jurisdiction over this very issue is vested with the DAR.

Section 50 of RA 6657 provides for the DAR's primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform cases:

Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

xxx xxx xxx

Specifically, DAR Administrative Order 09-94 No. (DAR AO 09-94), the executive issuance in force at the time the complaint in Civil Case No. 948 was filed in 1996, mandates the DAR Regional Directors to hear and decide protests in agrarian reform cases. 38 Relevant provisions of DAR AO 09-94 read:

I

Rationale

In line with the administration's vision to complete land distribution within ten (10) years from the effectivity of the CARL and in order to resolve the factors contributing to the delay in the coverage of lands under the program, the authority to hear and decide all protests involving coverage under R.A. No. 6657 or P.D. No. 27 is hereby devolved to all Regional Directors (RDs). The Authority of the RDs to decide protests against coverage under P.D. No. 27 pursuant to the Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1987 is hereby affirmed.

The appeal process from the decisions of the RDs to the Secretary is also hereby defined, pursuant to Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

II

Definition

Protests against coverage under CARP or under P.D. No. 27 occur when the landowner files a written objection to the initial activities undertaken by the DAR to bring a certain property under the agrarian reform program, such as the issuance of Notice of Coverage, Notice of Acquisition and the like. Protests may be based on exemptions, exclusions, retention and other grounds provided by law.

Protests shall also include those lodged in writing by farmers who believe they have a priority right over those have been previously identified by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) as the beneficiaries of the land distribution program. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Union Bank v. Hon. Regional Agrarian Reform Officer, et al., 39 We explained:

The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law. Section 50 of the CARL and Section 17 of EO No. 229 vested upon the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through EO No. 129-A, the power to adjudicate agrarian reform cases was transferred to the DARAB, and jurisdiction over the implementation of agrarian reform was delegated to the DAR regional offices. In Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, we held that consistent with the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the agrarian reform cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB are those that involve agrarian disputes. Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an "agrarian dispute" as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Given the technical legal meaning of the term "agrarian dispute," it follows that not all cases involving agricultural lands automatically fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB. 40

We note the law and jurisprudence's use of the phrase "primary jurisdiction." This emphasizes the requirement of complying with the correct procedure and of observing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine is well-established. We explained:

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.

To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper. 41

As the issue raised before the RTC and the CA of whether the subject properties are within CARP coverage does not fall within the technical meaning of agrarian dispute and following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it is clear that DAR exercises preliminary jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the RTC.

II

During pre-trial, all the parties stipulated and admitted that Antonio previously owned the subject properties and that upon his death, ownership of the subject properties passed to Antonia and the Medinas. 42 As the pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties and whose main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial, or totally dispense with it, it follows that the parties are bound to honor the stipulations they made during the pre-trial. 43 Thus, upon the death of Antonio and pursuant to Articles 979, 980, and 996 of the New Civil Code, 44 Antonia is entitled only to 1/4 of the subject properties while the surviving children, Jose Antonio, Luisa, and Milagros are entitled to the remaining 1/4.

We emphasize, however, that none of Antonio's heirs can claim a specific portion of the subject properties. Each of the four heirs' right is limited to a 1/4 undivided share of the subject properties. This is so because there is nothing in the records which would show that there was already a proper and valid partition of Antonio's estate. We held in Arado v. Alcoran: 45

Unless there was a proper and valid partition of the assets of the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions of their estates, because, as we have declared in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:

x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided. 46

We now determine whether what Caltex acquired in the public auction and subsequently sold to the government via the VOS scheme was limited to Antonia's 1/4 share in the subject properties.

Money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor. 47 We have held:

x x x Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. 48

Thus, the public auction conducted to answer the money judgment against Antonia should be limited to those properties which she owns. This means that with respect to the subject properties, only Antonia's 1/4 share can be sold in the public auction.

Both the RTC and CA determined that what was sold during the public auction was all of the subject properties and not just Antonia's 1/4 share. We affirm this finding. When supported by substantial evidence, the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are final and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, unless petitioner can show compelling or exceptional reasons for this Court to disregard, overturn or modify such findings. 49

In this case, the Sheriff's Certificate of Final Sale 50 contained the following relevant portions:

I, ADOLFO B. GARCIA, Deputy Sheriff of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, in the above-entitled case, by virtue of the 1st Alias Writ of Execution x x x, in the above-entitled case against the defendant ANTONIA VDA. DE MEDINA, the following described real properties were SOLD at public auction on August 24, 1989 to CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

That the plaintiff CALTEX (PHILS., INC.) duly represented by Atty. Rafael Durian having offered the highest bid, the undersigned Sheriff have therefore SOLD, CEDED, and CONVEYED to CALTEX (PHILS.), Inc. the properties described subject to redemption period of one year counted from the date of Certificate of Sale is registered in the proper Register of Deeds or Assessors Office.

NOW, THEREFORE, and by virtue of the Sheriff's Sale issued on August 24, 1989 and which expired on October 23, 1990 by these presents, all rights, interests, participations and titles of the herein bidder CALTEX (PHILS.), INC. over the above-described properties are hereby finally SOLD, CEDED and TRANSFERRED to said CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. 51

We likewise note that the subject properties, covered by TCT Nos. 133021-133032, were included in the enumeration of properties which were sold to Caltex and that there is nothing to indicate that with respect to the subject properties, only Antonia's 1/4 share was sold. We have held that the issuance of a final deed of sale is an act merely confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence of that fact. 52 Following the express provisions of the certificate of final sale, it is clear that what was sold to Caltex was not limited to Antonia's 1/4 share.

Worse, and demonstrative of Caltex's bad faith and intent to exercise ownership over the entire subject properties, Caltex voluntarily offered for sale the subject properties to the DAR. The Letters-Offer 53 dated August 13, 1993 covered the entire area of each of the subject properties, contained the annotation that Caltex is exercising its right of retention to the extent of 10 hectares and were without any qualification that the offer is limited only to 1/4 of the subject properties.

Without a doubt, what Caltex intended to purchase in the public auction and to sell to DAR was the entirety of the subject properties and not merely Antonia's 1/4 share. We reiterate with approval the CA's findings:

It seems rather peculiar that CALTEX offered for sale to the DAR the ENTIRETY of each parcel of land, NOT MERELY ANTONIA'S PRO INDIVISO INTEREST therein. This follows the tenor of the aforesaid Deputy Sheriff's Certificate of Sale and the Sheriff's Certificate of Final Sale. Each letter offer corresponds to one (1) parcel of land and the total area of this land was offered under the VOS scheme. MARO Eunomio Israel, Jr. testified that CALTEX executed VOS in favor of the DAR covering about 220 hectares of the subject properties.

The Letter Offers (sic) left no doubt or any suspicion on the part of the DAR as to such authority. The fact remains that CALTEX had clearly exercised ownership over the subject properties, which conferred upon it the right to dispose of the same by way of sale. CALTEX, believing itself as the owner of the subject properties, and manifesting to be so, exercised its right to dispose of what it owned when it sold the subject properties to the DAR. Consequently, the portions pertaining to the MEDINA CHILDREN were included in the VOS without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Fourth. In its Letter Offers (sic), CALTEX even indicated that it, alone, is exercising its right of retention to the extent of 10 hectares, a right which is guaranteed to the landowner by the Constitution. The law requires no further interpretation as to which party would have the right of retention, but that it is the landowner who can claim such right.

CALTEX had made clear the real nature of its ownership of the subject properties. The DAR cannot be faulted for relying on the representation of CALTEX based on the letter dated November 24, 1992 by Atty. Joselia J. Poblador, the Deed of Assignment with Special Power of Attorney coupled with interest in favor of CALTEX, and the titles covering the subject properties containing annotations to the effect that the same were sold at public auction to CALTEX as the highest bidder, among others.

All these are telling circumstances that CALTEX misrepresented itself to have the right to dispose of the entire subject properties. Verily, the foregoing acts demonstrative of full ownership manifested by CALTEX indubitably show that indeed it usurped the pro-indiviso share of the MEDINA CHILDREN. 54

We stress that an execution creditor generally acquires no higher or better right than what the execution debtor has in the property levied upon. It follows then that if the judgment debtor had no interest in the property, the execution creditor acquires no interest therein. 55 Thus, despite its actions to the contrary, as Antonia's interest over the subject properties was limited to her 1/4 undivided share, Caltex, during the public auction, was able to acquire only Antonia's 1/4 undivided share. In turn, Caltex could have offered to the DAR only the same 1/4 undivided share.

Consequently, as the public auction covered the entire subject properties, the Medinas are entitled to the reconveyance of their 3/4 undivided share of the subject properties.

III

We are aware that the subject properties have already been subject to CARP and CLOAs already issued to the famer beneficiaries. A CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in RA 6657 and other applicable laws. 56 The mere issuance of a CLOA does not put the beneficiaries' ownership beyond attack and scrutiny. CLOAs may in fact be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. 57 The grounds for their cancellation, however, are limited and generally result from actions of the beneficiary. These are:

1. Misuse or diversion of financial and support services extended to the ARB; (Section 37 of R.A. No. 6657)

2. Misuse of land; (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657)

3. Material misrepresentation of the ARB's basic qualifications as provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws;

4. Illegal conversion by the ARB; (Cf. Section 73, Paragraphs C and E of R.A. No. 6657)

5. Sale, transfer, lease or other forms of conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the land acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary in order to circumvent the provisions of Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws. However, if the land has been acquired under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, ownership may be transferred after full payment of amortization by the beneficiary; (Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228)

6. Default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortizations in case of voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme, except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure;

7. Failure of the ARBs to pay for at least three (3) annual amortizations to the LBP, except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure; (Section 26 of RA 6657)

8. Neglect or abandonment of the awarded land continuously for a period of two (2) calendar years as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative; (Section 22 of RA 6657)

9. The land is found to be exempt/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 or CARP coverage or to be part of the landowner's retained area as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative; and

10. Other grounds that will circumvent laws related to the implementation of agrarian reform. 58

11. The land is found to be exempt/excluded from CARP coverage, or part of the landowner's retained area. 59

As none of these grounds are present in this case, cancellation of the CLOAs cannot be effected and reconveyance of the Medinas' 3/4 share is no longer be possible. This does not mean, however, that the Medinas are left with nothing.

On the part of the CA, citing equity, it held that as the Medinas could not be restored to their share in their inheritance from Antonio, Caltex should be made to pay them the subject properties' present market value plus interest and damages.

We differ with the CA on this point. Instead of the subject properties' present market value, We hold that the Medinas are entitled to their share in the just compensation over the subject properties equivalent to their 3/4 share which should be computed in accordance with the express parameters set by law.

This case was initially one for annulment of sale with prayer for recovery of the subject properties, or, in the alternative, payment of the subject properties' fair market value. More, there is no pending petition for the determination of just compensation. Considering, however, that We are not a trier of facts and cannot receive new evidence from the parties to aid them in the prompt resolution of the case 60 and further considering the length of time this case has been pending and in order to finally settle the dispute and avoid further delay, We remand this case to the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the purpose of determining the just compensation the Medinas are entitled to receive.

We stress that the taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. 61 This program is a revolutionary kind of expropriation which affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. 62 As the State's exercise of its power of eminent domain is involved, the following limitations must be observed: (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use; and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property. 63

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. Its measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. 64 For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and price at the time of taking. 65

Section 17 of RA 6657 provides for the determination of just compensation, to wit:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

Further, Sections 56 and 57 of the same law constitute SACs and identify their jurisdiction:

Sec. 56. Special Agrarian Court. — The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special Agrarian Court.

The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such additional Special Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the number of agrarian cases in each province. In the designation, the Supreme Court shall give preference to the Regional Trial Courts which have been assigned to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall exercise said special jurisdiction in addition to the regular jurisdiction of their respective courts.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall have the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the Regional Trial Courts.

Sec. 57. Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, 66 We upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over petitions for determination of just compensation:

We do not agree with petitioner's submission that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent's petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of the DARAB's re-evaluation of the land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the following reason:

It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has 'original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.' This 'original and exclusive' jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just compensation. 67

To guide the SAC in the performance of its task of determining just compensation and the amount the Medinas are entitled to, We reiterate the guidelines the Court prescribed in Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines: 68

First, in determining just compensation, courts are obligated to apply both the compensation valuation factors enumerated by the Congress under Section 17 of RA 6657, and the basic formula laid down by the DAR.

xxx xxx xxx

Second, the formula, being an administrative regulation issued by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making and subordinate legislation power under RA 6657, has the force and effect of law. Unless declared invalid in a case where its validity is directly put in issue, courts must consider their use and application.

xxx xxx xxx

Third, courts, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, may relax the application of the formula to fit the peculiar circumstances of a case. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation; otherwise, they will be considered in grave abuse of discretion.

xxx xxx xxx

For clarity, we restate the body of rules as follows: The factors listed under Section 17 of RA 6657 and its resulting formulas provide a uniform framework or structure for the computation of just compensation which ensures that the amounts to be paid to affected landowners are not arbitrary, absurd or even contradictory to the objectives of agrarian reform. Until and unless declared invalid in a proper case, the DAR formulas partake of the nature of statutes, which under the 2009 amendment became law itself, and thus have in their favor the presumption of legality, such that courts shall consider, and not disregard, these formulas in the determination of just compensation for properties covered by the CARP. When faced with situations which do not warrant the formula's strict application, courts may, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the factual situations before them, subject only to the condition that they clearly explain in their Decision their reasons (as borne by the evidence on record) for the deviation undertaken. It is thus entirely allowable for a court to allow a landowner's claim for an amount higher than what would otherwise have been offered (based on an application of the formula) for as long as there is evidence on record sufficient to support the award. 69 (Emphasis in the original.)

Another important and essential requirement in the determination of just compensation is that, the fair market value of the expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking. The "time of taking" refers to that time when the State deprived the landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. 70 We have also held that the time of taking may also refer to the time when the title is transferred in the name of the CARP beneficiaries. 71

On this score, We find that the records are unclear as to the time of taking. The records are silent as to the date when title over the subject properties was transferred to the Republic or to the beneficiaries. Thus, We also direct the RTC, sitting as SAC, to determine the time of taking of the subject properties in the computation of just compensation.

The RTC, sitting as SAC, may also award interest in favor of the Medinas. In Apo Fruits Corp. and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 72 We explained the rationale in awarding interest on the just compensation due:

Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to be "just," must also be made without delay. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if the property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.

This is the principle at the core of the present case where the petitioners were made to wait for more than a decade after the taking of their property before they actually received the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due them. What they have not received to date is the income of their landholdings corresponding to what they would have received had no uncompensated taking of these lands been immediately made. This income, in terms of the interest on the unpaid principal, is the subject of the current litigation.

We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals the need for prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this case that:

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. 73

Here, the Medinas have already been deprived of the use and dominion over their landholdings for a substantial period of time and farmer-beneficiaries have already benefitted from their properties. Thus, the award of legal interest is proper. Needless to state, We cannot overemphasize the Medinas' right to receive their share in the just compensation equivalent to their 3/4 share in the subject properties. The right of a landowner to just compensation for the taking of his or her private property is a legally demandable and enforceable right guaranteed by no less than the Bill of Rights, under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. 74

IV

Meanwhile, We affirm with modification the CA's award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the Medinas. The CA awarded P500,000.00 moral damages and P500,000.00 exemplary damages, collectively, to the Medinas. We modify this award and hold that each of the Medinas is entitled to P1,000,000.00 moral damages and P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages. 75 In effect, We are increasing the total amount of damages each of the Medinas is entitled to receive.

Moral damages are awarded to compensate for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused the claimant. 76 It is not, however, enough to prove these sufferings as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive. 77 Similarly, to warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. 78

As correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, Caltex deprived the Medinas of their ownership and possession of their share in the subject properties. As a result, they suffered mental anguish and social humiliation. 79 More, Caltex was guilty of bad faith in its dealings with respect to the subject properties.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. It is, therefore, a question of intention, which can be inferred from one's conduct and/or contemporaneous statements. 80

We examined Caltex's acts and find that it was aware that only Antonia's share in the subject properties could be purchased during the public auction. In its August 23, 1989 Bid-Letter addressed to the Deputy Sheriff, Caltex clarified its bid as follows:

(3) With respect to property registered in the name of Heirs of Antonio Medina and/or Antonia Vda. de Medina representing or as Administration of Estate of Antonio Medina the Certificate of Sale shall refer only the rights, interests, claims and participation of Antonia Vda. de Medina in the covered property and improvements since she has co-heirs, a son and a daughter. x x x 81

This shows that Caltex knew that it cannot acquire the entire subject properties. Thus, knowing that the sale of the entire subject properties to it as reflected in the Certificate of Final Sale was erroneous, Caltex should have notified the Sheriff of the error and sought for a correction of the certificate of final sale. Instead, it let the error stand and even acted as if it owned the entire subject properties when it executed the letters-offer to the DAR.

Clearly, Caltex was dishonest with its dealings over the subject properties. As bad faith attended its actuations, there is reason to increase the award of moral and exemplary damages to P1,000,000.00 each.

Caltex's dishonesty not only deprived the Medinas of their share in the subject properties and their right to possess and occupy them, it also resulted in the delay of the CARP proceedings, most particularly the determination and computation of just compensation. More, the Medinas lost their right to assert their right over it. Further taking into consideration the length of time the Medinas have been deprived of their share in the subject properties and in the just compensation, We hold that the increase in the amount of damages is justified.

We are aware of our ruling in Paredes, et al. v. Calilung82 where We held that Caltex made no false representation to Atty. Calilung that it owned the subject properties in their entirety. In Paredes, Atty. Calilung charged Caltex's officers with estafa because they allegedly employed deceit to induce Atty. Calilung to enter into a contract of sale with Caltex by: (1) falsely misrepresenting that Caltex was the owner of and could assign to Atty. Calilung the entire subject real properties, when in truth, Caltex only acquired and could assign to Atty. Calilung the limited interest of Antonia; and (2) fraudulently concealing the fact that the subject properties were covered by CARP and were actually the subject of a pending VOS with the DAR.

In holding that there was no probable cause to charge Caltex's officers with estafa, We held that the sale of Caltex's interest in the subject properties was a legitimate business transaction done in the course of Caltex's business. We further held that the following circumstances cast doubt on Atty. Calilung's claim that he was ignorant of the true state of affairs of the subject properties: (1) Antonia was Atty. Calilung's mother-in-law; it was impossible that his mother-in-law and wife did not consult with him regarding the subject properties. It was also Atty. Calilung who approached Caltex and sought the purchase of the subject properties; (2) there is a paper trail by which Atty. Calilung could have traced and uncovered the status of the subject properties. As a lawyer, Atty. Calilung had every opportunity to verify what he was purchasing and should have realized that all he could purchase from Caltex was the same limited interest Caltex acquired from Antonia; and (3) Atty. Calilung is presumed to know that a VOS is not yet considered a consummated sale. As there is still no consummated sale, Caltex cannot be considered guilty of double sale. 83

Verily, the circumstances We considered in Paredes and in this case are different. In the former, in deciding that Caltex's officers were not guilty of bad faith, only Caltex's actions towards Atty. Calilung were considered. Here, in declaring that Caltex was guilty of bad faith, We considered the totality of Caltex's actions, from the time of the auction sale when Caltex acquired the subject properties up to the time it sold the properties to the DAR via VOS.

The amount of moral and exemplary damages, however, is tempered and mitigated by the Medinas' contributory negligence. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. 84 The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. 85

The Medinas contributed to the delay in the CARP proceedings. Caltex already sent several letters seeking to settle the partition of the subject properties and determine once and for all the share of the Medinas in the subject properties. Instead of responding, the Medinas ignored these letters. This lack of vigilance in asserting their right, to Our mind, constitutes contributory negligence which warrants limiting the award of damages to each of the Medinas at P1,000,000.00 moral damages and P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages.

V

Atty. Calilung argues that he is entitled to moral and exemplary damages and at least P745,911,833.00 lucro cesante as he could not register his title over the subject properties. Caltex sold the subject properties to him, when, in truth and in fact, it could not do so since the same were already sold to the DAR. He likewise claims that he is entitled to moral and exemplary damages, owing to the failure of Caltex to transfer title over, and deliver, the subject properties. 86

We deny Atty. Calilung's claim for lucro cesante. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). 87 The latter refers to indemnification for profits which the injured party failed to obtain or unrealized profits or income. 88

To be awarded lucro cesante, it must be established that there exists a basis for a reasonable expectation that profits would have continued to be generated had there been no breach of contract. This is, however, subject to the rule that a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. 89 The amount of unrealized profits must be established and supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure. 90

Atty. Calilung's bases for the award of lucro cesante are: (1) he was unable to register the subject properties in his name; and (2) based on the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Zonal Valuation Report of the BIR Regional Offices in Ilagan, Isabela, the lucro cesante to which he is entitled to can be pegged at P400.00 per square meter for interior lots and P800.00 per square meter for barangay road lots. Other than these bare and unsubstantiated allegations, however, Atty. Calilung presented no other evidence to prove that he is entitled to unrealized profits.

More, We affirm the CA's conclusion that Atty. Calilung knew or ought to have known the true nature and status of the subject properties. We agree with the CA that Atty. Calilung had become a member of Antonia's family prior to the sale to him of the subject properties. As such, he had easy access to information affecting them. More, if Atty. Calilung took time to check public records on file with the Register of Deeds, he would have easily discovered the issues surrounding the subject properties which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man, more so with a lawyer and entrepreneur like him.

We also reject Atty. Calilung's claim for moral and exemplary damages from Caltex on the ground of res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.

Conclusiveness of judgment is a species of res judicata and it applies where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but there is no identity of causes of action. Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. 91

In Paredes, We held that the transaction and sale between Caltex and Atty. Calilung was done in good faith. We also held that at that time, the VOS covering the subject properties was still being processed by the DAR. As there was no consummated sale to the DAR yet, Caltex remained a co-owner of the subject properties, together with the Medinas, and could still legally sell its share or interest therein to another person, including Atty. Calilung. Should the DAR finally approve the VOS covering the subject properties, Atty. Calilung, after acquiring Caltex's interest, shall be entitled to just compensation corresponding to his interest.

As the issue of Caltex's good faith with respect to Atty. Calilung has already been settled, there is no more ground to justify the grant of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the latter in this case.

For the same reason, We hold that Caltex is correct in arguing that the RTC and CA erred in directing it to return to Atty. Calilung the amount of P3,500,000.00 the latter paid for his purchase of the subject properties. Again, following Our ruling in Paredes, the transaction and sale between Caltex and Atty. Calilung was a legitimate business transaction. Thus, the contract between them remains valid. As such, similar to the Medinas and consistent with Our ruling in Paredes, Atty. Calilung is entitled to his 1/4 share in the just compensation. He is also entitled to legal interest because he was likewise deprived of the use and enjoyment of his share in the subject properties.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 193011 is DENIED, while the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 193039 is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 17, 2009 and Resolution dated July 9, 2010 are MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. Declaring the Sheriff's Sale of August 24, 1989 pursuant to a Final Judgement in Civil Case No. 84-22434 of Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, valid as to the 1/4 share in the subject properties of the judgment debtor Antonia Vda. de Medina only; which share passed on to Caltex Philippines, Inc. as successful bidder.

2. Upholding the Voluntary Offer to Sell of Caltex Philippines, Inc. in favor of the Department of Agrarian Reform to the extent of its 1/4 share in the subject properties.

3. Declaring the Voluntary Offer to Sell of Antonia Vda. de Medina, thru her Attorney-in-Fact Carlito Balauag, invalid.

4. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, sitting as SAC, for the determination of just compensation due to the parties, to be computed pursuant to Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines and the amount to be divided as follows: (a) the Medinas are entitled to their 3/4 share; and (b) Atty. Calilung is entitled to his 1/4 share. The Regional Trial Court, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is also directed to compute the amount of legal interest the Medinas and Atty. Calilung are entitled to receive, and to act with dispatch.

5. Caltex is ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, each to Jose Antonio Medina, Maria Luisa Medina and Milagros Medina. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, 92 these amounts shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

The letter dated June 10, 2019 of Tarcisio S. Calilung, herein petitioner, stating that he is withdrawing/terminating the services of the Law Firm of Diaz Del Rosario & Associates, Anacleto M. Diaz as collaborating counsel; the manifestation of Atty. Maria Rosario Z. Del Rosario of the Law Firm of Diaz Del Rosario & Associates, stating its confirmation as to the withdrawal of appearance as collaborating counsel for herein petitioner Tarcisio S. Calilung per his notice dated June 10, 2019; and the notice of withdrawal of appearance by Atty. Maria Rosario Z. Del Rosario of the Law Firm of Diaz Del Rosario & Associates, stating its withdrawal as collaborating counsel for petitioner Tarcisio S. Calilung with the latter's consent as evidenced by his notice filed before this Court on June 10, 2019, are all NOTED.

Atty. Maria Rosario Z. Del Rosario is hereby required to SUBMIT within five (5) days from notice hereof, a soft copy in compact disc, USB or e-mail containing the PDF files of the signed manifestation and the signed notice of withdrawal of appearance pursuant to A.M. Nos. 10-3-7-SC and 11-9-4-SC.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 3-46; Rollo (G.R. No. 193039), pp. 12-115.

2.Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 53-113; penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Retired Member of this Court), concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Antonio L. Villamor.

3.Id. at 50-51.

4.Id. at 118-146; penned by Honorable Isaac R. De Alban.

5.Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 661-683.

6.Id. at 54. Caltex also filed criminal cases for estafa against Antonia, resulting in her conviction and incarceration in 1992.

7.Id. at 361-365.

8.Rollo (G.R. No. 193039), p. 397.

9.Id. at 398.

10.Id. at 399.

11.Id. at 401-407.

12.Id. at 316-321.

13.Id. at 322-327.

14.Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 366-367.

15.Id. at 368-379.

16.Id. at 147.

17.Id.

18.Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 927-949, 1958-1971.

19.Id. at 57.

20.Id. at 421.

21.Id. at 159-160.

22.Id. at 161-166.

23.Id. at 165.

24.Id.

25.Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), p. 59.

26.Id. at 305-319.

27.Id.

28.Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 794-816.

29.Id. at 779-783, 821-829.

30.Rollo (G.R. No. 193039), pp. 187-215.

31.Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 145-146.

32.Id. at 109.

33.Id. at 88.

34.Id. at 90-91.

35.Id. at 111-113.

36.Id. at 50-51.

37.Id. at 1974.

38. Subsequent issuances of the DAR involving agrarian reform law implementation, i.e., DAR AO 06-00 entitled, "Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases," DAR AO 03-03 entitled, "2003 Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases," and DAR AO 03-17 entitled, "2017 Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases" retain the mandate of the DAR, whether the Secretary or the Regional Directors, to exercise primary jurisdiction over all agrarian law implementation cases. The issues which the DAR have primary jurisdiction to hear include: (1) classification and identification of landholdings for CARP coverage, including protests or oppositions and petitions for lifting of such coverage; (2) classification, identification, inclusion and qualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries; and (3) landowner's exercise of its right of retention, application for exemption from CARP coverage.

39. G.R. No. 200369, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 24, 35-37.

40. Id. at 35-37. See also DAR v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 173386, February 11, 2014, 715 SCRA 650; Valcurza v. Tamparong, Jr., G.R. No. 189874, September 4, 2013, 705 SCRA 128; and Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 112526, October 12, 2001, 367 SCRA 175.

41. San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013, 705 SCRA 38, 60-61.

42. Rollo (G.R. No. 193039), p. 245.

43. Interlining Corporation, et al. v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. No. 144190, March 6, 2002, 378 SCRA 521, 525.

44. Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.

   An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.

   Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

xxx xxx xxx

   Art. 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.

45. G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015, 762 SCRA 37.

46. Id. at 57-58, citing Carvajal v. CA, G.R. No. L-44426, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 237, 239.

47. Guy v. Gacott, G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016, 780 SCRA 579, 591.

48. Id.

49. Serra v. Mumar, G.R. No. 193861, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 335, 344.

50. Rollo (G.R. No. 193039), pp. 322-327.

51. Id.

52. Lucasan v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 176929, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 306, 315-316, citing Calacala v. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, 446 SCRA 438, 447.

53. Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 927-949, 1958-1971.

54. Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 80-81.

55. Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93640, January 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 151, 164.

56. RA 6657, Sec. 24; Lebrudo v. Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 156, 161.

57. See Almagro v. Amaya, Sr., G.R. No. 179685, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 61, 79.

58. Item IV B, DAR AO No. 02-94, Rules Governing the Correction and Cancellation of Registered/Unregistered Emancipation Patents (EPs), and Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) due to Unlawful Acts and Omissions or Breach of Obligations of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs) and for Other Causes; Jose, et al. v. Novida, et al., G.R. No. 177374, July 2, 2014, 728 SCRA 552, 572.

59. Item I, DAR AO 02-94.

60. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 370, 395.

61. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador Encinas, G.R. No. 167735, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 52, 59.

62. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 386.

63. Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727, 739.

64. Supra note 60 at 378-379.

65. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Jesus Alsua, G.R. No. 211351, February 4, 2015, 750 SCRA 121, 131.

66. G.R. No. 164876, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 495.

67. Id. at 504-505.

68. G.R. Nos. 181912 & 18334, November 29, 2016, 811 SCRA 27.

69. Id. at 73-79.

70. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, supra note 60 at 392-393.

71. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Jesus Alsua, supra note 65 at 393.

72. G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727.

73. Id. at 743-744.

74. Id. at 89.

75. In Allied Banking v. Eserjose, G.R. No. 161776, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 163, the Court reduced the amount of damages from P4,000,000.00 moral damages and P4,000,000.00 exemplary damages to P2,000,000.00 each. They were awarded to a property owner whose property was subjected to void real estate mortgages. In Mercury Drug Corp. v. Huang, G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007, 525 SCRA 427, the Court affirmed the award of P1,000,000.00 moral and P2,000,000.00 exemplary damages to a victim of a vehicular accident who sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung and became paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. In Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Sesante, G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 459, the Court awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 each to a passenger of a ship who sustained injuries due to the buffeting by the waves and consequent sinking of the ship.

76. Simon, Jr. v. Martinez, G.R. No. 156025, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 532, 550.

77. Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 261, 266.

78. Id. at 267.

79. Rollo (G.R. No. 193039), pp. 183, 200-201.

80. Adriano v. Lasala, G.R. No. 197842, October 9, 2013, 707 SCRA 345, 358.

81. Rollo (G.R. No. 193039), p. 314.

82. G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369.

83. Id. at 399-410.

84. National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Noble Casionan, G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 71, 81-82.

85. Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 292.

86. Rollo (G.R. No. 193011), pp. 20-21.

87. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA 402, 417.

88. See Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117103, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 387, 403.

89. So v. Food Fest Land, Inc., G.R. No. 183628, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 541, 547-548.

90. Yu v. Ngo Yet Te, G.R. No. 155868, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 423, 435.

91. Tala Realty Services Corp., Inc. v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 181369, June 22, 2016, 794 SCRA 252, 263.

92. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.