Calica Vda. de Lee v. Calica-Eclipse

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 220533. January 30, 2017.]

ROSALINA F. CALICA Vda. DE LEE, petitioner, vs. ESTELA F. CALICA-ECLIPSE, KATHLEEN GRACE ECLIPSE-ESCANO, and LEO AUGUSTO CALICA-ECLIPSE, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 30 January 2017 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 220533: ROSALINA F. CALICA Vda. DE LEE v. ESTELA F. CALICA-ECLIPSE, KATHLEEN GRACE ECLIPSE-ESCANO, and LEO AUGUSTO CALICA-ECLIPSE

Plaintiffs, in a complaint for reconveyance of title, should first substantiate their claim as heirs in a special proceeding and be declared as such before they can ask the court for the transfer of the properties to their names.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 praying that the January 30, 2015 Decision 2 and September 9, 2015 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124619 be reversed and set aside, and that judgment be rendered upholding the March 7, 2012 4 and April 13, 2012 Orders 5 of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union in Civil Case No. 7749.

Petitioner Rosalina Florendo Calica Vda. de Lee (Rosalina), 6 respondent Estela Florendo Calica-Eclipse (Estela), and Lilia Florendo Calica (Lilia) are sisters. Their parents, Catalino Fernandez Calica and Agustina Florendo (Calica Spouses), owned two (2) parcels of land in Barangay Sevilla, San Fernando City, La Union. The properties, designated as Cadastral Lots 3349 and 3349-B, have a total area of about seven (7) hectares. 7

Upon the death of the Calica Spouses, Rosalina, Estela, and Lilia inherited the properties in three (3) equal shares. When Lilia died with neither issue nor heir, Rosalina and Estela acquired Lilia's one-third share equally. 8

Later, however, Rosalina discovered that the parcels of land "were consolidated into a single parcel of land . . . under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-192[.]" 9 The land was registered in the names of Estela and her children, Kathleen Grace Calica Eclipse-Escano, and Leo Augusto Calica Eclipse (Estela and her children). 10 The title was allegedly issued under Catalino Calica's Deed of Donation in favor of Estela and her children. 11

On May 3, 2011, Rosalina filed a Complaint 12 for reconveyance of title against Estela and her children before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union, although they all reside in Project 4, Quezon City. 13 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7749 and raffled to Branch 66 under Presiding Judge Victor O. Concepcion. 14

Rosalina alleged that the registration of the parcels of land to Estela and her children was fraudulent and malicious, in violation of Article 19 15 of the Civil Code. She claimed that she was deprived of her one-half share of the properties. Thus, the title of the consolidated property should be reconveyed to her insofar as her share was concerned. 16

Rosalina claimed that she exerted earnest efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement with Estela and her children. However, no settlement was reached because they had been unreasonable. 17 Rosalina prayed that the title of the property be reconveyed to her and that she be awarded damages. 18

On August 22, 2011, Estela and her children filed their Answer. 19 They pleaded special and affirmative defenses with grounds for dismissal, thus:

1) failure to comply with the condition precedent of first bringing the matter before the appropriate barangay lupon for amicable settlement as mandated by Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code; and 2) failure to comply with the condition precedent of first exerting earnest efforts towards a compromise by the parties being members of the same family; and 3) the complaint states no cause of action as the allegations therein specifically asserted deprivation of [Rosalina's] legitime which could not be determined in an action for reconveyance of title but in an action for settlement of estate. 20 AScHCD

Rosalina filed her Reply/Answer to Counterclaim 21 dated August 26, 2011, denying such defenses. 22 Without the trial court resolving the special and affirmative defenses, the case was referred to mediation. 23

Estela and her children filed a Motion to Defer Mediation with Comments on [their] Arguments against the Special/Affirmative Defenses, which the trial court denied in the Order dated September 30, 2011. 24

On October 26, 2011, the trial court issued the Order 25 setting the case for Judicial Dispute Resolution proceedings for failure of the parties to amicably settle the case. 26 Still, the parties were not able to arrive at a compromise through the proceedings; thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 26 under Presiding Judge Juvencio S. Gascon. 27

A pre-trial conference was scheduled on February 23, 2012. 28 However, instead of filing a pre-trial brief, Estela and her children filed a Motion to Resolve Special and Affirmative Defenses with Alternative Motion to Dismiss or Motion to Require the Plaintiff to Pay the Correct Docket Fees. 29

On March 7, 2012, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order 30 denying the Motion to Resolve Special and Affirmative Defenses for lack of merit.

According to the trial court, the parties were not required to go through conciliation proceedings before the barangay lupon since the property is located in a municipality different from the parties' residences. This is an exception under Section 408 (e) 31 of the Local Government Code. 32

Moreover, Rosalina exerted efforts to arrive at a compromise with Estela and her children, who proved to be unreasonable. 33

On the issue that the Complaint stated no cause of action, the trial court held that Rosalina had a cause of action based on the allegations of her Complaint. 34

The dispositive portion of the March 7, 2012 Order of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the prayers of [Estela, et al.] to dismiss the instant case and/or to require the plaintiff to pay the correct docket fee are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. . . .

SO ORDERED. 35 (Emphasis in the original)

Estela and her children moved for reconsideration of the March 7, 2012 Order, but the Motion was denied by the trial court on April 13, 2012. 36

They then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 124619. 37

In its January 30, 2015 Decision, 38 the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's March 7, 2012 and April 13, 2012 Orders, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26 dated March 7, 2012 and April 13, 2012 in Civil Case No. 7749 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the Complaint for Reconveyance of Title filed by private respondent Rosalina Florendo Calica vda. De Lee.

SO ORDERED. 39 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court of Appeals ruled that the parties "failed to comply with the mandatory conciliation proceedings provided under the Local Government Code, [hence,] the complaint should be dismissed for being premature." 40

Further, the Court of Appeals held that Rosalina should have first established her status as an heir of the Calica Spouses before she could seek reconveyance of the property. 41 In failing to do so, Rosalina "c[ould] [not] be considered a real party-in-interest in this case." 42

Rosalina moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the Motion in its Resolution 43 dated September 9, 2015.

On November 13, 2015, Rosalina filed before this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 against respondents Estela and her children, assailing the January 30, 2015 Decision and September 9, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. 44

Petitioner argues that she was denied due process since neither she nor her counsel received a copy of respondents' Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. No affidavit of service was attached to the Petition to prove that petitioner or her counsel was served with a copy of the Petition. 45

Petitioner asserts that the trial court did not err when it denied the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Reconveyance. Since the case involves real property situated in a city different from the parties' residences, the exception under Section 408 (e) of the Local Government Code applies. 46

Petitioner claims that in any case, the parties already went through court-annexed mediation or conciliation proceeding and Judicial Dispute Resolution conferences, which were unsuccessful. The attempt to reach amicable settlement already accomplished the purpose of conciliation before the lupon. Respondents are also considered estopped from insisting on conciliation before the lupon for their active participation in the trial court proceedings. Respondents are deemed to have waived their right to barangay conciliation. 47

Petitioner contends that the trial court properly denied respondents' Motion because there was absolutely no dispute regarding her status as heir. Respondents admitted in their Answer before the trial court that petitioner and respondent Estela are the only forced heirs of their deceased relatives. 48

On November 4, 2016, respondents filed their Comment. 49 They counter that petitioner received a copy of their Petition before the Court of Appeals. This was evident when petitioner attached a copy of respondents' Petition to her Petition before this Court. The said copy contained no Court of Appeals docket number nor any marking of receipt from the trial court. Thus, petitioner's only source for her copy of the Petition was the copy that respondents had mailed her. 50 AcICHD

Respondents argue that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not dismiss petitioner's Complaint. Since both parties reside in the same barangay, the case should have been brought first to the lupon. Petitioner's failure to comply with this condition is a ground for dismissal. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Complaint. 51

Moreover, respondents cannot be deemed estopped as they have raised this ground for dismissal in their Answer before the trial court. Petitioner cannot ignore the requirement under the Local Government Code, even if the parties have gone through court-annexed mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution proceedings. 52

Granting that petitioner is an heir, respondents argue that an action for reconveyance is still not a proper action. They maintain that other matters must first be determined, such as whether the subject property forms part of the estate of their deceased relatives, the liabilities of the estate, and the extent of entitlement of the heirs. These issues are properly threshed out in a settlement of estate proceeding, not in a proceeding for reconveyance of title. 53

For this Court's resolution are the following issues:

First, whether petitioner was denied due process when she allegedly did not receive a copy of the Petition filed by respondents before the Court of Appeals;

Second, whether the Complaint should be dismissed on the ground of prematurity; and

Lastly, whether reconveyance of title is the proper remedy.

I

There was no denial of due process.

Petitioner argues that she was denied due process when she was not given a copy of respondents' Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner's argument lacks merit.

In Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad: 54

This court has consistently held that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. In other words, there is no denial of the right to due process if there was an opportunity for the parties to defend their interests in due course.

. . . There is no denial of due process if a party was given an opportunity to be heard in a Motion for Reconsideration. 55 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Even assuming that petitioner did not receive respondents' Petition, petitioner still cannot claim that she was denied due process. She was given an opportunity to be heard when she moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision granting respondents' Petition. In its Resolution, the Court of Appeals held:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent Rosalina F. Calica-Lee on March 4, 2015, seeking the reconsideration of our Decision dated January 30, 2015. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful review of our challenged decision, we became more convinced that such judgment is in consonance with the facts on record and law on the matter. The basic issues raised by private respondent in her motion were already properly addressed and settled by this Court in the questioned decision. 56 (Emphasis supplied)

II

The Complaint should be dismissed on the ground of prematurity.

Petitioner asserts that it was proper for the trial court to deny respondents' Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prematurity. The case is not premature because the dispute is an exception to the jurisdiction of the barangay lupon under Section 408 (e) of the Local Government Code, which provides:

SECTION 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon[.] (Emphasis supplied)

According to petitioner, the case falls under the exception inasmuch as the real property involved is situated in a city different from the residence of either party. ICHDca

Petitioner's understanding of the exception is erroneous. It is settled that if a "statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation." 57 A reading of the provision shows that for the dispute to be an exception to the lupon's jurisdiction, the subject of the dispute must involve two (2) or more real properties situated in two (2) or more cities or municipalities. This is further subject to an exception that "the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon[.]"

In light of this provision, the general rule applies. The dispute must first be brought to the lupon for amicable settlement since the parties reside in the same barangay and there is only one (1) real property involved. As explained by the Court of Appeals:

A plain reading of the afore-quoted provision clearly provides that, as a general rule, disputes of parties residing in the same city or municipality are subject to amicable settlement before the lupon of their barangay. The exception provided under paragraph (e) only applies when there are several properties involve[d] and the same are situated in different cities and municipalities. In the present case, the complaint alleged, and which was expressly admitted in the answer, that petitioners and private respondents are both residents of Project 4, Quezon City. On the other hand, the disputed property is situated only in one city, particularly in San Fernando, La Union. Obviously, the instant case is not covered by the exception provided in paragraph (e) of the Local Government Code. On the contrary, the general rule applies because the parties in the instant case are residing in the same city. As long as the location of the property involved is situated in one city or municipality, their dispute is automatically subject to conciliation proceeding before the lupon of their Barangay. The location of the subject property vis-a-vis the residence of the parties is immaterial and uncontrolling. Hence, the trial court's interpretation of the provision was evidently misplaced when it ruled that the case at bench is covered by the exception because the assailed property is situated in a city outside the place of residence of the parties. 58

Indeed, "the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction, which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant." 59 However, respondents can prevent "the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto[.]" 60 Under Rule 9, Section 1 61 of the Rules of Court, "the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in [the] Answer." 62

In this case, respondents timely raised petitioner's failure to bring the dispute to the lupon. They raised it as one of their special and affirmative defenses in their Answer. When the trial court failed to resolve their defenses, respondents filed a Motion to Resolve Special and Affirmative Defenses. Respondents have consistently questioned the lack of conciliation before the barangay lupon. They cannot be deemed to have waived this defense.

That the parties already went through conciliation and mediation proceedings as ordered by the trial court is immaterial. Conciliation before the lupon is compulsory 63 and is a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court under Section 412 (a) 64 of the Local Government Code. For failure to comply with a condition precedent, the Complaint should be dismissed. 65

III

Reconveyance is not the proper remedy.

Petitioner insists that there is no dispute on her status as an heir of their deceased relatives. Respondents themselves admitted in their Answer that petitioner is the daughter of the Calica Spouses and the sister of Lilia. As the only other heir aside from respondent Estela, petitioner claims that she is entitled to her one-half share of the property. Petitioner reiterates that her aim is not for the partition or settlement of the estate but only the restoration of her right as a co-owner. She asks for reconveyance of the title of the property to her. 66

Petitioner's ground for the recovery of property is her undisputed status as an heir. However, there is no record showing that petitioner has been declared as a legal heir and that the property forms part of the estate of their deceased relatives. Mere allegations, even if admitted, cannot substitute a judicial declaration of heirship. Petitioner has to substantiate her claims in a proper action. TCAScE

In Reyes, et al. v. Enriquez, et al.: 67

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition, or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto, this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding.". . .

While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum. 68 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner's resort is to file a petition for settlement of estate. After a judicial declaration of her status as an heir and of the property as part of the estate of their deceased relatives, petitioner can then file a complaint for reconveyance of title.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit and for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed January 30, 2015 Decision and September 9, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124619.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

 

By:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 10-25. The Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2.Id. at 125-135. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando (Chair) and Ricardo R. Rosario of the Second Division.

3.Id. at 40-42. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando (Chair) and Ricardo R. Rosario of the Former Second Division.

4.Id. at 77-79. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Juvencio S. Gascon of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, La Union.

5.Id. at 81-82. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Juvencio S. Gascon of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, La Union.

6.Id. at 10, Petition for Review. Rosalina's name likewise appears in the Petition as Rosalinda F. Calica-Lee.

7.Id. at 126, Court of Appeals Decision.

8.Id.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 125 and 126.

11.Id. at 126.

12.Id. at 47-51.

13.Id. at 47, Complaint.

14.Id. at 73, Regional Trial Court Order dated October 26, 2011.

15. CIVIL CODE, art. 19 provides:

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

16.Rollo, pp. 49-50, Complaint.

17.Id. at 49.

18.Id. at 50.

19.Id. at 58-68.

20.Id. at 126, Court of Appeals Decision.

21.Id. at 69-72.

22.Id. at 71-72.

23.Id. at 127, Court of Appeals Decision.

24.Id.

25.Id. at 73.

26.Id. at 127, Court of Appeals Decision.

27.Id.

28.Id. at 77, Regional Trial Court Order dated March 7, 2012.

29.Id. at 77, Regional Trial Court Order dated March 7, 2012, and 127, Court of Appeals Decision.

30.Id. at 77-79.

31. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 408 (e) provides:

SECTION 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon[.]

32.Rollo, pp. 77-78.

33.Id.

34.Id. at 78.

35.Id. at 79.

36.Id. at 81-82, Regional Trial Court Order dated April 13, 2012.

37.Id. at 125.

38.Id. at 125-135.

39.Id. at 133-134.

40.Id. at 129.

41.Id. at 130-133.

42.Id. at 133.

43.Id. at 40-41.

44.Id. at 10-11, Petition for Review.

45.Id. at 16-17.

46.Id. at 17.

47.Id. at 19.

48.Id.

49.Id. at 153-161.

50.Id. at 153-157.

51.Id. at 158.

52.Id.

53.Id. at 159-160.

54. G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/august2015/172301.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

55.Id. at 16.

56.Rollo, p. 41, Court of Appeals Resolution.

57.Bolos v. Bolos, 648 Phil. 630, 637 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

58.Rollo, p. 129, Court of Appeals Decision.

59.Aquino v. Aure, 569 Phil. 403, 416 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

60.Royales, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 212 Phil. 432, 436 (1984) [Per J. Escolin, En Banc].

61. RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 1 provides:

RULE 9. Effect of Failure to Plead

SECTION 1. Defenses and Objections Not Pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

62.Aquino v. Aure, 569 Phil. 403, 418 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

63.See Morata v. Go, et al., 210 Phil. 367, 376 (1983) [Per J. Escolin, En Banc].

64. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 412 provides:

SECTION 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. — No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

65. RULES OF COURT, Rule 16 (j) provides:

RULE 16. Motion to Dismiss

SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

66.Rollo, p. 19, Petition for Review.

67. 574 Phil. 245 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, First Division].

68.Id. at 251-253.