ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 196247. March 6, 2019.]
ANGELITO L. CALAQUI, petitioner, vs. SHELDAN INDUSTRIES AND/OR ARISTON M. DAWANG, JR., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 6, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 196247 (ANGELITO L. CALAQUI, Petitioner, v. SHELDAN INDUSTRIES and/or ARISTON M. DAWANG, JR., Respondents.) — After a judicious review of the records, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari against the Decision dated December 17, 2010 1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 111833 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) declared that the petitioner was not constructively dismissed.
Herein petitioner argued that the CA based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts and that the inference made therein was manifestly mistaken; that the offer to reassign him as a family driver was not simply a proposal, but had a "take-it-or-leave-it" undertone; and that he was effectively demoted without just and valid grounds.
The appeal lacks merit.
The thrust of the petition rests on a question of fact, which is generally not appropriate in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 2 While there are established exceptions to this rule, we do not find that this case falls under any of the recognized exceptions. 3 On this score alone, the petition should be denied. ICHDca
At any rate, we disagree with the petitioner's allegation that the CA based its decision on a misapprehension of facts. As the party alleging a disputed fact, the petitioner had the burden to prove his allegations. 4 He patently failed in this regard considering that the CA had correctly pointed out that aside from his sweeping claim, nowhere in the records did it show that the respondents insinuated that the petitioner would be fired from his job if he decided not to accept his designation as family driver. 5
Moreover, the offer to the petitioner to continue his employment as a family driver was merely a proposal. The petitioner's allegations that the respondents were headstrong about the transfer, and gave him no choice in the matter were broad statements lacking in detail and not supported by substantial evidence. The petitioner did not even allege any overt act on the part of the respondents that would support his allegations. Thus, We find no reason to overturn the findings of fact of the CA.
The Court likewise upholds the ruling by the CA that there was neither dismissal by the respondent nor resignation by the petitioner. 6 As a rule, where there is no dismissal and no abandonment, the appropriate course of action is to reinstate the employee but without paying him backwages. 7
However, We noted that the petitioner had already reached the mandatory retirement age of 65, being that he was already 59 years old when he filed his complaint in 2007. In an analogous case where the employee subject of reinstatement had reached the mandatory retirement age pending his case for illegal dismissal, We awarded retirement benefits in favor of the employee for every year of actual service. 8
Considering that herein petitioner was not dismissed from work, either for cause or by resignation or abandonment, and it being uncontroverted that he rendered service to the respondents for over two decades, he is hereby entitled to retirement benefits in accordance with Article 287 9 of the Labor Code. On this account, We find it appropriate to modify the assailed CA Decision by ordering the payment of retirement pay of one-half (1/2) month pay 10 for every year of service, computed up to the time that the petitioner had stopped working for the respondents, or on July 23, 2007. cDHAES
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on December 17, 2010 and the resolution dated March 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 111833, in that the respondents are DIRECTED to PAY Angelito Calaqui RETIREMENT BENEFITS equivalent to one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, computed up to the time that he had stopped working for the respondents or on July 23, 2007, in lieu of reinstatement.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 27-39; penned by CA Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez.
2.National Union of Bank Employees v. Philnabank Employees Association, G.R. No. 174287, August 12, 2013, 703 SCRA 384, 398.
3.Cabaobas v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 176908, March 25, 2015, 754 SCRA 325, 350.
4.Calilap-Asmeron v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157330, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 54, 67.
5.Rollo, p. 35.
6.Id. at 36.
7.Doctor v. NII Enterprises, G.R. No. 194001, November 22, 2017.
8. See, Maria De Leon Transportation, Inc. v. Macuray, G.R. No. 214940, June 6, 2018.
9. Pursuant to Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Advisory No. 1, Series of 2015, Renumbering of the Labor Code of the Philippines, As Amended, Art. 287 has been renumbered to Art. 302.
10. We, however, depart from the rate of retirement benefits granted in Maria De Leon Transportation, Inc. v. Macuray (supra) as in that case it was shown that the employer paid his employees less than the minimum wage. Considering that no such issue was raised in the present petition, we deem it proper to follow the rate of one half (1/2) month salary for every year of service as provided in Article 287 of the Labor Code.