THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 260023. August 15, 2022.]
MARITES CALAPATI,*ANNALYN GUERZON, and TERESA GARCIA, petitioners,vs.LETECIA BLANCO ARMSTRONG, **REPRESENTED BY VERONICA WATA,respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedAugust 15, 2022, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 260023 (Marites Calapati, Annalyn Guerzon, and Teresa Garcia v. Letecia Blanco Armstrong, represented by Veronica Wata). — The Court GRANTS petitioner's motion for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari, counted from the expiration of the reglementary period.
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments presented, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its assailed July 12, 2021 Decision 2 and February 22, 2022 Resolution, 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 166161, which affirmed the January 2, 2020 Decision, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, in an appeal from the November 5, 2018 Decision and April 25, 2019 Order, of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Subic, Zambales, ordering herein petitioners Marites Calapati (Calapati), Annalyn Guerzon (Guerzon), and Teresa Garcia (Garcia) to vacate and turn over physical possession of the land in question to herein respondent Letecia Blanco Armstrong (Armstrong).
Prefatorily, although the present petition is captioned as a petition for certiorari, ostensibly under Rule 65, the allegations of the petition clearly show that it was intended to be a petition for review under Rule 45; 4 and the Court will therefore treat it as such.
Settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are even deemed final and binding when upheld on appeal. 5 Here, the MTC, the RTC, and the CA unanimously found that: 1) Armstrong is the registered owner of a 6,750 square-meter parcel of land located at Naugsol, Subic, Zambales; 6 2) petitioners occupied portions of said parcel; 7 3) petitioners' occupation was by mere tolerance of Armstrong, and subject to their participation in the acquisition of the land through an association which will apply for a loan under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP); 8 4) petitioners formed or joined several associations for the purpose of acquiring title to their occupied portions through the CMP; 9 5) petitioners were expelled from one of these associations, Naugsol Homeowners Association, Inc. (Phase 1) (NHAP 1), on January 25, 2014, after failing to attend meetings and pay association dues; 10 and 6) after they were expelled from NHAP 1, Armstrong ceased tolerance of their occupation and demanded them to vacate. 11
Petitioners' contention that Armstrong failed to prove that the lands they were occupying were part of her registered property falls flat in the face of the above unanimous finding of the courts a quo that petitioners joined NHAP 1, which was then in the process of negotiating the sale of the lot from Armstrong through the CMP. If petitioners were certain that Armstrong did not own the lands they were occupying, they would not have joined an association that was negotiating to buy the land from her; and the fact that they did so only reinforces the conclusion that they were aware of Armstrong's ownership thereof. Furthermore, the record shows that petitioners admitted during the pre-trial that the lands they were occupying were indeed part of Armstrong's property. 12 With respect to petitioner Calapati, the MTC, in its April 25, 2019 Order, made the order to vacate in its November 5, 2018 Decision applicable to her, on the basis of said admission. 13 Petitioners do not dispute the existence of said admission, which has now become binding upon them. 14
As regards Guerzon and Garcia's contention that they remained entitled to possession because their expulsion from NHAP 1 was invalid, the CA correctly held that such issue cannot be threshed out in the present case for recovery of possession, which is limited to determining the issue of rightful possession. The issue of their expulsion from NHAP 1 is an intra-association dispute which does not fall within the jurisdiction of the trial court 15 in a possessory action to which NHAP 1 is not even a party. At any rate, their membership in NHAP 1 does not detract from the fact that they admitted to Armstrong's ownership of the property, and therefore conceded that their occupation thereof is based only upon Armstrong's continued tolerance.
Petitioners next aver that the issues in the present case are intertwined with the issues in a pending civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2022-0-11, before the RTC of Olongapo City, wherein petitioners, together with other parties, seek the cancellation of Armstrong's certificate of title and their declaration as bona fide occupants entitled to free patents. Petitioners consequently argue that the affirmance of the CA decision would render Civil Case No. 2022-0-11 moot and academic. 16 However, it must be noted that while the present case is an action for recovery of possession on the basis of ownership, i.e., an accion reivindicatoria, where the ownership of land is put in issue, herein petitioners themselves admitted Armstrong's ownership of the disputed property before the MTC. Thus, the MTC took Armstrong's certificate of title at face value and rendered judgment on the basis of the petitioners' right to possession. While it may be that the present case constitutes res judicata as against Civil Case No. 2022-0-11, such conclusion alone does not warrant a reversal of the concurrent rulings of the courts a quo in the present case. The applicability of res judicata between the present case and Civil Case No. 2022-0-11 is ultimately an issue which must be decided in the proceedings of the latter case, more so, in view of the fact that the issue of ownership in the present case was made the subject of a judicial admission. 17 Moreover, a perusal of the allegations in Civil Case No. 2022-0-11 shows that the same is directed not only at Armstrong's certificate of title, but to several other certificates of title alleged to have been procured through fraud. 18
Finally, the Court deletes the award of attorney's fees to Armstrong. As a general rule, in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation cannot be recovered. 19 The MTC, as affirmed by the RTC and the CA applied the second exception to this rule, finding Armstrong entitled to attorney's fees because she was compelled to litigate to protect her interest. 20 However, jurisprudence holds that an award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in favor of the prevailing party on the basis of compulsion to litigate under Article 2208 (2) of the Civil Code must be based on a factual, legal or equitable justification beyond mere compulsion to litigate. 21 Here, the MTC awarded attorney's fees and court appearances fees based on the mere fact that Armstrong was compelled to litigate, without providing any other justification therefor.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The July 12, 2021 Decision and February 22, 2022 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 166161 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the awards of attorney's fees and court appearance fees are DELETED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Also referred to in the records as "Marites Calalati."
** Also referred to in the records as "Leticia Blanco Armstrong."
1. Rollo, pp. 10-23.
2. Id. at 26-41. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and Carlito B. Calpatura concurring.
3. Id. at 43.
4. Id. at 10-13.
5. Philippine Savings Bank v. Sakata, G.R. No. 229450, June 17, 2020; Sosmeña v. Bonafe, G.R. No. 232677, June 8, 2020; Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 512 Phil, 679 (2005).
6. Rollo, p. 27.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 27-28.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id. at 29-30.
13. Id. at 31-32.
14. RULES OF COURT (as amended), Rule 129, Section 4.
15. See Section 2 (d), Rule 1 of the 2019 HLURB Revised Rules of Procedure and Section 2 (b) (2) of the 2021 Rules of Procedure of the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission, in relation to Republic Act No. 7279 (1992), Sections 31-33, Republic Act No. 8763 (2000), Section 26, Republic Act No. 9904 (2010), and Sections 12-16, Republic Act No. 11201 (2019).
16 Id. at 18-19.
17. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission made in the same case does not require proof; but may be contradicted upon proof that it was made through palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was not in fact made.
18. Rollo, p. 19.
19. CIVIL CODE, Article 2208.
20. Rollo, pp. 30-32.
21. Sian v. Spouses Somoso, G.R. No. 201812, January 22, 2020, citing Spouses Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose, Inc., 789 Phil. 453, 460 (2016).