FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 241427. March 29, 2022.]
VIRGILIO CACHERO y CABATIK, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 29, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 241427 — (Virgilio Cachero y Cabatik v. People of the Philippines). — Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed on August 22, 2018, at the instance of petitioner Virgilio Cachero (Cachero), seeking the review of the: (1) Decision 2 promulgated on January 30, 2018; and (2) Resolution 3 promulgated on July 12, 2018, both of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38361. The CA affirmed the Decision 4 dated October 19, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 02-1461, convicting Cachero for the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Case
This case stemmed from an Information 5 filed before the RTC charging Cachero, his wife Carmencita Cachero (Carmencita; collectively, Spouses Cachero), together with Atty. Angel Bautista, Jr. (Atty. Bautista), Limuel Cipriano (Cipriano), Ronald Flores (Flores), Miguela Redublo (Redublo), Delia Ariola (Ariola), and Luz Corpuz (Corpuz), with a complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, 6 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about July 15, 1998, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ANGEL D. BAUTISTA, Registry of Deeds; LIMUEL F. CIPRIANO, Examiner, RONALD FLORES, Vault Keeper; MIGUEL REDUBLO, typist, all from Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, taking advantage of their official positions as such, together with private individuals spouses VIRGILIO and CARMENCITA CACHERO, the registered owners of lots covered by TCT Nos. 131339 and 128995, Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, LUZ CORPUZ and DELIA ARIOLA, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue in authenticated form documents purporting to be the owner's copy of TCT Nos. [131339] and 128995, when no such original exist, and thereafter, with fraud and deceit, deliver the said certificates of title to CORTEZA BELAMIDE and WILMER BELAMIDE, assure and entice the said [Belamides] that the certificates of title are genuine and free from all liens and encumbrances, despite prior knowledge that the genuine copy thereof are with the Orient Bank by way of first mortgage, thus, inducing WILMER BELAMIDE and CORTEZA BELAMIDE to be mortgagees of the lots covered by the aforesaid titles, as Wilmer Belamide indeed entered into a mortgage contract with accused spouses VIRGILIO and CARMENCITA CACHERO in the amount of P1 Million for each lot or a total of P2 Million for the two lots, which amount was delivered to and received by the accused spouses Cachero, to the damage and prejudice of WILMER BELAMIDE in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
On August 8, 2002, a Warrant of Arrest was issued against all the accused. All except Atty. Bautista and Carmencita, who remain at large, were arrested and posted bail. 8 The arrested accused were then separately arraigned and pleaded not "not guilty" to the crime charged. 9 Pre-trial conference was then conducted. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
When the prosecution initially failed to offer its evidence, Cipriano, upon motion, invoked his right to a speedy trial. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case against him. 10 Thereafter, after being given another opportunity, the prosecution offered its evidence. Among the accused, however, only Flores presented his defense. 11 Cachero, on the other hand, waived his right to present his evidence. 12
The Antecedents
Prosecution's Version of Facts
In 1998, Ariola introduced Spouses Cachero to private complainant Corteza Belamide (Corteza). Spouses Cachero were seeking a loan of P1,000,000.00 to be secured by a mortgage on their two (2) properties. Spouses Cachero then showed Corteza a copy of the titles, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 128595 and 131339, registered in their names. 13 When Corteza, together with Ariola, verified the authenticity of the titles with the Pasay Register of Deeds, Cipriano, and Flores, employees therein, confirmed the genuineness of the title. 14
Subsequently, Corteza's brother, private complainant Wilmer Belamide (Wilmer) entered into a loan and mortgage transaction with Spouses Cachero. After giving P1,000,000.00 to Spouses Cachero, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed. At the time of the execution of the contract, Wilmer had not seen the titles and was unaware that the properties had already been mortgaged. 15 Corteza again went to the Register of Deeds to have the mortgage annotated. Redublo received the documents and instructed her to return the next day. When she returned, the annotation was already signed by Atty. Bautista (the then Register of Deeds). 16
A month after, a certain Baby Veloso informed Corteza that the land titles shown to her were fake and that the properties have been previously mortgaged to Orient Development Banking Corporation (Orient Bank). When verified with the Register of Deeds, the genuine land titles indeed contain an annotation of mortgage in favor of Orient Bank. 17
During trial and after the prosecution's formal offer of evidence, Cachero manifested that he would no longer present evidence. Accordingly, the case as to him was submitted for decision. 18
The RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered a Decision 19 dated October 19, 2015, finding Cachero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. The RTC ruled that for an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, all the elements of Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents must be proven. The prosecution, however, failed to prove the elements of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents on account of its failure to formally offer as evidence the alleged falsified TCT Nos. 131339 and 128995. 20 Notwithstanding, the prosecution had proven all the elements of the crime of Estafa against Cachero.
The RTC explained that Spouses Cachero made false pretenses that the TCT Nos. 131339 and 128995 shown to Corteza were genuine and authentic; that the Spouses Cachero's assurances and misrepresentations as to the genuineness of the subject titles were made prior to Wilmer's signing of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage; Spouses Cachero's pretenses were the proximate causes inducing Wilmer to give them P1,000,000.00 as consideration for the mortgaged properties. 21
As to Ariola and Corpuz, the RTC concluded that there was no sufficient evidence adduced by the prosecution to establish their involvement in the transaction between Wilmer and Spouses Cachero. 22 Accordingly, the trial court disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Virgilio Cachero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) and, accordingly, sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and one (1) day of prison correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay WILMER BELAMIDE the sum of P1,000,000.00 with legal interest from judicial demand until fully paid.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Ronald Flores, Miguela Redublo, Luz Corpuz and Delia Ariola are ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Considering that both remained at large, the records of this case as against accused Angel Bautista and Carmencita Cachero are sent to ARCHIVES without prejudice to subsequent prosecution should any of them be arrested.
SO ORDERED. 23
Unsatisfied, Cachero appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 24 promulgated on January 30, 2018, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the concurrence of all the elements of the crime of Estafa. The CA explained that the mere fact that Cachero showed Corteza the land titles without any encumbrance, knowing fully well that it had previously been mortgaged, constitutes deceit; and because of such false pretenses, Cachero and his wife were able to secure a loan of P1,000,000.00 from Wilmer. 25 The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 19, 2015 of the RTC, Branch 111, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 02-1461, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 26
Aggrieved, Cachero moved for reconsideration. It was, however, denied per Resolution 27 promulgated on July 12, 2018. Hence, the instant petition where Cachero raises the following issues:
Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER CACHERO'S COUNSEL, WHICH EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED HIM OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE IN COURT;
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CACHERO WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; AND
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] ERRED IN RENDERING A CONVICTION NOT BASED ON PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 28
The Court's Ruling
We find Cachero's petition bereft of merit.
Cachero was given his
At the outset, it is established that after the prosecution rested its case, Cachero, through his counsel, manifested that he will no longer present evidence. This led to the case against him being submitted for decision. Cachero insists, however, that because of such gross negligence of his counsel, he had been deprived of his day in court. 29
This We find untenable.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 30 For as long as the parties are given the opportunity to present their cause of defense, their interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was a denial of due process. 31
In this case, the RTC, after the prosecution rested its case, gave Cachero the opportunity to present his defense. In the hearing conducted on April 15, 2003, the supposed initial presentation of defense's evidence, it is evident from the Order of the RTC that Atty. Ferdinand Bocobo (Atty. Bocobo), Cachero's counsel manifested that Cachero would no longer present evidence. 32 Clearly, Cachero was afforded the chance to adduce evidence on his behalf but opted to waive the same. Further, records show that during the April 15, 2003 hearing, Cachero was personally present therein and did not object to his counsel's manifestation.
As further observed by the CA, Cachero never asserted his right to present evidence before the RTC after it rendered its October 19, 2015 Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration, 33 Cachero never raised as a ground for reconsideration his supposed deprivation of due process. He merely averred that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to convict him and that the decision was contrary to law. 34 This is tantamount to a waiver of his right to present evidence.
Moreover, Cachero cannot blame his counsel and aver that Atty. Bocobo committed gross negligence by manifesting that Cachero would no longer present any evidence.
It is an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence, or mistakes of the counsel hind the client. A departure from this ruling would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client's case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by operation of law. 35 In the case of Bagaporo v. People, 36 We explained this doctrine more exhaustively, thus:
x x x The doctrinal rule is that negligence of the counsel binds the client because, otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and [prove] that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. If it were otherwise, and a lawyer's mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of the case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. The only exception to the general rule is when the counsel's actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to client, that courts should accord relief to the party. Indeed, if the error or negligence of the counsel did not result in the deprivation of due process to the client, nullification of the decision grounded on grave abuse of discretion is not warranted. The instant case does not fall within the exception since petitioners were duly given their day in court.
x x x To rule otherwise would result to a situation that every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, would just have to claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing an adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge of his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurance of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough. 37
This rule, however, admits of exception. As enunciated in the case of Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals: 38
x x x This is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, almost bordering on recklessness and utter incompetence, that we can safely conclude that the due process rights of the client were violated. Even so, there must be a clear and convincing showing that the client was so maliciously deprived of information that he or she could not have acted to protect his or her interests. The error of counsel must have been both palpable yet maliciously exercised that it should viably be the basis for disciplinary action. 39
In the instant case, available records show that Atty. Bocobo was Cachero's counsel from the inception of the case until its conclusion by the RTC. It was Atty. Bocobo who stood beside him during the pendency of the case before the RTC. In fact, records show that Atty. Bocobo scrutinized the documentary evidence and cross-examined the witnesses when the prosecution presented evidence. 40 After the prosecution rested its case, he opted, with Cachero's knowledge at least, to waive his client's presentation of evidence. Needless to state, other than his manifestation to forego the presentation of Cachero's defense, Atty. Bocobo undeniably represented the cause of Cachero in the RTC proceedings.
To Our mind, Atty. Bocobo had not been reckless and incompetent in protecting Cachero's rights. Further, there is nothing on records that will show that Cachero was maliciously deprived of information as to the reason and the effect of waiver of his right to present evidence. It bears stressing that during the duration of the trial in the RTC, Cachero never questioned the actions and/or omissions of his counsel. If indeed, he believed that his rights were not being fully protected, he could have easily sought another representation.
In sum, the manifestation made by Atty. Bocobo, waiving Cachero's right to present evidence on his behalf, is not tantamount to gross negligence. Accordingly, Cachero is bound by such act and he cannot blame his counsel for the misfortune he is now into.
Cachero was not deprived of
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution guarantees an accused in criminal cases his right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial." The right to a speedy trial is defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. 41 Such, however, should be understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. 42 Moreover, it is violated only when there is inordinate delay, such that the proceedings are "attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 43
There are several factors to consider and balance to determine whether an accused was deprived of this right to a speedy trial: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. 44
In the instant case, We find that the trial of the case was not attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
It is important to note that there are several accused in the instant case, 8 to be exact. Among the 8, 6, including Cachero, were held on trial and represented by different counsels. With the plurality of the accused, each with different counsels, reasonable delay in the trial is inevitable.
Furthermore, it bears stressing that during trial and even after the promulgation of the Decision by the RTC, Cachero failed to timely question the delay in the trial of the case.
It is settled that failure to timely raise the alleged violation of its right operates against the defendant because sleeping on the right indicates his or her acquiescence to the delay. 45 By his failure to timely raise the alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, Cachero had waived such right. This was Our pronouncement in the case of Sps. Uy v. Adriano, 46 thus:
In the same vein, one's failure to timely question the delay in the trial of a case would be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question the same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the speedy trial right, like any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived when not positively asserted. A party's silence may amount to laches. The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege. 47
Such waiver is further bolstered by the fact that Cachero and Atty. Bocobo actively participated in the trial. As observed by the CA, when the prosecution presented its evidence, Cachero's counsel scrutinized the documentary evidence and cross-examined the witnesses. 48
The guilt of Cachero for
In sustaining a conviction for Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC, 49 the following elements must concur:
(a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 50
We agree with the RTC and the CA that all these elements are extant in this case.
Cachero made a false pretense or fraudulent representation that the 2 titles to the subject lots are genuine and free from any encumbrances. As found by the trial court, Spouses Cachero showed Corteza TCT Nos. 131339 and 128995 as proof that they are the registered owners of the subject lots, and that the titles are free from any encumbrances. 51 By the mere fact of showing Corteza the land titles which did not contain any annotations, Cachero committed deceit and fraudulent representation considering that at that time, he knew that the subject lots had already been mortgaged to Orient Bank.
It is likewise established that the assurances and misrepresentations by Sps. Cachero of the genuineness of the titles were made prior to the execution of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. 52
It is because of these fraudulent representations why Wilmer agreed to part with his P1,000,000.00 as consideration for the execution of the mortgage contract. Otherwise stated, without the fraudulent assurances made by Spouses Cachero as to their titles, Wilmer would not have agreed to execute the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. Corollarily, Wilmer suffered damage in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
The Penalty
The penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA needs modification in view of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 10951 (R.A. No. 10951), or "An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based, and the Fines Imposed under the RPC, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the "[RPC]," as Amended."
The pertinent portion of R.A. No. 10951, reads:
SECTION 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000); but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000).
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000): Provided, That in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
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2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the amount involved in the instant case, P1,000,000.00, falls under the third paragraph of the above cited provision, i.e., exceeds Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) but does not exceed One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00), Cachero is punishable with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is: arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Accordingly, the indeterminate penalty for Estafa should be prison term of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum. 53
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed January 30, 2018 Decision and July 12, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38361 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Virgilio Cachero y Cabatik is ORDERED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 34-65.
2.Id. at 13-24; penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, with Associate Justices Magdangal De Leon and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court), concurring.
3.Id. at 26-27.
4.Id. at 129-141; penned by Presiding Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan.
5.Id. at 14.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 130.
9.Id. at 130-131.
10.Id. at 259.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 135.
13.Id. at 260-261.
14.Id. at 131.
15.Id. at 132.
16.Id. at 131.
17.Id. at 261.
18.Id. at 135.
19.Id. at 129-141.
20.Id. at 136-137.
21.Id. at 139.
22.Id.
23.Id. at 141.
24.Id. at 13-24.
25.Id. at 22-23.
26.Id. at 24.
27.Id. at 26-27.
28.Id. at 43.
29.Id. at 44-52.
30.Labay v. Sandiganbayan, 836 Phil. 1229, 1261 (2018); Associate Justice Marvic Leonen Dissenting Opinion.
31.Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman, 810 Phil. 106, 122 (2017), citing Resurreccion v. People, 738 Phil. 704, 720 (2014).
32.Rollo, p. 19.
33.Id. at 142-146.
34.Id. at 142.
35.Yap v. Heirs of Pantalan, G.R. No. 199783, April 10, 2019.
36. G.R. No. 211829, January 30, 2019.
37.Id. citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 764 Phil. 53, 63-65 (2015).
38. 752 Phil. 15 (2015).
39.Id. at 25.
40.Rollo, pp. 20-21.
41.Tan v. People, 604 Phil. 68, 78-79 (2009).
42.Castañeda v. People, G.R. No. 241729, July 8, 2020.
43.Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 231144, February 19, 2020.
44.Tan v. People, supra at 80 citing Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 918 (2004).
45.Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 43.
46. 536 Phil. 475 (2006).
47.Id. at 505.
48.Rollo, pp. 20-21.
49. Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
50.Osorio v. People, 834 Phil. 768, 779 (2018).
51.Rollo, p. 131.
52.Id. at 139.
53.Arriola v. People, G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020.