FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 231072. February 15, 2022.]
ROSALINDA T. CABRERA, petitioner,vs. ZOSIMO V. CABRERA, JR., 1 AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated February 15, 2022 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 231072 (Rosalinda T. Cabrera, Petitioner vs. Zosimo V. Cabrera, Jr., and the Republic of the Philippines, Respondents).
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the October 27, 2016 Decision 2 and April 18, 2017 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104599, which affirmed the September 18, 2014 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. Q-11-69560.
The RTC declared the marriage between respondent Zosimo V. Cabrera, Jr. and petitioner Rosalinda T. Cabrera as null and void on the ground that the marriage was solemnized without a valid marriage license.
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether petitioner and respondent had cohabited as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage, so as to constitute an exception to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
We answer in the negative.
In a petition for review on certiorari, the power of the Court is generally confined only to errors of law; questions of fact are not entertained. The Court's power does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper tribunal has based its determination. 5
This is due to the principle that the Court is not a trier of facts; factual questions are for the trial courts to resolve. However, there are exceptions to this rule such as: when the findings of facts of the RTC and the CA are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. 6 The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. In this case, the factual issues have already been determined by the RTC, which findings were affirmed by the CA.
Indeed, the issue of whether the parties had satisfied the minimum five-year requirement of marital cohabitation before marriage is a question of fact. Since the issue is factual in nature, the factual findings of the CA remain conclusive on the Court as such findings were supported by the record or based on preponderant evidence.
At any rate, upon review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA. Respondent was able to prove, by preponderant evidence, that the cohabitation between him and petitioner prior to the solemnization of the marriage was less than five years. It is noteworthy that respondent's testimony on this matter was substantially corroborated by the testimonies of his sisters. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. CAIHTE
Petitioner's reliance on the presumption of marriage 7 and on the presumption that the solemnizing officer regularly performed his official duties are misplaced.
In Republic v. Dayot8(Dayot), the Court clarified that the presumption of marriage does not apply where the parties actually entered into a contract of marriage.
x x x Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions. 9
The falsity of the allegation relating to the period of petitioner and respondent's cohabitation is not a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. 10 No presumption in the Rules of Evidence could prevail over such an essential matter. As explicitly stated in Dayot, "[I]f the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all." 11
Here, it was established that the marriage was entered into by the parties less than two years after they met — such fact petitioner did not dispute. Based on the records, petitioner never alleged any counter fact, nor attempt to deny respondent's claim. Curiously, petitioner never pointed to any date, whether specific or approximate, of the time they had supposedly met that would rebut respondent's claim. All petitioner did to dispute respondent's averment was to invoke the presumption of a valid marriage and the presumption that the solemnizing officer had regularly performed his official duties.
The fact that petitioner failed to file an answer is not a defense. In proceedings involving the declaration of nullity of marriage, failure to file an answer will not render the respondent therein in default. Instead, the case is referred to the Prosecutor's Office for investigation whether or not collusion between the parties exists. Consistent with the rules, such was obeyed in this case.
It appears, therefore, that both petitioner and respondent lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage. Also, the records show that they did not execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their marriage, before any person authorized by law to administer oaths, as expressly required by Article 34 of the Family Code. Verily, the parties are not exempt from the marriage license requirement. 12 Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their May 28, 2001 marriage void ab initio.13
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. A presumption always arises in favor of marriage. It has always been the duty of the State to protect marriages as a sacred institution. However, to permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. 14 The Court cannot allow such blatant disregard of the law in the name of a presumption that has clearly been disputed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 27, 2016 Decision and April 18, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104599, which affirmed the September 18, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-11-69560, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Also referred to as "Zosimo V. Cabrera" in some parts of the rollo (see rollo, pp. 90 and 94).
2.Rollo, pp. 35-45; penned by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Ramon A. Cruz and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a member of this Court), concurring.
3.Id. at 49-49A.
4.Id. at 65-70; penned by Presiding Judge Roslyn M. Rabara-Tria.
5.NGEI Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Filipinas Palmoil Plantation, Inc., 697 Phil. 433, 441 (2012).
6.Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 574 (2007).
7. Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
8. 573 Phil. 553 (2008).
9.Id. at 573-574.
10.Id. at 575; see also Santiago v. People, 764 Phil. 128, 140 (2015).
11.Republic v. Dayot, supra note 8 at 575.
12. See also Santiago v. People, supra note 10 at 140-141.
13.De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, 568 Phil. 724, 733 (2008); Republic v. Dayot, supra note 8 at 576.
14.Republic v. Dayot, supra at 574.