Cabili v. Rovira

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 11092. September 29, 2021.]

ATTY. TOMAS O. CABILI AND ATTY. MOISES G. DALISAY, JR., complainants, vs.ATTY. VOLTAIRE I. ROVIRA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows:

"A.C. No. 11092 (Atty. Tomas O. Cabili and Atty. Moises G. Dalisay, Jr. v. Atty. Voltaire I. Rovira). — The present administrative case resolves the Verified Complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Atty. Tomas O. Cabili and Atty. Moises G. Dalisay, Jr., (complainants) against Atty. Voltaire I. Rovira (respondent).

The complainants alleged that on March 2, 2015, the Office of the President (OP) promulgated a decision finding elected City Mayor of Iligan City, Celso G. Regencia (Regencia), guilty as charged in an administrative complaint for abuse of authority. He was meted out a penalty of six (6) months suspension from office. 2

On March 27, 2015, in view of Regencia's suspension, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), installed Vice-Mayor Ruderic A. Marzo (Marzo) of Iligan City as Acting City Mayor, pursuant to Section 46 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), or the Local Government Code of 1991. 3

Regencia, however, refused to step down from office and challenged the OP decision before the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA), with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The CA initially issued a TRO. However, on April 24, 2015, the TRO was lifted by a Resolution unanimously adopted by three (3) justices of the division. 4 CAIHTE

Thus, on April 27, 2015, Regencia stepped down from office to serve his suspension. Meanwhile, on August 10, 2015, the Department of Justice filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Misamis Oriental, seven (7) Informations — for three (3) counts of murder and four (4) counts of frustrated murder — against Regencia and several others. Regencia was implicated as the mastermind in the ambush of the convoy of Congressman Vicente F. Belmonte, Jr. of the lone congressional district of Iligan City on December 11, 2014. 5

On August 12, 2015, the RTC, Branch 44, Misamis Oriental, issued seven (7) Warrants of Arrest against Regencia and his co-accused. Regencia went into hiding until October 12, 2015, when he surrendered to Judge Arthur L. Abundiente of the RTC, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, who was also serving as the Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City. Regencia was then committed to the city jail of Iligan City. 6

On October 13, 2015, while inside his detention cell, Regencia issued a written declaration to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iligan City that he will assume office as mayor on October 19, 2015, the end of his six-month suspension imposed by the OP in the administrative case against him. 7

In view of Regencia's declaration, Vice-Mayor Marzo and first councilor Providencio A. Abragan, Jr. (Abragan, Jr.), who assumed the position of Vice-Mayor in an acting capacity, consulted with the DILG as to the legal effects of such declaration. DILG Region X Officer-in-Charge Regional Director Nilo Castanares, DILG Undersecretary Austere Panadero, and DILG Secretary Mel Sarmiento, issued their respective advisories, to the effect that during the period of his detention, Regencia is deemed to be physically and legally incapacitated from discharging the functions and duties of his office. In such case, the vice-mayor shall assume the position of mayor, in accordance with Section 46 of RA 7160. 8

Following the DILG's advisories, Marzo took over the position of Mayor of Iligan City in an acting capacity. 9 This resulted to the filing of a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order filed by Atty. Vermin Quimco, et al., against Marzo, Abragan, Jr. and DILG Iligan City Emilio Rana before the RTC, Branch 4, Lanao del Norte, Iligan City. The petition sought to declare the advisory of DILG Secretary Mel Sarmiento as null and void for being illegal. 10

Subsequently, respondent appeared as counsel for Atty. Vermin Quimco, et al., in the declaratory relief case. Respondent then filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ Preliminary Injunction 11 dated December 8, 2015, in which he alleged that:

Recently[,] Vice-Mayor Ruderic C. Marzo collected Seventy-two Million Pesos (P72,000,000.00) as real property tax from [the] Mapalad Power Corporation (formerly IDDP 1 and IDPP 2) but up to the present he has not entrusted the same to the City Treasurer of Iligan City. 12 (Underscoring in the original).

Thereafter, respondent also filed a Motion to Cite in Contempt 13 dated December 17, 2015 against Marzo, Abragan, Jr., and several others, wherein he indicated his designation as signatory of the motion as follows:

Sgd.Iligan City Legal OfficerIligan City Hall, Buhanginan Hill14

According to complainants, the allegation made by respondent in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to the effect that Marzo did not deliver the real property tax payment of Mapalad Power Corporation to the City Treasurer constituted a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as it is absolutely false, malicious, defamatory, derogatory, and libelous. 15 DETACa

According to complainants, Mapalad Power Corporation, a subsidiary of Conal Holding Corporation, paid its real property taxes in the amount of P74,068,541.30 directly to the City Treasurer's Office on October 19, 2015, or fifty (50) days before respondent filed the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. This is supported by Certifications dated December 14, 2015 16 and December 29, 2015 17 issued by the City Treasurer, Louela S. Maybituin, stating that Conal Holding Corporation has paid its real property taxes for the 2nd quarter of 2013 up to 2015 in the amount of P74,068,541.30. Moreover, Receipt No. 00100194 18 dated October 19, 2015 issued by the City Treasurer shows the details of the collection of real property tax from Conal Holding Corporation for the relevant years. Finally, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iligan City had passed Resolution No. 15-1204 19 on October 27, 2015, adopting Appropriation Ordinance No. 15-6415-87, which appropriated the amount of P29,751,922.15, sourced from the real property tax payments of Conal Holding Corporation, to be used for various expenses of Iligan City. 20

Complainants further argued that by designating himself as the Iligan City Legal Officer when he filed the Motion for Contempt, respondent again violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR. Complainants aver that respondent does not hold any valid appointment as City Legal Officer of Iligan City as evidenced by a Certification 21 dated January 6, 2016 issued by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iligan City stating that no request for confirmation of appointment of city legal officer was submitted to its office by Regencia. Under Section 454 (d) of RA 7160, an appointment by the city mayor of heads of department and offices shall be with the concurrence of the majority of all the Sangguniang Panlungsod members. Considering that no appointment for city legal officer was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the concurrence of its members, it follows that respondent was not validly appointed to that position. 22

In a Resolution 23 dated April 6, 2016, the Court required respondent to file a verified comment on the complaint-affidavit. On July 7, 2016, respondent filed his Verified Comment, 24 arguing that the complaint filed against him is devoid of merit.

According to respondent, as soon as he discovered that he was misinformed into making the allegation in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ Preliminary Injunction, he called Marzo in his mobile phone to apologize. He, likewise, personally apologized to Marzo during the Iligan City mayoralty candidates' forum sometime in April 2016. Both apologies, according to respondent, were duly accepted by Marzo. 25 Moreover, respondent averred that during the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on December 23, 2015, his witness, Atty. Rafael Benedictos, Jr., apologized in open court and clarified that the P72,000,000.00 check had already been received by the City Treasurer's Office. In view of this, he himself also apologized before the trial court. Respondent contended that he should not be made to suffer disbarment because "lawyers are not immune from committing mistakes x x x." 26 He also noted that Marzo did not even join and is not party to the complaint against him, and neither was he reprimanded by the trial court judge for the incident.

Respondent also argued that he is the City Legal Officer of Iligan City, duly appointed as such by Regencia on December 9, 2015. In accordance with Section 454 (d) of RA 7160, the Sangguniang Panlungsod issued Resolution No. 16-06 27 dated February 9, 2016, where less than majority of the members concurred for respondent's appointment. Thus, respondent filed a protest with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for the approval of his appointment. He averred that the Sangguniang Panlungsod's resolution is ineffective and void, considering that he possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a city legal officer. Respondent argued that pending final resolution of the CSC of his protest, he is the current city legal officer and his designation of himself as such in the Motion to Cite in Contempt did not constitute deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office. 28

In their Reply, 29 complainants refuted respondent's defenses by submitting an Affidavit 30 dated July 4, 2016 executed by Marzo himself, stating that he never had a conversation with respondent about the declaratory relief case, or the present disbarment case. 31 Moreover, complainants pointed out that contrary to respondent's assertion, he never admitted his error in open court, or in any pleading he filed, relating to the reckless allegation he made against Marzo. Complainants cited the pertinent portions 32 of the Transcript Stenographic Notes (TSN) during the hearing on December 21, 2015, in which respondent did not admit any mistake or error on his part. Instead, respondent stated that "x x x [they] intended to relay that information because of the habit, scheme, planned and character of this administration anticipating plunder and stealing the money." 33 Finally, complainants insisted that respondent is not a duly appointed city legal officer because Regencia, who was detained at the time the appointment was supposedly made, had no capacity to hold office and, hence, cannot issue a valid appointment in favor of respondent. 34 In any case, the CSC, in a letter 35 dated June 22, 2016 addressed to Regencia, already disapproved respondent's appointment for lack of concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. aDSIHc

In a Resolution 36 dated September 14, 2016, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

After the mandatory conference on May 19, 2017, the parties were directed to submit their verified position papers. 37 After both parties complied, 38 the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

In a Report and Recommendation 39 dated July 31, 2017, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles (Commissioner Robles) recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR. According to Commissioner Robles, the supposed apology extended to Marzo will not absolve respondent of his liability for "recklessly pleading untruths." 40 In any case, proof of the alleged apology was not even presented by respondent. As to the issue of respondent's appointment as city legal officer, Commissioner Robles noted that the appointment was already disapproved by the CSC. Nevertheless, since the Motion to Cite in Contempt was denied by the trial court, respondent's representation or misrepresentation therein that he is the city legal officer of Iligan City is no longer significant in the present case. 41

The IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution 42 dated November 29, 2017, affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, but modified the penalty to suspension of three (3) months from the practice of law. On May 28, 2019, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent should be held administratively liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court modifies the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but maintains the penalty it imposed upon respondent, as will be discussed hereunder.

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession. 43

Canon 10 of the CPR provides that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to all courts. Rule 10.01, Canon 10 states:

RULE 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In the present case, respondent's acts do not measure up to this Canon. In his Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, respondent stated that Marzo collected Mapalad Power Corporation's payment of real property tax in the amount of P72,000,000.00 and has not, up to the time of the filing of the motion, remitted it to the City Treasurer.

It turned out, however, that respondent's allegation was false. Complainants were able to present evidence that the real property tax payment of Mapalad Power Corporation has been paid directly to the City Treasurer as early as October 19, 2015, weeks before respondent filed his motion on December 8, 2015.

During the hearing for the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ Preliminary Injunction, when pressed why he made that allegation against Marzo, respondent answered as follows: ETHIDa

ATTY. DALISAY TO THE WITNESS:

Q That is the point I am asking you. Why did you [allege] that the amount was not entrusted. You imputed a crime for respondent Marzo, which it is malicious. When we filed (sic) pleading in court we must sure (sic) of the facts. We should not be presumptuous.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. ROVIRA:

Your Honor, that was what we were informed. But, your Honor, we were informed that much but we intended to relay that information because of the habit, scheme, planned and character of this administration anticipating plunder and stealing the money. . . 44

By stating that he made his allegation in the motion based merely on an information given to him, respondent effectively admitted that he did not make his own determination of whether such information is true. Respondent's obligation as a lawyer, to be sure, goes beyond taking at face value what was relayed to him by his client or otherwise. Rule 10.01 imposes on lawyers a positive obligation to ensure that no falsehood shall be committed in court, and that the court will not be misled by any artifice.

Lawyers have an obligation to the court, as well as to the opposing party, to make only truthful statements in their pleadings. 45 The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. 46

Respondent could have easily determined the truthfulness of such information had he only verified with the City Treasurer as to whether the real property tax payment was received by their office or not. In deciding not to do so, respondent demonstrated malice and bad faith. In the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the movants were praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to allow Regencia to continue his assumption of office and to exercise the powers of a City Mayor. It is in this light that the allegation against Marzo was made. In the absence of any evidence to support such allegation, however, it is clear that the imputation of wrongdoing was intended to influence the trial court's action on the motion by putting Marzo in a bad light. This is highly improper and cannot be condoned by the Court.

A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, although he is required to serve his clients with utmost dedication, competence and diligence, his acts must always be within the bounds of law. Graver responsibility is imposed upon him than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and show respect to their processes. Hence, any act on his part that obstructs, impedes and degrades the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct necessitating the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him. 47

The Court had the occasion to rule that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements by an attorney in his pleadings or motions is a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the canons of professional ethics. 48

By making the baseless allegation against Marzo, respondent also violated Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR which states:

RULE 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

To reiterate, respondent made the allegation against Marzo without any evidence to support his statement. He simply alleged that Marzo failed to remit the real property tax payment to the city treasurer, without referring to any proof, oral or documentary. Neither was there showing that at the time the allegation was made, there was a pending administrative or criminal case against Marzo in relation to the alleged failure to remit the real property taxes paid. cSEDTC

In his defense, respondent argued that he should not be admonished for the allegation he made, because as soon as he discovered the inaccuracy of his statement, he apologized to Marzo and, subsequently, in open court. Respondent also emphasized that Marzo did not even join the present complaint against him, and neither was he penalized by the trial court judge for his act.

The Court is not impressed. Respondent's apology, even if made and accepted, will not exculpate him from administrative liability. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. 49

Respondent's infraction of the CPR took place the moment he made the baseless and malicious allegation in his motion and presented it in court. His subsequent action, as well as the resulting attitude of the party against whom such allegation was made, will not detract his liability for a violation that was already committed. In this regard, it is also immaterial that Marzo was not joined as a party in the present case or that respondent was not earlier admonished by the trial court for his actions. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. 50

Respondent's imputation of malicious and baseless allegations against Marzo fell short of the standard required of him as a member of the bar and as an officer the court. For this, he should be held administratively liable.

Complainants also alleged that respondent is guilty of misrepresentation when he signed the Motion to Cite in Contempt dated December 17, 2015 as the Iligan City Legal Officer. On this score, the Court notes that the Motion to Cite in Contempt was filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod issued its Resolution No. 16-06 51 dated February 9, 2016, and CSC Letter 52 dated June 22, 2016, both disapproving respondent's appointment. It may be said, therefore, that respondent's designation of himself as Iligan City Legal Officer at the time he filed the Motion to Cite in Contempt was made in good faith and under the legitimate belief that his appointment was valid.

The Court, in any case, notes some irregularities in respondent's signature in the Motion to Cite Contempt. In Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari, 53 the Court listed the additional information which is required to be indicated as part of a counsel's signature, to wit:

(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's address must be stated;

(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132, [the] [C]ourt required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys number;

(3) In Bar Matter No. 287, [the] [C]ourt required the inclusion of the "number and date of their official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year"; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership number;

(4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code, a lawyer must indicate his professional tax receipt number;

(5) Bar Matter No. 1922 required the inclusion of a counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education [MCLE] Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; and

(6) [The] [C]ourt's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC required the inclusion of a counsel's contact details.

Respondent's signature in the Motion to Cite Contempt is hereby reproduced:

Sgd.Iligan City Legal OfficerIligan City Hall, Buhanginan Hill54

Thus, glaringly absent in respondent's signature are his: (1) Roll of Attorney's number; (2) IBP official receipt number; (3) professional tax receipt number; (4) MCLE compliance number; and (5) contact details.

The Court, in In re Uy, emphasized that "[a]s with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain formalities." 55 The inclusion of a lawyer's Roll of Attorney's number, professional tax receipt number, and [IBP] receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek to ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage in it. 56 On the other hand, the inclusion of the MCLE compliance number "seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for keeping abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining the ethics of the profession, and enhancing the standards of the practice of law." 57 Finally, information on the counsel's address and contact details "aid in the service of court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate better representation of a client's cause." The Court continued to state that: AaCTcI

x x x They are not mere markings on a piece of paper. To willfully disregard them is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal practice; it is to betray apathy for the ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is wanting of the standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in the bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the profession that one brandishes. 58

In respondent's case, there is no evidence that he willfully disregarded the information required to be included in his signature. The records do not show that his attention on the matter was previously called, either by the IBP or the trial court in which the Motion to Cite in Contempt was filed, and that he was given an opportunity to explain his non-compliance. The Court also notes that in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 59 his Comment 60 on the present complaint, and his Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Position Paper 61 filed before the IBP, respondent's signature was complete. Considering the foregoing, the Court is inclined to give respondent the benefit of the doubt and rule that his failure to properly sign the Motion to Cite in Contempt may have been due to oversight. In this regard, respondent is reminded to be more circumspect in signing his pleadings and motions, bearing in mind that faithful compliance with the requirements is what is expected of him as a lawyer, and that non-observance thereof will merit administrative sanctions.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds that respondent violated Rules 10.01 and 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR for making baseless and malicious allegations against a party in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction he filed before the trial court. The Court, thus, sustains the penalty imposed by IBP Board of Governors of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Voltaire I. Rovira is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.01 and 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for three (3) months from the practice of law, effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely. Atty. Voltaire I. Rovira is also reminded to be more circumspect in signing his pleadings.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 1-10.

2.Id. at 1.

3.Id. at 2.

4.Id.

5.Id.

6.Id. at 2-3.

7.Id. at 3.

8.Id.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 4.

11.Id. at 17-19.

12.Id. at 18.

13.Id. at 33-37.

14.Id. at 37.

15.Id. at 5.

16.Id. at 20.

17.Id. at 21.

18.Id. at 24.

19.Id. at 25-29.

20.Id. at 5-6.

21.Id. at 44.

22.Id. at 7.

23.Id. at 45.

24.Id. at 49-56.

25.Id. at 53.

26.Id.

27. Not attached to the Comment of respondent. Attached to complainant's Reply dated July 4, 2016; id. at 93.

28.Id. at 55.

29.Id. at 65-74.

30.Id. at 77.

31.Id. at 66.

32.Id. at 78-89.

33.Id. at 87.

34.Id. at 74.

35.Id. at 112.

36.Id. at 115.

37. IBP Records, Volume III, id. at 23.

38.Id. at 28-48; 52-63.

39. IBP Records, Volume IV, id. at 2-4.

40.Id. at 3.

41.Id. at 3-4.

42.Id. at 1.

43.Alpajora v. Calayan, 823 Phil. 93, 107 (2018).

44.Rollo, p. 87.

45.Atty. Asa v. Atty. Castillo, 532 Phil. 9, 23 (2006).

46.Id.

47.Lukang v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4178, July 8, 2019.

48.Buenviaje v. Magdamo, 817 Phil. 1, 8 (2017).

49.Mitchell v. Amistoso, A.C. No. 10713, September 8, 2020.

50.Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar, 559 Phil. 211, 225 (2007).

51.Rollo, p. 93.

52.Id. at 112.

53. 768 Phil. 10, 23-24 (2015).

54.Rollo, p. 37. (Underscoring supplied).

55.Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari, supra note 53, at 24.

56.Id. at 24-25.

57.Id. at 25.

58.Id.

59.Rollo, pp. 17-19.

60.Id. at 49-56.

61. IBP Records, Volume III, id. at 23.