FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-18-3874. November 5, 2018.][Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4687-P]
LOIDA R. CABEBE, complainant, vs.ROVELYN B. BALUYOT, CLERK OF COURT VI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MARIVELES, BATAAN, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 5, 2018which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. P-18-3874 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4687-P] (Loida R. Cabebe v. Rovelyn B. Baluyot, Clerk of Court VI, Regional Trial Court, Mariveles, Bataan).
For Our resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed before this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by complainant Loida R. Cabebe (complainant) as the duly authorized representative of Philippine Investment One (SPV-AMC), Inc. (PI One) against respondent Atty. Rovelyn B. Baluyot (respondent), Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, charging her for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Misconduct, and Gross Neglect of Duty. 2
Complainant alleges that on August 10, 2007, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) absolutely and irrevocably sold, assigned, and conveyed all its rights, title, and interests over the loan obligation of Diversified Plastic Film System, Inc. (Diversified) in favor of PI One, its successors, and assigns. However, Diversified failed to pay its loan obligation despite demand. Thus, on November 25, 2014, PI One filed a petition for foreclosure of the Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) before the OCC of Mariveles, Bataan. The auction sale was scheduled on February 13, 2015. 3
The day before the scheduled auction sale, or on February 12, 2015, Diversified filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) and/or temporary restraining order (TRO), raffled to Judge Emmanuel A. Silva's (Judge Silva) sala. Diversified claimed that PI One does not have the capacity to act as trustee under the MTI. Judge Silva granted the petition on the same day, issuing a 72-hour TRO, which enjoined the scheduled auction sale. 4
The 72-hour TRO expired and no WPI was issued. Thus, PI One re-applied for the foreclosure sale with the OCC through a letter dated February 18, 2015. The auction was re-scheduled on March 23, 2015 and April 10, 2015. 5
However, on March 19, 2015, Judge Silva issued a WPI. 6
PI One questioned Judge Silva's March 19, 2015 Order 7 before the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari. It also filed a petition for appointment/confirmation as trustee of the MTI and the loan of Diversified before the RTC of Makati. 8 AIDSTE
On January 19, 2016, RTC-Makati rendered a Decision, 9 confirming the status of PI One as the trustee of the MTI. On May 4, 2016, the CA also granted PI One's petition for certiorari, ordering the dissolution of the WPI issued by Judge Silva. 10 Diversified filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.
On June 7, 2016, pending said motion for reconsideration before the CA, PI One re-applied for the foreclosure of the MTI through a letter dated May 23, 2016. After compliance with the publication requirements and payment of fees in the amount of Ninety-Two Thousand Pesos (P92,000) as directed by respondent, the foreclosure sale was re-scheduled on July 28, 2016 and August 12, 2016 per June 16, 2016 Notice of Sheriff's Sale issued by the OCC. 11
Complainant was, however, perturbed that despite the RTC's confirmation of its status as trustee, the CA's dissolution of the WPI, and compliance with the requirement of republication and payment of the required fees therefor, respondent had to obtain the opinion of Judge Silva and Judge Jose Marie Quimboy, through a letter dated July 12, 2016, if she should proceed with the foreclosure. 12
On July 19, 2016, PI One wrote a letter addressed to respondent reminding her that her function in an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding is ministerial; that the WPI has already been dissolved by the CA; PI One has already been confirmed as the trustee by the RTC; and that it is improper for her to seek opinions from Judges Silva and Quimboy because there was already an administrative case filed by PI One against Judge Silva in connection with his issuance of the TRO and WPI, among others. 13
Meanwhile, undaunted, Diversified filed another case against PI One for indirect contempt and injunction, raffled before Judge Quimboy's sala, contending that PI One should be held liable for contempt for insisting that the foreclosure should proceed despite the fact that the CA's decision dissolving the WPI has not yet attained finality in view of Diversified's motion for reconsideration thereof. 14
On July 26, 2016, Judge Quimboy issued an Order, 15 without granting or denying Diversified's prayer for injunction but instead, it ruled that the WPI dissolved by the CA is still subsisting as it had yet to attain finality. According to complainant, Judge Quimboy's order was confusing as there was no discussion as to whether the foreclosure should proceed or not. This prompted PI One to file an Extremely Urgent Motion for Clarification of the July 26, 2016 Order. 16
Acting upon the said urgent motion, Judge Quimboy, through his Order 17 dated August 9, 2016, deferred the resolution of the issue on the validity of the WPI issued by Judge Silva to the CA, in view of the motion for reconsideration pending before the appellate court.
PI One still insisted that it was ministerial for respondent to proceed with the scheduled foreclosure sale but respondent maintained that she is bound to abide by the lawful orders of the court. 18
On January 3, 2017, the CA denied Diversified's motion for reconsideration. 19 Thus, PI One again urged respondent, through a letter, 20 to proceed with the foreclosure proceedings. But then again, respondent upheld the validity of the WPI considering that PI One's letter was silent on whether the CA's Resolution dated January 3, 2017 had already attained finality. 21 Notably, Diversified questioned the aforesaid CA Resolution before this Court through a petition for review. 22
Complainant charges respondent with gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and gross neglect of duty, arguing that despite her ministerial function in foreclosure proceedings, respondent exercised discretion and deliberately decided not to perform her duty to the damage and prejudice of PI One. Complainant further imputes bias and bad faith on the part of respondent in refusing to proceed with the foreclosure proceedings.
For her part, respondent explained that when the 72-hour TRO expired, its efficacy was terminated. Thus, when the OCC received PI One's request for the resetting of the foreclosure sale, in the absence of a TRO/WPI, the OCC granted PI One's request and rescheduled the same on March 23, 2015 and April 10, 2015. However, on March 19, 2015, a WPI was issued, enjoining the foreclosure proceedings. When the CA dissolved the said WPI, PI One again requested for the rescheduling, republication, and resending of notices for the foreclosure to proceed. After compliance with the publication and notice requirements, the OCC, on June 16, 2016, issued an amended notice of sheriff's sale, rescheduling the auction on July 28, 2016 since there was no manifestation to the OCC that a motion for reconsideration was filed before the CA. Respondent averred that it was only on June 30, 2016 that the OCC had received the copy of the motion for reconsideration. Respondent then sought the advice of Judge Silva and Judge Quimboy on the matter. Judge Quimboy suggested that the query be referred to the OCA while Judge Silva inhibited himself from the case. On July 26, 2016, the OCC received Judge Quimboy's Order, upholding the effectivity of the WPI. Following thus the court's directive as regards the WPI, respondent did not proceed with the scheduled auction sale. 23 AaCTcI
In its Administrative Matter for Agenda 24 dated June 19, 2018, the OCA found the complaint against respondent partly meritorious. According to the OCA, respondent cannot be faulted for not proceeding with the foreclosure and seeking the advice of the judges, when she came to know of Diversified's motion for reconsideration. When Judge Quimboy issued the July 26, 2016 Order, it was made clear that the WPI enjoining the foreclosure to proceed remained valid and effective. Hence, respondent had to abide by the court's order. Further, the OCA stressed that while the CA already dissolved the WPI, such ruling had not yet attained finality considering that Diversified filed a petition for review before this Court questioning the CA's decision on the WPI. In addition, a civil case is also pending wherein PI One also filed a motion praying for the implementation of the CA decision and to direct the OCC to proceed with the foreclosure.
The OCA, however, found respondent negligent in issuing the June 16, 2016 amended notice of sheriff's sale without first verifying the finality of the CA's decision dissolving the WPI. According to the OCA, prudence dictates that respondent should have first verified whether or not the dissolution of the WPI had attained finality. Because of such negligence, PI One paid another republication fee for a foreclosure which did not proceed. 25
Thus, it was recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be found guilty of simple neglect of duty and penalized with a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. 26
We resolve.
In resolving the instant administrative matter, it is important to understand the duties and functions of a clerk of court, particularly in an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding. Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 99-10-05-0, as amended, provides:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Upon receipt of an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, it shall be the duty of the Clerk of Court to:
(a) receive and docket said application and to stamp thereon the corresponding file number, date and time of filing;
(b) collect the filing fees therefor and issue the corresponding official receipt;
(c) examine, in case of real estate mortgage foreclosure, whether the applicant has complied with all the requirements before the public auction is conducted under the direction of the sheriff or a notary public, pursuant to Sec. 4 of Act 3135, as amended;
(d) sign and issue the certificate of sale, subject to the approval of the Executive Judge, or in his absence, the Vice-Executive Judge;
(e) after the certificate of sale has been issued to the highest bidder, keep the complete records, while awaiting any redemption within a period of one (1) year from date of registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds concerned, after which the records shall be archived.
xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, the clerk of court's function in foreclosure proceedings is purely ministerial. "A ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." 27
Hence, when an application for extra-judicial foreclosure is filed before the OCC, it was incumbent upon the clerk of court to discharge her duties as enumerated above. Specifically, when PI One filed a re-application for the extra-judicial foreclosure, it was incumbent upon respondent to proceed with her duty to receive and re-docket the same, collect the necessary fees therefor, examine its compliance with all the requirements, re-schedule the auction sale, and even proceed with such sale with or without notice of the pendency of a motion for reconsideration before the CA, unless there was an authorized instruction to the contrary. As a ministerial officer, the clerk of court ought to know that it is his or her duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to faithfully perform what is incumbent upon him or her. 28 EcTCAD
Thus, contrary to the OCA's recommendation, respondent cannot be faulted for receiving PI One's re-application, re-docketing the same, and accepting the re-publication fees therefor as she was merely performing her ministerial duty above-enumerated. At that time, she had no reason to refuse acceptance of the PI One's re-application as there was no manifestation or notice of any lawful instruction or court order to do otherwise. Notably, records show that respondent was notified of the pendency of a motion for reconsideration before the CA only after having accomplished her aforesaid ministerial duty.
Neither can respondent be held administratively liable for not proceeding with the scheduled auction sale considering that at that time, an instruction to the contrary, i.e., the court order stating that the WPI enjoining the foreclosure sale remains to be valid and effective. When Judge Quimboy issued an order expressly stating that the WPI was still effective, considering that the CA decision dissolving the same had not yet attained finality, it was but right for the respondent to abide by that court order and restrain from proceeding with the auction sale. It is basic that an officer performing ministerial functions is not exempt from complying with and obeying lawful orders/directives of the court lest he or she be charged with contempt or administrative liability for disobedience to the same.
It is also noteworthy that the imputation of bias and bad faith against respondent was not supported by any evidence apart from bare allegations.
In all, We do not find respondent to have committed any malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance to warrant the imposition of any sanction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED." Bersamin, J., designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2606 dated October 10, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2607 dated October 10, 2018; Del Castillo, J. and Gesmundo, J., on official leave.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 1-16.
2.Id. at 1.
3.Id. at 2.
4.Id.
5.Id. at 3.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 60-63.
8.Id. at 3.
9.Id. at 108-119.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 4.
12.Id. at 4-5.
13.Id. at 5.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 178-182.
16.Id. at 7.
17.Id. at 195-198.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 247-248.
20. Id. at 249-250.
21. Id. at 253.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id. at 402-403.
24. Id. at 399-406.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 405-406.
27. Spouses Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 660 Phil. 368, 380 (2011).
28. Erdenberger v. Aquino, 671 Phil. 551, 556 (2011).