Cabalo v. Net Ship Management, Inc.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 212429. January 27, 2016.]

DANDY D. CABALO, petitioner,vs. NET SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., TSM INTERNATIONAL, LTD. AND ROSALIA CABALLERO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 27 January 2016 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 212429 (Dandy D. Cabalo v. Net Ship Management, Inc., TSM International, Ltd. and Rosalia Caballero)

Pending before the Court is a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of a Resolution Ordering Restitution of Executed Judgment Award, 1 dated June 22, 2105, filed by Net Ship Management, Inc., TSM International, Ltd. and its officer, Rosalia Caballero (respondents), regarding the execution of the judgment in the subject case before the Labor Arbiter (LA).

The subject case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Dandy D. Cabalo (Cabalo) against respondents, seeking payment of permanent total disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. As a seafarer formerly employed by respondents, Cabalo alleged that he suffered "Left Inguinal Hernia," a permanent and total disability, while on board the ship "M/T SICHEM LILY."

After requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers, the LA rendered a Decision, 2 dated November 9, 2011, in Cabalo's favor. It ordered respondents to pay Cabalo US$118,800.00 in its Peso equivalent as permanent and total disability benefits and 10% thereof as attorney's fees.

Aggrieved, respondents appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

On July 30, 2012, the NLRC rendered a Decision 3 denying respondents' appeal. The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was similarly denied by the NLRC in its resolution, dated September 13, 2012.

Undaunted, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). ATICcS

Meanwhile, on October 8, 2012, the NLRC decision became final and executory and a corresponding writ of execution was issued on March 9, 2013. Respondents paid the judgment award in its Peso equivalent in the aggregate amount of P5,179,680.00.

On November 29, 2013, the CA promulgated a decision 4 in respondents' favor. The appellate court stated that the company-designated physician's extensive diagnosis finding Cabalo fit to work for duty was more credible than the opinion of Cabalo's chosen physician. Moreover, his treatment only lasted for 116 days — well within the 120-day period provided by law. Thus, the CA concluded that Cabalo was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

Cabalo moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution, 5 dated April 29, 2014.

Unconvinced, Cabalo filed a petition for review on certiorari6 before the Court arguing, among, others, that he was totally unfit to perform the duties of a seaman. Hence, he was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

On July 7, 2014, the Court issued a resolution 7 denying Cabalo's petition outright for failure to show any reversible error in the challenged CA decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Thereafter, an Entry of Judgment 8 was issued and the Court's resolution became final and executory on September 2, 2014.

In view of the reversal of the LA and NLRC decisions, respondents filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution before the LA seeking the restitution of the judgment award paid to Cabalo.

The LA Order

On March 31, 2015, the LA issued an order 9 denying respondents' motion for issuance of a writ of execution for premature filing. It stated that respondents failed to show that the CA ordered restitution in its November 29, 2013 decision pursuant to the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended.

Unfazed, respondents filed before the NLRC a petition to annul and set aside the March 31, 2015 order of the LA and sought the execution of November 29, 2013 decision of the CA.

The NLRC Ruling

On May 29, 2015, the NLRC issued a decision 10 denying respondents' petition. The NLRC opined that Section 18, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, expressly required that either the CA or the Court must first order restitution before the same could be carried out by the LA or NLRC. As the November 29, 2013 decision of the CA was silent on the propriety of restitution of the judgment, the NLRC concluded that it could not grant the motion of respondents.

Hence, this present motion.

ISSUE

WHETHER AN ORDER OF RESTITUTION MUST BE EXPRESSLY STATED IN THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OR THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE IT CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY THE LABOR ARBITER

Respondents argue that no express order for restitution need to be stated in the CA or the SC decision because restitution comes as a necessary and inevitable consequence of the reversal of the judgment of the NLRC. Respondents cite Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in support of their position.

Respondents, however, submit that the NLRC En Banc Resolution 05-14, which amended Section 18, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, requires an order of restitution from the Court as a condition to the restitution of the executed judgment award. Although respondents firmly believe that the CA and the SC are not bound by the said NLRC En Banc Resolution, they are forced to seek from the Court an issuance of a supplemental decision or an order of restitution due to the LA and the NLRC's insistence on its observation. Otherwise, they will be left with a mere paper judgment, which they have no means of enforcement.

In his Comment, 11 Cabalo insisted that respondents' motion for immediate issuance of a resolution ordering restitution of executed judgment award was devoid of any merit; that, due to respondents' failure to file a motion for reconsideration, the July 7, 2014 resolution of the Court had already attained finality; and that the said judgment could not be altered or amended anymore.

The Court's Ruling

The motion is meritorious.

The CA decision, which was

It is an oft-repeated rule that once a judgment has become final, the issues therein should be laid to rest. It is likewise equally settled that once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof is the court's ministerial duty. 12

Foremost rule in execution of judgments is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, or may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. 13 The Court, nonetheless, has held that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. 14 TIADCc

Jurisprudence is replete of cases where the execution extended to those matters necessarily included in the judgment. In Perez v. Evite, 15 where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of possession of the land was considered included in the decision where the defeated party's claim to possession was based solely on his claim of ownership.

The same principle applies in labor cases. In DHL-URFA-FFW v. Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Phil. Corp., 16 the med-arbiter's decision therein nullified a certification election and ordered the holding of another one. On appeal, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) undersecretary issued a resolution stating that the certification election should not be set aside. Subsequently, the CA reversed the DOLE undersecretary's resolution. When the case reached the Court, the petitioner therein assailed that the CA decision was invalid because its dispositive portion failed to specify what should be done by the parties after its promulgation. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and held that, in reversing the undersecretary's resolution, the CA necessarily reinstated the med-arbiter's earlier decision to conduct a new certification election.

Notably, the principle that the execution of a judgment extends to those necessary therein, including matters of restitution or reparation of executed judgments, is expressly recognized under the Rules of Court. Section 5, Rule 39 thereof provides:

Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. —

Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

The above-cited provision instructs that when the higher courts reversed or annulled an executed judgment of the trial court, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may order the restitution or reparation of damages. Evidently, there is no requirement that the higher court must first order restitution or reparation of damages as a condition sine qua non before the trial court may do the same. The only limitation is that the trial court must issue such orders only as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

In the case at bench, both the LA and NLRC rendered decisions in favor of permanent and total disability claim of Cabalo. Upon the finality of the NLRC judgment, it was executed and respondent paid US$118,800.00.

The CA, however, granted respondents' petition for certiorari and held that:

The award of disability benefits to Cabalo in the amount of US$118,000.00 on the basis of a pro-forma copy of the CBA is erroneous. . . . In any event, Cabalo was not able to prove his permanent disability. 17

The CA decision clearly found that the Cabalo was not entitled to the US$118,800.00 permanent disability benefits awarded. This same decision was upheld by the Court when Cabalo's petition for review of certiorari was dismissed outright for failure to show any reversible error warranting the exercise of the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to but the decision must be considered in its entirety. 18 Thus, the LA and the NLRC erred in holding that the CA decision, which was upheld by the Court, never ordered the return of the judgment award to respondents. By declaring that the US$118,800.00 disability award to Cabalo was invalid, necessarily, the judgment award earlier paid by respondents must be restituted to them.

There is no need to issue

Both the LA and NLRC were of the position that considering neither the Court nor the CA had issued an order of restitution, they could not effect the judgment awards restitution. They invoked Section 18, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 05-14, which provides:

SECTION 18. Restitution. — Where the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court with finality and restitution is so ordered, the Labor Arbiter shall, on motion, issue such order of restitution of the executed award, except reinstatement wages paid pending appeal.

A perusal of the said provision does not show that a separate order of restitution is an indispensable requirement before restitution of an executed judgment can take effect due to the following reasons:

First, the phrase "where the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court with finality and restitution is so ordered" does not carry any words of mandatory import. It does not direct the CA or the Court that they must include in their judgment an order of restitution, or otherwise restitution shall not take effect. The provision should read only as directory in character.

Second, if the Court would sustain the interpretation of the NLRC and LA, that the CA and the Court decisions' should contain an order of restitution, then it is as if the NLRC Rules of Procedure is dictating the actions of the higher courts. Unquestionably, the CA and the Court are not bound by the procedural rules of an administrative tribunal. In fact, the Court has the constitutional prerogative to disapprove the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. 19 Once the higher courts render a decision, then the lower tribunals have no choice but to execute the same. AIDSTE

Third, the construction of the NLRC and the LA is manifestly prejudicial to the victorious litigant. It commands that the party must first secure an order of restitution in the higher courts before there can be a recovery of payment which, to begin with, was improper. There is no assurance that the party could definitely secure the required order of restitution in due time. The winning party will be left at the mercy of the labor tribunals, while the defeated party conveniently sits on top of another man's earnings. The substantive right of a party to enjoy the fruits of a favorable judgment will be negated by a mere procedural technicality.

Based on the foregoing, once the decision of the Court or the CA reversing the executed judgment has attained finality, then the LA should order the restitution of the executed award.

It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party must not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. 20

WHEREFORE, the motion is GRANTED. The Labor Arbiter is DIRECTED to proceed with the execution of the Court's Resolution, dated July 7, 2014, and to issue the necessary order of restitution.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 68-80.

2. Penned by Labor Arbiter Pablo A. Gajardo, Jr.; id. at 81-91.

3. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Hermino Suelo with Commissioner Angelo Ang Palan and Commissioner Numeriano D. Villena, concurring; id. at 93-105.

4. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez with Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, concurring; id. at 36-50.

5. Id. at 123-125.

6. Id. at 3-33.

7. Id. at 52.

8. Id. at 53.

9. Id. at 128-130.

10. Id. at 131-136.

11. Id. at 141-144.

12. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85469, March 18, 1992, 207 SCRA 287, 292.

13. Raymundo v. Galen Realty and Mining Corp., G.R. No. 191594, October 16, 2013, 707 SCRA 515, 523.

14. Tumibay v. Spouses Soro, 632 Phil. 179, 187 (2010).

15. 111 Phil. 564 (1961).

16. 478 Phil. 842 (2004).

17. Rollo, pp. 40-41.

18. Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 776, 800 (2000).

19. 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. . . .

5. . . . Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

20. Florentino v. Rivera, 515 Phil. 494, 505 (2006).