Caasi v. Kanlungan Centre Foundation, Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 199769. September 11, 2013.]

JUVY C. CAASI, petitioner, vs. KANLUNGAN CENTRE FOUNDATION, INC. — CENTER FOR MIGRANT WORKERS AND/OR ATTY. MILABEL CRISTOBAL AMAR, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated September 11, 2013, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 199769 (Juvy C. Caasi v. Kanlungan Centre Foundation, Inc. — Center for Migrant Workers and/or Atty. Milabel Cristobal Amar). — Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the August 16, 2011 Decision 1 and November 25, 2011 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 115515, which affirmed the April 12, 2010 Decision 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed and set aside the November 10, 2008 Decision 4 of the Labor Arbiter finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

Petitioner consistently maintained her version of events, thus:

Petitioner, JUVY C. CAASI, a registered Social Worker, started working with the [Kanlungan Centre Foundation, Inc. — Center for Migrant Workers] in August 2001 as a social work intern of the University of the Philippines College of Social Work and Community Development. As such, petitioner joined the Direct Support Services Program of Kanlungan as case manager and handled migration-related cases. AEITDH

From November 2001 to March 2002, she served as a social work intern of the Community Extension Services Program (CESP) of Kanlungan in its regional field office based in San Fernando City. Petitioner revitalized the community-based Mental Health Program of Kanlungan in Pugo, La Union.

Before the June 2002 Social Work board exam, petitioner had a two-month (May-June 2002) research project with Kanlungan, under a project contract, to document existing programs and services for migrant workers and their families in Region I. After this research, another one, a baseline data-gathering project in Barangay Escopa IV, Quezon City, also under a project contract, was undertaken by the petitioner.

In November 2002, the position of Case Manager/Community Organizer (CM/CO) of CESP was offered to, and accepted by the petitioner. She then began her stint with CESP on [November 11, 2002], receiving a monthly salary at probationary rate.

Being on probation, the petitioner's performance was assessed at the end of three (3) months. She continued working until the end of her probationary status on the 6th month, or on May 2003, making her qualified for regularization. SDHITE

On that same month, the piloting of the Local Economy Development (LED) Project, a socio-economic project of Kanlungan in Naguilian, La Union, coincided with the end of the Phase IV of Kanlungan's program/funding phase. For Phase V, only one CM/CO was allotted to CESP and another CM/CO for LED. Petitioner was the CM/CO of CESP ready for regularization at that time, while another CM/CO staff of CESP, Aurea Jane Chiday, was on her 5th month on probation.

Chit Arma, Kanlungan's Human Resource Development (HRD) Officer, told the petitioner and Chiday the possibility that one of them [would] be terminated, since only one staff was needed for CESP. Arma, however, offered the petitioner the CM/CO item in LED.

Considering that the tasks of a CM/CO in both CESP and LED projects are similar, the petitioner agreed to accept the CM/CO item in LED, on the condition that she [would] no longer undergo probation since she had just finished her probation under CESP.

On [May 15, 2003], petitioner started her first day as CM/CO for LED. In July of that year, the new contracts of all Kanlungan staff were ready for the start of the Phase V. The petitioner, however, did not outrightly sign her contract until her bargain — that she [would] no longer undergo probation — is granted.

On [July 30, 2003], the HRD furnished the petitioner its recommendation letter dated [July 14, 2003], addressed to the chairperson of Kanlungan's Board of [Trustees] [BOT], for the waiver of her probationary status as CM/CO for LED. The following day, [July 31, 2003], the petitioner signed the three-year contract as fulltime LED CM/CO. DIEACH

On her first year as a regular staff in May 2004, the petitioner received her first tenure pay of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) which was added to her monthly salary. Every 15th day of May of the succeeding years, the said tenure pay was added to the petitioner's salary.

Like other regular staff members of Kanlungan, aside from salary increases and allowances, the petitioner was likewise provided with 13th month pay and performance/Christmas bonuses, as well as leave entitlements of fifteen (15) days sick leave and fifteen (15) days vacation leave.

In May 2006, petitioner's work contract with Kanlungan ended. Thus, she asked the LED coordinator, Adonis Baga, for the renewal of her contract. Baga explained that in the absence of a new contract, the service record as per previous contract [would] still continue.

Subsequently, an interim phase of the LED project was put into effect, from [July 1, 2006] to [June 30, 2007]. The petitioner continued to be engaged as a community organizer for the said project, whereby a new contract of employment for the said period was entered into by the parties.

During the mid-year assessment-planning activity in June 2006, it was assessed that the organization of OFWs and their families in Bannuar-Naguilian, which was being assisted by the petitioner, was already organizationally capable of sustaining its activities with minimal input from a community organizer. It was then decided that during the interim phase of Kanlungan from July 2006 to June 2007, local community organizers [would] be trained from among the Bannuar-Naguilian leaders who [would] continue the work of a LED CM/CO for Phase VI. EcDATH

In March 2007, the petitioner started to inquire from Kanlungan's management about the status of her employment, but they always failed to give her any clear answer.

On the second week of May 2007, the petitioner learned from her coordinator (Baga) that she [would] be working with Kanlungan until [June 30, 2007] only, which disappointed her, for she expected to be working with Kanlungan until August 2007, the end of the extended interim phase.

On the last week of May, petitioner inquired from Cristy Virtusio, Kanlungan OHRD staff, regarding the filing of SSS maternity claim, especially since she was about to be separated from Kanlungan. On the early part of June 2007, she likewise asked Virtusio for the computation of her separation pay and gratuity in preparation for the end of her employment on [June 30, 2007].

On [June 29, 2007], in a meeting with the LED Coordinator and the Director, the latter informed the petitioner [that] according to the Kanlungan lawyers, she was not entitled to separation pay due to finished contract, but the check for her gratuity was ready.

It was agreed upon during the said meeting that petitioner will prepare a letter to the [Kanlungan's BOT], stating her entitlement to the said benefits, as well as her employment history, as justification for her claim, Meanwhile the director offered the petitioner to still continue working, while waiting for the response of her letter, to which she agreed.

On [July 16, 2007], the petitioner learned about the [BOT] decision denying her claims, through the director's letter-reply. Consequently, she again sent a letter dated [July 17, 2007] appealing her case, but to no avail.

Hence, on [August 13, 2007], the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondents for illegal dismissal; non-payment of salary; and payment of separation pay, gratuity, as well as moral and exemplary damages. 5

On the other hand, respondents alleged the facts to be as follows:

1. Kanlungan Center Foundation, Inc. . . . is a non-government, non-stock and non-profit organization, organized on [July 18, 1989]. The function/purposes of [Kanlungan] are spelled out in its Articles of Incorporation[,] to wit:

[a.] To assist disadvantaged migrant workers and their families in the resolution of their problems caused by overseas migration and employment through assistance and advice;

[b.] To help distressed worker returnees in their reintegration within the family and the society through rehabilitative therapies; TAIDHa

[c.] To respond to the housing needs of battered woman migrants by providing temporary shelter during the processing and adjudication of their case;

xxx xxx xxx

2. [Kanlungan] is dependent on the financial support of the funding agency/partner. In 2003, [Kanlungan] ventured into a new arena, it proposed to its funding partner a special project which was approved for a period of three years — that is the Local Economy Development (LED). Below is the part of the concept of the LED:

"A.Internalizing and operationalizing the concept of savings for investments.

B. Formulating a specific and quantifiable plan vis-a-vis intended duration of overseas employment, and the kind of lifestyle the worker aspires to have and/or maintain upon return to the homeland. Based on this, s/he would determine the amount s/he would like to save which will finance desired investments.

xxx xxx xxx

The cultural shift should lead to the development of local economy in a way that it could eventually successfully reintegrate returning overseas workers, and offer viable economic opportunities that could be an alternative to overseas jobs . . . ." ICDcEA

3. Based on this special project, [Kanlungan] created a position for a fixed period[,] that is the [LED] Coordinator and Community Organizer. It is understood from the project proposal and from the contract of employment that employment under the said special project is for a fixed period, that is from [May 1, 2003] to [June 30, 2006]. The employment period is [co-terminus] with the special project approved by [Kanlungan's] funding agent/partner which is the [LED]. Petitioner is aware that her employment with [Kanlungan] as Community Organizer is for a limited period and it shall end on [June 30, 2006]. [Kanlungan's] funding partner approved the one-year extension period, from [June 30, 2006] to [June 30, 2007], purposely to complete the consolidation and documentation of the project.

4. When the [LED] Program was approved, [petitioner] was under probationary period of employment with [Kanlungan] under the [CESP] in La Union, from [November 11, 2002] until [May 22, 2003]. DTESIA

5. Based on the need of the said special project, petitioner applied and was hired by [Kanlungan] as a Community Organizer of the [LED] Project from [May 1, 2003] to [June 30, 2006]. [Kanlungan] even credited her probationary employment with the CESP upon petitioner's request, hence, she did not undergo probationary employment period of five months, and was considered for the job for 3 years.

6. Under the [LED] Program, the Community Organizer shall be receiving a monthly salary of P9,976.20. The salary of the [LED] Program is substantially higher than the staff of the [CESP] on the ground that the LED staff has a limited period of employment, since the LED is just a special project. [Petitioner's] salary as CESP's Community Organizer was merely P7,790.00.

7. A few months before the end of the Phase V project, [Kanlungan's] funding partner extended the project for another year from [June 30, 2006] to [June 30, 2007] for the purpose of consolidation and documentation.

8. At the end of the Phase V project, then executive director of [Kanlungan] issued a memo to all staff informing all the staff of the end of the Phase V project and their respective contract.

9. As early as May 2006, in one of the Management Committee [meetings,] petitioner intimated that she shall stay until [June 30, 2007] to finish the extended period and her contract. On [November 8, 2006] General Staff meeting with the Board of Trustees, petitioner again reiterated her position that she [would] stay at [Kanlungan] until the end of the extended contract, [June 30, 2007]. cSATEH

10. Starting [July 1, 2007], [petitioner] did not report for work, due to the end [of] her contract. As a matter of fact, her co-workers even threw a despedida for her on her last day at the office in La Union.

11. Petitioner knew very well that her contract has ended and she needs to submit documents required of her. 6

The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed, considering that, by operation of law, she already attained the status of a regular employee. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the complainant was illegally dismissed. Consequently[,] the respondent KANLUNGAN CENTRE FOUNDATION, INC. must pay the complainant's claims for separation pay, backwages, 13th month pay and gratuity pay, all in the amount of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE AND THIRTY-SEVEN CENTAVOS (P318,861.37) plus P10,000.00 moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED. 7

Upon respondents' appeal, however, the NLRC dismissed petitioner's case on the basis of the employment contracts she signed showing her engagement with Kanlungan as a project or fixed-term employee. In time, the CA affirmed the NLRC Decision and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition. Essentially, petitioner pleads Us to resolve whether she is a regular or a project employee.

We deny.

The issue of whether petitioner is a regular or a project employee is purely factual in nature. This Court reiterates that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, 8 We discussed the guidepost of a Rule 45 appeal from the CA's Rule 65 decision on labor cases: aSTAHD

. . . In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case? 9

Our review is, therefore, limited to the determination of whether the CA correctly resolved the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the NLRC. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion is not what is ruled upon but whether it correctly determined the existence or lack thereof on the part of the NLRC. Viewed in this light, the Court "[does] not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our 'own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.' The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court." 10 Certainly, factual questions cannot be touched upon except in the course of finding whether the CA correctly ruled in determining whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in considering and appreciating the factual issues before it. 11

Even upon examination of the records, We found that there is evident want of persuasive allegation that there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the factual findings of the NLRC or the CA. Quite the contrary, what is patent from the two successive employment contracts 12 executed by petitioner is her engagement as a Community Organizer of the LED Project for a fixed term, specifically stipulated to be effective from May 2003 up to June 2007. The salary and benefits she received during said period, which petitioner insistently claims to be similar to what was being received by a regular employee per Kanlungan's Manual of Operation, are completely immaterial and irrelevant.

The litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies in setting a fixed period of employment involving a specific undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the particular employee's engagement. 13 The decisive factor in the term employment is the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship, a day certain being understood to be that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when. 14 By entering into a project employment contract, an employee is deemed to understand that his employment is coterminous with the project and that he may not expect to be employed continuously beyond the completion of the project. 15 SITCEA

Project employment contracts, which fix the employment for a specific project or undertaking, are valid under existing law. What Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, indiscriminately and completely rules out are those written or oral agreements entered into precisely to circumvent the employee's security of tenure. 16 As held in Rowell Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 17

The aforesaid Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, however, does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period. It does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employee's duties. What Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, seeks to prevent is the practice of some unscrupulous and covetous employers who wish to circumvent the law that protects lowly workers from capricious dismissal from their employment. The aforesaid provision, however, should not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive employers of the right and prerogative to choose their own workers if they have sufficient basis to refuse an employee a regular status. Management has rights which should also be protected. 18

In this case, the standards set forth in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora 19 were sufficiently complied with. It is reasonable to conclude that the fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties for absence of substantial evidence that force, duress or improper pressure were employed by Kanlungan to vitiate petitioner's consent. Indeed, it satisfactorily appears that both parties dealt with each other on, more or less, equal terms with no moral dominance whatsoever being exercised by Kanlungan over petitioner. Notably, petitioner is a cum laude graduate of the country's premier state university and a 9th placer in the 2002 Social Work Board Exam. 20 Further, whether the LED Project was offered by Kanlungan to petitioner or that it was the latter who actually applied to the vacant position is inconsequential. No evidence was adduced by petitioner to prove that Kanlungan committed misrepresentation in claiming that either petitioner or Chiday would possibly be terminated because only one staff was needed for Phase V of the CESP. aHIDAE

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The August 16, 2011 Decision and November 25, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115515, sustaining the April 12, 2010 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-54.

2.Rollo, pp. 56-57.

3.Id. at 86-94.

4.Id. at 100-113.

5.Id. at 13-18.

6.Id. at 305-307.

7.Id. at 113. (Emphasis in the original)

8.G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334.

9.Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, supra, at 342-343. See also Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas, etc., et al., G.R. No. 179146, July 23, 2013; Niña Jewelry Manufacturing of Metal Arts, Inc. v. Montecillo, G.R. No. 188169, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 416, 430; Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa MWC-East Zone Union v. Manila Water Company, Inc., G.R. No. 174179, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 263, 272-273; Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA), G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 119, 132; and Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., G.R. No. 183572, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 218, 232-233.

10.Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, G.R. No. 172086, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 676, 684.

11.See Poseidon International Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tito R. Tamala, et al., G.R. No. 186475, June 26, 2013 and Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Eleto B. Bañas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013.

12.Rollo, pp. 139-142, 184-188.

13.Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees Union — ALU-TUCP v. Philippine National Oil Company — Energy Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170351, March 30, 2011, 646 SCRA 658, 669.

14.Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, 260 Phil. 747, 757 (1990).

15.Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees Union — ALU-TUCP v. Philippine National Oil Company — Energy Development Corporation, supra note 13, at 666.

16.Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, supra note 14, at 763.

17.546 Phil. 516 (2007).

18.Rowell Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 526.

19.Supra note 14.

20.Rollo, p. 194.