THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198371. December 7, 2015.]
ATTY. FRANCISCO U. BULSECO, JR., petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO MIRAMON, NAMELY, EMILIA MIRAMON, JOSEFINA PICHAY-EVILLA, CONCEPCION PICHAY-GOROSPE, DOMINADOR MIRAMON PICHAY AND EDILBERTO MIRAMON PICHAY, ALL REPRESENTED BY JOSEFINA PICHAY-EVILLA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated December 7, 2015, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 198371 (Atty. Francisco U. Bulseco, Jr. vs. Heirs of Pedro Miramon, namely, Emilia Miramon, Josefina Pichay-Evilla, Concepcion Pichay-Gorospe, Dominador Miramon Pichay and Edilberto Miramon Pichay, all represented by Josefina Pichay-Evilla). — This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated June 3, 2011 and Resolution 2 dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 115403 which reversed and set aside the Order 3 dated April 29, 2010 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. II-2971, in favor of Atty. Francisco U. Bulseco, Jr. (petitioner) which awarded an attorney's lien through the transfer of 500 square meters of real property by the Heirs of Pedro Miramon namely, Emilia Miramon, Josefina Pichay-Evilla, Concepcion Pichay-Gorospe, Dominador Miramon Pichay and Edilberto Miramon Pichay, all represented by Josefina Pichay-Evilla (respondents).
Factual Background
On March 9, 2004, a Complaint 4 for annulment of sale and cancellation of title with reconveyance of an 8,247-sq.m. land located in Tallungan, Aparri, Cagayan was filed by the respondents against the heirs of Fernando Campo in the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan. The respondents were represented by the petitioner as their lawyer through a Contract of Services 5 dated June 11, 2003 wherein it was explicitly provided that a favorable judgment obtained by the respondents shall obligate them to convey, cede and transfer a 500-sq.m. portion of the lot under litigation, to be taken from the northernmost portion thereof, in favor of the petitioner. Paragraph 3 of the same contract provided that the same shall be effective during the lifetime of the civil action and shall cease after its final determination before the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan. 6
The civil action of the respondents prospered. In a Decision 7 dated July 8, 2008 in Civil Case No. II-2971, the RTC ordered the defendants a quo to reconvey an area of 2,749 sq.m. each of the land in favor of the heirs of Gregorio Miramon and the heirs of Agustin Miramon, respectively. 8
The defendants a quo appealed to the CA and the petitioner was furnished with a copy of the Notice of Appeal 9 dated July 18, 2008. The respondents, however, changed counsel and availed of the legal services of a new lawyer to represent them. Pending appeal, the petitioner wrote a letter 10 dated August 18, 2008 to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Cagayan regarding his agreement with his former clients (the respondents) about the transfer of 500-sq.m. portion of the property in litigation as evidenced by the Contract of Services 11 dated June 11, 2003 in payment for legal services he rendered. SaCIDT
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in its Decision 12 dated October 30, 2009. The CA decision became final and executory, hence, an Entry of Judgment 13 was issued on November 28, 2009.
The respondents filed a Motion for Execution to implement the CA Decision dated October 30, 2009 which was granted by the RTC on July 28, 2010. 14 On March 10, 2010, the petitioner also filed a motion for execution before the RTC pursuant to Section 37, Rule 137 of the 1997 Rules of Court for the enforcement of his agreement with the respondents that in the event they obtain a favorable judgment, they will convey, cede and transfer a portion of the lot to the petitioner. 15
The respondents countered contending that they entered into a new Contract of Services 16 with him on December 16, 2003 as he was in urgent need for cash for his annual trip to the United States of America (USA); that the previous stipulation as contained in paragraph (2) of the Contract of Services dated June 11, 2003 was converted when he agreed to be paid with cash in the amount of P30,000.00 plus P500.00 fee per court appearance. 17
In an Order 18 dated April 29, 2010, the RTC granted the motion of the petitioner and awarded him with an area of 500 sq.m. of the subject land as his attorney's lien. The RTC explained that the contract between the parties was valid and binding because "[t]he act of the counsel in handling the case after the execution of the contract, up to its termination before [the RTC], was an implied acceptance of such contract; otherwise, he should have desisted from handling it if he does not want to be embroiled thereat. In the same manner, the client instead of allowing and consenting to be represented by the counsel in all stages of the proceedings before [it], should have terminated the services of the counsel, if she does not want to be bound by such contract." 19
In granting the motion, the RTC opined that there was no specific provision in the second contract which expressly novated the contents of the first contract; that there was no proof that the P30,000.00 stated in paragraph (b) has been paid during the execution of the second contract; and that it would be unreasonable for a counsel to trade a prime 500-sq.m. land worth a million for a measly amount of P30,000.00 which is not enough to cover the cost of a roundtrip ticket to the USA. 20
The respondents sought for reconsideration 21 but it was denied by the RTC in its Resolution dated July 22, 2010. 22
Feeling aggrieved, the respondents elevated the matter before the CA via a petition for certiorari23 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In a Decision 24 dated June 3, 2011, the CA granted the petition. The CA pronounced that a contingent fee arrangement in a lawyer-client relationship is allowed in its jurisdiction subject, however, to judicial supervision as to its reasonableness which was wanting in the present case. 25 The CA observed that the petitioner failed to show the RTC's jurisdiction to order the annotation of the transfer of the 500-sq.m. portion of the litigated property as his attorney's lien. What he instead did was to write a letter to the RD regarding the matter. Also, he moved the court a quo for the satisfaction of his lien only after the appeal on the principal action has already been terminated. 26 And, even if there were no irreconcilable differences between the two Contracts of Services, still the first contract was considered void insofar as paragraph (2) thereof is concerned. Citing Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 27 and Section 37 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, 28 the CA opined that a charging lien in favor of a lawyer is proper only when a money judgment favorable to the client has been secured in the action. 29 Here, the action was not for a money judgment but for reconveyance of property. Therefore, there being no valid case made out for a charging lien and considering the parties' contract, the petitioner was considered not entitled to claim the same.
Hence, this case.
Ruling of the Court
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the CA.
Foremost, the respondents correctly resorted to the remedy of certiorari because there was an error of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court when it allowed the annotation of the attorney's lien on the title of the land. The Court quotes the CA's pronouncement on the matter, viz.:
The [RTC] has no jurisdiction to order the annotation of the attorney's lien after the appeal from the order declaring the lawyer entitled to such lien has been perfected. Instead of causing the recordal of his lien in the [RTC] while it still had jurisdiction over the case and custody over the records, [the petitioner] wrote concerning the same to the [RD]. Further, he moved the [RTC] for satisfaction of his lien only after the appeal on the main case has been terminated. 30 cHECAS
It is well-settled that "[a]n attorney's fee, in its ordinary concept, refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal services he has rendered to a client. The client and his lawyer may enter into a written contract whereby the latter would be paid attorney's fees only if the suit or litigation ends favorably to the client. This is called a contingency fee contract. The amount of attorney's fees in this contract may be on a percentage basis, and a much higher compensation is allowed in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails." 31
As aptly explained by the CA, contingent fees should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, pursuant to Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees. 32 Here, the legal services of the petitioner were engaged by the respondents to recover a certain parcel of land in Civil Case No. II-2971 as heirs. The judgment obtained by the respondents in such case was not a money judgment which, according to the CA, is among the requisites in order for a charging lien to be valid. Thus, such judgment did not entitle the petitioner to claim any charging lien because the land involved may not be used to pay for his legal services.
It has been consistently held that the practice of law is a profession, not a moneymaking venture. 33 "A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client's cause and a trustee of his client's cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of administering justice in society. It follows that a lawyer's compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his attorney's oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees." 34
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated June 3, 2011 and Resolution dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115403 are AFFIRMED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Manuel M. Barrios concurring; rollo, pp. 53-64.
2. Id. at 66.
3. Rendered by Presiding Judge Andres Q. Cipriano; id. at 98-100.
4. Id. at 109-116.
5. Id. at 145.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 136-142.
8. Id. at 142.
9. Id. at 143.
10. Id. at 144.
11. Id. at 145.
12. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring; id. at 148-162.
13. Id. at 163.
14. Issued by Pairing Judge Conrado F. Manauis; id. at 189-190.
15. Id. at 164-166.
16. Id. at 170.
17. Id. at 167-168.
18. Id. at 98-100.
19. Id. at 99-100.
20. Id. at 100.
21. Id. at 103-107.
22. Id. at 101-102.
23. Id. at 67-96.
24. Id. at 53-64.
25. Id. at 58-59.
26. Id. at 61-63.
27. Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
28. Sec. 37. Attorney's Liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
29. Rollo, pp. 59-61.
30. Id. at 61-62.
31. Atty. Orocio v. Anguluan, et al., 597 Phil. 524, 541-542 (2009).
32. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., 516 Phil. 605, 624 (2006).
33. Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez, 544 Phil. 447, 459 (2007).
34. Id. at 459-460.