Buenaventura v. Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 251490. September 29, 2021.]

NARCISO L. BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs.ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILS., INC., ENTERPRISE SHIPPING COMPANY AND RICHARD P. PALPAL-LATOC, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 251490 (Narciso L. Buenaventura v. Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc., Enterprise Shipping Company and Richard P. Palpal-Latoc). — The instant petition for review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated October 2, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 160643 denying payment of full disability benefits, sickness allowances and damages to petitioner seafarer Narciso L. Buenaventura (Narciso).

Facts of the Case

Narciso worked for respondent Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. (Elburg) under several employment contracts since May 15, 2005. 3 On July 16, 2017, Elburg, acting on behalf of its foreign principal, Enterprise Shipping Company, rehired Narciso as fitter for a contract term of nine (9) months on board MSC Katrina. The employment contract was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and the International Maritime Employer's Council (IBF-AMOSUP IMEC/TCCC). 4 As fitter, Narciso is assigned at the engine department under the guidance of the second engineer. His duties entailed operating the lathe machine and is mainly responsible for welding, grinding, boring and gas cutting parts and pieces of the vessel from brackets to installing doors and maintenance of parts in the hull of the vessel. 5

Prior deployment, Narciso had been declared by the company-designated physician as fit for sea duties in the mandatory pre-employment medical examination (PEME). 6 On July 16, 2017, Narciso was deployed for MSC Katrina. Narciso claimed that while onboard the vessel on September 6, 2017, he experienced a headache and suffered from an episode of vertigo. He reported his symptoms to his supervisors, who instructed him to rest for the day. Narciso claimed that after three days, he then experienced numbness in his entire body. He alleged that the first engineer informed him of his medical examination and treatment upon reaching the next port. However, the vessel's master later advised that he will instead be repatriated to the Philippines for treatment. 7 TIADCc

Upon repatriation, Narciso claimed that on September 16, 2017, he immediately reported his medical conditions to respondent Elburg for referral to the company-designated physicians. Narciso received a health card from the company. 8 On 17 September 2017, he proceeded to a hospital in Olongapo City where he underwent a series of medical tests such as blood chemistry, urinalysis, x-ray, ultrasound, cranial CT Scan and echocardiography. 9 On 19 September 2017, Narciso was admitted to the hospital due to his persisting dizziness. 10 On 22 September 2017, Narciso had been discharged. 11 On the same day, the physician from the hospital issued a clinical abstract stating the following findings:

TIA (periventricular white matter/ischemic dyscrasia);

Nepholitiasis bilateral;

Dyslipidemia;

CAP II, IPG;

Thombocytopenia r/o blood dyscrasia. 12

In a medical certificate dated September 22, 2017, the physician from the hospital reiterated the foregoing findings and advised Narciso to rest for four (4) months. 13 On October 17, 2017, Narciso consulted with his personal physician, who assessed him as "(n)ot fit to work since he is high risk of bleeding with his present blood platelet count." 14 Narciso then sought consultation and treatment with another physician who assessed him with the following conditions:

Idiopathic Thrombocytopenic Purpura

Transient Ischemic Attack

Bilateral Nephrolithiasis 15

The same physician issued an assessment dated December 7, 2017, stating that Narciso is "unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity." The physician also concluded that Narciso's illness is "considered work aggravated/related." 16 With the foregoing assessment, Narciso claimed payment of disability benefits and other remuneration from Elburg. However, the company denied payment. As a result, Narciso filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for his disability claims. 17

Elburg, on the other hand, denied liability for payment of disability benefits to Narciso. The company claimed that Narciso was disembarked from the vessel on September 16, 2017 due to the completion of his probationary period on the vessel. The vessel owner assessed Narciso's performance to be poor resulting in his repatriation. Nevertheless, as Narciso had been in the employ of Elburg for a number of employment contracts, the company claimed of offering payment of severance pay equivalent to two (2) months salary. Elburg alleged that the parties agreed on a meeting for the settlement, but Narciso did not appear. Later, the company was surprised that a labor complaint had been filed by Narciso against them. 18

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In a Decision 19 dated July 31, 2018 the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Narciso. The LA held that Narciso had been medically repatriated. This is proven by the undisputed fact that Narciso received a health card from respondent Elburg, and that he was admitted and confined at a hospital from September 19 to 22 2017, which are dates close to his repatriation on September 16, 2017. Anent Narciso's illnesses, the LA ruled it to be work-related. His various conditions were contracted due to his long years of sea deployment and were aggravated in his latest employment with Elburg. The LA held that the company failed to refute Narciso's position on the laborious nature of his work as fitter and the mental and physical stress he was exposed during the term of the contract. The LA also concluded that Narciso's cardiovascular ailment is compensable as he was incapacitated to return for sea duties because of his work-related illnesses. The unrebutted medical assessments issued by Narciso's physicians support the LA's findings of his unfitness to return for sea duties. 20

As to the Elburg's allegations, the LA was unconvinced that Narciso had been disembarked from the vessel due to his poor performance. The company did not present any documentary proof, particularly, the owner's request to relieve Narciso from his duties. The LA also did not consider Elburg's contention that Narciso failed to comply with the three-day rule for post-employment medical examination from his repatriation. Based on the facts, it was the company who failed to comply with its duty to refer Narciso to a company-designated physician. In any case, the LA found substantial compliance with the three-day rule, when Narciso seasonably used the health card from Elburg for his medical examinations at an accredited hospital. From the foregoing, the LA awarded permanent and total disability benefits amounting to US$102,308.00 pursuant to the CBA, US$3,116.00 sickness allowance and 10% attorney's fees. 21

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Elburg filed an appeal and on October 30, 2018, 22 the NLRC rendered its Decision denying payment of full disability benefits to Narciso. The NLRC noted that all physicians whom Narciso consulted were unanimous in declaring that his low blood platelet count incapacitated him to resume his sea duties. His other ailments, while diagnosed and could have been triggered or exacerbated by his work, were not found as the cause of his unfitness to return to work. In view of the common assessments, the NLRC limited its analysis in determining whether the condition of low blood platelet count or thrombocytopenia is work-related or not. 23 Citing online sources, the NLRC defined Thrombocytopenia as a condition that can arise due to decreased production of platelets in the bone marrow or increased breakdown of platelets in the bloodstream, spleen or liver. The immune system destroys the blood platelets which are necessary for blood clotting. One of Narciso's physicians assessed that his condition is Idiopathic Thrombocytopenia Purpura. Idiopathic, to mean that the cause of certain illness is unknown or uncertain. As Narciso's condition is diagnosed as idiopathic and triggered by the failure in the immune system, the NLRC was unconvinced that Narciso's work caused or exacerbated his condition. 24 Moreover, the NLRC observed in the medical assessment from one of Narciso's physicians, that the seafarer had been examined in 2012 for low platelet count. This established that Narciso's condition was pre-existing and could not have been caused or aggravated by his work. The NLRC, however, agrees with the LA that Narciso was medically repatriated. The company failed to provide evidence to support its claim that Narciso had been disembarked due to the completion of a probationary period and the vessel owner's instructions to relieve him from sea duties for poor performance. 25 Although the NLRC found bad faith in the company for not acknowledging that Narciso suffered from an illness on board the vessel, the NLRC held that it cannot award payment of full disability benefits for failure to show that his illness is work-related. Nonetheless, the NLRC awarded P200,000.00 as financial assistance. 26 AaCTcI

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Narciso filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals assailing the NLRC Decision. On October 2, 2019, the CA rendered its Decision 27 affirming the denial of payment of permanent and total disability benefits. The CA gave credence to Elburg's contention of Narciso's failure to comply with the three-day rule in referring his medical condition to the company-designated physicians from repatriation. The presence of the medical health card alone did not prove that he subjected himself to the mandated post-employment medical examination. The CA further held that the medical assessment issued by the physician from the health card-accredited hospital did not show that Narciso suffered from a permanent and total disability. There was no indication that Narciso needed further medication or treatment. Further, the assessments of Narciso's physicians hold no credence because the same lacked details on how Narciso was evaluated by the physicians. There were no descriptions of tests or procedures conducted on him and was merely "tailored" to support the claim for disability benefits. Narciso is not entitled to payment of disability benefits and sickness allowance. The CA, however, upheld the award of P200,000.00 financial assistance for humanitarian reasons. The CA also ruled the money award amounting to P200,000.00 is final considering that Elburg did not raise its payment as an issue. 28

Proceedings before the Court

Narciso filed the instant appeal by certiorari assailing the CA Decision. He emphasized that he sustained several illnesses on board the vessel affecting his brain, kidney, lungs, blood and blood platelet. It was an error for the NLRC to narrow down review of his case to only one illness. All his illnesses, including stroke and nephrolithiasis, should have been taken in their totality. The ailments should not have been considered independently from one another. 29

Narciso argued that he worked with Elburg for over 8 years. His constant exposure to the harsh conditions and strenuous work onboard the vessel likely caused his illnesses, including the blood platelet dysfunction. Further, he was declared fit for sea duties in his PEME. Thus, having suffered from illnesses while onboard the vessel, it follows that he contracted the illnesses from his work. He argued that this is reasonable linkage to show that his illnesses are work-related and compensable. 30

Narciso also argued that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) provides for a disputable presumption of work relation to the illnesses. While his personal physician found one of his illnesses as "idiopathic" or the cause of certain illnesses to be unknown, this is not reason to hold outright the that there is no work-relation to his illness. 31 Absent proof from the company that his illness is not work related, the disputable presumption must apply. Further, the medical assessments of the physician from the health card-accredited hospital and Narciso's physicians consistently show that his conditions are permanent in character as they were never resolved. The assessment of the physician from the health card-accredited hospital neither made a declaration of Narciso's fitness to return to work, nor any issuance of the disability grading. Considering that Narciso was incapacitated to perform his sea duties for over 120 days, his illnesses are deemed permanent and total. 32

Narciso also asserted that his disability claims and other benefits cannot be forfeited because he complied with the three-day rule for post-employment medical examination from his repatriation. In fact, Elburg provided him a health card on 16 September 2017, which was the day after he disembarked from the vessel. The health card is substantial evidence that Elburg has actual knowledge of his illnesses which manifested onboard the vessel. Finally, Narciso claimed payment of his entitled sickness allowances and attorney's fees. 33 SDHTEC

In the Comment, 34 Elburg reiterated the ruling of the CA. The company emphasized that Narciso should be disqualified from receiving disability benefits and his money claims for failure to comply with the mandated three-day rule on post-employment medical examination upon repatriation. Elburg argued that Narciso failed to provide details surrounding the circumstances for his referral to the company-designated physician. 35 In any case, the company claimed that it has no duty to refer Narciso to the company-designated physician as he was not medically repatriated but disembarked due to the end of his probationary period. Further, Elburg emphasized that the assessment of the physician from the health card-accredited hospital did not even find Narciso's illnesses to be permanent and total. The physician merely advised the seafarer to rest for 4 months which is not a finding of unfitness to return to work. 36

Elburg also argued that the medical assessments of Narciso's personal physicians do not deserve credence because the medical assessments were obtained months after his repatriation. Narciso could have been exposed to other factors risking his health during the intervening period from his repatriation to the time he consulted his personal physicians. Moreover, the medical history from one of Narciso's physicians even stated that he had been examined in 2012 for low platelet count which means that he was suffering from a pre-existing illness. 37 The company argued that Narciso concealed his pre-existing illness prior deployment, disqualifying him from receiving the benefits and compensation under the POEA-SEC. Narciso cannot use the fit to work assessment in the PEME as basis to claim disability benefits because he failed to disclose a pre-existing illness. Nevertheless, the PEME is not conclusive proof that a seafarer is free from any ailment prior deployment. It is not exploratory and does not identify the real state of health of the seafarer. 38

Finally, Elburg contends that Narciso should not be paid sickness allowances as he is not medically repatriated. He should also be denied payment of attorney's fees because there is no compensable disability to warrant this award. There was also no proof that the company acted in bad faith. Elburg even offered to pay severance pay equivalent to two-month salary after he disembarked from the vessel due to the end of his probationary period. 39

Ruling of the Court

Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC provides for the employer's liabilities to a seafarer who suffered from a work related illness or injury. Under this section, the employer has the duty to refer the seafarer to the company designated-physician for post-employment medical examination or treatment. Prior referral, the seafarer must have submitted oneself to the employer within three days from repatriation. The three-day rule is mandatory as it reasonably allows the company-designated physician to assess the seafarer's true conditions upon repatriation. 40 The foregoing duties find application when the seafarer is medically repatriated. 41

Here, parties differed in their version of facts surrounding Narciso's repatriation from the vessel. Narciso claimed that the provisions of Section 20 (A) of the POEA-SEC will apply because he was medically repatriated, while Elburg denied liability under the provision as Narciso was repatriated due to the end of his probationary period. We find for Narciso.

Based from the POEA-approved contract, 42 Narciso was hired on a fixed-term basis for a period of nine months. Nowhere in the contract did it state that Narciso was initially to work on probationary status. Elburg must prove that the terms and conditions on the probationary period have been evaluated, verified and approved by the POEA similar to the nine-month contract. Here, Elburg only presented an undated certification 43 signed by Captain Popovic Boris stating that Narciso signed off from MSC Katrina on September 15, 2017 in Jabel Ali due to the "end of probation." Other than this self-serving certification, there are no records to convince Us that Narciso entered a fixed term contract with a probationary period. Notably, it is undisputed that Narciso had been repeatedly hired by Elburg prior to the contract in this case. Thus, and as discussed by the NLRC in its Decision, given Narciso's employment history with Elburg, it is "unthinkable" that Narciso was an unsatisfactory worker and was repatriated for poor performance. There were even no records to support the company's allegation that the vessel owner requested for Narciso's disembarkation. To Our mind, Narciso was medically repatriated for the conditions he suffered on board the vessel. AScHCD

We also find that Narciso sought for referral and post-employment medical examination from Elburg and the company-designated physician. Elburg does not deny providing Narciso a medical health card. Logically, Narciso's examinations and consultation with a physician from the health card-accredited hospital is funded by Elburg through the health card. In this sense, We can reasonably conclude that the physician from the health-card accredited hospital is the company-designated physician. Anent compliance with the three-day rule for post-employment medical examination, We find that Narciso timely complied with the period. On record, Narciso's medical examinations on September 17, 2017 44 and eventual admission to the hospital on September 19, 2017 45 clearly fall within 3 days from his repatriation on September 16, 2017. Between the positive narration of Narciso on compliance with the three-day rule which is supported by medical records and Elburg's bare denial that Narciso failed to seek referral from the company, We give credence to Narciso.

Having settled that Narciso is medically repatriated and that he complied with the three-day rule on post-employment medical examination, the company is liable to pay Narciso his entitled sickness allowance under Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC. 46 As to entitlement to disability benefits, the same provision states that an employer shall be liable for a seafarer's illness or injury when it is proven that: (1) the injury or illness is work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. From the discussions above, Narciso was medically repatriated for conditions suffered on board the vessel or during the term of his contract. Hence, We now focus discussion whether Narciso's illnesses are work-related or work-aggravated.

In a pro-forma assessment dated September 22, 2017, 47 the company-designated physician stated:

This is to certify that BUENAVENTURA, NARCISO L., 53 y/o a resident of x x x was examined/treated/confined in this hospital from Sept. 19, 2017 to Sept. 22, 2017 with the following diagnosis: TIA (periventricular white matter/ischemic dyscrasia); Nephrolithiasis bilateral; Dyslipidemia; CAP II, IPG; Thrombocytopenia r/o blood dyscrasia. Remarks: Rest day for 4 months. x x x (underscoring in the original)

Contrary to the NLRC in deciding the issue of work-relation on only one illness, the determination must be made on all illnesses as found by the company-designated physician, namely: (1) TIA (periventricular white matter/ischemic dyscrasia); (2) Nephrolithiasis bilateral; (3) Dyslipidemia; (4) CAP II, IPG; and (5) Thrombocytopenia r/o blood dyscrasia.

Section 20 (A) (4) of the 2010 POEA-SEC provides that illnesses not listed in Section 32 of the same law are disputably presumed work-related. In Ventis v. Salenga, 48 the Court discussed that this presumption is applicable when the seafarer suffers from the unlisted illness during the term of the contract. The unlisted illness suffered onboard the vessel enjoys the disputable presumption of work-relation because it is at such time that the seafarer is under the direct control and supervision of the employer, who is tasked to "take all necessary precautions to x x x protect the health of the seafarer." 49 The disputable presumption under Section 20 (A) (4) operates in favor of the employee and the burden rests upon his or her employer to overcome the statutory presumption. 50 The employer can only overcome this presumption of work-relation if there is sufficient basis to support the assessment that the seafarer's illness was not work-related. In this case, absent proof from Elburg, the unlisted illnesses, except TIA or the Transient Ischemic Attack, are presumed work-related.

Elburg argued that Narciso is burdened to prove the general conditions under Section 32-A to benefit compensability, viz.: AcICHD

(1) the seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;

(2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;

(3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and

(4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. 51

We do not agree. When the seafarer's illness or injury is suffered during the term of the contract, as in this case, the seafarer need not further prove that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of illness or injury for the presumption to apply. Thus, the foregoing general conditions under Section 32-A are not applicable because Narciso suffered his illnesses during the term of the contract.

We also do not find concealment on the part of Narciso. While he may have been examined in 2012 for low platelet count, such is not conclusive to prove that he had been diagnosed and made specifically aware of the illness Thrombocytopenia to fall under the definition of a pre-existing illness 52 under the POEA-SEC. Further, Elburg's contention of concealment of a pre-existing illness involve factual issues that should have been raised at first instance before the labor arbiter and not before this Court pursuant to the principles of due process and fair play. The company only took cue of this issue from the NLRC Decision without offering evidence. In fact, We note Elburg's original position was that Narciso is not entitled to disability benefits because he was not medically repatriated.

As to the degree of disability, it is paramount that the company-designated physician definitively issues a medical assessment. This duty is embodied in Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC which provides that the company-designated physician shall issue a final assessment declaring the seafarer's fitness for sea duties or the degree of disability. 53 A final and definitive disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the extent of the sickness or injuries to the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such. 54 Here, We agree with Narciso that the assessment dated September 22, 2017 issued by the company-designated physician is not final for failure to state his fitness to work or the degree of disability. The assessment merely enumerated the illnesses of Narciso and recommended four months of rest. There was no indication whether or not his ailments are resolved. Narciso was left guessing the true status of his health. In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., 55 the Court emphasized that the following requirements must concur for the determination of the seafarer's condition: (1) an assessment must be issued within the 120/240-day window; and (2) the assessment must be final and definitive. Absent any of the foregoing, the seafarers' illness shall be deemed permanent and total. 56 In this case, considering that the assessment of the company-designated physician is not final, definitive and conclusive, Narciso's illnesses are deemed permanent and total. TAIaHE

Finally, We uphold the LA's award of permanent and total disability benefits under the CBA. Section 20.1.3.1 of the CBA 57 provides that a seafarer shall be entitled to compensation for a permanent disability as a result of a work-related illness. Based from the table of disability compensation in the CBA, 58 Narciso's rank as fitter merits the disability award amounting to US$102,308.00 for Impediment Grade 1. We also hold that Narciso is entitled to attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the money award following Article 2208 59 of the New Civil Code, which allows its recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under the employer's liability laws.

Respondents Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc., its President Richard P. Palpal-Latoc, and Enterprise Shipping Company shall be jointly and severally liable to Narciso in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, 60 as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, 61 which provides that "if the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages." 62

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 2, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 160643 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are jointly and solidarily liable to pay Narciso L. Buenaventura:

1) US$102,308.00 as permanent and total disability benefits pursuant to the IBF-AMOSUP IMEC/TCCC.

2) Sickness allowance equivalent to the seafarer's basic wage computed from the time he signed off until the 120th day from the seafarer's repatriation on September 16, 2017.

3) Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the money award.

All monetary award shall be subject to the interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Resolution until full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED." (Leonen, J.,on official leave.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 28-54.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Pedro B. Corales and Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas; id. at 11-22.

3.Id. at 213; 257-259; 151.

4.Id. at 12.

5.Rollo, p. 419.

6.Id. at 218.

7.Id. at 220.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 220-221.

10.Id. at 282.

11.Id.

12.Id.

13.Id. at 281.

14.Id. at 221.

15.Id. at 285.

16.Id. at 286.

17.Id. at 174.

18.Id. at 174-175.

19.Id. at 417-427.

20.Id. at 422-423.

21.Id. at 424-426.

22. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Grace E. Maniquiz-Tan; id. at 144-158.

23.Id. at 154.

24.Id. at 155.

25.Id. at 424.

26.Id. at 157-158.

27.Supra note 2.

28.Rollo, pp. 18-21.

29.Id. at 38.

30.Id. at 39-40.

31.Id. at 45.

32.Id. at 48-50.

33.Id. at 50-54.

34.Id. at 523-524.

35.Id. at 530-533.

36.Id. at 534-535.

37.Id. at 535-536.

38.Id. at 536-538.

39.Id. at 541-543.

40.Daño v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp., G.R. No. 236351, September 7, 2020.

41. Section (20) (A).

42.Rollo, pp. 261-262.

43.Id. at 531.

44.Id. at 265.

45.Id. at 282.

46. Section 20 (A) (3).

47.Rollo, p. 281.

48. G.R. No. 238578, June 8, 2020.

49.Ventis Maritime Corporation v. Salenga, G.R. No. 238578, June 8, 2020.

50.Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. Heirs of Fritz D. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 227447, June 23, 2020 citing Phil-Man Marine Agency, Inc. v. Dedace, Jr., G.R. No. 199162, July 4, 2018.

51. Section 32-A, 2010 POEA-SEC.

52. Definitions and Terms:

xxx xxx xxx

11. Pre-existing illness — an illness shall be considered as pre-existing if prior to the processing of the POEA Contract, any of the following conditions are present:

a. The advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing illness or condition; or

b. The seafarer had been diagnosed and has knowledge of such an illness or condition but failed to disclose the same during pre-employment medical examination (PEME), and such cannot be diagnosed during the PEME.

53. Section 20 (A) (2).

54.Pastor v. Bibby Shipping Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 238842, November 19, 2018.

55. 765 Phil. 341 (2015).

56.Id.

57.Rollo, p. 302.

58.Id. at 303.

59. Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

xxx xxx xxx

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

60. Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

61. An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8042, Otherwise Known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995.

62. See Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., 793 Phil. 535 (2016).