Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v. Casas

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200898. October 5, 2015.]

BROWN MADONNA PRESS, INC., THADDEUS ANTHONY A. CABANGON, FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (now Fortune General Insurance Corporation) and/or ANTONIO CABANGON-CHUA, petitioners, vs. MARIA ROSARIO M. CASAS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated05 October 2015 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 200898 (BROWN MADONNA PRESS, INC., THADDEUS ANTHONY A. CABANGON, FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (now Fortune General Insurance Corporation) and/or ANTONIO CABANGON-CHUA, Petitioners, v. MARIA ROSARIO M. CASAS, Respondent). — This is a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 200898 affirming the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 116539.

We found no error in the CA's decision to uphold the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruling that the respondent Maria Rosario Casas (Casas) had been illegally dismissed by petitioner Brown Madonna Press, Inc. (BMPI).

Specifically, the CA did not err in finding that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as Casas had sufficiently proven that she was summarily dismissed from work based on two documents: (1) the letter she sent to BMPI asking for her reinstatement, and (2) the clearance and quitclaim document that BMPI introduced in evidence.

We also held that BMPI failed to prove its defense that Casas resigned from work, as the pieces of evidence it presented merely established a possible motive to resign.

With the fact of dismissal established, we proceeded to affirm the CA's legal conclusion that Casas had not been accorded procedural and substantive due process as the lower tribunal found; Casas had not been given the opportunity to assail the allegations against her.

The motion for reconsideration

In the present motion for reconsideration, BMPI reiterates that Casas had requested a graceful exit from the company through BMPI's company president, Antonio Cabangon-Chua, which request the latter granted. The Clearance and Quitclaim document (which Casas did not sign) was meant to facilitate this agreement.

BMPI claims that it never received a letter from Casas asking for her reinstatement; thus, this cited evidence should not be used against it.

Lastly, BMPI asserts that it did not summarily dismiss Casas; there was no need for to accord her the procedural and substantive requirements as Casas had requested a graceful exit from the company; in short, she resigned from work.

Discussion:

We deny BMPI's motion for reconsideration, as its arguments are rehashes of previously submitted arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Even if we were to entertain these arguments, we would nevertheless deny the motion for the following reasons:

First, the extent of review that the Court accords to questions of fact in a labor case is limited: we ask whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in its decision. Our review does not involve a total re-evaluation of the evidence adduced.

The CA, in concluding that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion, found that the NLRC's factual conclusion (that Casas had been summarily dismissed) was based on two documents submitted in evidence and on Casas' testimony. We find no grave abuse of discretion in the CA's conclusion, as the NLRC's evaluation of these pieces of evidence had not been arbitrary, capricious, or in blatant disregard of reason and the law.

Second, even if we were to re-evaluate the petitioners' evidence and hold that the CA should have given due weight to BMPI's denial of its receipt of Casas' letter (requesting for reinstatement) and to BMPI's denial that Casas had been summarily dismissed, the evidentiary situation would still result in equipoise. These bare denials, even when given weight, would only negate Casas's testimonies that she sent the letter and that she was summarily dismissed. CAIHTE

The pieces of evidence left uncontested would be the Clearance and Quitclaim Document establishing that BMPI intended to sever its relationship with Casas sometime on January 5, 2007, and the fact that there had been a private conversation between Casas and Cabangon-Chua on January 5, 2007, after which, Casas left the building with her belongings and did not report back to work the next working day.

In equipoise situations (or when the evidence presented by the employer and the employee counterbalance each other), the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employee. 1

Thus, while the remaining uncontested pieces of evidence may support either the employee or the employer's version of the truth because both are of equal probative value, the employee's version should prevail.

Under these principles, Casas's version that she had been summarily dismissed during her private conversation with Cabangon-Chua, should prevail over the latter's assertion that she resigned.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents Brown Madonna Press, Inc., Thaddeus Anthony A. Cabangon, Fortune Life Insurance Company (now Fortune General Insurance Corporation) and/or Antonio Cabangon Chua in G.R. No. 200898, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

 

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

* Carpio, J., on official leave; Brion, J., designated as acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2222 dated September 29, 2015; Peralta, J., designated as acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Special Order No. 2223 dated September 29, 2015; Jardeleza, J., designated as acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza, per Special Order No. 2246 dated October 5, 2015.

1. Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, G.R. No. 159195, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 308, 323, citing Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 129329, July 31, 2011, 362 SCRA 56, 68.