Binay v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) Presiding Justice Amparo Cabotaje-Tang

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 231262-65. June 14, 2021.]

DR. ELENITA BINAY, petitioner,vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) PRESIDING JUSTICE AMPARO CABOTAJE-TANG, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 14, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 231262-65 (DR. ELENITA BINAY, petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) PRESIDING JUSTICE AMPARO CABOTAJE-TANG, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents). — For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari1 assailing the Resolutions 2 of the Sandiganbayan, which denied Dr. Elenita Binay's (Binay) Omnibus Motion and Motion for Inhibition.

On May 9, 2011, four Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging several individuals with malversation and violation of Section 3 (c) of Republic Act No. 3019. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0272 and SB-11-CRM-0273, as well as Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0274 and SB-11-CRM-0275. 3

These cases arose from two separate proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman.

People v. Santiago, et al., involved Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0272 and SB-11-CRM-0273 (then OMB-C-C-05-0048-B and OMB-C-C-03-0166-C) for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for malversation, respectively. 4 The charges covered the allegedly anomalous procurement of P36,431,700.00 worth of hospital beds and bedside cabinets. 5 It was committed in 2001 and was covered by Purchase Order No. 11657. 6

On the other hand, People v. Asunio, et al., involved Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0274 and SB-11-CRM-0275 (then OMB-C-C-0-0163) for malversation and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, respectively. 7 The charges arose from the alleged irregularities committed in procuring autoclave machines and dry heat sterilizers in 2000, as covered by Purchase Order No. 11482. 8

Subsequently, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in the Santiago case, filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion and Compliance. It sought, among others, the admission of the Amended Informations 9 to include the following as accused: IDaEHC

1. Elenita C. Binay;

2. Nicanor V. Santiago, Jr.;

3. Ernesto A. Aspillaga;

4. Virgilio M. Clarete;

5. Dulce P. Cruz;

6. Luz R. Yamane-Garcia;

7. Conrado B. Pamintuan;

8. Nestor R. Bulos;

9. Jaime P. Delos Reyes;

10. Apollo B. Carreon; and

11. Carmen C. Maano. 10

In its May 14, 2014 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Informations in Santiago. 11

Meanwhile, in the Asunio case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a Memorandum on the Consolidated Resolution. 12 It prayed that the attached Amended Informations be admitted so that the following will be included as accused:

1. Elenita Binay;

2. Nicanor V. Santiago, Jr.;

3. Ernesto A. Aspillaga;

4. Pascualita Capaycapay-Penaflor;

5. Edgardo M. Mamuyac;

6. Virgilio M. Clarete:

7. Dulce P. Cruz;

8. Luz R. Yamane-Garcia;

9. Conrado B. Pamintuan;

10. Nestor R. Bulos;

11. Jaime P. Delos Reyes; and

12. Apollo B. Carreon. 13

The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Informations in its August 29, 2014 Resolution. 14

It then dropped the titles of Santiago and Asunio and proceeded to jointly hear the cases as People v. Elenita Binay, et al. 15

On arraignment, Binay refused to enter a plea. As a result, a plea of not guilty was entered for her. 16

Later, Binay confirmed that the four cases were raffled together. Claiming that her constitutional rights were violated, she filed an Omnibus Motion 17 for the re-raffling and the conduct of separate trials for Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0272-0273 and Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0274-0275. 18

Binay then moved 19 for Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang (Justice Cabotaje-Tang) to inhibit from the cases. 20 She alleged that during the October 13, 2016 hearing on the Omnibus Motion, Justice Cabotaje-Tang made statements that showed bias and partiality against Binay's cases. 21

In its January 13, 2017 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied Binay's Omnibus Motion and Motion for Inhibition. 22 It noted that the cases were consolidated as early as 2011 and Binay was included as an accused in 2014; thus, her failure to immediately question the consolidation of cases showed that the Omnibus Motion was an afterthought meant to delay the proceedings. 23

Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan found the consolidation of cases proper. 24 It decreed that the cases covered offenses of the same class and involved similar parties. These circumstances, according to the Sandiganbayan, warranted the consolidation of cases. 25

As to the allegation of bias and partiality, the Sandiganbayan decreed that Binay failed to substantiate her claim. As such, it maintained that magistrates would be presumed to decide cases on their merits, without fear or favor. 26

Binay moved for reconsideration, 27 but it was denied on March 22, 2017 Resolution. 28

Hence, Binay filed a Petition for Certiorari29 before this Court.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her Omnibus Motion. She maintains that the consolidation of cases was improper since they are unrelated with each other. She stresses that the cases pertain to different transactions and sets of accused, and require varying pieces of evidence. 30

Rather than simplify, petitioner says the consolidation of cases causes confusion on the proceedings, 31 violating her constitutional right to speedy trial. She notes that the prosecution would have to finish presenting its evidence in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0272-0273 before the evidence in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0274-0275 may be presented, delaying the cases' resolution. 32

Petitioner further contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in denying her Motion for Inhibition. She avers that Justice Cabotaje-Tang's demeanor during the October 13, 2016 hearing showed her bias and partiality. 33

Petitioner adds that the denial of her Omnibus Motion and the release to media outlets of the January 16, 2017 Resolution a day before she received a copy of it all the more show that she would not be afforded fair trial. 34

Finally, petitioner denies that the filing of the Omnibus Motion was a mere afterthought meant to delay the proceedings. 35

In its Comment, 36 respondent Office of the Special Prosecutor asserts that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Sandiganbayan. It insists that the cases were properly consolidated since they arose from the same transaction, involving similar issues and the same set of evidence. 37 DTCSHA

It likewise contends that Justice Cabotaje-Tang's supposed bias was unsupported by substantial evidence. 38

In her Reply, 39 petitioner reiterates that the consolidation of cases was improper 40 and that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying her Motion for Inhibition. 41

This Court resolves the following issues:

First, whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Elenita Binay's Omnibus Motion;

Second, whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner Elenita Binay's Motion to Inhibit Presiding Justice Amparo Cabotaje-Tang.

The Petition is partly meritorious.

I

Consolidation "is a procedural tool that permits individual cases that involve common questions of fact or law to be jointly heard and resolved by a court or tribunal." 42 Its purpose is to "avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, save unnecessary costs and expense. In brief, consolidation seeks to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the litigants." 43

The rule on consolidation of criminal cases is provided under Rule 119, Section 22 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It states:

SECTION 22. Consolidation of Trials of Related Offenses. — Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied)

In relation, Rule XIII, Section 4 of the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan provides: cDSAEI

SECTION 4. Consolidation and Transfer of Cases. — Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is assigned, in order to promote the speedy disposition of cases, and serve the convenience of the parties and the interest of justice.

(a) Before Cases are Raffled. — If the propriety of consolidation appears upon the filing of the cases concerned as determined by the Raffle Committee, all such cases shall be consolidated but considered individually except for purposes of the raffle-determining Division caseload.

(b) After the Cases are Raffled. — If the propriety of such consolidation becomes apparent only after the cases are raffled, consolidation may be effected motu proprio by the Division or upon written motion of a litigant concerned filed with the Division taking cognizance of the case to be consolidated. If the motion is granted, consolidation shall be made to the Division with the lowest docket number, and if the latter accepts the consolidation, it may transfer to the former, an equivalent number of cases of approximately the same number of parties, age, nature and stage in the proceedings, with proper notice to the parties in said cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Whether cases should be consolidated is a matter of judicial discretion. 44 Absent any finding of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not disturb, much less overturn, a court's finding on this matter. 45

Neri v. Sandiganbayan46 set out the guidelines in the consolidation of cases:

Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation of trial. As held in Caños v. Peralta, joint trial is permissible "where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties." More elaborately, joint trial is proper

where the offenses charged are similar, related, or connected, or are of the same or similar character or class or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts, occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where the same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their prosecution, and if not joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on each trial.

In terms of its effects on the prompt disposition of cases, consolidation could cut both ways. It may expedite trial or it could cause delays. Cognizant of this dichotomy, the Court, in Dacanay v. People, stated the dictum that "the resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the government cannot . . . be given preference over the right to a speedy trial and the protection of a person's life, liberty or property." Indeed, the right to a speedy resolution of cases can also be affected by consolidation. As we intoned in People v. Sandiganbayan, a case involving the denial by the anti-graft court of the prosecution's motion to consolidate a criminal case for indirect bribery with another case for plunder, consolidation should be refused if it will unduly expose a party, private respondent in that instance, to totally unrelated testimonies, delay the resolution of the indirect bribery case, muddle the issues, and expose him to the inconveniences of a lengthy and complicated legal battle in the plunder case. Consolidation, the Court added, has also been rendered inadvisable by supervening events — in particular, if the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial had already been heard in the earlier case. 47 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A perusal of the records reveals that there is a need for separate trials. CScTED

In criminal actions, such as the cases faced by petitioner, the prosecution is duty bound to prove the accused's guilt by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It must present evidence, exhibits, and witnesses which would establish the accused's guilt. The accused's guilt or innocence is a question of fact which "hinges heavily on proof that the overt acts constituting, or the elements, of the crime were indeed committed or are present[.]" 48

Here, petitioner stressed that the charges against her pertained to different transactions, covered by distinct purchase orders and committed on separate occasions. They likewise involved unrelated documentary exhibits and pieces of evidence.

Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0272-0273 relate to the allegedly anomalous procurement of hospital beds and bedside cabinets in 2001, covered by Purchase Order No. 11657. 49 To establish the accused's guilt, the prosecution marked the following exhibits, among others:

 

J-1	Check No. 062709 dated April 30, 2001 for P35,106,910.91
J-2	Official Receipt No. 12885 issued by Apollo Medical Equipments (sic) and Supplies dated 4-30-2001 for P35,106,910.91
J-3	Handwritten notes referring to PO 11657
J-4	Disbursement Voucher No. 1730 dated 4/30/2001
J-7	Certificate of Authentication dated February 23, 2001
J-8	Certification dated February 21, 2001
J-9	Certification dated October 19, 2000
J-13	Certificate of Supplier's Accreditation dated July 7, 2000
J-14	Letter dated March 29, 2000 to Apollo B. Carreon from DTI
J-15	Manual of various hospital beds
J-47	Notice of Delivery dated April 24, 2001
J-49	Sales Invoice No. 12476 dated 04-20-01 of Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies, white copy
J-52	Sales Invoice No. 12474 dated 04-20-01 of Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies, white copy
J-64	Certificate of Purchase and Delivery Supplies dated April 20, 2001 signed by Nestor Bulos and Nicanor V. Santiago, Jr.
J-68	Purchase Order No. 116570 dated March 14, 2001
J-71	Purchase Order No. 116570 dated March 14, 2001, signed by Ernesto A. Aspillaga and Elenita S. Binay, white copy 50

 

On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0274-0275 pertain to the supposedly improper bidding and irregular procurement of autoclave machines and dry heat sterilizers 51 sometime in 2000. 52 The prosecution, in its Pre-Trial Brief, 53 marked the following exhibits for Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0274-0275: EDCcaS

 

K-1	Certified copy of Apollo Medical Equipments (sic) and Supplies Official Receipt No. 12688 dated 01/31/2000
K-2	Certified copy of Disbursement Voucher No. 0276101 dated 1/30/01 payable to Apollo Medical Equipment Supplies with an amount of Php8,508,909.09
K-2-a	Photocopy of Dorsal portion of Disbursement Voucher No. 0276101
K-3	Certified copy of DV Attachment Checklist with Apollo Medical Equipment Supplies as payee
K-4	Certified copy of the COA Inspection Report dated January 17, 2001
K-5	Certified copy of Notice of Delivery dated January 10, 2001
K-7	Certified copy of Request for Obligation and Allotment with Apollo Medical Equipment Supplies/Ospital ng Makati as payee with an approved amount of Php8,830,000.00
K-8	Certified copy of Report of Inspection
K-9	Certified copy of Purchase Order No. 11482 dated December 29, 2000 by City of Makati issued to Apollo Medical Equipment Supplies
K-11	Certified copy of Price Canvass Request dated December 27, 2000 by Nicanor V. Santiago Jr., City Administrator, City of Makati to Apollo Medical Equipment Supplies
K-12	Certified copy of Purchase Request No. 98-13953 dated December 15, 2000
K-14	Certified copy of Abstract of Canvass and Award of Purchase/Contract dated December 128, (sic) 2000
K-15	Certified copy of Certificate of Purchase and Delivery of Supplies dated December 29, 2000
K-16	Certified copy of Certificate of Purchase and Delivery of Supplies dated January 09, 2001
K-17	Certified copy of Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies Sales Invoice No. 337 dated January 9, 2001
K-18	Certified copy of Inspector's Report dated December 29, 2000
K-19	Certified copy of Justification for the preference to use SICOA Autoclave and Sterilizing System
K-20	Certified copy of Duplicate Copy of Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property dated December 29, 2000 received and signed by Mabel Asunio, Head, Dept. of OB-Gyne 54

 

Furthermore, as petitioner correctly argued, the consolidation of cases would result in a confusion of evidence. Individuals not charged in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0272-0273 would be confronted with pieces of evidence and allegations unrelated to their cases. The same goes for individuals who were charged only under Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0274-0275. 55

While it is true that a separate trial would entail additional costs and time in the presentation of witnesses and documents, 56 allaying these extra burdens cannot take precedence over petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial. As ruled in Dacanay v. People: 57

[T]he resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the Government cannot be given preference over the right to speedy trial and the protection to a person's life, liberty or property accorded by the Constitution[.]

A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the 1987 Constitution, more specifically under Section 14 (2) of Article III thereof. As defined in the case of Flores v. People[,] a speedy trial is one "conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays." The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. Likewise, it is intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions[.] 58 (Citations omitted)

II

Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule on judges' inhibition and disqualification:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Inhibition can be compulsory or voluntary. 59 Under the first paragraph, judges are conclusively presumed to be unable to impartially rule on a case. Thus, they are compulsorily disqualified from hearing the case. 60

On the other hand, the second paragraph relates to voluntary inhibition, where the decision to desist from a case is left to the judge's discretion. 61 As discussed in Chin v. Court of Appeals: 62

The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.

As we have held in Pimentel v. Salanga, a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But, when a suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, the judge should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he should reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. A judge could gracefully inhibit himself where the case could be better heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.

The decision on whether he should inhibit himself, however, must be based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, does not give the judge the unfettered discretion to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough grounds for a judge to inhibit, especially when it is without any basis. 63 (Citations omitted)

Here, petitioner's imputation of bias and partiality was primarily based on Justice Cabotaje-Tang's demeanor during the October 13, 2016 hearing. Petitioner alleged that Justice Cabotaje-Tang's statements showed that she was personally offended by the filing of the Omnibus Motion, 64 thus: DHESca

PJ Cabotaje-Tang:

The Court will ask you counsel, is this effectively a motion for inhibition?

Atty. Reyes:

No, Your Honor. Just for re-raffling, Your Honor.

PJ Cabotaje-Tang:

Because if you are asking the Court to have this case re-raffle (sic), that is practically taking away the cases from the Court and have it re-raffled to other divisions. Practically, that will have the effect of an inhibition.

Atty. Reyes:

Your Honor, our motion is anchored on bundled re-raffling of the cases, Your Honor. It just so happened that when the four (4) cases were bundled and raffled, it was assigned to this Court, Your Honor. Our argument, Your Honors, is not [g]rounded on our prayer for the inhibition of this Court, Your Honors, just for the re-raffling. Considering . . . (interrupted)

PJ Cabotaje-Tang:

So, what legal basis can you invoke for the Court to order a re-raffle of these cases?

Atty. Reyes:

Your Honor, our submission is that, given; Your Honor, the political color by which these cases has (sic) been instituted, Your Honors. We just want to . . . . (interrupted)

PJ Cabotaje-Tang:

So, you are telling the Court that it will likewise be swayed by political considerations?

Atty. Reyes:

No[,] Your Honor. Our question, Your Honor, with respect to the institution of the cases (sic), Your Honor, not with the manner by which these cases have been tried by this Court, Your Honor. Our prayers, Your Honors, is that the cases be raffled and that 0272, 0273 be tried separately from cases 0274 and 0275, Your Honor, in order to protect the rights of the accused.

PJ Cabotaje-Tang:

Why? Are you telling the Court that if these cases remained to (sic) this Court, the right of your client will (sic) not be the amply protected or it will be prejudiced?

Atty. Reyes:

Your Honor, the right of the accused is not only to the conduct of an impartial trial but the trial which appears impartial. . . . (interrupted)

PJ Cabotaje-Tang:

Precisely.

Atty. Reyes:

Yes, Your Honors.

PJ Cabotaje-Tang:

If you are now saying that there should be appearance of impartiality, you are somehow casting aspersion on (sic) the impartiality of this Court.

Atty. Reyes:

That is not our intention, Your Honor, with due respect, Your Honor, what we are questioning, Your Honors, is the manner by which the cases have been raffled. Only that, Your Honor.

PJ Cabotaje-Tang:

Why? What was wrong during the raffle of the cases?

Atty. Reyes:

Our submission, Your Honor, is that the cases should have been separately raffled, and then, upon proof submitted by the prosecution that the cases should be consolidated and if possibly jointly tried, it is only then that the cases should be consolidated. It created the impression, Your Honor, considering that the cases were bundled and raffled together notwithstanding the fact that 0272 and 0273, 0274 and 0275 involved two (2) different cases, Your Honors, separate purchase orders, canvass, reports, investigation reports, Your Honor, it created the impression that there was prejudgment of these cases create (sic) a pattern, Your Honor. 65

This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that the statements do not show bias and partiality. They are mere clarificatory questions. In Gochan v. Gochan: 66

In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably — both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected.

Equally important is the established doctrine that bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion — even if later found to be erroneous — will not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may be inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. At bottom, to disqualify a judge, the movant must prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence. 67 (Citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The January 13, 2017 and March 22, 2017 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are MODIFIED. The Sandiganbayan is directed to issue an order for the re-raffle of the criminal cases. Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0272-0273 shall proceed independently of Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0274-0275. These cases shall be resolved with dispatch by the Divisions to which the cases would be raffled.

SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., on wellness leave.)

By authority of the Court:

MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-54.

2.Id. at 55-73 and 74-94. The January 13, 2017 and March 22, 2017 Resolutions were penned by Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and concurred in by Associate Justices Sarah Jane T. Fernandez and Zaldy V. Trespeses of the Special Third Division, Sandiganbayan, Quezon City.

3.Id. at 9-13.

4.Id. at 9, 135, 140.

5.Id. at 137 and 142.

6.Id. at 9-10.

7.Id. at 10 and 13.

8.Id. at 12-13.

9.Id. at 135-144.

10.Id. at 11.

11.Id. at 12.

12.Id. at 13.

13.Id.

14.Id. at 14.

15.Id.

16.Id. at 353.

17.Id. at 95-106.

18.Id. at 15-16.

19.Id. at 115-127, Motion for Inhibition.

20.Id. at 18.

21.Id. at 119.

22.Id. at 73.

23.Id. at 61.

24.Id. at 63.

25.Id. at 65.

26.Id. at 72-73.

27.Id. at 469-497.

28.Id. at 74-94.

29.Id. at 3-54.

30.Id. at 21-37.

31.Id. at 37.

32.Id. at 39.

33.Id. at 42.

34.Id. at 44-45.

35.Id. at 45.

36.Id. at 548-560.

37.Id. at 550-552.

38.Id. at 554-555.

39.Id. at 568-576.

40.Id. at 569.

41.Id. at 570.

42.Office of the Ombudsman v. Chipoco, G.R. Nos. 231345 & 232406, August 19, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65550> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

43.Palanca v. Querubin, 141 Phil. 432, 439 (1969) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].

44.Caños v. E. L. Peralta, 201 Phil. 422 (1982) [Per J. Escolin, Second Division]. Seealso People v. Sandiganbayan, 456 Phil. 707 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

45.People v. Sandiganbayan, 456 Phil. 707 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

46. 716 Phil. 186 (2013) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

47.Id. at 199-200.

48.Id. at 200.

49.Rollo, p. 10.

50.Id. at 26-33 and 416-420.

51.Id. at 12.

52.Id. at 25.

53.Id. at 363-385.

54.Id. at 34-36.

55.Id. at 23-24.

56.Id. at 66.

57. 310 Phil. 534 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].

58.Id. at 538-539.

59.People v. Kho, 409 Phil. 326, 334 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

60.Id. at 335.

61.Id.

62. 456 Phil. 440 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

63.Id. at 450-451.

64.Rollo, pp. 42-43.

65.Id. at 70-72.

66. 446 Phil. 433 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

67.Id. at 448.